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Preface to the Seventh Edition
Lord Ronald said nothing; he flung himself from the room, flung himself
upon his horse and rode madly off in all directions.
– Stephen Leacock
In 1912, the Canadian humorist and economist Stephen Leacock introduced the
world to the town of Mariposa—a fictional small town (with remarkable similarities to
Orillia) in Southern Ontario—in his book Sunshine Sketches of a Little Town. Through
a series of short stories, or word sketches, about particular incidents and occasions in
the town, Leacock led the reader to an understanding of the town and its people. In
this textbook, and in the course that accompanies it, we have used the same strategy;
through a series of short sketches of specific incidents or areas within psychology, we
lead you to an understanding of the subject matter and methods of experimental psy-
chology. Like Lord Ronald, however, these are sketches that ride off in all directions.
Each of the chapters in this book is a short sketch of a particular topic in psychology.
They can be read in any order as each chapter is meant to be a self-contained story. By
the end of the book, we hope you will have learned what experimental psychology is
about, what experimental psychologists do, and more specifically, what experimental
psychologists do in the Department of Psychology and Neuroscience at the University
of Lethbridge.
With both major additions and losses of faculty within the department, this edition
of Psychological Sketches is a substantial revision of previous editions. This seventh
edition of the book reflects these changes with the necessary, but ultimately sad re-
moval of chapters previously contributed by now retired faculty, updates to some chap-
ters from continuing faculty, and the addition of bright, exciting chapters from new
members of the department. It also includes expanded subject and author indices to
make it easier for the reader to locate specific topics and authors. We hope you enjoy
it.
John R. Vokey and Scott W. Allen
July 6, 2005
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Chapter 1
Facilitated Communication:
Does It Enable Communication
or Appropriate It?
Scott W. Allen
1.1 What is Facilitated Communication?
Neil is 25 years old. He does not speak. Occasionally he screams
for no apparent reason, makes moaning sounds, rocks back and forth, hits
objects such as a desk, and bites the fat of his hand above the thumb. He
spent the majority of his public school years in a special school for students
with severe retardation. He is labelled autistic.
With an adult supporting his hand at the wrist, he types with his in-
dex finger, revealing unexpected literacy. The method is called facilitated
communication. One of Neil’s facilitators recently asked him to complete
the sentence, “When people see me they think I probably . . . ” Neil typed
“AM MEAN.” When asked why people might think he is mean, Neil typed,
“HOW I LOOK.” Then Neil was asked to complete the sentence, “The
thing I’d like others to know about my handicap is . . . ” Neil typed, “I
CANNOT HIDE IT.”
Neil’s communication is not voluminous. He types mostly single-word
and two- or three-word responses to questions. Yet his few words demon-
strate attention to abstract concepts, awareness of others, and understand-
able feelings. (Biklen, 1992, p. 15)
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B iklen was describing a man suffering from autism, a disorder that in itsextreme forms is marked by profound communication difficulties. Thosesuffering from severe autism often do not speak (or, presumably communi-cate) at all, or if they do, they show echolalic speech, parroting back what
they have just heard or constantly repeating inappropriate phrases such as commercial
jingles or bits of songs. Severe autism is often diagnosed in conjunction with severe
mental retardation. Thus, cases of people like Neil who appear to be capable of modes
of thought far in excess of what they have previously shown are indeed intriguing and
encouraging.
The magic key that appears to have unlocked the door to communication for Neil
and others like him is a relatively new technique called facilitated communication. De-
veloped by Rosemary Crossley in Australia in the 1980’s (see Crossley, 1992; Crossley
& Remington-Gurney, 1992) and popularized in North America by Douglas Biklen
(see Biklen, 1990, 1992; Biklen et al., 1991; Biklen, Morton, Gold, Berrigan, &
Swaminathan, 1992), this technique involves the use of a facilitator: an individual
who supports the hand or arm of the autistic person in order to help that person point
to letters or pictures or to type on a keyboard. The facilitator is not meant to guide
the person’s hand toward a particular response but to provide physical and emotional
support to the autistic person. The physical support is meant to counteract such prob-
lems as poor eye/hand coordination, abnormally high or low muscle tone, difficulty in
pointing with a single finger, and an inability to draw the hand back once a selection
has been made (Biklen et al., 1991). Biklen and his colleagues summarize the method
as follows:
The method includes the following strategies: speaking to the student in
the manner one would address a non-disabled student of the same age; ex-
plaining to the student that the hand-over-hand or wrist or arm support has
proven effective for other students who have difficulty speaking or saying
what they want to say; initially helping the student to not make mistakes,
by pulling the student’s hand back from a clearly wrong selection, for ex-
ample if a student is pointing to a same letter for the third time; reminding
the student to focus on the keyboard or other target; using structured ques-
tions, fill-in-the-blanks, simple match problems and similar ‘set work’ ini-
tially until a student achieves some success with typing; not ‘testing’ the
student’s competence; and giving students the opportunity to choose types
of work they will do, including an opportunity for free expression (e.g.,
‘Is there anything else you would like to say?’) (Biklen et al., 1991, pp.
163-164).
The procedure also involves (ideally) fading the physical support provided by the fa-
cilitator over time so that eventually the client can type independently.
Biklen (1990) argues that the problem faced by autistic people is not that they can-
not understand language but that they have a problem with generating language. They
have some unspecified neurological problem that makes it difficult or impossible to put
words together into meaningful units or even to put sounds together into meaningful
words. There are accompanying motor difficulties that also make it difficult for these
people to independently communicate by pointing to letters or pictures. Therefore their
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understanding of the world around them lies hidden away because of their inability to
communicate it. Their inability to generate language is seen by people around them as
an inability to understand. Helping these autistic people to control their motor impair-
ments enough to point to pictures or letters in a communicative way, or even to type on
a keyboard allows them to finally communicate their thoughts to the outside world.
You are probably thinking by now that this sounds a bit too much like a miracle
cure and, if so, you are not alone. There has been a lot of controversy over facilitated
communication both in the popular press in Australia and North America and in the
academic journals. In the remainder of this chapter I will summarize some of the
arguments that have been made in support of facilitated communication followed by
arguments that have been made against it.
1.2 The Case For Facilitated Communication
There are several important questions that must be answered in order to make a con-
vincing case for the effectiveness of facilitated communication. These include:
1.2.1 Where did the autistic clients obtain their newly discovered
skills?
If the autistic clients don’t talk, how can they suddenly start using sophisticated words
and sentence structures when they are typing? Where did they learn spelling and gram-
mar? Biklen and his colleagues (Biklen et al., 1991) argue that these people pick up
their knowledge of grammar and spelling the same way all children pick up much of
their knowledge of spoken language, through being exposed to it. Children learn most
of their language skills before they start formal schooling and without much effort to-
ward teaching from the people around them. The students that Biklen studied reported
(through facilitated communication) that they had learned reading and math skills from
television, from being read to, and from seeing flash cards. Thus they had been exposed
to spelling, grammar, mathematics and had incidentally learned a fair amount about it
without demonstrating any knowledge at the time.
1.2.2 Who is the communication coming from: the client or the
facilitator?
By now you have probably already considered this question. Is the information that is
coming out through the facilitated communication process—a process that involves two
people—really coming from the client? Are the communications the thoughts of the
client or is the facilitator, knowingly or unknowingly, affecting the communications?
Is this really a case of the client acting as a human Ouija board for the thoughts of the
facilitator? This is really the main sticking point, theoretically, legally, and morally.
Theoretically, this question is at the crux of the validity of the procedure, if the com-
munication is not coming from the client the procedure is worthless and those who are
using it are just fooling themselves. Legally, it is important to know whose thoughts are
being communicated. For example, imagine that an autistic woman and her facilitator
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witness an accident together. Both give evidence in court, the facilitator by herself and
the autistic woman through facilitated communication with the help of her facilitator.
Do you now have two independent witnesses giving testimony or is there really just
one—the facilitator? Morally, the question is similar. Imagine that, in an effort to give
the facilitated autistic person as much self-determination as possible, you directly ask
the person the question “Do you want to live with your parents or in a group home?” If
it is really the client who is answering the question then that person has just made a life
altering decision for him or herself. It may not have been the best decision but, like the
rest of us, it is that person’s decision to make. If, on the other hand, it is the facilitator
who is answering the question the facilitator has (knowingly or unknowingly) taken the
right of self-determination away from the individual1. This is likely to be a conflict of
interest situation when the questions are related to treatment or communication.
The best evidence that communications are coming from the client comes when
clients have reached the point where they no longer need the assistance of the facil-
itator. Biklen (1990) reports one case where a student answered a simple question
correctly with one keystroke without the facilitator present. However, the quality of
this response was very different from the full sentences this child was typing when the
facilitator was present. Biklen also mentions a dozen students who were seen to be
typing phrases independently, but it is not clear what independent means in this case.
It appears to mean “without hand support on the arm or hand”(Biklen, 1990, p. 311) so
it is not clear whether these students were communicating without a facilitator present,
in which case the communications could reasonably be assumed to be their own, or
with facilitators touching them elsewhere (e.g., holding their sleeve or touching their
shoulder) in which case there is still ample opportunity for subtle movement from the
facilitators to influence the students’ responses.
One of the principles of the facilitated communication approach, as mentioned ear-
lier, is that clients are not to be tested. The rationale for this principle is that the
stress associated with being evaluated will interfere with the supportive emotional at-
mosphere necessary for communication to occur. Not only must clients be supported
physically, they must also be supported emotionally. They must be made to feel at
ease and to feel that the facilitator, and any others present, believe they are capable of
high-level communication and value what they have to say. When the clients are being
evaluated these conditions aren’t met and facilitated communication may not occur.
This principle of avoiding testing makes it difficult for proponents of facilitated
communication to prove that communications are originating with the client and not
the facilitator2. Biklen et al. (1992) list six arguments that indirectly support the idea
that communications are coming from the clients rather than the facilitators. These are
listed in Table 1.1 . None of these arguments proves that the communication is coming
from the client but Biklen argues that together they provide at least some support for
1Of course you may not be able to avoid having a third party make important life decisions for an indi-
vidual. However, if you are going to do so, you should at least be aware of it and make efforts to ensure that
the person who is making the decisions is the person who is most able to operate in the best interests of the
individual. This person is not likely to be the facilitator.
2Of course, if you respect this principle, it also makes it impossible to prove that the communications are
not coming from the client. You may be familiar with this type of argument from a medium or a channeler:
“There is an unbeliever present. Your negative vibrations are interfering with the cosmic continuum. There
will be no visitations tonight. No, you don’t get your money back.”
1.2 The Case For Facilitated Communication 5
1. The style, speed, and accuracy of a student’s fine motor control movement
to the letters or keys is fairly constant across facilitators.
2. Individuals make typographical errors that are unique to them. Some indi-
viduals fairly consistently hit more than one key at a time when typing.
3. Many individuals produce phonetic or invented spellings that are unique to
them and do not appear in the work of others, despite the fact that several
individuals sometimes share a common facilitator.
4. Some individuals type phrases or sentences that are unusual and would not
be expected from the facilitators.
5. Individuals sometimes produce content that is not known to the facilitator.
6. Perhaps most impressive and satisfying, through facilitated communication
individuals reveal their personalities.
Table 1.1: Arguments that the communication is coming from the client rather than the
facilitator (from Biklen et al., 1992).
that notion. Points 1, 2, and 3 are similar in arguing that there are idiosyncrasies in the
students’ movements, errors, and unusual spellings that are unique to the individuals
and constant across facilitators. This would be expected if the students were the source
of the communication but if the facilitators were the source you would expect such
idiosyncrasies to be unique to the facilitators. Point 4 argues that communications that
you would not expect from the facilitators, such as ‘my facilitator is a stupid jerk and
I hate him’, are evidence that the communication is coming from the student. Point 5
makes a similar argument that information that is generated that the facilitator claims
not to know, such as what the student did on the weekend, is evidence that the student
is the source. Point 6 argues that, because the students are showing evidence of unique
personalities through their communications (personalities very different from what they
show without facilitated communication) the communications must be theirs. This final
argument, although satisfying to Biklen and his colleagues, is not very compelling. It
is not hard to imagine that even if the communication were coming from the facilitator
it would reveal a personality for the student.
Calculator and Singer (1992) have demonstrated the best evidence to date that com-
munications are originating with the clients. They tested five children who had been
using facilitated communication for at least three months. All were diagnosed as ei-
ther mentally retarded or autistic. These children were given two different forms of
the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-Revised (Dunn & Dunn, 1981) in two testing ses-
sions separated by two weeks. In one of the sessions the facilitator was not present.
In the other session the facilitator was present and facilitated the child’s responding.
However, the facilitator wore earplugs and headphones playing white noise so that he
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or she could not hear what was going on in the session. All five children scored be-
low the published norms for the test for their age when the facilitator was not present.
In other words, they were off the bottom of the percentile scale. However, when the
facilitator was present, three of the five children improved markedly. In fact, two of
the children scored extremely well, one at the 95th percentile and one above the 99th
percentile. Since the facilitator could not hear what was happening in the test situation,
Calculator and Singer argue that the three children who showed a marked improvement
in their performance in fact showed valid communication.
1.3 The Case Against Facilitated Communication
1.3.1 What was the pretreatment condition of the autistic clients?
When Biklen talks about students who communicate “independently” he gives little
detail on what their communication abilities were like before they began facilitated
communication or even whether these students were classified as autistic. There don’t
seem to be any documented cases where clients who were clearly classified as severely
autistic have had their communication support faded to the point where they can type
independently without a touch from a facilitator. This lack of documentation from pro-
ponents of facilitated communication (but see Calculator & Singer, 1992) is in marked
contrast with most of the experimental research that finds no support for facilitated
communication (e.g., Datlow Smith & Belcher, 1993; Eberlin, McConnachie, Ibel,
& Volpe, 1993; Hudson, Melita, & Arnold, 1993; S. Moore, Donovan, & Hudson,
1993; S. Moore, Donovan, Hudson, Dykstra, & Lawrence, 1993; Szempruch & Ja-
cobson, 1993; Wheeler, Jacobson, Paglieri, & Schwartz, 1993) where the pretreatment
condition of the participants is well documented. The pretreatment condition of the
participants is important because it isn’t very impressive that they can communicate by
typing if their language skills weren’t really that bad to begin with (I suspect that no
one is impressed that I typed this whole paper myself without help from anybody).
1.3.2 Who is the communication coming from?
This is really the main sticking point and there have been numerous experimental stud-
ies addressing this question. One of the most interesting is one conducted by Wheeler,
Jacobson, Paglieri and Schwartz (1993). This study took place at the O. D. Heck Devel-
opmental Centre in Schenectady, New York where two of the authors were on staff. The
staff at the Heck centre were using facilitated communication and seeing very satisfac-
tory results with it. Given the controversy surrounding the procedure, they decided to
do a controlled study to show how well facilitated communication worked. There were
12 participants ranging in age from 16 to 30 years. All were diagnosed as severely or
profoundly mentally retarded with strong autistic tendencies and all but one were non-
verbal, the remaining participant displayed limited vocalizations and gestures. These
12 participants and the 9 facilitators who worked with them were the most competent
producers of facilitated communication at the residential centre. All had been using
facilitated communication for between 5 months and 1 year.
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Figure 1.1: Experimental setup for Wheeler et al. (1993) study. Although the sub-
ject and the facilitator can type together, the subject can only see picture A and the
facilitator can only see picture B.
The design of the study was quite elegant. The participants sat at the long end
of a T-shaped barrier so that the client and the facilitator could each see down their
own side but not down the other’s side. See the illustration in Figure 1.1. At the
far end of the T sat the researcher who displayed pairs of pictures, one on each side
of the barrier. The participants’ task was to name the pictures by typing the name.
There were three conditions in this study: 1) The facilitated condition in which the
subject was shown a card but the facilitator was not and the subject answered through
facilitated communication, 2) The non-facilitated condition in which the subject was
shown a card but the facilitator was not (as in the previous condition) but the facilitator
was not allowed to touch the subject, although verbal prompts were allowed, and 3) the
distracter condition in which both the subject and the facilitator were shown pictures
and the subject answered through facilitated communication. This was a distracter
condition because half the time the pictures shown to the subject and the facilitator
were the same picture and half the time they were different pictures. The facilitator
knew this was the case but of course did not know on which trials the pictures were the
same. Each participant took part in 6 blocks of trials (2 of each of the three conditions).
There were 5 trials in each block for a total of 30 trials per subject. Thus, across all
6 subjects there were 180 trials on which the subjects could show clear evidence of
communication: all of the trials in the facilitated condition (12 subject X 10 trials each)
and the half of the trials in the distracter condition in which the subject and facilitator
saw different pictures (12 subjects X 5 trials each). Of these 180 trials the subjects
showed communication on 0 (zero)! Furthermore there were about as many subjects
who typed the picture the facilitator saw in the distracter condition when the pictures
were different (12/60) and the subject never saw the picture they typed as when the
cards were the same (14/60). Thus the subjects were not significantly more likely to
correctly identify a picture they had seen than they were a picture they hadn’t seen. The
only sensible interpretation for these findings is that the communications were coming
from the facilitators and not the subjects.
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It is important to keep in mind that Wheeler and his colleagues were trying to prove
facilitated communication and thus were very careful to run the experiment in such a
way as to have every chance of success. The participants were given only 5 trials at a
time so that they would not become distracted or fatigued. The subjects were paired
with the facilitators with whom they showed the best communication in everyday ac-
tivities. The test was explained to the participants as a way of demonstrating to others
that the communications were coming from the subject (something the facilitators and,
presumably, the subjects were eager to show) consequently there was no sign of dis-
tress among the subjects. Finally, the facilitators and the subjects were free to stop the
procedure at any time if they weren’t feeling in their best form. Despite all this, the
only sign of communication appeared to be coming from the facilitators and not the
subjects.
Wheeler and his colleagues are not the only authors to find such results. S. Moore,
Donovan, Hudson, Dykstra, and Lawrence (1993) asked facilitators to generate 10
short-answer questions that the client would be able to answer (e.g., What is the name
of your dog?). In one condition the facilitator asked the questions and the client an-
swered using facilitated communication. In a second condition the questions were
prerecorded and asked of both the client and the facilitator over earphones. In a third
and critical condition the client heard the question over the earphones and the facili-
tator heard only music. Five of eight clients answered the questions in the first two
conditions at better than chance levels (4/5 were 100% correct in the first condition
and 3/5 were 100% correct in the second condition). Of those 5, 0 (zero) answered the
questions at better than chance performance in the third condition.
One argument that has been raised against such findings is that autistic people have
some sort of word finding difficulties so that asking them to name pictures or to give
short answers are especially difficult tasks. Conversely, it may be that the tasks are so
simple that the clients feel insulted and refuse to answer. Moore, Donovan, and Hudson
(1993) responded to such criticisms by designing a study using a procedure suggested
by two of the facilitators in the S. Moore, Donovan, Hudson, Dykstra, and Lawrence
(1993) study. In the first phase of this study the facilitators left the room while the
researchers presented an object of some sort to the client (e.g., a flashlight). The clients
could touch the item and listen to a description of it. On returning to the room the
facilitators could interact with the clients in any way they chose in order to find out
what the client had seen. The second phase of the experiment was the same except
that instead of showing the client an object, the client’s primary caregiver talked to the
client about a particular topic (e.g., the client’s favourite television show). There were
a total of 18 objects presented to 5 clients, 0 (zero) were identified. There were a total
of 17 conversational topics presented to the 5 clients, 0 (zero) were identified. So there
is no evidence of facilitated communication even in this study where the facilitators
chose the task.
Let me quickly summarize some similar findings: Cummins and Prior (1992) report
two studies, one with questions and one with patterns. When the facilitator could not
hear the questions no client correctly answered a question through facilitated commu-
nication. When the facilitator and client were shown different patterns (unbeknownst to
either) the pattern the client saw was reported through facilitated communication 0/36
times, the pattern the facilitator saw was reported 33/36 times.
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Szempruch and Jacobson (1993) showed severely to profoundly mentally retarded
clients pictures in the absence of the facilitators and then asked the facilitators to find
out what was seen in their absence. In 127 trials with 23 clients there were 0 (zero)
correct answers. Hudson et al. (1993) reported a single client study. When the facili-
tator could not hear the questions being asked of the client (questions generated by the
facilitator) 0 (zero) of 26 questions were answered correctly.
The vast majority of the experimental studies show no evidence that any communi-
cation is coming from the clients and several studies present quite good evidence that
the communication is coming from the facilitator.
1.4 So is Facilitated Communication Real
or Not?
There you have it. You have seen a number of arguments that facilitated communica-
tion exists and is a very useful tool for helping autistic people communicate. On the
other hand, you have seen a number of arguments that facilitated communication does
nothing to help the clients communicate and that any communication produced by the
procedure comes solely from the facilitator. The question that remains is fairly simple:
Who has the better evidence?
To close, I’ll leave you with a moral argument to consider. Donnellan, Sabin and
Majure argue that in the absence of conclusive data one should go ahead and try facil-
itated communication based on the argument that one should make decisions in such
a way that if an assumption turns out to be incorrect it will have the least dangerous
effect on the client.
The danger of not offering the option of facilitation to an individual is far
greater than the danger of raising false hopes for families, as long as the in-
dividual with autism is not blamed for “failing” to communicate with this
methodology. Indeed, families have survived disappointments far more
costly in terms of their lives, fortunes, and the welfare of their children
than they will if facilitated communication turns out to be a relatively un-
generalizable phenomenon (Donnellan, Sabin, & Majure, 1992, pp.71-72).
On the other hand, Wheeler and his colleagues argue that one must exercise great
care in accepting communications when the source is unclear.
One of the most important issues to be addressed in connection with fa-
cilitated communication deals with whether one recognizes as valid, and
therefore acts upon, communications involving (a) accusations of abuse
or mistreatment; (b) statements of self-determination and personal prefer-
ence regarding living conditions, daily activities, and social relationships;
and (c) self reports of health and medical relevance. There is potential for
great harm here, both in accepting as valid communications that are not
valid or, conversely, ignoring authentic expressions made by individuals
who are dependent on others for their care. Current practice in the field of
developmental disabilities emphasizes the primacy of individual choice.
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Accepting a communication subject to facilitator influence as representing
client preferences undermines person-centered planning (Wheeler et al.,
1993, p. 59).
Chapter 2
Categorizing Objects: The
Usefulness of False Friends
Scott W. Allen
2.1 What is Categorization?
W hen a dog comes walking toward you on a street in broad daylight,you easily, and almost effortlessly, categorize it. That is, you decidethat particular animal is a member of the category “dog” even thoughyou have no previous experience with that specific dog. This is such
a natural and fluent response that it is easy to overlook that you are even making a
decision. It is only under conditions of missing or ambiguous information that you are
likely to become aware that you are making a decision: Is that animal 20 feet away on
a rainy night a poor forlorn kitty or a skunk? The behavioural consequences of such a
decision are obvious.
2.1.1 Why do I care?
My main interest and the topic of this chapter is the process by which we make these
decisions. There are at least two reasons why one might be interested in such a topic.
The first, and by far the most important in my view, is that such questions are intrinsi-
cally fascinating. If you are a completely pragmatic type and cannot see the sense in
investigating our mental processes simply because they are neat, then you might care
about how people categorize things because there are formal categorization tasks that
certain groups of people must learn. In your high school math and physics classes you
will have learned to recognize categories of word problems in order to apply the appro-
priate formulae to solve them. In your research methods and statistics courses you will
learn to recognize different sorts of experimental designs in order to apply the appro-
priate statistical analyses. Medical students must learn to diagnose disease categories
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in order to apply the proper treatment. The more we know about the process by which
people make such categorization decisions, the more effectively we should be able to
teach these tasks.
Incidentally, this chapter is a specific example of a general theme in cognitive psy-
chology: the search for mental processes. Cognitive psychologists are interested in the
processes underlying such cognitive tasks as memory, reading, problem solving, and
attitude formation. The question that is common to all these areas is “How do we go
about performing these tasks, what is the process?”
2.1.2 How could one, in principle, learn about mental processes?
One obvious concern with trying to study mental processes is that you can’t see them
(of course that hasn’t stopped physicists from studying black holes and quarks, or
chemists from studying molecular structure). Because there is no way to directly ac-
cess the processes in which you are interested, you must concentrate on the results of
such processes. Some sets of results are consistent with some posited processes and
others are not. Thus, mental processes can be studied by setting up experiments that
are designed to allow you to choose between alternative possible explanations. For
example, if you can devise an experiment that will give you one result if process A is
at work and a different result if process B is at work then you can determine which
process must have been operating simply by examining the results you obtained. The
trick, and it is no mean feat, is to design such experiments. We will come back to this
after looking at some theories of how we go about classifying things.
2.2 General Theories of Categorization
E. E. Smith and Medin (1981) introduced a categorization of categorization theories
that has become standard. Or to put it another way, Smith and Medin introduced a
classification of theoretical approaches to concept learning that has become standard.
2.2.1 The classical view
Early research in concept formation took the form of requiring subjects to induce rules
from presentations of items with feedback (e.g., Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1956).
The subject would be presented with a series of examples, usually consisting of a set of
four discrete dimensions (e.g. shape of items, number of items, colour of items, number
of borders) each with two or three discrete values (e.g. circle, triangle, or square; 1, 2,
or 3; green, red, or black). The subject’s task was to try to classify each of the items
as it was presented. With practice, and feedback on every trial, the subject was meant
to induce the underlying classification rule. This procedure was seen as a reasonable
model of how people learned to classify objects. The specific point of argument in
classical theorist’s work was that people were accomplishing the classification task by
a process of hypothesis testing rather than the process of accumulating differential habit
strength to stimulus elements, as advocated by the behaviourists of the time (but that
is another chapter). But the underlying assumption common to both views was that
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learning a concept was mainly a process of learning what elements of the stimuli were
essential for correct categorization.
Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin’s ambitiously titled book A Study of Thinking con-
tended that both adults and children learned to apply categorization rules to specific
examples and that through the presentation of many examples with feedback one could
induce the underlying rules. Thus their research dealt with how people could learn
different types of rules, what strategies were used, how difficult different logical forms
of rules were and so on. The rules were defined by a set of criterial features that were
necessary and sufficient1 for classification, for example, an item was in the category
if it was black and had triangles, or an item was in the category if it had two items or
1 border but not both. This type of representation would allow for elegant, efficient
representation of concepts. This view of concept learning and representation has been
called a classical view because the emphasis on discovering the necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for membership in a concept has historically been a dominant concern
in both philosophy and psychology (E. E. Smith & Medin, 1981).
There were a number of problems with the classical view (see E. E. Smith & Medin,
1981 for a detailed discussion). One of the most notable was the consistent failure to
find necessary and sufficient features for many natural categories (try, for example,
to think of a set of features, that you can see from the outside, that will tell you that
an animal is a dog). If the process of classification is based on these features, they
should be available, however that appears not to be the case. Further problems for
the classical view come from the existence of a graded typicality structure (e.g. a
robin is considered a more typical bird than an ostrich) and unclear cases (e.g. Is a
rug furniture? Is a piano?, Medin & Smith, 1984). According to a classical view all
members are equally good members providing they possess the singly necessary and
jointly sufficient features for membership. This feature of classically defined categories
also excludes unclear cases—if the necessary and sufficient features are present the
item in question is a member of the category, if they are not present it is not a member.
2.2.2 The probabilistic view
In response to the problems of the classical view with natural categories, Rosch and her
colleagues (e.g., Rosch, 1978; Rosch & Mervis, 1975) developed a probabilistic view
of natural categories. Instead of requiring adequate knowledge of a concept to be a set
of necessary and sufficient defining features, people were believed to normally learn
a large set of features that were characteristic of, but not necessary for the concept
(e.g., singing and flying are characteristic of birds but neither are necessary for an
animal to be a bird). The basis for categorization was argued to be the accumulation
of a sufficient number of these characteristic features to distinguish the target concept
from other plausible concepts. This form of knowledge would account for the fact that
people normally acted as if some concept members were better than others, behaviour
that was difficult to account for if category membership were determined by singly
necessary and jointly sufficient features.
1As an example of necessary and sufficient conditions, in order to be a bachelor, it is necessary that one
be male. It is also necessary that one not be married. Being male and unmarried are together sufficient to
make one a bachelor.
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A popular form of model based on Rosch’s work was that, through exposure to
many items, some form of average or prototype was abstracted that consisted of all of
the characteristic features. New items were assigned to a category on the basis of their
relative similarity to the prototype of various categories. As with the classical view,
subjects in learning experiments conducted under this view were never given classifi-
cation rules when studying category learning, in this case because of the assumption
that prototype-based category learning was automatic and natural. The probabilistic
framework led to investigation of topics such as the difference in classification perfor-
mance on typical versus atypical category members (e.g., robins vs penguins), what
level of category was easiest to learn (e.g., mammals vs deer vs mule deer), and what
level was learned first by children (e.g., animal vs bird vs robin).
For the purposes of the distinctions I want to talk about in this chapter, the impor-
tant notion in this view is that of implicit abstraction of the prototype and, as in the
classical view, a loss of specific episodic information with continued learning. That
is, as people become more familiar with a category, they rely more on the abstracted
prototype and less on their memory for specific examples. For example, Homa, Ster-
ling, and L. (1981) took this position when they suggested that specific examples are
used for generalization only early in a training sequence, before the learner has had an
opportunity to abstract a prototype. In their work, the structure being learned was ill-
defined, rather than the explicitly defined rules thought to be learned according to the
classical view, but the assumption is that the influence of particular prior cases quickly
falls out while the abstract information carries the weight of the decisions.
2.2.3 The exemplar view
More recently, as a response to the abstractive emphasis of the classical and proba-
bilistic views, some investigators have emphasized the specific exemplars of categories
(e.g., Brooks, 1987; Medin & Ross, 1989). Although there are, as in the probabilistic
view, a number of specific models, the common logic is that rather than abstracting the
essence of a category at the time of experience with the category exemplars, either by
inducing a rule or by abstracting a prototype, one may simply make use of memory for
specific prior examples to make a categorization decision for a new item. A new item
is categorized on the basis of its similarity to individual prior cases rather than on its
similarity to an abstracted prototype: This critter is a dog because it looks just like Rin
Tin Tin (or Lassie, or Benjie) and Rin Tin Tin is a dog—not because it matches some
prototypical or ideal dog.
According to an exemplar view there is no need for abstraction, either of a proto-
type or of defining rules. Most of the data that favoured a prototype explanation over
a rule explanation could also be explained by a nonanalytic use of prior exemplars for
classification. The presumed benefit of having information in this form is that such
knowledge would provide a more flexible response to complicated, interacting condi-
tions in the world. Once again, the research in this framework did not tend to give
subjects rules for classification when examining their behaviour.
To summarize, a classical view of categorization suggests that through experience
with items you infer a rule based on individual characteristics that are necessary for
any item to belong to a category. For example, birds must have feathers and beaks and
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FURIG NOBAL
FEKIG NEKAL
FUTEG NOTEL
PURYG POBYL
FYRIP NYBAP
KURIT KOBAT
Table 2.1: Training display from Whittlesea (1987, expt. 6). Note that each of the five
items under each prototype is exactly two letters away from the prototype.
so on. A prototype view of categorization suggests that through experience with items
you devise a prototype: a sort of average or ideal member of the category. You classify
new birds on the basis of their similarity to that bird prototype. Finally, an exemplar
view suggests that you don’t derive any sort of rule or average through experience with
items. All you do is store away all the items you’ve seen in memory. You classify new
items on the basis of their similarity to specific items you’ve seen before.
2.3 Distinguishing Between Different Theories
As I just mentioned, an exemplar theory of categorization can generally explain all the
same results that a prototype theory can explain but for different reasons. For example,
take the finding that a typical category member (e.g., robin or sparrow) is generally
classified faster and more accurately than an atypical category member (e.g., penguin
or ostrich). According to a prototype theory, this makes sense because robins and
sparrows have lots of characteristic features of birds—they are small, you find them in
trees, they sing, they fly—while penguins and ostriches have few of these characteristic
features. Therefore, when you go to match these items against your bird prototype
(the average bird you have abstracted from all your experience with birds) robins and
sparrows match better and are thus classified faster and with fewer errors.
According to an exemplar theory you make your classification of new items based
on their similarity to specific items you have seen before. Unless you live in a zoo, most
of the birds you have seen before will be fairly typical birds. Thus you will have stored
away lots of examples of robins and sparrows and relatively few examples of penguins
and ostriches. Having lots of stored examples of typical birds means that when you en-
counter a new typical bird there will be lots of similar examples leading to fast accurate
classification of the new item. When you encounter a new atypical bird there will be
fewer similar examples leading to slower and more error-prone classification.
This brings us back to the problem, mentioned earlier, of discerning what processes
must be operating. Remember that we are interested in the process, so that, even if
two different proposed processes like classification by prototypes and classification by
reference to specific prior examples often predict the same consequences, we still want
to be able to discriminate between them. This requires that one design an experiment
where the two processes will predict different outcomes. An experiment by Whittlesea
(1987) is an excellent example of such a design.
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Whittlesea was interested in discriminating between classification based on proto-
types and classification based on similarity to prior examples. In order to test which
process the participants in his study were using, he set up experimental conditions
where the distance of new items from the prototypes varied independently of their dis-
tance from prior examples.
In a training phase Whittlesea gave subjects two lists of pseudowords as shown in
2.1. He told the subjects that there were two categories as defined by the prototypes at
the top of each list and that the other members of the lists all were the same as the pro-
totypes except for two letters. In a later test phase he tested how well the subjects could
perceive three types of items: The old items seen in training, a set of new items that
were two letters different from the prototypes and two letters different from the training
items, and a set of new items that were three letters different from the prototypes but
only one letter different from the training items (see 2.2).
Whittlesea’s design generates different predictions from the two theories of catego-
rization. A prototype theory predicts that subjects will perform better on the new items
that are two letters away from the prototype than on items that are three letters away
from the prototype because they are closer to the prototype. However, an exemplar
theory predicts that subjects will perform better on the new items that are three let-
ters away from the prototype because they are only one letter away from the old items
whereas the new items that are only two letters away from the prototype are also two
letters away from the training items.
Whittlesea found that subjects performance in the test phase was best on the train-
ing items (76% correct), next best on the items that were only one letter away from
the training items even though they were three letters away from the prototype (72%
correct) and worst on the items that were two letters away from the training items, even
though they were only two letters away from the prototype (70% correct). These differ-
ences, while they were not large, were statistically significant and showed that, at least
under the circumstances of this experiment, people were classifying new items based
on their similarity to prior examples not on their similarity to a prototype.
2.4 Combinations When We Are Learning: The Role
of Practice Items
Virtually all of the research carried out on categorization until very recently has con-
centrated on requiring subjects to classify items without any explicit knowledge of the
category structure. That is, in situations where there is a rule that defines the cate-
gories, the subjects in the experiments are not told the rule. This is because according
to a classical theory of categorization once the subject has been told the rule, the action
is all finished. Because the subject is thought to be inducing the rule from his or her
experience with the individual items, once the general rule has been discovered, there
is no more induction to be done and the subject will always give the correct answer.
The same conclusion does not follow from an episodic view of categorization. By this
view, even when the subjects know a rule, there will be a strong influence of the spe-
cific items that have been seen. My main interest in categorization is what happens in
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2 away from prototype 2 away from prototype 3 away from prototype
0 away from training 2 away from training 1 away from training
(training items)
FEKIG FUKIP PEKIG
FUTEG PUTIG FYTEG
PURYG FURYT PURYT
FYRIP FYREG FYKIP
KURIT KERIG KURET
NEKAL NOKAP PEKAL
NOTEL POTAL NYTEL
POBYL NOBYT POBYT
NYBAP NYBEL NYKAP
KOBAT KEBAL KOBET
Table 2.2: Test items used by Whittlesea (1987, expt. 6). The prototype for the top set
is FURIG and for the bottom set is NOBAL.
this situation where there are two forms of information that people can use: the rule in-
formation and information about specific items. What happens when people are given
an explicit rule for classifying items and then given practice with specific items?
One can imagine two extreme answers to this question. The first is that with prac-
tice the information about specific items quickly drops out and the person becomes
faster and more accurate at applying the abstract rule. If this were the case, then apart
from an initial training period, there should be no effect of specific prior examples on
classification performance. The opposite extreme answer is that after practice with a
sufficient number of examples, a library of instances is built up in memory which is
used in classifying novel examples on the basis of analogy to these known items. If
this were the case, then once a sufficient storehouse of instances is built up, the spe-
cific prior episodes will be doing all the work and the original rule would have no part
in classification performance. The use of specific episodes would be mimicking the
effects of rule use.
One of the few researchers investigating categorization (loosely speaking) where
subjects are provided with a rule followed by practice with examples has been Brian
Ross (e.g., Ross, 1984; Ross & Kennedy, 1990). Teaching his subjects to solve proba-
bility word problems, Ross (1984) investigated their use of memory for prior examples
when applying the rules they were learning to novel problems. He found that subjects’
use of “remindings” of prior examples (where a “reminding” is an explicit retrieval
of a prior problem) was affected by the similarity of the prior example to the current
problem and that remindings had a substantial effect on the successful solution of the
problems. Subjects performed better on a novel problem when it had a story line sim-
ilar to a problem in the training set that required a similar solution than when it had a
neutral story line. Furthermore, subjects were worse than in the neutral condition when
the test problem had a story line similar to a practice problem that required a different
solution. So, at least in the early stages of learning rules for classifying word prob-
lems, people successfully use their memory for similar prior examples to help them
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solve new problems.
Research that is more closely related to categorization is work pertaining to medi-
cal diagnosis. Medical diagnosis is, after all, simply a categorization of patients on the
basis of the disorders they exhibit. Allen, Norman, and Brooks (1992) investigated the
influence of the practice examples that were used when medical students were being
taught to diagnose dermatological disorders. The medical students were given rules for
six diagnostic categories. Examples of the rules are shown in 2.3. After studying the
rules, the students were given practice applying the rules with 24 training items (four
examples of each of the six different disorders). The training items were colour photo-
graphic slides of dermatological lesions chosen from the slide collection of a teaching
dermatologist. The students saw the training set five times with corrective feedback
each time. Following this training they were given a set of new slides to diagnose.
The nifty trick in this study is the relation of the test slides to the training slides. All
the students saw the same set of test slides, however there were two different training
sets. While each training set contained four examples of each of the six diagnostic
categories, the specific examples used were different in the two training sets. The items
in one training set were chosen to bias the diagnosis of certain critical items in the test
set in one direction while the items in the other training set were meant to bias the
diagnosis of the critical items in a different direction. 2.1 shows a critical (chameleon)
item and similar training items from the two different training sets. The critical item in
2.1 is actually a case of Lichen Planus. However, note that according to the diagnostic
rules in 2.3 you can make a reasonable argument for either Lichen Planus or Contact
Dermatitis for this item. That is why we called these critical items “chameleon” items,
they could be seen in more than one way. The interesting question is whether the med-
ical students’ propensity for diagnosing this item as a case of Lichen Planus varies
depending on what they saw in the training series. That is, do students who saw a train-
ing series containing cases of Lichen Planus similar to the chameleon item (training
set A) call the chameleon Lichen Planus more often than students who saw a training
series containing cases of Contact Dermatitis similar to the chameleon item (training
set B)? If they do, it means that they are using their memory for the specific items they
saw in training to help make their diagnostic decisions since the rule information was
identical for all students.
The Contact Dermatitis items that are similar to the chameleon are the false friends
that were alluded to in the title to this article. They are false friends because, although
they are similar to the chameleon item (which, remember, is a case of Lichen Planus)
they belong to a different category. Thus, if you rely on your memory for these items
to help you classify the chameleon item, you will be led astray. It is these false friends
that allowed us to tease apart the students’ reliance on rules from their reliance on prior
examples. Without these items and their unusual relationship to the chameleon items
we would be stuck with the more common and uninformative situation where similar
old items give you the same answer as the rule.
Table 2.4 shows the results of this experiment. There are two ways the critical items
could be biased by the training set: Toward the correct diagnosis (as in training set A
for the critical item shown in Figure 2.1) and toward a specific incorrect diagnosis (as
in training set B in Figure 2.1). Thus there are three ways in which a student could
diagnose the critical items: a) Correctly, b) incorrectly but consistent with the incorrect
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Figure 2.1: An illustration of the basic experimental manipulation used by Allen, Nor-
man, & Brooks(1992). In this illustration, the critical test item, seen by both groups,
is a case of lichen planus. For the subjects trained on set A the most similar looking
training item is also a case of lichen planus. For subjects trained on set B the most
similar looking training item is a case of contact dermatitis. Good quality colour slides
were used in the experiment.
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Rules
Contact Dermatitis – Well-defined areas of coalescing vesicles, may be red, with
surrounding erythema, irregularly shaped, showing pattern of contact. Prone to
secondary infection. Most common on areas where skin is exposed to contact with
an irritant.
Lichen Planus – Pink or purplish coloured, shiny, polygonal-shaped papules
which may coalesce to form plaques with a slight scale and areas of healthy skin
in between. They may also have milky-coloured streaks. The most likely areas are
the wrists and forearms.
Definitions
Erythema: Redness resulting from vasodilation.
Papule: Small circumscribed superficial solid elevation up to 1 cm in diameter.
Plaque: A disc-like lesion formed by the coalescence of papules or nodules.
Vesicle: Papule containing fluid, .1 to 1 cm in diameter.
Table 2.3: Two of the six rules used by Allen, Norman, & Brooks (1992) along with
definitions of terms that were supplied.
Bias in Diagnosis consistent with
Training Correct Incorrect Other
Bias Bias Incorrect
Correct 89 7 4
Incorrect 42 37 2
Table 2.4: Diagnostic accuracy (%) for medical students (from Allen, Norman, &
Brooks, 1992).
bias, and c) some other incorrect diagnosis. For the critical item shown in 2.1 the
corresponding diagnoses would be: a) Lichen Planus, b) Contact Dermatitis, and c)
one of the remaining four diagnoses. As shown in 2.4 when the training set biased the
students toward the correct answer they were correct 89% of the time and answered
with the incorrect bias only 7% of the time. However, when the training set biased
them toward a particular incorrect diagnosis they were correct only 42% of the time
and answered with the incorrect bias 37% of the time. Thus there was a substantial
difference in their performance that could only be due to the specific items on which
they received practice. A second experiment showed that this effect remained even
when there was a one week delay between the training set and the test set. Thus the
effect of similarity to training items appears to be relatively long lasting.
Although the previous study demonstrated a strong effect of previous examples
on medical students’ diagnoses, it did not suggest whether more expert diagnosticians
would show a similar sensitivity to prior cases. To answer this question the same
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authors (Brooks, Norman, & Allen, 1991) used a different procedure to look at the
performance of more expert diagnosticians. In the first phase of this study first year
family medicine residents and practising family physicians (averaging 15 years from
graduation) were shown a series of 30 photographic slides of dermatological lesions.
They were told the correct diagnosis for each slide and asked to rate how typical each
lesion was of the diagnostic category it represented. The main purpose of this phase
was to expose the physicians to correctly labelled examples of dermatological lesions.
In the subsequent test phase the physicians were asked to diagnose 60 more slides. For
our purposes there were two important types of items in the test phase. Both types of
items belonged to the same diagnostic categories that were shown in the first phase.
The difference was that some items, the same-diagnosis/similar items, were not only
in the same diagnostic category as one or more training items but were also visually
similar to one of the training items. The other type, the same-diagnosis/different items,
were in the same diagnostic category as one or more training items but were not vi-
sually similar to one of the training items. Thus, any difference in performance on
the same-diagnosis/similar and same-diagnosis/different items must be due to the ear-
lier presentation of the similar items and not due to a difference in application of the
formal rules known to these physicians.
For both the residents and the family physicians there was a strong effect of the sim-
ilar training items on their subsequent diagnoses. The residents diagnosed more of the
same-diagnosis/similar items correctly (65%) than they did the same-diagnosis/different
items (53%). The same held true for the practising family physicians (70% for same-
diagnosis/similar items and 52% for same-diagnosis/different items). The importance
of similar prior cases is clearly not confined to only those people who are first learning
a rule as was the case with the medical students in the Allen, Norman, and Brooks
(1992) study. It remains even with experienced physicians with an average of 15 years
of dealing with skin disorders. It is also worth noting that half the residents were tested
immediately following the first phase and half were tested following a two week delay.
There was no reduction in the difference between the similar and different items with
the delay suggesting, as in the one week delay condition in the previous experiment,
that the effects of similar prior cases are quite long-lasting.
2.5 Conclusion
It appears that specific examples used in practice do not fade quickly leaving the ab-
stract rule to run classification performance. Rather, the specific examples used in
training appear to have a life of their own, hanging around to influence the classifica-
tion of similar items up to two weeks later. Furthermore, individuals one would expect
to have exceedingly well learned rules and experience with thousands of cases of der-
matological lesion (the practising physicians) continue to show classification perfor-
mance that is strongly affected by similar prior cases. This suggests that even experts
use their memory for prior cases to help them classify new items. Thus, even in situa-
tions where there are well-learned, formal classification rules, a person’s classification
performance will not be based solely on those rules but will be influenced by specific
prior cases. That is, even in situations that should favour a process consistent with a
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classical theory of classification, the classification process is at least partly based on
memory for specific prior examples—a process consistent with an exemplar theory of
classification.
Chapter 3
Attachment Theory
Jean Choi
R ecall the last time that you encountered a particularly traumatic event inyour life. Who was the first person you wanted to call? Now think aboutyour relationship with that person. Do long separations evoke a need forcontact? According to attachment theory, you have established a bond
with that person, and the nature of your relationship with that person is influenced by
the first relationship in your life—that between you and your primary caregiver.
Attachment theory was first developed by John Bowlby (1969), and since its incep-
tion, its effects have been far-reaching throughout various areas in psychology. In
developmental psychology, it has influenced theories of parent-child relationships; in
social and personality psychology it has influenced theories of peer, family, and ro-
mantic relationships in adults; and in clinical psychology it has influenced theories of
the disruption of attachment. Attachment theory comprises two principal components:
a normative component and an individual difference component (Simpson & Rholes,
1998). The normative component addresses modal, species-specific patterns of be-
haviour, whereas the individual difference component addresses the variations from
these modal behavioural patterns (see Figure 3.1. The first empirical studies of at-
tachment theory addressed the patterns of attachment in young children, emphasizing
individual differences in the quality of attachment (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall,
1978).
3.1 Bowlby’s Attachment Theory
The development of John Bowlby’s attachment theory was influenced by his clinical
work with institutionalized boys. This work suggested that disruptions between a child
and his primary caregiver were associated with physical and social problems later in
development. In addition, Bowlby was influenced by the observation that across hu-
man cultures and in several primate species, infants displayed a consistent sequence
of reactions when separated from their caregivers. Immediately following separation,
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Figure 3.1: Research traditions of attachment theory (from Simpson & Rholes, 1998).
infants cried and screamed for their caregivers, characterizing the protest stage. These
protests were thought to be a good strategy to promote survival as they often brought
the caregivers back to the vulnerable infant. If persistent protests did not retrieve the
caregiver, infants would enter the second stage—despair—characterized by inactivity
and the cessation of protests. If protests failed to retrieve caregivers, the next best sur-
vival strategy may be to avoid excessive movement and loud protests, behaviours that
may draw predators, for long periods of time. Following despair, infants not reunited
with their caregivers would enter a third and final stage, detachment. During this phase,
infants resume normal activity and begin to act independently. Detachment may act to
clear the way for the formation of new affectional bonds with other potential caregivers
willing to provide resources that the infants would require to survive.
Attachment originates from innate behaviours that are important for the newborn
infant’s protection and survival, particularly during the time of human evolution; Bowlby
referred to this time period as “the environment of evolutionary adaptedness”. Be-
cause infants are born completely dependent upon their caregivers, they require a
set of mechanisms for maintaining proximity to those caregivers. An infant’s set
of behaviours—such as crying, sucking, clinging, orienting, and later, smiling and
babbling—communicates its needs to others, elicits caregiving, and facilitates the for-
mation of an attachment bond between the child and caregiver.
The attachment bond is a specific type of affectional bond . An affectional bond
is the attraction of one individual to another that is persistent and involves a specific
individual. The affectional bond may be characterized by four fundamental attributes:
specificity, endurance, emotionality and biological functionality. Specificity refers to
the target of the attachment behaviour; the attachment behaviour is directed to a spe-
cific individual within the proximate environment. The loss of that specific individual
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is distressing despite the presence of other close individuals. Endurance refers to the
persistence of the attachment bond; the bond is presumed to remain influential through-
out the individual’s life. Emotionality refers to the emotional intensity associated with
the attachment bond, which often arises during its formation and maintenance. Any
threat to the bonded relationship is accompanied by explicit protest and anxiety. Dis-
tress vocalizations elicit the primary caregiver’s attention, signalling the caregiver of
the infant’s emotional state. Cries and calls function to lead to a quick reunion and pro-
tection from any impending danger. This protection from danger comprises the bond’s
biological functionality. Separation protests have become incorporated into the infant’s
behaviours and resemble fear responses associated with unfamiliarity.
A unique characteristic of the attachment bond that does not necessarily apply to
other types of affectional bond is the security and comfort associated with the attached
individual (Ainsworth et al., 1978). The caregiver acts as a reliable base for exploration
so that the child may actively explore its environment with the security of possessing
a safe base to which the child may return when reassurance is needed. Glances to the
caregiver, who is also maintaining surveillance for potential perils, reassure the child,
allowing the child to explore the environment, leading, in turn, to the development of a
sense of autonomy.
3.2 The Development of the Attachment Bond
As infants develop, their attachment behaviour passes through four phases, becoming
increasingly refined and targeted to the primary caregiver.
3.2.1 Phase 1: Nonfocused orienting and signalling
The infant begins life with a set of innate, proximity-promoting behaviour patterns
that orient the infant toward others. In the newborn, these include crying, making eye
contact, clinging, cuddling, and responding to caregiving efforts. These behaviours
function to draw individuals toward the infant. At this stage, there is little evidence that
the infant is attached to the parents; attachment behaviours are emitted, but without
direction toward any specific individual.
3.2.2 Phase 2: Focus on one or more figures
By 2 or 3 months of age, the infant becomes discriminative and directs attachment
behaviours to familiar individuals. The infant may smile more at familiar individuals
and less at strangers, indicating recognition. However, in this phase, attachment has
not fully developed. The infant still favours several people with proximity-promoting
behaviours, and no one person has yet become a safe-base. Infants at this phase show
no special anxiety at being separated from their parents and no fear of strangers.
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3.2.3 Phase 3: Secure base behaviours
By 6 or 7 months of age, the infant normally has formed a genuine attachment. For
the first time, the infant uses the attached individual as a safe base from which to ex-
plore the environment. By this age, the infant is able to crawl more freely and can
move toward the caregiver or entice the caregiver to come to the infant. Attachment
behaviours shift from mostly proximity-promoting to proximity-seeking behaviours.
These proximity-seeking behaviours lead the infant to the caregiver and include ap-
proaching and following the caregiver. In this phase, the attachment figure has become
the infant’s stable social-emotional base. A 7-month-old, for example, may explore a
novel environment, but periodically look to his or her “mom” as if seeking reassurance
that all is well. The presence of the primary caregiver allows the infant to explore and
learn about the environment from a safe base. Also characteristic of this phase is the de-
velopment of stranger anxiety in which strangers begin to evoke alarm or withdrawal in
the infant, as well as increased separation protests, which includes the infant’s distress
when separated from the primary caregiver. These patterns of behaviour correspond
with the infant’s increased mobility, which may lead it to wander from its protector.
3.2.4 Phase 4: Partnership
By 18 months to 2 years of age, the child acquires insight into the primary caregiver’s
feelings and motives, and a reciprocal relationship forms between the child and care-
giver.
3.3 Quality of Attachment
Although attachment behaviour is deemed universal, the nature of attachment rela-
tionships is subject to individual differences. Mary Ainsworth, a student of Bowlby,
developed a laboratory technique, the Strange Situation procedure, in order to assess
the type of attachment relationship in one- to two-year-olds (Ainsworth et al., 1978).
This technique consists of eight stages:
1. Parent and infant are introduced to the experimental room. 30 seconds
2. Parent and infant are alone. Parent does not participate while infant explores. 3
minutes
3. Stranger enters and talks to the parent, then approaches infant. Parent leaves
inconspicuously. 3 minutes
4. First separation episode: Stranger’s behaviour is geared to the infant. 3 minutes
5. First reunion episode: Stranger leaves, parent greets and comforts infant, then
leaves again. 3 minutes
6. Second separation episode: Infant is alone. 3 minutes
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7. Continuation of second separation episode: Stranger enters and gears behaviour
to the infant. 3 minutes
8. Second reunion episode: Parent enters and greets the infant; stranger leaves in-
conspicuously. 3 minutes
The infant’s behaviour during each stage comprises the basis for classifying the infant’s
relationship with the caregiver into one of three attachment categories (Ainsworth et al.,
1978):
Secure attachment. In the experimenter room with the caregiver, the infant uses the
caregiver as a secure base; the infant actively explores the environment, occa-
sionally glancing at the caregiver during this time. The infant may or may not
cry when the caregiver leaves, but shows some signs of distress. With the return
of the caregiver, the infant seeks the caregiver and is easily soothed. This type of
relationship characterized approximately 63% of Ainsworth et al.’s (1978) sam-
ple.
Insecure–avoidant attachment. When in the experimenter room, the infant tends to
ignore or avoid the caregiver, playing in isolation. The infant does not show dis-
tress when the caregiver leaves. The infant continues to ignore the caregiver in
each of the reunion episodes by looking or turning away. This type of relation-
ship characterized approximately 29% of Ainsworth et al.’s (1978) sample.
Insecure–ambivalent attachment. When in the experimenter room, the infant demon-
strates ambivalent behaviour, ranging from clinging to the caregiver to hitting
and/or pushing the caregiver away. The infant fails to explore the new environ-
ment, preferring to stay with the parent. When the caregiver leaves the room, the
infant shows a great deal of distress. The infant remains upset and angry when
the caregiver returns and is difficult to console. This category characterized ap-
proximately 8% of Ainsworth et al.’s (1978) sample.
A fourth category—Insecure–Disorganized Attachment—was introduced after Ainsworth
et al.’s (1978) original study, characterizing high-risk caregiver-child pairs, whereby
confusion, apprehension, and undirected movements are displayed by the children
(Main & Solomon, 1990).
3.4 Attachment in Adults
The primary focus of attachment research has been the relationship between the child
and caregiver. However, Bowlby (1969) has always maintained that attachment bonds
are sustained throughout the life span. Research on attachment in adults has followed
two research traditions: (1) attachment to peers or romantic partners and (2) attachment
in nuclear families.
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3.4.1 Attachment to romantic partners
According to Zeifman and Hazan (1997), the infant-caregiver relationship and the pair
bond between two romantic partners share the same underlying mechanism: attach-
ment. During development, the importance of attachment between the infant and care-
giver shifts to the pair bond. Pair-bonding as a reproductive strategy is proposed to have
evolved due to the adaptive advantage conferred through shared care of the young (Lan-
caster & Lancaster, 1987). Attachment is defined as the flexible, pre-existing mecha-
nism that ensures that “two individuals would be highly motivated to stay together and
resist attempts to separate them” (Zeifman & Hazan, 1997, ; p. 246). In other words,
attachment has been co-opted by evolution to serve a second function in addition to
protection of the infant—the maintenance of long-term pair bond relationships. Par-
allels drawn between the infant-caregiver relationship and adult pair-bond relationship
provide evidence that attachment is the common mechanism in both types of relation-
ship. Some parallels include: (1) the similarities of the adult’s response to separation
and loss of a pair-bond individual to the infant’s response to separation from the care-
giver; for example, the sequences of reactions to disruptions of a pair-bond relationship
follows the “protest, despair, and detachment” sequence of a disrupted child-caregiver
relationship; (2) the significance of familiarity as a selection factor for both adults and
infants in their choices for attachment figures; there is evidence for assortative mating
in adults (i.e., we tend to like what is familiar) and infants’ enhanced attraction to the
familiar caregiver; (3) evidence that attachment bonds are most frequently limited to
parents and sexual partners (Hazan & Zeifman, 1994); (4) the common need for phys-
ical contact in both infant-caregiver relationships and pair-bond relationships; and (5)
the essential biological requirement for attachment, as evident in the studies of insti-
tutionalized children(e.g., Kaler & Freeman, 1994) and health decrements associated
with disrupted attachment(see Zeifman & Hazan, 1997).
3.4.2 Attachment to peers
Aspects of attachment theory have also been applied to peer relationships. Some pro-
pose that early attachment relationships form the prototype for future attachment re-
lationships, including peer relationships, via the internal working model. The internal
working model is the set of expectations about the reliability of attachment figures
(i.e., “Can I depend on the attachment figure being there for me when I need her or
him?”). The early working model is assumed to be a function of the infant-caregiver
relationship that becomes internalized over time and comprises the prototype not only
for future relationships but for the individual’s personality. The internal working model
consists of concepts of one’s self and the concepts of other individuals, and the inter-
action between these concepts influences personality development. Kim Bartholomew
(1990) developed a model of peer relationships based on these components of the in-
ternal working model, which continue operating throughout one’s life, affecting adult
relationships.
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3.4.3 Attachment in the nuclear family
The focus in the nuclear family research tradition addresses the inter-generational trans-
ference of the infant-caregiver attachment relationship, measuring the way in which
adults discussed their past relationships with their own parents and how these relation-
ships are linked to the attachment classifications of their own children. The first and
most widely used interview measure of adult attachment, the Adult Attachment Inter-
view (AAI) (George, Kaplan, & Main, 1985), is a 60-minute interview that gauges the
feelings adults have about their own childhood relationships. The AAI was specifi-
cally developed to predict the Strange Situation behaviour of the respondents’ infants.
The principle goal of the AAI is to determine how information about past attachment
figures is structured, organized, and stored. This information is presumed to reflect
the childhood internal working model. Research addresses both the long-term stability
of attachment patterns across the life span and the role that early care played in the
formation of attachment bonds. Research results have suggested that there is some
correspondence between the maternal internal working model and the quality of at-
tachment in the next generation such that mothers who describe characteristics of a
secure relationship with their parents are more likely to have a securely-attached child
themselves (Benoit & Parker, 1994).
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Chapter 4
Sex Differences in Spatial
Abilities in Humans: Two Levels
of Explanation
Jean Choi
T hink about how you find your way around when you’re visiting a newcity. As you travel from place to place, do you take note of buildings andtheir respective locations, or do you generally try to keep track of whichdirection you’re going and how far you’ve gone? Similarly, when you read
a map, do you notice the landmarks and use them to find your way, or do you look at the
scale to code distances and use the direction indicators? These different methods we
use to find our way have been found to vary as a function of sex. Males tend to use more
cardinal directions (e.g., north and south) and distances (e.g., miles or kilometers) than
females, whereas females tend to rely more heavily on landmarks (e.g., buildings) and
their relative directions (e.g., right and left). This example illustrates the application
of spatial abilities, and how differences in spatial abilities become evident in everyday
activities.
4.1 Spatial Abilities
In general, spatial ability is defined as the “skill in representing, transforming, gen-
erating and recalling symbolic, nonlinguistic information” (Linn & Petersen, 1985, p.
1482). It is required in many facets of our daily activities, including map-reading,
navigating, and remembering where objects are located in space (such as your keys!).
Spatial abilities have been studied extensively in both humans and nonhumans using
a variety of methods, and perhaps the most consistent finding in this large body of re-
search is the prevalence of sex differences. In humans, spatial research, for the most
part, has been based on various pencil-and-paper tests (see Figure 4.1).
Based on a meta-analysis of almost three hundred individual studies using various
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Figure 4.1: Sample item from a spatial rotation test. Participante are asked to mark the
two drawings from the 4 on the right that match the drawing on the left.
spatial tests, Voyer, Voyer, and Bryden (1995) concluded that spatial abilities comprise
three dissociable categories: mental rotation, spatial perception, and spatial visual-
ization. Mental rotation is the ability to manipulate, rotate, twist, or invert two- or
three-dimensional objects. Testing this ability involves asking an individual to visual-
ize objects in different positions by mentally rotating them (as in Figure 4.1). Spatial
perception refers to the ability to determine spatial relationships despite distracting in-
formation. The water level test, for example, requires one to indicate how the top of
the water line would look in a tilted bottle. This test requires one to ignore distract-
ing information such as the tilt of the bottle. Spatial visualization is the manipulation
of complex information through several stages. A prototypical test item requires one
to mentally transform a two-dimensional object into a three-dimensional object. In
general, males tend to show an advantage in all of these spatial categories, although
the size of the differences between males and females depends on the category of spa-
tial abilities. Mental rotation tests yield the largest and most reliable sex difference,
followed by spatial perception tests, which show a moderate effect size for sex (i.e., a
moderate sex difference), and spatial visualization tests usually yield the smallest effect
size. However, another category of spatial abilities that has recently received attention
is object location memory. This is a unique category in that it is the only one that pro-
duces a female advantage (Silverman & Eals, 1992). Object location memory assesses
how well an individual remembers the location of objects.
But, why are there sex differences in spatial abilities? The answers to this question
are varied and can be addressed using two levels of explanation.
4.2 Levels of Explanations
Two levels of explanation can be considered when accounting for spatial sex differ-
ences: proximate and ultimate explanations. Proximate explanations address the direct
mechanisms affecting behaviour; these may include hormonal or neural mechanisms.
Ultimate explanations address the adaptive significance of the behaviour; that is, how
might the behaviour lead to the survival and/or reproduction of the individual. Ulti-
mate and proximate explanations are complementary, as opposed to competing, ex-
planations. An example of how behaviour may be explained at these two levels can
be seen when considering why male songbirds sing in the spring. An ultimate ex-
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planation would focus on the possible adaptive nature of the male’s singing. Over
evolution, a singing male may have attracted more females than a male who did not
sing; thus, singing males would have had access to more mating opportunities, increas-
ing the chance of having offspring. Or, it may be that the male’s singing may have
warned other males to stay away from the singer’s territory. This may have led to
fewer fights for the singing male, increasing his chance of survival and ultimately, re-
production. Either way, those males who carried the genes that led them to sing had a
greater chance to reproduce and leave more offspring than the males who did not sing.
This would lead to a greater proportion of the singing males’ genetic material in the
next generation. Over time, the genes that led to singing would be pervasive among
males and finally, become characteristic of the population. A proximate explanation
of singing behaviour in males would emphasize the environmental and physiological
stimuli underlying the behaviour. For example, a proximate explanation for the male’s
singing would include the effects of increased daylight in the spring and the increased
production of testosterone, triggering singing behaviour. As you can see, the ultimate
explanation is directed to the survival or reproductive value of the behaviour, whereas
the proximate explanation addresses the direct mechanisms of the behaviour.
4.2.1 A proximate explanation of spatial sex differences
Differential effects of gonadal hormones comprise one proximate explanation of spa-
tial sex differences. The prevailing hormonal theories presume that differences in the
relative concentrations of estrogen and testosterone affect how the brain is organized,
which, in turn, may lead to differences in various cognitive abilities, such as spatial abil-
ities. The lateralization of function (i.e., differences in the degree to which each side of
the brain is specialized for cognitive processes, such as spatial abilities) may be related,
at least partially, to differential exposure to gonadal hormones (Hampson & Kimura,
1992). Given that females have higher concentrations of estrogen and progesterone,
and males have higher concentrations of testosterone, these hormonal differences may
affect the degree of lateralization. In most individuals, particularly in right-handed
people, language is represented to a greater degree in the left hemisphere, whereas the
right hemisphere seems to be more involved in nonverbal processes, such as spatial
abilities. Many theories presume that sex differences in lateralization are related to sex
differences in cognitive abilities, specifically, that adult males tend to be more later-
alized than females. That is, poorer performances on spatial tests in females are due
to either bilateral representation of language, interfering with development of spatial
abilities (e.g., McGlone, 1980) or bilateral representation of spatial ability, leading to
greater inefficiency than unilateral representation (Harris, 1978).
Although there is little direct evidence of the effects of gonadal hormones on spatial
abilities in humans, there is much indirect evidence based on a variety of populations
and methodologies. Hampson and her associates, for example(Hampson, Rovet, &
Altmann, 1998), investigated spatial abilities in children with a syndrome called con-
genital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH). This condition is characterized by excess levels
of prenatal androgens due to the overproduction of a testosterone-like androgen, an-
drostenedione. CAH females, therefore, become relatively more masculinized than
other females, due to exposure to higher levels of androgens as fetuses. Although
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generally treated immediately after birth through surgery and hormonal therapy, the
exposure to prenatal hormones appears to have an enduring effect on the brain. When
compared to control girls (those girls who have not had exposure to excessive levels
of androgens), CAH girls demonstrate superior spatial abilities, supporting the notion
that prenatal hormonal levels have an enduring effect on the organization of the brain,
despite surgical and hormonal intervention after birth.
In addition to organizational effects of gonadal hormones, there is also evidence of
activational effects. For example, changes in gonadal hormones in adults seem to have
an effect on spatial abilities, as demonstrated by a study of transsexuals undergoing
hormonal therapy before a sex change operation (Goozen, Cohen-Kettenis, Gooren,
Frijda, & Poll, 1995). Women who were undergoing androgen therapy, and men who
were undergoing anti-androgen and estrogen therapy were tested twice: before hor-
mone therapy and three months after the onset of their therapy. Spatial scores of women
increased, presumably due to the exposure to androgens, whereas spatial scores of men
exposed to estrogen decreased. This pattern of results suggests that small increases
in androgens enhance spatial abilities in women, whereas decreases in androgens and
increased exposure to estrogen depress spatial abilities in men. Other research has fo-
cused on estrogen using normal hormonal fluctuations associated with the menstrual
cycle in women. For example, Silverman and Phillips (1993) demonstrated that scores
on a mental rotation test varied within the same individual, depending on when she
completed the test. Women performed more poorly on this spatial test when estrogen
levels were elevated during the midluteal phase (defined as 16-23 days after the onset
of menses), compared to performances during menses, when levels of estrogen were
relatively lower. However, despite the growing evidence that testosterone and estrogen
affect spatial abilities in humans, the exact nature of the inter-relationships between
estrogen, testosterone and spatial abilities remains unclear.
4.2.2 An ultimate explanation of spatial sex differences
In the previous section, we found that differential levels of gonadal hormones appear to
affect spatial abilities and may account for some of the differences between males and
females—an example of a proximate explanation. The ultimate explanation addresses
the origin of these spatial sex differences. Recall that ultimate explanations address the
adaptive nature of specific behaviour. Evolutionary psychology, as outlined in other
chapters of this textbook, emphasizes the ultimate explanations of behaviour, using the
principles of natural selection. In human evolutionary psychology, the mind is concep-
tualized as a set of specialized information-processing mechanisms that developed dur-
ing the environment of evolutionary adaptedness (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). Humans
spent the majority of their time in evolutionary history living in a hunter-gatherer social
structure, in which group members gathered plants for sustenance, and supplemented
them by hunting animals. The skills required to solve particular problems faced by our
ancestors during the environment of evolutionary adaptedness, such as the necessary
skills to gather plants and hunt animals, would thereby be favoured by selection pres-
sures. Natural selection would have caused the human mind to evolve specific mech-
anisms to effectively solve adaptive problems, leading to a set of specialized cognitive
modules. These modules have evolved over generations, leading to function-specific
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adaptations. Spatial behaviour is an example of a product of differential pressures.
The evolutionary origin of sex differences in spatial abilities has spawned several
theories; one that is specific to human evolution is the hunter-gatherer theory. During
the environment of evolutionary adaptedness, males and females worked cooperatively
in small kin groups, in which sexual division of labour was pervasive in all facets of
daily activities (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). The division of labour persisted over evo-
lutionary history during which selection pressures favoured different spatial skills in
males and females. This division of labour would be particularly evident in the ac-
quisition of food whereby males primarily hunted and women gathered. The resulting
products of this division of labour were exchanged, with males providing meat, a highly
valued source of protein and fats, and females providing plant foods, comprising much
of the daily sustenance rations.
Because males were involved in hunting, scavenging, and travelling over large ar-
eas for food, effective skills related to navigation over a large area were essential for
males. Hunters would have had to roam over a large territory, subsequently finding
their way home after pursuing prey. Superior spatial skills related to traversing through
a large environment and directed motor tasks such as projectile accuracy would have
been subject to selection pressure in males. In support of this supposition, Watson
and Kimura (1991) found that males were more accurate in an overhand-throwing task
and were better able to intercept a flying ball, even after accounting for differences in
sports-related experiences. Further support for the hunter-gatherer theory was found in
our study focusing on navigation. In this study, males and females were led through
a circuitous path through a wooded area and required to “find the shortest route back
to the origin” (Silverman et al., 2000). Participants were also asked to indicate the
direction of the point of origin at various points in the route. Males chose the shortest
route more frequently than females and were more accurate in indicating the absolute
direction of the point of origin. These navigation abilities were associated with three-
dimension mental rotation ability, suggesting that the ability to mentally rotate objects
and tracking in an unfamiliar environment void of distinguishable features are mediated
by the same underlying mechanism, or at the least analogous mechanisms.
in the environment of evolutionary adaptedness, females tended to be involved in
foraging and searching for non-mobile plant foods that had to be identified and local-
ized within a larger array of vegetation (Silverman & Eals, 1992). Foraging and gather-
ing by females were performed in a smaller area, compared to hunting, and would have
led to selection pressures associated with object location memory within a static spatial
array. Silverman and Eals (1992), for instance, demonstrated that females were better
able than males to recall the locations of objects. In their test, participants were asked
to “examine the objects” for a minute, and then given a second array in which some of
the objects had been moved. Females were better able to indicate which objects in the
second array had been moved than were males. In a further study, undergraduates were
asked to wait for two minutes in a tiny office that was contrived to resemble a graduate
student’s office. The office was outfitted with various objects such a pair of glasses,
books, and a coffee mug. As expected, females were better able than males to freely
recall the location of various objects in the office. More recently, Neave, Hamilton,
Hutton, and Pickering (In press) replicated and extended these findings. They found
that females were better than males at recognizing target plants within a larger array of
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plants that varied in size and complexity.
4.3 An Application of Spatial Sex Differences: Map Read-
ing
Given that males tend to perform better in mental rotation, spatial visualization, and
spatial perception tests, and females tend to perform better in object location memory,
the question arises as to whether these sex differences emerge in everyday behaviour.
We explored this question using a direction-giving paradigm, based on a novel map
(see Figure 4.2)
We asked individuals to learn the shortest route from a given point of origin to a
point of destination, and to provide written directions from memory to other adults
(Choi & Silverman, 1996). In their directions, females tend to refer more to landmarks
and relative directions whereas males tend to use more distances and cardinal direc-
tions. An example of a set of directions containing primarily distance and cardinal
directions would be “Go southwest for about a mile, then go south for another 5 miles.
Then turn west, and travel for another 4 miles”. Directions with more emphasis on
landmarks and relative directions would be “Go left until you see the high school, then
turn left. Go past the bank and across the railroad tracks. Turn right at the mall, and
go past the car rental place”. Although males and females used different methods to
give directions, each method was equally effective. We inferred that females’ better
object location memory may lead to greater emphasis on landmarks and relative direc-
tions when reading a map, and males’ better mental rotation ability may lead to more
emphasis on distances and cardinal directions.
These sex differences have been replicated using a three-dimensional virtual envi-
ronment, in which the locations of landmarks were either manipulated or remained the
same (Sandstrom, Kaufman, & Huettel, 1998). This navigation task required partici-
pants to find a hidden target as quickly as possible. Females and males performed at
a comparable level when landmark information was available and reliable. However,
when landmarks were moved in an unpredictable fashion, the ability to navigate in the
virtual environment was more disrupted in females than in males. Females also re-
quired more time when there were no landmarks and only geometric cues, such as the
shape of the room, providing further evidence that males and females depend on differ-
ent methods to navigate. This greater female reliance on landmarks is consistent with
our findings, as described above, that males were better able to navigate in an environ-
ment with very few distinguishable landmarks (Silverman et al., 2000). Because the
ability to navigate in this type of environment was correlated with higher scores on the
mental rotation test, it suggests that there is some specific ability that is shared by both
tasks. This association also provides some indication that performances on individual
spatial tests are manifested in everyday behaviour.
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4.4 Conclusion
Spatial abilities comprise a broad cognitive capacity, which consists of dissociable cat-
egories. There is evidence that the extent and direction of sex differences depend on
the spatial category; for example, males perform better on mental rotation tests and
females perform better on object location tests. There are also related differences in
map reading and navigation methods, suggesting that individual differences in spatial
tests are reflected in everyday behaviour. The origin of spatial sex differences can be
addressed using two complementary levels of explanations; proximate explanations ad-
dress the direct mechanisms underlying spatial abilities, whereas ultimate explanations
address the evolutionary origins of spatial sex differences. At the level of proximate
explanations, research suggests that sex differences in spatial abilities are associated
with differences in gonadal hormones. At the level of ultimate explanations, such dif-
ferences are argued to have evolved due to different selection pressures related to the
division of labour.
Chapter 5
Albert — Portrait of a Cheese
Freak
Margaret Forgie
. . . It’s a matter of instinct;
it’s a matter of conditioning;
it’s a matter of fact.
You can call me Pavlov’s dog,
ring a bell and I’ll salivate —
how’d you like that . . .
— from “Brian Wilson”
by Barenaked Ladies (Words and music by Steven Page, 1992).
P erhaps one of the most famous discoveries in all of psychology (after all,it’s in the lyrics of a popular song!) was that of classical conditioning, aform of learning in which an animal comes to make an association betweentwo previously unrelated events. This discovery is credited to the Russian
scientist, Ivan Pavlov (Brennan, 1986; Pavlov, 1960). In the popular version of this
“experiment”, Pavlov is said to have trained dogs to salivate to the ringing of a bell
by consistently pairing the bell’s ring with the presentation of food (a stimulus that
reliably produces salivation in the first place).1
This principle, that animals can learn to associate two stimuli and to respond to
a cue or signal that was previously unimportant to the animal, is a fundamental form
of learning that can be observed in virtually all animal species, from the simple sea
1Despite this popular conception, it should be noted that Pavlov was neither a psychologist, nor specif-
ically studying learning at the time. His discovery was serendipitous and occurred during the course of
studying digestive processes in dogs, work for which he was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1904 (Brennan,
1986). He also did not discover the phenomenon by ringing a bell, but rather by observing the reaction of
his dogs’ salivary output to the sound of the approaching lab worker whose job it was to feed the animals.
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slug Aplysia californica to human beings. In fact, the process of classical conditioning
is everywhere in daily life, as in, for example, the fact that you and I, like the dogs in
Pavlov’s original studies, have learned to salivate to the sound of supper being prepared.
But classical conditioning is not just about drooling for food. It is a general pro-
cess that is in place to prepare us to deal with recurrent situations in our environment.
In order to understand just how powerful the phenomenon can be, and how insidious
(particularly when the behavioural response being conditioned is one that is undesir-
able), we need to examine it in more detail; and I can think of no better subject for this
exercise than to introduce you to Albert, cheese freak.
Somewhere between the lowly sea slug and humans lies the domestic cat (some-
times I think closer to sea slugs than other times). I have lived with cats since my
childhood, and, also being a long-time student of behaviour, I have spent many hours
pondering their various behaviours. Albert, who has lived with me for about 10 years
now, is a very large (15 to 17 pounds depending on the season), male, tabby version of
the species. And Albert has attitude, lovin’ attitude. He’s the biggest, marshmallow cat
I have ever met, and more than a bit dumb, to boot. He is also just plain large. And so,
when he wants something, he usually gets it (in fact, many of my friends are afraid of
Albert! It’s the size of the eyes apparently).
Albert has a lot of interesting behaviours, but I think some of the most interesting
have to do with “people food”. If it is Albert and food, then the food is probably
cheese. The moment that the cheese block is removed from the refrigerator with its
accompanying tell-tale crinkle of the cheese wrapper and Ziploc bag, Albert turns those
big eyes on you, and begins his approach. Over time, Albert has come to respond to
all sorts of crinkling plastic no matter where he is in the house at the time. Every time
the sequence is the same: open refrigerator—make crinkle—and Albert orients and
appears out of nowhere. Did I mention Albert was large and friendly. . . ? And terribly
hard to get rid of once that approach has started.
5.1 Classical Conditioning
So what’s going on here? Albert is demonstrating a conditioned response to plastic
wrap in much the same way as Pavlov’s dogs demonstrated a conditioned response to
a ringing bell. The process by which this happens is outlined in Figure 5.1. Initially,
Albert experienced cheese and began to approach when he detected its presence. In
psychological jargon, these two events are referred to as the unconditioned stimulus
(UCS—the cheese) and the unconditioned response (UCR—the approach behaviour).
The term “unconditioned” refers to the fact that the stimulus reliably produces the re-
sponse before conditioning starts. The conditioned stimulus (the crinkle of the plastic
wrap), so-called because it is the one to which the animal will become conditioned and
is unrelated to the response initially, is present each time the cheese is produced. In
this case, because I am in the habit of buying a big block of cheese and keeping it in a
Ziploc bag, the conditioned stimulus reliably predicts the arrival of the unconditioned
stimulus (a situation that is necessary for conditioning to occur). After many repeated
experiences of crinkle⇒cheese, crinkle⇒cheese, the crinkle of the wrapper alone (or
the presentation of the conditioned stimulus) is enough to bring Albert running. Al-
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bert’s approach behaviour in these latter cases is referred to as a conditioned response
because it is elicited by the conditioned stimulus.
5.2 Stimulus Generalization and Discrimination
Examining Albert’s behaviour further demonstrates two other principles associated
with conditioned responding: stimulus generalization and stimulus discrimination. These
two principles help us to understand how conditioned behaviours can be increased or
made more refined. First, stimulus generalization is a process whereby an animal no
longer restricts its response to the specific conditioned stimulus that first elicited it,
but rather to a variety of closely-related stimuli. The fact that Albert now responds to
pretty much any crinkly plastic that generates a sound similar to the Ziploc bag/cheese
wrapper combination is a good example of this principle. We can say that Albert’s
behaviour has generalized to all plastic wrappers (imagine his surprise, though, when
the sound produces a bag of tomatoes!). Second, Albert also shows stimulus discrimi-
nation. In this case, an animal refines its conditioned response to include only the most
likely stimuli to produce the desired result. Albert demonstrates this principle when
he restricts his attention to crinkly plastic that is immediately preceded by the opening
and closing of the refrigerator door. As he rarely makes a response if the bag did not
emerge from the refrigerator, he has apparently learned to discriminate fridge-plastic
from not fridge-plastic.
5.3 Operant Conditioning
Albert’s behaviour also provides an example of another form of learning, that of oper-
ant conditioning. This form of learning is most often associated with the name of B.F.
Skinner (Brennan, 1986; Skinner, 1938), and involves changing the frequency of a be-
havioural response (that is, increasing or decreasing the rate and persistence with which
an animal will perform a behaviour). In this form of learning, the change in behaviour
is produced by making rewards (e.g., the giving of food to a hungry animal) and pun-
ishments (e.g., the spanking of a naughty child) when a particular response is made.
For example, when we require children to complete their homework before allowing
them to watch television, we are providing them with a reward (television viewing) for
performing a behaviour (doing homework). It is our hope that by offering the reward,
the behaviour of homework-doing will increase. In these simple cases, rewards serve
as positive reinforcers, increasing the likelihood that the behaviour will be performed
again; whereas punishments serve as negative events designed to decrease behaviour.
In Albert’s case, when he makes his approach response, sometimes he gets a piece of
cheese and sometimes he does not. When he does not (because the bag does not con-
tain cheese or I just decline to give him some), he is usually surprised, but persistent,
and this often leaves me in the ridiculous position of trying to show Albert that the bag
does not contain cheese so he will go away. Thus, the times that Albert gets the cheese
have reinforced the behaviour of responding to that crinkly sound.
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Albert does not receive the reward every time, however, and sometimes he even gets
an active negative response when he is too persistent. These aspects of his behavioural
interactions highlight two additional features of operant conditioning: the schedule or
pattern of delivery of reinforcements, and the consistency with which they are deliv-
ered, are strong influences on the continuation of the behaviour. Extinction, or the
decline and eventual disappearance of the behaviour, can be brought about by repeat-
edly and consistently not rewarding the response. When partial reinforcement occurs
(such as when the bag only sometimes contains cheese, or when I only sometimes give
him a piece), however, the behaviour is extremely difficult to stop. One example of
this form of schedule of reinforcement maintaining an undesirable and difficult-to-stop
behaviour (in some cases) is gambling (particularly devices such as slot machines and
the like). Like Albert’s approach response to crinkly plastic, each time you pull the
handle of a slot machine there is a chance that you will win a jackpot. Most of the
time this does not happen, but the few times that it does (particularly if you have a run
of successes early on in the process) maintain the “hopeful” behaviour of “Maybe this
time will be the next lucky break!”. Thus, it is doubtful that Albert will stop seeking
the opportunity to do cheese for a long time to come.
Although Albert’s response to cheese makes for a humorous way to introduce the
concepts associated with these two forms of learning, it also highlights the fact that
complex patterns of behaviour can be produced and maintained in response to signals
or cues from the environment that are not connected to the situation in an immediately
obvious way. Furthermore, patterns of behaviour can come to be “cemented-in” by
a combination of these cues and the rewarding properties of the stimulus of interest.
In addition to characterizing all aspects of our daily lives from childhood to old age,
these general phenomena are thought to play a role in a number of maladaptive (or
undesirable) patterns of behaviour that we humans seem to want to engage in with
vigour (e.g., those associated with administering drugs of abuse). In the lecture we will
explore how these forces operate in the initiation and maintenance of the drug-seeking
behaviour that is an important component of the addictive cycle of behaviour.
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Chapter 6
Building Brains. . . Building
People
Margaret Forgie
T he role of experience in shaping the development of the nervous system,and thus of behaviour, has been addressed by several authors in this vol-ume. There is no doubt that differential experience in our postnatal envi-ronment is one of the most powerful tools in shaping the individual archi-
tecture of the brain. This experience is crucial to the normal brain development of most
species, and it is this individual brain architecture that gives each of us our own unique
pattern of strengths and weaknesses in ability, personality, and so forth. As you can
read in “Nurture’s Little Secret”(see Chapter 22, page 167), experience produces this
change by eliciting activity in the brain; and it is this activity, or lack thereof, that al-
lows for the growth of brain cells and the pruning back and remodelling of connections
between cells.
The effects of experience, however, do not occur in a unilateral fashion, affecting
each of us in an identical manner. Why? The answer is simply that we all begin life
outside the womb with different brains—the result of a long and complex chain of
events that begins at the earliest phases of the development of a human child. Thus,
although newborn human infants share many behavioural characteristics—as one might
expect from members of the same species with the same basic “human” brain plan, each
individual infant is also fundamentally unique. For example, all human infants appear
to have a special attraction to human faces, and the characteristics of the infant’s visual
capabilities are such that when held in the arms the child is placed at the best viewing
distance to take in that face (Berndt, 1997). These basic patterns of behaviour shared
by all infants presumably prepare them for the more or less consistent aspects of the
postnatal environment. On the other hand, infants are also behaviourally different, as is
clearly evident in temperament (Berndt, 1997). Newborn babies differ in their activity
(speed and intensity of behaviour), reactivity (reaction to stimuli), emotionality (depth
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of emotional response), and sociability (willingness to associate with others). Thus,
differences in behaviour that occur from the moment of birth, interact with the postnatal
environment to produce an environment that is also unique for each child.
Both the prenatal foundation of nervous system development and the sculpting ef-
fects of postnatal environments and experiences are necessary to produce a functional
human brain (and, thus, a behaviourally functional human being). To offer a simple
analogy, we can liken the process of the development of an individual’s behavioural
repertoire to the building of a house. A house without a carpenter (and a brain without
experience) is just a nicely formed block of cement: the basics of the plan are there,
but there is nothing to complete the building or to decorate the finished product. On the
other hand, it is also the case that a house without an adequate foundation (or a brain
that has been somehow compromised in early development) will not allow the carpen-
ter to construct a solid building that can withstand the stresses and strains of years of
living. At a minimum, the layout of the foundation will constrain the layout of the
rooms that the carpenter can build, and give the house its unique appeal. In this way,
the foundation for individual differences in brain organization is put into place early in
development, and is then modified by postnatal experience.
6.1 Prenatal Development of the Brain
The nervous system begins its development very early in the prenatal period and con-
tinues well into adolescence and young adulthood. For example, the frontal lobe of
the cerebral cortex is a very long-developing brain structure that does not finish the
developmental process until well after puberty (Kolb, 1995). How much of this de-
velopmental process is completed before birth differs between species (Kolb, 1995).
Beginning at about two to three weeks post-conception, the first hint of the nervous
system appears in the developing human embryo with the formation of the neural tube
(K. Moore & Persaud, 1998). This tube-like structure gives rise to the central nervous
system. Once this tube is formed, cells that will become brain cells begin to divide in
the wall of the tube, and then migrate to form the basic structure of the brain. Once
cells have reached their targets, they begin to form the characteristic shape of the type
of brain cell that they are, and to hook up to other cells, and so start the process of
making connections. Although the brain has begun to form the highest of brain con-
trol centres (the cerebral cortex) by the fifth month of pregnancy, in human beings
the process of cell migration is still occurring at the time of birth. The process of
the “blooming” of connections peaks at about one year of age (Greenough, Black, &
Wallace, 1987; Kolb, 1995). From this point, throughout the remainder of postnatal
development, the primary forces include the activity-dependent remodelling of those
connections discussed in Chapter 22. Thus, events occurring in the prenatal period
have potent influences on the basic construction of the brain.
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6.2 Where do Individual Differences
Come From?
Given the obvious complexity of the processes of prenatal development, it is easy to see
that abnormal construction of the brain could contribute to developmental disabilities.
But what about the normal variation in behaviour that characterizes the vast majority
of the human population? Where do these more subtle, individual differences in be-
haviour come from? In short, they result from the same variations in the combined
forces of genes and environment that can produce abnormal development, but on a less
dramatic scale. All development can be seen as an interaction between the unfolding
of a genetic program and the modification of the program by environmental factors.
Many persons, however, persist in assigning causality to one or the other of these in-
fluences, viewing behaviours as arising from the singular influence of either a genetic
or an environmental factor (the age-old “nature” [genes] vs. “nurture” [environment]
debate). This dichotomy has some appeal, for it can be seen to simplify the incredibly
complex issue of behavioural development. Merely restricting the argument to a sim-
ple nature vs. nurture debate, however, does not really do much to help to explain the
exact nature of the phenomenon in question. In his 1949 book, The Organization of
Behaviour, the noted Canadian psychologist, D.O. Hebb attempted to move away from
this simple dichotomy in a discussion of the potential contributing factors to individual
differences in intelligence. These factors are also useful in categorizing the potential
contributors to all individual differences in behaviour.
The first of these factors is, of course, genes. Unless we are the member of a set of
identical siblings, each of us has our own unique genetic endowment. The integrity of
this genetic endowment is essential for normal development, but it is not a blueprint for
the whole of the process. Although each cell contains the same genetic information,
whether or not a gene will be turned on or off, a process known as gene expression,
depends on myriad other factors. When a gene is turned on or off it changes what the
cell can and cannot do. The factors that influence gene expression are enormous in
number. Thus, the final product of development is genes + environment = a new form,
a process known as epigenesis.
The second factor includes chemicals and other experiences occurring in the prena-
tal period. This period includes a host of physiological factors specific to the individ-
ual foetus such as hormones, growth factors, the presence of teratogenic agents (agents
from the outside that are able to produce birth defects), diseases from the mother, etc.
Among the most powerful agents in shaping the development of the individual ner-
vous system (and indeed of the entire foetus) are hormones. In particular, the hormonal
events that characterize the differentiation of the developing child into a biological male
or female, have profound effects on the wiring of the central nervous system.
As with all developing structures, the brain shows critical or sensitive periods: win-
dows of time during which it is especially susceptible to specific influences from the
environment. The timing of these critical periods depends largely on the specific brain
area concerned. Because of the length of time over which the brain develops, the whole
of the prenatal period contains sensitive periods for some aspect of brain function. Fur-
thermore, the exact nature of the effect of an environmental agent will depend upon
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what the environmental agent is, and what particular process is occurring at the time
the influence is received. Many of these influences are an expected and necessary part
of development (such as the exposure of the brain to circulating hormones in the foetal
and maternal blood), but others are unexpected and produced by exposing the foetus
to harmful agents (or by depriving it of beneficial ones). For example, a deficiency in
folic acid during and before the early phases of pregnancy is associated with a failure
of the neural tube to close, leading to disorders such as spina bifida (Batshaw, 1999).
Consumption of alcohol by the mother during pregnancy appears to disrupt cell migra-
tion in the foetal brain (among myriad other deleterious effects, Ferriero & Dempsey,
1999).
The remaining factors primarily influence the brain in the postnatal period. The
third factor includes chemical agents that one might experience after birth. Many en-
vironmental toxins, such as lead, cause severe brain damage in developing children
(Batshaw, 1999). It is not unlikely, then, to postulate that variations in our exposure
to chemical agents throughout our lives will have an effect on our brain. In fact, such
environmental exposure is implicated in diseases such as multiple sclerosis and Parkin-
sonism (Kolb & Whishaw, 1994). The fourth and fifth factors are the effects of experi-
ence in the postnatal period. Hebb (1949) proposed that both general experiences, such
as might be encountered by all members of the species, and specific experiences that
would affect a certain individual, help to shape the developing brain. An example of
both of these classes of experience can be seen in language. The human brain is wired
up in such a way that at birth (or shortly thereafter), children respond to language-
related sounds regardless of what language is spoken around them; their brains are
prepared for the general experience of language. Somewhat later, children begin to
respond only to the sounds of their native language, and start the process of acquiring
that native tongue. This is an example of specific experience: What specific language
did you learn as your first language in childhood? Last, most of us will experience
some type of brain damage at some point in our lives, whether due to injury, disease,
or the aging process (Kolb, 1995). These traumatic events may alter the wiring of the
brain, and the individual’s behaviour, irrevocably (see Chapter 10, page 77).
Thus, the development of the brain is a cumulative process, and one that requires
both a solid foundation of growth prenatally, and a safe, experience-filled environment
postnatally. The nature of that foundation is unique for each of us, and it prepares us
to respond in our own individual way to all the variations of experience awaiting us in
our life outside the womb.
Chapter 7
Stress in the Workplace
C. Gail Hepburn
E very day there seems to be a news story about the rise of stress in the work-place. Workers are reporting higher levels of stress in the workplace thanever before and these stress levels have costs both for workers and for theorganizations in which they work. After reading this discussion you will
have an understanding of what stress is (and what it is not), what the costs of stress in
the workplace may be, why workplaces are not completely full of ‘stressed-out’ work-
ers, and how researchers have conceptualized the causes of stress in the workplace.
7.1 The Stress Process
It is important to distinguish between the events or situations that may be perceived
as stressful and the workers’ experience of stress. The term stressor is applied to any
objectifiable event or situation in the workplace that has the potential to cause stress
(e.g., a deadline, extreme heat or cold, a rude supervisor). Stress is a worker’s psycho-
logical response to stressors (e.g., feeling threatened or challenged). Strain is another
important term in the stress process—strain results from stress, think of strain as the
consequences or costs associated with feeling stress (e.g., anxiety, stomach upset). In
general, workers are faced with stressors, they feel stress, and then they experience
strain. These terms will be elaborated on throughout this discussion.
7.2 The Costs of Stress
7.2.1 Stress affects workers
Strain comes in a variety of forms. Workers may experience psychological strain. Psy-
chological strain describes those outcomes that are affective or emotional in nature
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as well as those outcomes that are cognitive in nature. Individuals experiencing psy-
chological strain will report such affective responses as feeling anxious, depressed, or
overwhelmed. They may also report cognitive disturbances such as being distracted or
having difficulty concentrating or remembering things.
Physical strain is another outcome of stress. Physical strain includes minor health
complaints such as headaches or stomach upset. More serious health conditions are
also associated with the experience of stress. They include coronary heart disease,
high blood pressure, and asthma.
Workers also may experience behavioural strain. Behavioural strain outcomes are
those behaviours or actions that are engaged in by workers who are experiencing stress.
They can include nervous habits, situation avoidance, smoking, and alcohol consump-
tion.
7.2.2 Stress affects organizations
One would hope that organizations are concerned about the health of their workforce
and interested in reducing stressors in their workplaces. Unfortunately, concern is
often not a sufficient argument to induce stressor reduction. However, organizations
do agree that stress is associated with certain costs and these costs are of interest to
organizations—they affect their bottom line. Costs of worker stress to organizations in-
clude, but are not limited to, reduced performance, increased absenteeism and turnover,
and workplace accidents.
Worker performance may decline for those workers experiencing stress. Workers
suffering from psychological strain may not be performing at their best: how well do
you study when you are anxious or distracted? Workers experiencing stress may choose
to avoid the stressor and stay away from their workplace. This form of behavioural
strain will likely affect work performance and, if the worker quits, may force the orga-
nization to engage in recruitment activities; often a costly exercise. Researchers have
recently linked worker stress to accidents in the workplace, but more research needs to
be done to confirm this relationship. However, given what we know about strain it does
seem a logical outcome.
We can agree that all workplaces contain stressors, those events or situations that we
find stressful. Some workplaces are inherently stressful, they always contain events or
situations that cause stress. For example, the work environment of firefighters, police
officers, air traffic controllers, and dentists (imagine if most of your interactions at
work were with people who were frightened of you) are inherently stressful or full of
stressors. We should then also agree that it simply is not possible to rid all workplaces
of all stressors. Why then do workplaces function at all? In fact, we know that some
workplaces function extremely well.
7.3 Why Workplaces Function in the Face of Stress 51
7.3 Why Workplaces Function in the Face of Stress
7.3.1 Peoples’ reactions to stressors differ
Not everyone reacts the same way to a stressor—the same stressful situation or event
does not elicit the same strain reaction in everyone. People with certain personality
types or with access to certain resources appear to be protected from the effects of
stressors, they experience less strain than others as a result of the exposure. For exam-
ple, people who have access to a strong social support network may be buffered from
the effects of certain stressors. Coworkers may be able to help them with a job task
while friends or family may provide emotional support in times of difficulty. These
people will experience less strain than those with weak social support networks.
Similarly, people with certain personality types or without access to certain re-
sources appear to be more vulnerable than others to some stressors, they experience
more strain than others as a result of the exposure. For example, people who are rated
highly on the personality trait negative affectivity—the general inclination to view the
world negatively—are more vulnerable to stressors and they experience greater strain.
People high in negative affectivity simply tend to react negatively to situations and
experience negative emotions.
Therefore, one reason why workplaces are functional in the face of stress is the fact
that not everyone reacts the same way to the same situation or event. Not everyone
experiences the same level of strain in the face of the same event or situation.
7.3.2 People appraise situations and events differently
Not everyone views the same situation or event the same way. Lazarus and Folkman
(1984) describe a process whereby people evaluate the situations and events that they
face. The Transactional View of Stress includes two stages of cognitive appraisal: pri-
mary and secondary appraisal.
Primary appraisal is the first evaluation of a situation or event at work. When
faced with a potential stressor at work we think about the possible costs or benefits to
us of this situation or event. Is it irrelevant or benign or does it have the potential to be a
threat (e.g., cause us harm or loss) or provide a challenge? It is only those situations that
we consider to be potentially threatening or challenging that undergo further appraisal.
Please note the use of the words threat and challenge. Not all potential stressors are
considered negatively. For example, for most people a promotion at work would be
considered a challenge and be associated with positive emotions.
Once a situation has been defined as potentially threatening or challenging we con-
sider what we can do to cope with the situation. Secondary appraisal involves asking
ourselves if we have the resources or abilities to cope with the situation or event. If we
believe we do not have the ability to cope with the situation or event we perceive it as
stressful. Until this point we would refer to the situation or event as a potential stressor,
now it will be considered as stressor. Stressors then are those situations or events in the
workplace that we perceive to be a threat or challenge and that we believe we do not
have the ability to deal or cope with.
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Therefore, another reason workplaces function in the face of stress is likely due to
the fact that not everyone appraises the same situation or event the same way. Once
again personality traits can play a role. For example, those high in negative affectiv-
ity may be more likely to appraise situations or events negatively (i.e., during primary
appraisal they may be more likely to see events or situations as threatening). Alter-
natively, optimistic individuals may be more inclined to view events or situations in a
positive way and see a challenge.
7.3.3 People cope with stressors differently
People can engage in a variety of coping strategies. Researchers have devoted much
attention to two strategies proposed by Lazarus and Folkman (1984) and a third strategy
proposed by Moos and Billings (1982).
Lazarus and Folkman proposed problem-focused coping and emotion-focused cop-
ing. People engage in problem-focused coping when they attempt to deal directly with
the stressor, usually with the hopes of removing it. For example, if you must complete
an assignment that requires the use of a computer program that you do not understand,
problem-focused coping could involve taking a training session on how to use the soft-
ware. People engage in emotion-focused coping when they attempt to deal with the
emotions that accompany the stressor, rather than the stressor itself. For example, turn-
ing to your coworkers and discussing your concerns about your lack of experience with
the program would be an example of emotion-focused coping.
Moos and Billings (1982) introduced appraisal-focused coping. People engage in
appraisal-focused coping
indexcoping strategies!appraisal-focused when they attempt to deal with a stressor by
denying that it exists or by reinterpreting it. Deciding to avoid the office and go to
the movies instead of taking that training session is an example of appraisal-focused
coping, as is rationalizing not taking the training session because you are convinced that
you will never be able to use the software. It is easy to imagine that personality traits
are useful in explaining why some people choose one coping strategy over another.
Therefore, a third reason why workplaces function in the face of stress is that not
everyone chooses the same strategy to cope with the same stressor. However, it is
important to be aware of one danger in interpretation of these coping strategies. No
one coping strategy is necessarily superior to another. At first glance it may seem
obvious that one should always attempt a problem-focused coping strategy. Why not
remove the stressor entirely? But what if the worker has no control over the situation?
If one has chosen an occupation where a stressor is inherent (and to remove it would
mean no longer being in this occupation) an emotion-focused coping strategy may not
be a bad alternative. Think about the coping strategies available to firefighters, police
officers, and dentists.
7.3.4 Organizations deal with the negative effects of stress in dif-
ferent ways
Not all organizations deal with stressors in their workplaces in the same way. A de-
tailed description of organizational strategies to combat the negative effects of stress
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in workplaces is beyond the scope of this discussion. However, it is unacceptable to
imply that the sole reasons why organizations function in the face of stress are due to
individual differences in workers. Organizational leaders also have a role to play.
Organizations combat the negative effects of stress in their workplaces in a number
of ways (Murphy, 1992). Tertiary preventive interventionsare efforts to assist those
workers who have been unable to cope with stressors in their work environment. Em-
ployee assistance programs such as programs to fight drug and alcohol abuse are exam-
ples of tertiary preventive strategies. Secondary preventive interventions are efforts to
assist workers who currently are facing stressors in the workplace. For example, pro-
viding time management training for managers is a secondary preventive strategy. Such
training may provide managers with a few more coping options. Although helpful, both
tertiary and secondary preventive strategies tend to put the onus back on workers to deal
with the stressors in their work environment. Primary prevention, the final intervention
to be discussed, puts the onus back on the organization. Organizations use primary
prevention strategies when they attempt to reduce or entirely remove stressors in their
workplaces. For example, giving workers greater control over their jobs, or reducing
workloads would be examples of primary prevention strategies.
Therefore, a final reason why workplaces function in the face of stress (and why
some workplaces function better than others) may be the fact that organizations deal
with the sources and the effects of stress in their workplaces differently. Not surpris-
ingly, given the expense involved in many primary prevention efforts, organizations
have historically made more use of tertiary and secondary preventive strategies than
primary prevention strategies.
7.4 Stressors in the Workplace—A Researchers’ Frame-
work
Sauter, Murphy, and Hurrell’s (1990) framework for describing potential stressors in
the workplace is frequently used in the literature. In it they describe several critical
stressors in the workplace. Please note that they do not include the physical work
environment in their framework. However, the physical environment can be a stressor
in the workplace. Think about the noise or heat levels that workers are exposed to in a
manufacturing setting and how these levels may affect workers.
Sauter et al. (1990) consider:
Work Load and Work Pace: Work load consists of role overload, having too much
work or having too difficult a job to complete; and role underload, having too
little work or having too easy a job to complete. Both overload and underload as
well as machine-paced work have been linked to health outcomes.
Work Schedule: Strain outcomes have been linked to the temporal scheduling of work
(e.g., night shift, rotating shifts, 12 hour shifts).
Role Stressors: They are derived from Role Stress Theory (Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn, Snoek,
& Rosenthal, 1964). They include role ambiguity—a lack of understanding of
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what is expected of you, and role conflict—having incompatible work demands.
Both are associated with strain.
Career Security: Job insecurity, or insecurity about the long-term job prospects have
been linked to strain.
Interpersonal Relationships: The social context at work should be considered as a
potential stressor. Social relationships can be positive—people receive social
support, and negative—there can be conflict within and between work groups.
Job Content: The nature of the job or task should not be forgotten. It includes the
skills and abilities that are required as well as the degree to which one is respon-
sible for other people.
Control: Although not listed explicitly in their framework of workplace stressors,
Sauter et al. (1990) discuss control over one’s work in their list of factors that
determine the impact of work on worker health. Greater levels of control over
one’s work are associated with less strain.
This list of potential workplace stressors is by no means complete, but these stres-
sors could be considered core stressors in any workplace. For researchers studying
workplace health the changes and trends in today’s workplace are driving the need to
expand such lists (Hepburn, Loughlin, & Barling, 1997). For example, the face of the
workforce is changing and as more and more women enter the workforce issues related
to work and family balance are emerging. Globalization has led to downsizing and
mergers and the call for work teams. Technological advances are encouraging debate
about “deskilling” of the workforce and the need for “reskilling”. The effect of these
changes on workers and their organizations must be considered. Trends show that more
and more people are working part time yet much of the research in the field of work
stress and health has focused on full-time employees. What does it mean to be part
of this “contingent” workforce (e.g., part-time and contract employees)? These and
other questions are “challenging” researchers interested in how people function in the
workplace.
Chapter 8
Sleep: What’s the point?
Darren K. Hannesson
W hen I was dating my wife-to-be, we once had an argument. Well,actually we had lots of arguments, but once we argued about what Iwas doing with my time. I had been playing a lot of hockey with myfriends and, to be honest, spending less time with her than I usually
had. She said that if she was important to me, more important than hockey, that should
be reflected in the amount of time I spent with her. I conceded the point, “upped” my
“wife-to-be” time by decreasing my hockey time (“sniff”) and, two cats, two kids, and
a minivan later, the rest is history, as they say.
I share this story with you not to lament my hardship, but to make the point that
the relative importance of activities in our lives is often reflected in how much time we
spend doing them. By this criterion, there is nothing we do that is more important than
sleep. In fact, next time you are asked what you are doing with your life, I suggest the
most honest reply would be: “sleeping, mostly”. On average, humans spend about 1/3
of their lives sleeping—between 7–8.5 hours a day, 50–60 hours a week, 2500–3000
hours a year, or between 200,000–300,000 hours a lifetime.
Given the importance of sleep, you would probably expect that we have a very
good understanding of what sleep is and why we do it. However, you’d be mistaken.
Surprising to me at least, sleep is proving to be a great mystery on all fronts, although
we have adopted some good operational criteria to define what it is. In this chapter, we
will briefly explore what psychologists know about sleep, how it is defined, and why it
occurs.
8.1 What Is Sleep?
Everyone feels pretty sure he or she knows what sleep is. Indeed, the difference be-
tween being full awake and fully asleep is like the difference between “day and night”.
But, if you are like me, upon being roused while watching a boring movie, you might
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have asked more than once, “Was I asleep?”. Or, alternatively, you may have shaken a
friend’s shoulder to get her to open her eyes, and then interrogated her with suspicion
when she’s claimed she was really asleep (a duplicitous ploy my wife uses sometimes
to make me answer the phone instead of her!). Such cases illustrate that sleep, and par-
ticularly the transition from waking to sleeping, is much harder to define with certainty
than one thinks. In general terms, sleep is defined by a decrease in arousal associated
with reduced responsiveness to sensory input and reduced motor output. But where is
the line between resting quietly with your eyes closed and being asleep? What’s the
difference between being in a coma and being asleep? Sleep researchers and clinicians
have thus turned to operational criteria to define sleep precisely.
8.1.1 Sleep stages
The the main tools used to define sleep are the electroencephalogram (EEG), elec-
tromyogram (EMG) and electrooculogram (EOG). Each of these tools measures elec-
trical activity and converts it into movements of a line up or down (see Figure 8.1),
such that the record produced looks like a squiggly line. An EEG is recorded by plac-
ing electrodes on the scalp of a person (or other animal), which then detect the elec-
trical activity of the cerebral cortex underneath the skull. The signal obtained reflects
the summed activity of large populations of cortical neurons in the brain regions be-
low the electrodes, and is analogous to the crowd noise that would be recorded by a
microphone hanging from the bottom of a blimp over a football stadium. Sleep is re-
flected in characteristic patterns of brain activity with distinct appearances on the EEG
record. EEG, therefore, is the primary tool used to define sleep. An EMG is recorded
by placing electrodes on the skin overlying major muscle groups, which detect the un-
derlying electrical activity associated with muscle contractions. Although EMG could
be used to monitor a range of different muscle groups, in sleep research EMG usually
is targeted at muscles in the body core (as opposed to the periphery), with neck mus-
cles being the standard choice. An EOG is recorded by placing electrodes over the eye
muscles, and thus detects eye movements. EOG is the primary criterion for defining
the rapid-eye-movement (REM) stage of sleep, discussed subsequently.
Using these tools, researchers have discovered that sleep is not a simple continuous
state, but rather a dynamic one associated with a number of distinct orderly phases,
each characterized by particular patterns of EEG, EMG, and EOG recordings (see Ta-
ble 8.1) (Hobson, 1989; Kavanau, 1994; Rechtschaffen, 1998). In fact, sleep can be
differentiated into 4 distinct stages, termed stages I through IV, which are all distinct
from an awake state.
When a person is awake, but quiet (e.g., reading), the EEG recorded consists of low
amplitude (i.e., small) irregular waves reflecting high, but generally asynchronous brain
activity (see Figure 8.2). Intermittent muscle activity and eye movements are reflected
in high amplitude but irregular activity in the EMG and EOG respectively. Compared
to waking, stages I-IV of sleep, in general, are associated with an increase in regularity
and amplitude, a decrease in frequency of EEG activitym and a decrease in EMG and
EOG activity. Thus, stage I, the lightest sleep stage, is associated with reductions
in EEG amplitude and frequency and reduced EMG and EOG activity (although some
slow eye movements are evident in the EOG) relative to waking. The frequency of EEG
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Figure 8.1: Illustration of some general characteristics of an electrogram. Up and
down deflections of a pen are created by changes in the electrical signal recorded by
one or more electrodes. The paper moves at a constant rate creating a squiggly line
that reflects changes in electrical activity over time. Two measures used to characterize
the resulting trace are spike amplitude (i.e., the height of the pen deflections, measured
vertically from v to v) and the frequency (i.e., the number of cycles, defined as one up
deflection followed by one down deflection, per unit time, measured horizontally from
f to f ).
waves is between 3 and 7 waves per second (i.e., 3–7 Hz), a pattern called theta waves.
Stage II is associated with an increase in the regularity or synchronization of EEG
activity, and the appearance of two intermittent wave patterns, termed sleep spindles
and K-complexes. Sleep spindles are 1–3 second bursts of waves at a frequency of
about 10 Hz that recur about every 10 seconds during stage II of sleep, although they
are occasionally seen during other sleep stages as well. K-complexes refer to a single
large (e.g., high amplitude) wave and are seen exclusively in stage II. Stage III and stage
IV sleep are closely related to one another, and are collectively referred to as slow-wave
sleep or deep sleep. In stage III, a low frequency (around 1 Hz) high amplitude type
of activity called delta waves appears, and both EOG and EMG activity are very low.
Stage IV is differentiated from stage III simply by the percentage of time spent in delta
waves—with 50% being the threshold for transition from stage III to IV (and in fact
much of stage IV is spent in near continuous delta wave activity).
8.1.2 The sleep cycle
There is a regular progression through the stages of sleep that is called the sleep cycle
(Carskadon & Dement, 1994; Hobson, 1989). Prior to falling asleep, alpha waves, a
higher amplitude lower frequency wave form, begin to appear in the awake EEG. These
waves reflect a transition from being fully alert to drowsy, and seem to be required
before a person can fall asleep. Alpha waves are absent from the EEG in a person that
is fully alert and engaged in activity (and who, of course, would not fall asleep). When
a person falls asleep, they enter stage 1 and move stepwise down through each stage
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Table 8.1: EEG, EMG, and EOG characteristics during different stages of sleep.
Stage EEG EMG EOG
I Mostly moderate amplitude
theta waves Moderate activity Low activity
II Moderate amplitude theta waves
with K complexes and sleep spindles Moderate activity No activity
III Large amplitude with
<50% delta waves Low activity No activity
IV Large amplitude with
>50% delta waves Low activity No activity
REM Low amplitude irregular waves No activity High activity
and then back up (i.e., I → II → III → IV → III → II → I). A sleep cycle is concluded
upon returning to stage 1 and is typically about 90 minutes in duration.
A typical night’s sleep consists of 5 to 6 cycles, with successive cycles usually
containing a larger percentage of time spent in stage I sleep (see Figure 8.3). In fact, in
many cases no slow wave sleep occurs during the last 1 or 2 sleep cycles of the night.
Interestingly, some evidence suggests that people feel most refreshed when they are
awakened at the conclusion of a sleep cycle (Hobson, 1989). This possibility suggests
you might be better off, in some cases, setting your alarm clock a bit earlier to wake
yourself at the likely end of a sleep cycle (e.g., at six hours from the time you went to
bed) rather than getting a bit more sleep and waking up mid-cycle (e.g., at 6.5 hours
from the time you went to bed).
An additional important component of sleep is called rapid-eye-movement or REM
sleep (Carskadon & Dement, 1994; W. Dement & Kleitman, 1957; Hobson, 1989).
REM sleep is unique in that EEG activity returns to lower amplitude irregular activity
resembling quiet waking, and there is an increase in EOG activity reflecting the rapid
eye movements for which this stage is named. REM sleep occurs during stage 1 sleep
at the end of sleep cycles, and thus is not typically seen during the first bout of stage 1
sleep, unless a person is sleep deprived. REM sleep is the phase of sleep most associ-
ated with dreaming, with people generally reporting dreaming about 80% of the time
when awakened during this stage. The content of the dreams is typical of what most of
us think of as dreams, and can often be quite elaborate.
My favorite REM dream I’ve had consisted of an episode in which I had been called
up to play for the Philadelphia Flyers, and was on a shift standing in front of the net.
The puck popped loose, but when I went to shoot I realized I had a fork instead of a
hockey stick. Eventually, I managed to shovel the puck in anyway and the announcer
went wild, screaming: “He shoots, he forks!”. REM dreams often feel very vivid but
none of the actions in the dreams get acted-out because, aside from the eye muscles,
there is a near total loss of muscle tone during REM sleep, as evident in a nearly flat
EMG record. This muscular inhibition is actively maintained by particular parts of
the brain, and probably prevents injuries that might otherwise occur from acting out
particularly physical dreams. In studies with cats, researchers have been able to block
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Figure 8.2: An EEG record illustrating quiet waking (the upper trace) and stages I
through IV of sleep (each successive trace). K indicates a K-complex during stage II,
spindles denotes sleep spindles also present during stage II, and D marks delta waves,
which are present during stage III and IV. Note that REM sleep is not shown but pro-
duces an EEG trace largely similar to that of quiet waking.
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Figure 8.3: Time spent in different sleep stages during a typical human 7.5 hour night
of sleep. X denotes periods of REM sleep. The vertical axis represents stage of sleep
and the horizontal axis represents time in minutes from “bedtime”.
muscular inhibition during REM sleep and found that cats frequently engage in mouse
hunting type behaviours, leading to speculation that mouse hunting is a likely topic of
cat dreams (Morrison, Sanford, Ball, Mann, & Ross, 1995). Dreams are sometimes
seen in other sleep stages (collectively termed non-REM sleep), but only about 7% of
the time. Also, dreams during non-REM sleep are typically simpler, and usually mainly
sensory in nature. A classic non-REM dream would simply be the sensation that one
was falling.
8.2 Why Do We Sleep?
8.2.1 Theories of why we sleep
In terms of the time we commit to it, sleep might be the most important thing we do,
and therefore it follows that sleep should make some easy-to-discover and substantial
contribution to our overall functioning or well-being. In fact, the purpose of sleep is
presently unknown, and there are a variety of opposing and highly contentious views.
This ignorance has also been the case historically, and many interesting and speculative
accounts have been proposed. One widely held primitive view was that sleep involved
the departure of the spirit from the body, allowing it to cavort temporarily in the spirit
world (Hobson, 1989). Because the spirit animated the body, this account explained
both why the body seems almost dead during sleep and why we dream—dreams are a
fuzzy recollection of the spirit’s adventures away from the body.
Although there are a variety of contemporary accounts for sleep, most can be
grouped into two general categories: recuperative theories, and evolutionary/circadian
theories. Recuperative theories hold that sleep repairs or otherwise helps maintain the
body (Carskadon & Dement, 1994; Rechtschaffen, 1998; Reimund, 1994). According
to these views, being awake disturbs the body, causing either damage and/or a departure
from homeostasis (i.e., physiological stability of the body); being asleep repairs this
damage and/or restores homeostasis. Furthermore, according to the strictest interpre-
tation of these views, sleep should occur (or at least become “desired”) when the body
reaches some threshold level of disruption, and should last until repair/homeostasis is
re-achieved.
According to evolutionary/circadian theories sleep is part of a 24-hour cyclicity to
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our behaviour determined by pressures of natural selection (Cohen, 1979; Kalat, 2004;
Kleitman, 1963; Rechtschaffen, 1998). We, and most other species, have evolved in an
environment with two distinct phases: day and night. Moreover, all species have faced
the need to achieve survival and reproductive goals under conditions in which there
is varying degrees of competition for adequate supplies of food and nutrients. The
evolutionary/circadian view holds that sleep, then, is an adaptation produced by these
selective pressures. There are likely differences in how well any given species could
function during one set of conditions (e.g., day) compared with the other (e.g., night).
The evolutionary/circadian view holds that it would have been adaptive to maximize
activities during the phase for which a species is optimally suited, and to minimize ac-
tivity during the other phase. In addition, it would have been adaptive for a species to be
active each day just long enough to achieve evolutionary significant goals, such as food
and mate procurement, but remain inactive otherwise, via sleep, to ensure that poten-
tially scarce energy/nutrient reserves are not wasted. Thus, the evolutionary/circadian
view predicts that a species should sleep during that part of the day-night cycle for
which it is least well suited, as a means of protection from accidents and predators.
Furthermore, the duration of sleep should reflect the approximate daily time required
to achieve significant survival and reproductive goals without wasting energy on unim-
portant activity.
Evaluating recuperation versus evolutionary theories, however, is difficult. Dam-
age/homeostatic imbalances produced by waking, and which require sleep for repair,
are proving difficult to identify. For example, muscle fatigue, although an obvious ex-
ample of waking-related “damage”, is repaired equally well during quiet rest as it is
during sleep (Rechtschaffen, 1998). At the same time, to some degree, evolutionary-
based theories require speculation about ancestral conditions and associated pressures
that are challenging to verify. Nonetheless, there are several important sources of data
that enable evaluation of some of the predictions of these two types of sleep theories:
the comparative analysis of sleep, the effects of sleep deprivation, and general circadian
effects.
8.2.2 Evaluating the predictions of theories for sleep
Comparative analysis of sleep
The comparative analysis of sleep provides a number of interesting observations rele-
vant to hypotheses on why we sleep. First, all mammal and bird species studied so far
engage in sleep (Kalat, 2004; Rechtschaffen, 1998; Winson, 1993). Moreover, sleep
occurs despite the fact that it may be accompanied by significant risk, as it is for prey
species that are consequently less vigilant for potential predators while asleep, or re-
quire elaborate adaptations, and as it does for some marine mammals, such as dolphins,
that must be able to surface regularly for air, and therefore sleep with only half the brain
at a time (Mukhametov, Supin, & Polyakova, 1977). This incredible pervasiveness of
sleep makes two significant points:
1. sleep must be important for something, and
2. the primary purpose of sleep cannot relate to some special, higher-order human
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function (e.g., resolving emotional conflict).
A second important observation derived from the comparative analysis of sleep
is that there is incredible variability in the normal duration of sleep between species
(Kalat, 2004). Sloths earn their moniker through a daily average of about 20 hours,
whereas humans and pigs are in the middle, at about 8 hours. At the low end, cows
get about 3 hours, and horses and deer get about 2 hours. This variability demonstrates
that large amounts of sleep are not necessarily required by general mammalian physiol-
ogy. It also shows that sleep duration doesn’t necessarily relate to daily activity levels.
Sloths aren’t exactly burning up the jungle in those 4 daily hours of waking! Moreover,
the case of sloths stands in striking contrast with that of horses, which can easily travel
upwards of 60 miles in a day, and yet require only about 2 hours of sleep?!?
Indeed, the absence of any positive correlation between daily activity and sleep du-
ration across species clearly refutes any simply-formulated recuperation theory that ar-
gues that sleep is caused by the accumulation of waking-related damage or disturbances
in the body, which must be reversed by a corresponding duration of sleep-related re-
pair. In contrast, an evolutionary/circadian account is far more compatible with the data
on the duration of sleep across species. Many of the species that sleep very little are
grazers, such as zebras, which are at greatest risk to being preyed-upon while sleeping,
and at the same time need long hours devoted to eating because of the relatively low
nutrient density of grasses. Conversely, many species that sleep longer hours are big,
successful carnivores, such as lions, which obtain and consume large nutrient dense
meals in a relatively short proportion of time, and are at little risk of predation during
sleep.
Sleep deprivation
The effects of sleep deprivation are particularly germane to assessing the predictions of
theories as to why we sleep. Recuperative theories make the clear prediction that sleep
deprivation should have obvious consequences on the body, with cumulative damage
and homeostatic disruptions accompanying increased deprivation. They also predict
that greater amounts of sleep should be required when greater amounts of damage or
homeostatic disruption have occurred, and thus a positive correlation between amount
of time awake and amount of time spent asleep. We all know that we feel lousy when
we don’t get our usual amount of sleep. This common observation would appear to be
prima facie support for recuperation theory. But particular caution must be exercised in
interpreting our own subjective experiences and anecdotal reports we hear from others
about sleep deprivation. First, it is difficult to disentangle the effects of sleep depriva-
tion from what has caused the sleep deprivation. Most of us dont deprive ourselves of
sleep simply to investigate the effects of sleep deprivation. Usually sleep deprivation
occurs because we are under stress to accomplish something, we have been celebrating
with perhaps too much food and drink, or we are otherwise not feeling well. Thus, it
is easy to misattribute feeling lousy the next day to sleep deprivation when the more
significant culprit may be the factor that caused the sleep deprivation. Second, it can
be difficult to determine the extent to which we are experiencing meaningful adverse
effects from sleep deprivation. For example, although we may feel sleepy, our bodies
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may be otherwise functioning at normal levels.
One of the most interesting sources of information of sleep deprivation comes from
the well-publicized case of a 17-year-old, young man named Randy Gardner from Cal-
ifornia (W. C. Dement, 1978). Under the supervision of doctors and psychologists and
with the assistance of a number of friends, Randy stayed awake for just under 11 days.
At no time did doctors find any cause for concern about Randy’s health, and at the
end of his stunt, he gave an entirely coherent press conference. Overall, he reported
that he felt well, although he did complain of sleepiness, irritability, and boredom oc-
casionally. Psychological assessments during his deprivation revealed relatively few
effects besides some alteration of visual perception, which he described as brief bouts
in which aspects of the world seemed illusory, or dream-like. The absence of more
profound physiological or psychological disturbance after such prolonged deprivation
is difficult to reconcile with recuperative theories.
An additional component of Randy’s experience also was not supportive of recu-
perative theories. When Randy finally slept, despite missing out on about 88 hours of
usual sleep, he awoke after only 14 hours, and thus regained only 6 of those lost 88
hours. He didnt regain any further sleep on subsequent nights either, as he returned
to his normal 8 hours a night. If the main purpose of sleep is to repair the normal
damage/homeostatic disruption that occurs in about 16 hours of waking and requires
about 8 hours of sleep, it is difficult to imagine how 260 hours of waking-related dam-
age/homeostatic disruptions, almost 20 times as much as normal, would require only
14 hours of sleep, or about 1.75 times as much as normal. However, Randy is but a
single case and could therefore represent an anomaly.
There have been experimental studies of sleep deprivation in humans and other ani-
mals that have had somewhat conflicting findings (Horne, 1988). Generally, the human
studies have investigated a wide range of physiological and psychological functions,
and have found few or no disturbances. The three consistent effects appear to be minor
and include increased sleepiness, increased irritability, and reductions in some aspects
of attention, although there is some question as to whether the attentional impairments
are a secondary result of microsleeps (colloquially known as “the headnod”) (Durmer
& Dinges, 2005). Microsleeps are 2-3 second episodes of stage 1 sleep that begin to
appear intermittently after several days of sleep deprivation. In contrast to the human
studies, dramatic results have been obtained in many studies of sleep deprivation in
non-human animals (Rechtschaffen, 1998).
For example, studies in rats have sometimes resulted in death within 2 or 3 weeks
of even partial deprivation. However, it is not clear whether sleep deprivation or stress
is the real culprit in such studies. In contrast to human studies, animals cannot be told
that they may drop out of the study at any time if they aren’t enjoying the experience.
They also can’t be told that the deprivation will end after a fixed period of time. Finally
the techniques for sleep deprivation in animals are often very stressful in themselves.
For example, one technique, called the flower pot method, involves placing the subject
on a balanced pedestal surrounded by water. When the animal enters sleep and relaxes
its postural muscles the pedestal tilts leading to a “rude awakening” as the animal slides
into cool water. Indeed, there is considerable evidence of stress-related effects, such as
stomach ulcers, in these animal studies that aren’t seen in the deprivation studies with
humans.
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Circadian rhythms
According to the evolutionary /circadian account, sleep represents a programmed cyclic-
ity in our activity that was selected by evolutionary pressures. Consideration of some
of the features of circadian effects in organisms is generally consistent with such a
view. The term circadian, roughly translated from the Latin root, means “about a day”.
It is used to describe behavioural or physiological cycles that are roughly one day in
duration (Hastings, 1997). The circadian sleep/wake cycle is the most obvious exam-
ple of such phenomena, but things such as body temperature and hunger also have a
natural daily rhythm (Arendt, 1998). At one point, most psychologists assumed that
such rhythms were led by environmental information or cues about time of day. Such
cues, called zeitgebers, are numerous and include such obvious things as the intensity
of outdoor light or the position of the sun, and more subtle things, such as ambient
temperature or activity of other organisms (e.g., when the rooster crows it is morning).
However, a number of findings have now demonstrated that most circadian effects,
including sleep, are largely controlled by a genetically programmed internal biological
clock, although zeitgebers can have a modulatory influence (Mistlberger, 1994). The
most poignant illustration of this endogenous periodicity comes from studies in which
humans or other animals have been kept in conditions devoid of zeitgebers (e.g., a room
with constant lighting conditions and no other information about time of day). In these
cases, circadian variation in behaviours such as sleep is maintained, strongly arguing
that such rhythms must be endogenously driven. Interestingly, however, for humans the
sleep/wake cycle drifts to about 25 hours in these cases, which indicates that zeitgebers
do have a modulating influence that normally keeps our cycle at 24 hours. Additional
studies have shown that post-natal experience with the day-night cycle is not required
for the expression of circadian rhythms in zeitgeber-free conditions, further illustrating
the existence of a genetically programmed internal clock (Richter, 1971). The presence
of such a clock is, of course, required by the evolutionary account for sleep, but its
presence alone is not necessarily incompatible with recuperation theories. For example,
circadian sleep rhythms could provide a regular impetus for recuperation, but still allow
the duration of sleep to be shortened or lengthened depending upon how much activity-
dependent, damage/homeostatic disruption an individual had experienced.
However, the data available suggest that circadian rhythms are relatively impervi-
ous to modulation in a manner predicted by recuperation theories. Numerous studies
have attempted to shift experimentally the sleep rhythm in humans or other animals
by exposing individuals to increases in physical, mental, or physiological stress; in all
cases, little to no change in the circadian sleep cycle occurs (Mistlberger, 1994). In
other words, a day of hard physical labour doesn’t appear to alter when a person feels
sleepy or how long they stay in bed, at least under experimental conditions (O’Connor
& Youngstedt, 1995). And because increased exposure to stressors ought to increase
the need for body repairs or homeostatic adjustment, recuperation theories’ prediction
of increased requirements for sleep under these conditions is simply not supported.
A related source of data comes from experiments in which people are forced to stay
up later than usual. In these cases, recuperation and evolutionary theories make strik-
ingly different predictions. Recuperation theories again predict that longer durations
of waking should produce greater damage/homeostatic disruption and therefore result
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in greater than normal sleep. Evolutionary/circadian theories predict that sleep should
still be largely confined to its normal time of day, and, therefore, being awake during
part of your normal sleep period should in fact lead to less than normal sleep. Such
studies have found that individuals get less total sleep than normal, consistent with the
evolutionary theories’ prediction, although they do often sleep somewhat beyond their
normal waking time (Wever, 1979).
A final illustration of the primacy of circadian factors versus recuperative factors
in motivating sleep, which you can and probably will try at some time during your
university career, comes from staying up all night. Recuperation theories predict that
the longer you have been awake, the sleepier you should get as damage/homeostatic
disruptions mount; evolutionary/circadian theories predict that you should actually be-
come less sleepy as your normal waking time approaches. In fact, consistent with what
night shift workers talk about as “getting over the hump”, people begin to feel less
sleepy as morning approaches.
8.2.3 Conclusions on sleep theories
Overall, evolutionary/circadian accounts for sleep are more consistent with some of the
characteristics of sleep. And, if these theories are correct, there are some interesting
implications for how we should approach sleep. First, if sleep needs don’t relate to
the events of the preceding or subsequent day, we need to change our thinking about
deviations from our normal sleep habits. In other words, expressions like “Get some
sleep, you had a big day today (or have a big day tomorrow)” should become obsolete.
Second, if sleep evolved to solve ancestral needs of protection and energy optimiza-
tion, little if any sleep may really be required in environments like modern Canada,
where the selective pressures of ancestral times simply aren’t present. Night-related
danger, particularly in urban areas, is no longer substantial due to the ubiquity of artifi-
cial lighting and the virtual absence of dangerous predators. Energy optimization also
is not particularly important under conditions where the food supply is plentiful. In
fact, excess energy consumption is one the major problems faced in Canada. Perhaps
reducing the amount time spent conserving energy through sleep, then, could be part
of a solution to the obesity problem in Canada!
However, it is important to point out that, although a strict interpretation of recuper-
ation theories, in which there is a direct relation between degree of waking related body
disturbances and sleep needs, seems untenable, a role for sleep in repair or homeostatic
processes cannot yet be fully dismissed (Rechtschaffen, 1998). For example, it may
be that although sleep was “designed” to solve adaptive problems related to protection
and energy conservation it may also provide an important period for body recuperation.
The failure to detect any simple relation between degree of waking-related damage or
homeostatic disruption and sleep needs, then, might be explained by the possibility that
repair functions typically require much less sleep than we get (and therefore additional
sleep isn’t required when the amount of repairs needed goes up). Indeed, one idea that
has emerged is that there are two types of sleep—core sleep and optional sleep (Horne,
1988). Core sleep may consist of only a few hours of sleep each night, and includes the
time required for body repairs and homeostatic adjustments. Optional sleep, then, is
any extra sleep, which solely serves the purposes of protection and energy conservation
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proposed by evolutionary/circadian accounts. This middle ground seems reasonably to
coincide with common sense, and suggests that most of us might be able to increase
our productivity (or time for fun) without ill-effect by at least reducing the number of
hours we sleep, if not forgoing sleep altogether.
Chapter 9
Psychopharmacology
Darren K. Hannesson
H ow many people in Psychology 1000 are junkies? How many are regularillicit drug users? How many frequently take mind-altering drugs of somekind? How many have used a drug that changes brain activity in the lastweek? The last month? The last year? Although the exact type and pattern
of use varies, chances are most of you have personal experience with recreational drugs
in some form. Maybe you have had a caffeine fix with a cup of java or a chocolate bar
and a coke. Maybe you have been stupid and had a couple of smokes, or put on a
funny hat and had a few drinks at a sporting event. Maybe you got a bit tipsy once, and
drank a shooter from somebody’s cleavage, or maybe you even had a couple of tokes
listening to some cool music.
No big deal perhaps. But maybe you went a bit further, and experimented once, and
did a line of powder or even mainlined some smack, horse, big H, doogie, white lady,
junk, schoolboy (all street names for heroin). That may be a little hard core perhaps,
but chances are that some of you, at least, have gone too far with drugs and suffered
some adverse effects. Maybe you have worshiped at the porcelain altar, or were in an
accident of some sort. Maybe you have shared some drugs with a minor, or consumed
so many pills or drinks that you have found yourself passed out on the floor, or zonked-
out, half-naked on a picnic table. Maybe you have even had a bad stretch of intense
drug use that caused your hygiene or health to deteriorate, or even an acute medical
crisis.
Drug use is extremely prevalent in our society (and around the globe) and heavily
permeates pop culture. Although data vary somewhat from study to study and across
different parts of the world, representative numbers for the percentages of teens and
adults (13 and up) taking various kinds of drugs can be seen in Table 9.1 (Maisto et
al., 2004). Approximately 40% of North American adults are likely to have tried illicit
drugs, about half of which can be accounted for by experimenting with marijuana.
Legal drugs such as nicotine (tobacco) and alcohol have dramatically higher lifetime
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Table 9.1: Prevalence of psychoactive drug use in North America (adapted from Maisto
et al., 2004). Data are expressed as a percentage of adults over age 18 that have used a
particular category of drugs in the past month, year, or at all. Numbers in parentheses
are data for adults in the 18–25 year old age bracket only.
Drug Past Month Past Year Lifetime
Illicit drugs 7 (20) 12 (32) 40
Illicit drugs (not marijuana) 3 6 24
Psychotherapeutic drugs (misuse) 2 5 15
Nicotine 25 (38) 30 (47) 45
Alcohol 50 (60) 65 (75) 90
Caffeine 80 85 98
use rates of about 50% and 90%, respectively. The ubiquitous drug, caffeine, which
can be found in coffee, tea, chocolate, and many kinds of pop, is regularly consumed
by an astounding 80% of adults and is likely to have been tried by as many as 99%.
In fact, caffeine is even routinely given to children (in the form of chocolate and pop).
When consideration is restricted to the age range of typical university students, the data
are even more striking. Illicit drug use in the last month is about 20% (vs. 7% for adults
in general), cigarette use is about 38% (vs. 35% for adults in general), and alcohol use
is about 60% (vs. 50% for adults in general).
So, a lot of people are using drugs. So what? A lot of people are eating pizza. A lot
of people are going to movies. Why, as a society, do we care so much about drug use?
The reason is simple. The drugs just mentioned alter the way that people think, act, and
feel, and thus can have a profound effect on how individuals function. Because a large
number of individuals engage in drug use, this behaviour can have a cumulatively large
effect on society. But that is not all. Because drugs can be powerfully reinforcing, they
can produces patterns of use and behaviour that can be very difficult to change. This
resistance to change, then, limits the extent to which drug use can be curtailed even in
the face of adverse individual or societal consequences.
Although a numerical value probably is not needed for any of us to appreciate the
significance of the potential adverse effects of drug use, some quantification helps put
the magnitude of the problem into perspective. However, quantifying the exact effect
of drug use is incredibly complex. Many of the societal problems whose incidences are
dramatically increased in association with drug use are difficult to evaluate. What are
the costs of murders, assaults, rapes, accidents, and relationship problems that arise,
in part, from drug use? Nevertheless, to get some sense of the costs of drug use,
researchers have tried to quantify part of it by focusing on measurable things such as
insurance payouts for accidents, lost productivity from absenteeism at work, treating
drug-related illnesses, and crime. In the U.S. alone, the figure obtained is about $400
billion (Shreiner Institute for Health Policy, 2001), or the equivalent of the entire annual
revenues of the Government of Canada!
Given the prevalence and effect of drug use, it is worthwhile to know something
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about these kinds of drugs, what effects they produce, and how they produce them.
The objective of this chapter, then, is to introduce briefly some concepts in the broad
and fascinating field of psychopharmacology (the study of drugs and their effect on
behaviour) and explore a few commonly used drugs for illustrative purposes.
9.1 The Bases for Drug Actions
There are, of course, many different kinds of drugs. But, you may have noticed that the
types of drugs I have been talking about share certain similarities, and are different from
things like cumidin to thin the blood or viagra to treat penile erectile dysfunction. So,
we are not talking about just any drugs, but specifically those that affect our thoughts,
feelings, and actions. These are called psychoactive drugs. But pizza can also affect
my thoughts, feelings and actions. What is the difference between a psychoactive drug
and pizza? Although there are grey areas, drugs are generally differentiated from other
substances by the fact that they are not normally required for the maintenance of health,
in contrast to substances such as food, vitamins, or water.
The field of psychopharmacology is broad, with many drugs of interest, and many
questions to ask. As an introduction, this chapter can cover only a small slice. We will
look at a few drugs used primarily for their recreational value and ask “what effects
does this drug produce” and “what mechanisms mediate the drug’s effects”. Before we
can do that, however, we need to look briefly at the bases for normal thoughts, feelings,
and behaviour.
9.1.1 The neural bases of experience brain, neuron, and synapse
A central tenet of neuroscience and psychology is that every feeling, thought, and, in
fact, all psychological phenomena are based on the activity of the nervous system, and
primarily the brain. Actions or behaviours, then, are the product of interaction between
the brain and the body. If we use a PET scanner to record the activity of the brain
of an awake person, we can see that at any moment there are areas of the brain that
are more active than others. When we ask the person to do something (e.g., think
of the word “monkey”), we can see changes in the areas of brain that become active
(Demonet, Thierry, & Cardebat, 2005). Furthermore, when we ask the person to do that
same thing again, we see many of the same changes in brain activity. This consistency
leads us to believe that experience (i.e., thinking of the word “monkey”) is mediated
by patterns of activity across the brain.
But what exactly is brain activity? Brain activity consists of the summed activity of
billions of cells, called neurons. These billions of neurons are interconnected with one
another via thin fibres, which enable them to send and receive signals. The primary
function of a neuron, and how the brain and nervous system ultimately work, can be
thought of as communication—a network of billions of neurons “talking” with one
another by sending, receiving, and processing signals.
The key to understanding how most psychoactive drugs work is understanding the
mechanisms of neuronal communication (and how drugs affect it). Generally, there are
two steps. First, because neurons are of some length, they need a way to send signals
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along that length. This signalling is achieved through unique, electrochemical proper-
ties of neurons that enable them to conduct electrical signals in a way that resembles
the conduction of electricity along a wire. Second, once the signal gets to the end
of a neuron, it has to be transmitted to the next neuron. This transmission occurs at
specialized junctions, called synapses, through a process called synaptic transmission.
Synaptic transmission is the most complex and flexible component of neuronal
communication, and is the primary process affected by most psychoactive drugs. A
synapse is made up of the terminal part of the fibre from one neuron sending a sig-
nal (which we call the pre-synaptic neuron), part of the neuron that will receive the
signal (which we call the post-synaptic neuron), and the space in between. When the
electrochemically-conducted signal reaches the terminal, it causes the release of spe-
cial chemicals that are stored in packets there into the synaptic space. These chemicals
are called neurotransmitters because they transmit signals between neurons. Once in
the synaptic space, neurotransmitters interact with specialized proteins found on the
surface of the post-synaptic neuron, called neurotransmitter receptors, and produce
changes in the activity of the post-synaptic neuron.
There are a few important points to note about synaptic transmission. First, there
are many different kinds of neurotransmitter molecules (50 or more), although any
given neuron generally produces and releases only a few of these. Thus, there are
differences in the types of neurotransmitters seen in different parts of the brain and
differences in the extent to which different neurotransmitters are involved in different
brain functions. Second, for each neurotransmitter, there are specific receptors that se-
lectively interact with that neurotransmitter, and not other molecules normally found in
the brain. Furthermore, for most neurotransmitters, there are several different subtypes
of receptor with which it can interact. Third, for the most part, the net effect of the
signals transmitted at synapses ultimately comes down to producing either an increase
or decrease in the activity of the post-synaptic neuron. Thus, we call synaptic trans-
mission that increases the activity of the post-synaptic neuron excitation (or excitatory
transmission). Transmission that decreases the activity of the post-synaptic neuron,
we call inhibition (or inhibitory transmission). Different neurotransmitters tend to be
involved in producing excitation or inhibition, although some neurotransmitters can
produce either, depending upon which of its receptor subtypes with which it interacts.
9.1.2 Drug effects on synaptic transmission
The main way that psychoactive drugs affect brain activity, then, is by altering synap-
tic transmission. In general, most drugs can be grouped into one of two categories.
Agonists are drugs that mimic or enhance synaptic transmission, mediated by a partic-
ular neurotransmitter or neurotransmitter receptor. Antagonists are drugs that block or
reduce synaptic transmission, mediated by a particular neurotransmitter or neurotrans-
mitter receptor. These effects are usually achieved by either: 1) changing the amount
of neurotransmitter found in the synaptic cleft, or 2) interacting directly with neuro-
transmitter receptors.
In quick summary, then, the way drugs affect behaviour is by affecting activity at
synapses, which changes the frequency of activity of affected neurons, thus altering
patterns of activity across the brain. Because patterns of brain activity mediate our
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thoughts, feelings, and behaviour, drug-induced changes in brain activity alter the way
we think, feel, and act. Different psychoactive drugs produce different effects because
they produce agonistic or antagonistic effects on different neurotransmitters or neuro-
transmitter receptors.
9.2 Nicotine
indexnicotine Nicotine, derived from the tobacco plant, is one of the most widely used
drugs in the world. The tobacco industry generates about $45 billion a year, with as
many as 2 billion users(Goldberg, 2003). Nicotine is usually consumed by smoking,
which involves inhalation into the lungs, where absorption is rapid across the blood-
vessel rich linings (Hukkanen, Jacob 3rd, & Benowitz, 2005). In fact, nicotine may
reach the brain within 7 seconds after inhalation, which, remarkably, is about twice as
fast as for a drug injected intravenously.
The tobacco plant, two species of which are commercially cultivated, is the only
known natural source of nicotine. This plant was indigenous to South America, and
tobacco was likely used by the indigenous populations there for perhaps thousands of
years (Maisto et al., 2004). It caught on like wild fire once discovered by 15th century
Europeans; by the 1600s it was everywhere around the globe. Interestingly, despite its
popularity, smoking was opposed by such prominent figures as the pope, the Russian
czar, and the emperor of Japan. However, laws or edicts proved ineffective in curtailing
its use. As one modern researcher has noted “no society that has ever taken up tobacco
use has ever abandoned it” (Brecher, 1972).
Although smoking, in the form of cigarettes, cigars or pipes, is the most common
route of administration, nicotine is also consumed in the form of snuff, a processed
mixture of tobacco, salt, oils, and flavorings, that can be snorted and absorbed across
the nasal membranes. It can also be consumed in the form of chewing tobacco, which
is absorbed across the linings of the mouth and cheeks. Nicotine, in fact, is readily
absorbed across any body tissue (Hukkanen et al., 2005), a fact that is capitalized on
by several products designed to make quitting smoking easier. Nicotine gum relies
largely on absorption across the linings of the mouth and cheeks (called trans-mucosal
absorption), and “the patch” relies on absorption across the skin (called ).
The main action of nicotine is as a mild brain stimulant (Goldberg, 2003; Wonna-
cott, Sidhpura, & Balfour, 2005). Thus, it increases arousal, which is thought to be
the reinforcing action of the drug, and enhances certain cognitive functions, such as
short-term memory. Like many stimulants, nicotine also suppresses appetite, which
may be part of why people often eat more when they quit smoking and gain some
weight. Vomiting or nausea can be induced by nicotine, which is why novice smokers
sometimes “turn green”, but tolerance to this effect develops rapidly. The main physio-
logical effects of nicotine include increasing heart rate and blood pressure and reducing
muscle tone. The chronic stimulatory effects of smoking on the cardiovascular system
help account for the smoker’s dramatically increased risk of heart disease and stroke.
At high doses of about 60 mg, nicotine can even kill a person. And although a typical
cigarette contains between 5 and 10 mg. nicotine, overdose by smoking is practically
impossible because only about 1 mg gets absorbed per cigarette, and levels don’t build
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up too much because nicotine gets eliminated from the body fairly quickly.
The mechanism of nicotine actions involves its ability to activate directly one of the
subtypes of receptors for the neurotransmitter acetylcholine (Wonnacott et al., 2005).
This receptor is an excitatory receptor (i.e., it stimulates activity of neurons), and is
widespread throughout the brain and other parts of the body, including muscle tissue
and the autonomic nervous system, which is important in regulating the activity of your
internal organs. Not surprisingly, acetylcholine is implicated in all of the various func-
tions that nicotine effects, including arousal and cognition, regulating muscle activity,
and regulating activity of the cardiovascular system. One of the significant effects of
nicotine in the autonomic nervous system is to promote release of adrenaline—which
produces part of the rush of having a smoke.
9.3 Alcohol
Behind caffeine, alcohol is probably the most widely used psychoactive drug consumed
by humans (Maisto et al., 2004). In fact, alcohol pervades our cultures in ways not seen
with any other drug. It is an integral part of a wide range of human social phenomena,
including weddings, sporting celebrations, christenings, religious ceremonies, parties,
and musical events. Alcohol use is at least 10,000 years old; in fact, it has been sug-
gested that the first human civilizations in Sumeria may have arisen in response to the
need for a stable home base to make beer! Indeed, the prevalence of written informa-
tion on brewing beer in the clay tablets dating from this time and region suggest that
alcohol was a topic of some importance.
So what is alcohol? There are a variety of organic compounds referred to as al-
cohols, but the form we drink is “ethanol”. Alcohol is consumed in a wide variety of
beverages that are derived from the fermentation of sugars by yeast. Barley malt is the
source of sugar for beer, honey for mead, grapes for wine, and various other fruits for
fruit wines. There is a limit, however, to how much alcohol can be produced before
the yeast kill themselves off (about 5% for beer, and about 12% for wine), which thus
restricts that maximum alcohol content of fermented products. To create products with
a higher alcohol content, then, the process of distilling evolved, leading to the creation
of spirits such as whiskey or cognac.
Because alcohol is thus made in the form of “tasty” drinks, it is almost exclusively
consumed via the oral route, where it is absorbed in the intestines. It can, however,
be administered effectively intravenously, as well; hospitalised alcoholics will often be
put on an alcohol drip to avoid severe withdrawal symptoms.
Like all drugs, the effects of alcohol are related to the dose taken. One important
variable that differentiates alcohol products, then, is the concentration of alcohol in the
drink, usually expressed as percantage alcohol. Thus, if you drink 1 glass (250 ml) of
beer that is 5% alcohol, you are taking 12.5 ml of alcohol (250 ml x 0.05). A 30 ml
(about 1 ounce) serving of whiskey that is 40% alcohol would also give you about 12
ml of alcohol (30 ml x 0.40). Thus, a glass of beer is about the equivalent of a one
ounce drink of “hard stuff”.
Once consumed, alcohol is eliminated from the body relatively slowly, and thus
produces effects that can last hours after consumption has ceased (Goldberg, 2003;
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Maisto et al., 2004). The enzyme, alcohol dehydrogenase, found mainly in the liver,
plays a prime role in inactivating alcohol by metabolizing it to acetylaldehyde. How-
ever, a fraction of the alcohol consumed is cleared directly via the lungs, kidneys, and
skin—a fact that has some important practical implications. Clearance via the lungs en-
ables breathalizers to be used to estimate blood alcohol level by measuring the amount
of alcohol being secreted from the lungs (which is usually about 1/20th the amount in
the blood). Clearance through the skin also contributes to the fact that someone who
has been doing some heavy drinking can be detected by the “reek of booze” even for
some hours after they have stopped drinking.
The effects of alcohol on a person is a function not only of the amount of alcohol
consumed, but also of how quickly it is being cleared from the body—the end result
being the amount of alcohol that is in the blood, known as the blood alcohol level
(BAL)(Goldberg, 2003; Maisto et al., 2004). Typically, about 8–10 ml of alcohol, or
almost 1 drink, can be cleared per hour. Thus, consuming one or more drinks per hour
leads to elevations in BAL that are proportional to the number of drinks taken per hour
and a person’s blood volume. At a BAL of 0.04% (0.04 mg / 100 ml of blood), mild
intoxication usually becomes evident. At 0.08%, a frequently used threshold for legally
defined intoxication, more profound intoxication becomes apparent. At 0.16%, gross
intoxication is evident, at 0.28% stupor, and approaching 0.48% can be fatal.
Alcohol is a brain depressant, causing reductions in overall brain activity(Deitrich,
Dunwiddie, Harris, & Erwin, 1989; Maisto et al., 2004; McIntosh & Chick, 2004). The
net result depends on the dose, but in general alcohol produces varying degrees of im-
pairment of a wide variety of psychological and physiological functions (although it is
important to note that the exact behavioral effects resulting from these impairments can
be significantly modulated by environmental or contextual factors, especially at lower
BALs). Psychological functions that are disrupted include attention, memory, speech,
and reasoning/judgment. The last effect, which typically involves disinhibition (i.e.,
doing things you normally would stop yourself from doing), is considered one of the
most problematic or dangerous effects of alcohol intoxication, both for individuals and
society. Thus, lapses in judgement may play a role in drunk driving, alcohol-related
violence, and dangerous sexual behaviours. Additional impaired functions include sen-
sory processes in all modalities and motor functions.
Physiologically, alcohol inhibits secretion of antidiuretic hormone, a hormone that
normally inhibits micturition (“peeing”). This inhibition explains why drinking can
promote an inordinate number of trips to the bathroom and leave you dehydrated af-
terwards (Wiese, Shlipak, & Browner, 2000). Alcohol also has a number of other
physiological effects that can lead to weight gain (the dreaded “beer belly”). Besides
typically being high in otherwise non-nutritious calories, alcoholic drinks inhibit fat
metabolism and increase gastric secretions thereby promoting appetite (Suter, Schutz,
& Jequier, 1992).
Although it has long been known that alcohol suppresses neuronal activity, its pre-
cise mechanism of action has long been unclear (Deitrich et al., 1989; Maisto et al.,
2004). Recent advances suggest that alcohol works in at least three ways. First, alco-
hol produces a nonspecific disruption of the conduction of neural signals by changing
the membrane properties of neurons. Second, alcohol is an agonist at a subset of re-
ceptors for the neurotransmitter GABA, which is the main inhibitory neurotransmitter
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in the brain. Third, alcohol is an antagonist of the neurotransmitter glutamate, the
main excitatory neurotransmitter in the brain, and decreases glutamate activity both
by decreasing the amount that gets released into synapses and by blocking a subset of
glutamate receptor subtypes.
9.4 Marijuana
Marijuana is by far the most commonly used illicit drug (Maisto et al., 2004). It is
sometimes called cannabis because it comes from plants of the cannabis genus (mainly
cannabis sativa). Cannabis plants are believed to be indigenous to India, but are quite
hearty and have been found to grow readily almost all over the world (Abel, 1980).
Marijuana has been used medicinally for thousands of years to treat muscle spasms,
nausea, and pain; more recently, the plant was grown by American settlers for its fibres,
which are strong, versatile, and called “hemp”. Hemp clothing, for example, is now
widely available and coveted for its durability. Recreational marijuana use, in North
America at least, did not really spring up until the last century, and its spread may have
been largely fueled by the prohibition on alcohol.
The main means for administering marijuana involve drying the leaves and rolling
them into a marijuana cigarette, also called a “joint” or “spiff”. The tops and flowers of
the female plant are considered the best, and are called “ganja”; the lower leaves and
stem are poorer quality, and are called “bhang”. In addition to joints, it is becoming
increasingly common to smoke marijuana with bong pipes. These pipes have a pocket
of water between the burning marijuana and the user, which is thought to filter out some
of the harsher chemicals in the smoke. Marijuana is also sometimes processed to create
a higher concentration of the active ingredients. Hash is created by processing the dried
leaves into a resin, thereby removing most of the fibrous part of the plant. This resin
can be smoked in pipes, “hot-knifed” or simply ingested (e.g., as hash brownies). Hash
oil is made by boiling hash in alcohol and getting the purest resin separated from all
other parts of the plant. It is usually added to tobacco cigarettes and smoked, though it
too can be ingested. Smoking produces more rapid absorption than eating, and, as with
cigarettes and nicotine, the active ingredients of marijuana can reach the brain in less
than 10 seconds after smoking (Iversen, 2000).
Marijuana produces a wide range of psychological effects (Goldberg, 2003; Iversen,
2000; Kalat, 2004; Maisto et al., 2004). Its popularity as a recreational drug derives
primarily from its ability to produce euphoria (a state of giddy happiness) and reduced
anxiety. Additional effects include analgesia, increased appetite, short-term memory
impairment, reduced motor coordination, and perceptual disturbances. Much of the
controversy over the dangers of marijuana use relates to the effects of long-term use
and something called the amotivational syndrome. Opponents of marijuana use sug-
gest that long-term users exhibit a broad decline in motivation that adversely affects
daily functioning; research does indeed show that regular marijuana users score lower
on tests of motivation. However, the effect is small and skeptics point out that indi-
viduals who become regular marijuana users may simply be less motivated to begin
with.
Physiologically, marijuana increases the heart rate and dilates peripheral blood ves-
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sels (which can lead to blood shot eyes, which can sometimes serve to tip-off someone
as being “stoned”). Marijuana also leads to dilation of the bronchial passages in the
lungs, and thus has been used to treat asthma (a disorder involving constriction in the
lungs). However, the utility of marijuana in this situation is limited by the fact that
marijuana smoke also damages the lungs, and thus could potentially exacerbate asthma
and produce other lung problems, such as cancer, in the long run. Marijuana also has
well known effects on both the male and female reproductive systems. It suppresses
testosterone production and leads to decreased sperm counts and reduced libido. It can
also suppress ovulation in females.
Although marijuana has a wide range of very real effects on psychological and
physiological functioning, and some of these are clearly undesirable, there are many
myths that have been perpetuated about it (Kalat, 2004). For example, it has been
suggested that marijuana causes brain damage, infertility, insanity, and violence. At
present, the available research fails to support any of these claims (Goldberg, 2003;
Maisto et al., 2004).
Until relatively recently, the mechanisms of action for marijuana were not under-
stood. We now know that marijuana contains more than 500 different chemicals, 60
of which are unique to this plant, and called cannibinoids (Maisto et al., 2004). Some
of these cannibinoids, then, are responsible for marijuana’s actions mainly via interac-
tions with the brain. It was recognized fairly early on that one of the most important
molecules, but definitely not the only one, was tatrahydrocannabinol (THC). But, no-
body knew how THC or other components of marijuana exerted effects on brain ac-
tivity until THC-specific receptors were found in widespread regions of the brain (and
body). This discovery, however, only posed a new question. Why were these receptors
there? It took several more years before a molecule endogenous to the brain, called
anandemide, was found that also could activate these receptors (termed cannibinoid
receptors) (Howlett et al., 2004). Interestingly, anandemide was shown to bear remark-
able structural resemblance to THC, but its normal function in the brain is still not
known.
9.5 Conclusion
Psychoactive drugs are substances that alter the way we feel, think, or act, but are not
needed for normal maintenance of body health. They act by altering patterns of activity
across brain regions, typically through effects on synaptic transmission. Different drugs
produce a range of psychological and physiological effects, which depend in large part
upon which neurotransmitter (or neurotransmitter receptor) they affect and whether
they produce agonistic or antagonistic effects. For any given drug, the strength and
even nature of its effects vary with dose, which in turn can be significantly affected by
the route of drug administration. These points were illustrated by looking at three of
the most commonly used recreational drugs—nicotine, alcohol, and marijuana.
76 Psychopharmacology – Hannesson
Chapter 10
Brain Plasticity
Bryan Kolb
D onna was born on June 14, 1933. Her memory of her early life is sketchybut those who saw her early on report that she did not seem to knowanything for some time. She could neither talk, nor walk, nor even use atoilet. Indeed, she did not even seem to know who her father was, although
her mother seemed more familiar to her. Like all children, Donna grew quickly and in
no time she was using and understanding simple language and could recognize lots of
people by sight almost instantly. Donna began taking dancing lessons when she was
four and was a “natural”. By the time she finished high school she was ready for a
career as a dancer with the National Ballet. Her career as a dancer was interrupted in
1958 when she married and had two children. Donna never lost interest in dancing
and kept fit in her years at home with the kids. In 1968 her children were in school
she began dancing again with a local company. To her amazement, she still could do
most of the movements although she was pretty rusty on the classic dances that she had
once so meticulously memorized. Nonetheless, she quickly relearned. In retrospect
she should not have been so surprised as she had always been known as a person with
a fabulous memory.
In 1990 Donna was struck by a drunk driver as she was out on an evening bicycle
ride. Although she was wearing a helmet she suffered a closed head injury (among
other injuries!) and was in a coma for several weeks. As she awakened from the
coma she was confused and had difficulty in talking and in understanding others, she
had very poor memory, she had spatial disorientation and often got lost, she had vari-
ous motor disturbances, and she had difficulty recognizing anyone but her family and
closest friends. Brain scans revealed diffuse cerebral injury with some focal injury on
the ventral surface of the temporal and frontal lobes where the brain presumably was
banged against the skull in her fall. Over the ensuing 10 months she regained most
of her motoric abilities and language skills and her spatial abilities improved signifi-
cantly. However, she found herself to be short-tempered and easily frustrated with her
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slow recovery. She suffered periods of depression. Two years later she was once again
dancing, but she now found it very difficult to learn new steps. Her emotions were
still labile, which was a strain on her family, but her episodes of frustration and temper
outbursts were becoming much less common. A year later they were gone and her life
was not obviously different from that of other 55 year old women. She did have some
cognitive changes that persisted, however. She could not seem to remember the names
or faces of people that she met and was unable to concentrate if there were distractions
such as a television or radio playing in the background. She did not seem to be able to
dance as she had before her injury and she retired from her life’s first love.
Donna provides a typical example of one of the most intriguing and important prop-
erties of the human brain: it has a capacity for changing its structure, and ultimately
its function, throughout our lifetime. This capacity to change, which is known as brain
plasticity, allows the brain to respond to environmental changes or changes within the
organism itself. Consider the plasticity in Donna’s brain. When she was a newborn she
was confronted with a world that nature could not possibly have prepared her for. She
had to learn language, to distinguish different faces, to walk, to ride a bicycle, to read,
to dance, and so on. Since her brain is solely responsible for her behaviour, this means
that her brain somehow had to change to reflect her experiences. When Donna reached
puberty her body changed but so did her thoughts. Her dreams often had sexual content
and, since her dreams are a product of her brain, there must have been some change
in her brain activity to change her dreams so dramatically. This change was likely in-
duced by the estrogen surge of adolescence. When Donna returned to dancing after a
10 year break, she had retained much of her skill, even though she had not practised
at all. In this case the brain somehow did not change and she could quickly relearn
what she had lost. After her accident, Donna had to “relearn” how to talk and walk and
so on. In actual fact she did not go through the same process she had as a baby but
something in her brain had to change in order to allow her to regain her lost abilities.
Whatever changed in her brain must have had some limits, however, because she never
did recover her memory or her ability to learn new dances.
Thus, in the life of Donna we can see several different types of brain plasticity.
First, during her early childhood the brain changed dramatically in its structure, or-
ganization, and behaviour. These changes were not accomplished quickly: her brain
was fundamentally different from its adult form until at least 12 or 14 years. Indeed,
the plastic changes in the developing brain are so profound that a child is effectively a
different creature at different stages of its own development! The brain’s plasticity re-
flects more than mere maturational change, however, as it includes the ability to change
with experience. Indeed, the capacity to alter brain structure and function in response to
experience provides the nervous system with the ability to learn and to remember infor-
mation. Some experiential changes are self evident, such as the acquisition of specific
bits of knowledge, whereas other changes are more subtle, such as perceptual learning
or the development of different problem solving strategies. Nonetheless, regardless of
the nature of experiential change, the brain has altered its form and function. Finally,
after a brain injury processes are recruited to change the brain again. In this case the
brain must reorganize, at least in part, in order to allow the production of behaviours
that have been lost.
Although the property of brain plasticity is most obvious during development, the
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brain remains malleable throughout the life span. Indeed, it is evident that we can learn
and remember information long after maturation.
Furthermore, although it is not as obvious, the adult brain retains its capacity to
be influenced by ‘general’ experience. For example, being exposed to fine wine or
Pavarotti changes one’s later appreciation of wine or music, even if encountered in
late adulthood. The adult brain is plastic in other ways too. For example, one of the
characteristics of normal aging is that neurons die and are not replaced. This process
begins in adolescence, yet most of us will not suffer any significant cognitive loss
for decades because the brain compensates for the slow neuron loss by changing its
structure. Similarly, although complete restitution of function is not possible, the brain
has the capacity to change in response to injury in order to at least partly compensate
for the damage.
The brain is plastic in another way, too. Imagine the problem of learning a com-
pletely new skill, such as juggling while perched on a unicycle. Initially one is totally
inept but with practice at least some people can master the task. Thus, a new behaviour,
or set of behaviours, has been acquired. From what we have just discussed, it should be
obvious that the brain has changed. But what has changed it? One candidate is the be-
haviour itself. That is, if we repeatedly engage in a particular behaviour, the behaviour
itself can alter the brain, which in turn facilitates the behaviour. The idea that activity
might change the heart or muscles is seldom questioned. The possibility that behaviour
could change the structure and function of the brain is seldom considered! Neverthe-
less, it is an important aspect of brain plasticity. Indeed, there is little doubt that even
thought can change the brain. Consider the now extensive research on the variables
influencing eye-witness testimony. Different people’s accounts of the same events are
notoriously inconsistent, in part because they are altered significantly by questions or
thoughts ‘planted’ by others. That is, the ”’memory”, and by inference the brain, is al-
tered by cognitive activity. In a general sense this is the process of perceptual learning
where we learn about the world by observing and thinking about sensory experience.
The property of brain plasticity confronts us with a host of fundamental questions.
First, since we assume that the brain produces behaviour, then how is it that a changing
brain can produce stable behaviour? Shouldn’t behaviour change if the brain is chang-
ing? Indeed, how do we remember anything if the brain is changing every time we
learn something? Second, it has been assumed since the time of Broca (i.e., the mid
1800s) that at least some functions are localized in the cortex. If the brain is plastic,
what does this imply for the nature of cortical organization? Third, what are the con-
straints on plasticity? There must be factors such as hormones or other chemicals that
can directly control processes fundamental to plasticity. Fourth, it seems likely that the
brain has some type of limits in the extent to which it is plastic. What are the limits
and what determines them? Fifth, there is the general question of establishing what the
properties of the nervous system are that enable it to be plastic. And, more specifically,
are all regions of the brain equally plastic? Sixth, there is a clinical, and even poten-
tial educational, question of whether we can gain control of the plasticity and turn it
on or off at opportune times. Finally, there is the interesting question of what factors
influence plasticity and whether individual differences in different abilities may at least
partly reflect differences in the brain’s capacity for plasticity.
In sum, the study of brain plasticity provides a window on some of the fundamen-
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tal questions in psychology and neuroscience. In particular, it allows a way of looking
at the neurological bases of fundamental psychological processes such as learning and
thought, and the manner in which these develop. It also leads to consideration of impor-
tant clinical issues surrounding behavioural change, whether it be related to recovery
from neurological injury or disease or psychopathology related to other causes.
10.1 Assumptions and Biases
As we consider the properties of the brain that make it plastic, we need to consider
several biases and assumptions that underlay thinking about plasticity.
10.1.1 Behavioural states, including mind states,
correspond to brain states
Although this idea is not novel, and probably appears to be self-evident to most neuro-
scientists, it has been a central philosophical issue since the time of Descartes. In fact,
modern day philosophers still debate this issue seriously, in large part because mind (or
‘cognitive processes’ in modern jargon) is the central psychological problem. I shall
assume that it is the brain that thinks and controls behaviour, and try to show that an
understanding of plasticity will be enlightening with respect to how it does these tricks!
10.1.2 The structural properties of the brain are important in un-
derstanding its function
It follows from my first assertion that changes in the physical structure of the brain
will be reflected in changes in its functioning. Although many behavioural scientists
(e.g. Skinner) have seen the hardware of the brain as virtually incidental to the study
of its function, this is not my view. Rather, I assume not only that changes in hard-
ware underlay behavioural change but also that it is possible to identify and potentially
influence those changes. This does not imply that a single structural change is respon-
sible for all behavioural change, nor that a particular behavioural change is due to only
one morphological change, nor that an understanding of morphology means an under-
standing of the functional properties that emerge from the morphology. It does mean,
however, that the cerebral hardware places significant constraints on the computations
of the brain and may provide important clues for understanding the nature of those
computations.
10.1.3 Plasticity is a property of the synapse
The Spanish anatomist Ramo`n y Cajal was the first to postulate in the early part of this
century that the process of learning might produce prolonged morphological changes in
the efficiency of the connections between neurons. However, it was not until 1948 that
a Polish neuroscientist, Jerzy Konorski, formally proposed a mechanism. He suggested
that appropriate combinations of sensory stimuli could produce two types of changes in
neurons and their connections: (1) an invariant but transitory change in the excitability
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of neurons, and (2) an enduring plastic change in neurons. In other words, Konorski
suggested that when neurons are active they change. This change might be transitory,
much as when one looks up a phone number and then forgets it, or it might be enduring,
such as the case in which a telephone number is memorized. The idea that neurons
are somehow changed with use is important for it means that one could look at the
neuron and try to identify the changes. The question is, however, where do you look?
A Canadian psychologist, Donald Hebb, proposed in 1949 that the logical place to
look is at the synapse. He suggested that when synapses are active, they change if
the conditions are right. The nature of the right conditions are beyond the current
essay, but Hebb’s idea that the principal change in neurons with repeated activity is at
the synapse has proven to be correct. This means that during development, learning,
recovery from injury, and aging, there are changes at the synapse that allow the brain
to be functionally plastic.
10.1.4 Behavioural plasticity results from summation of
plasticity of individual neurons
It should be self evident that no single neuron will have much influence upon functional
plasticity but this needs to be stated explicitly. After all, in a brain with 1010 neurons
(or more!) it would be inconceivable to think that any one neuron would make much
difference. Note, however, that in animals with very simple nervous systems, such as
tiny worms that have in order of 100 neurons, changes of a single neuron may be very
important. We might predict that such “brains” would be less plastic than the human
brain because it would make no sense to have it changing every time one of the neurons
was especially active.
10.1.5 Specific mechanisms of plasticity are likely to underlie more
than one form of behavioural change
The nervous system is likely to be conservative in its construction. Thus, general
mechanisms that are used for one type of behavioural change, such as in learning
and memory, may also form the basis of other types of behavioural change, such as
in recovery from brain injury. This preconception does not exclude the possibility of
specific mechanisms for different types of plasticity, but it has the advantage in that it
allows studies of one form of plasticity to provide insights into mechanisms involved in
others. Indeed, it has become clear in recent years that the structural changes underly-
ing experientially-induced plasticity such as in perceptual development are remarkably
similar to those underlying recovery from some types of brain injury.
10.1.6 The cortex is the most interesting candidate for neural plas-
ticity
Some neural structures are likely to be more plastic than others. It is reasonable to sup-
pose that if one were designing a brain it would make little sense to make all synapses
equally plastic. After all, one presumably needs some constancy in a labile system if
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function is going to remain stable. For example, one could imagine that it might be
advantageous for basic spinal reflexes to be less plastic than those processes involved
in lexical memory (i.e., vocabulary). One difficulty, however, is that it is often difficult
a priori to predict what features of neural organization are likely to be more or less la-
bile. There are several reasons to suppose that the mammalian cortex might be a place
to search for plasticity. First, it is the cortex of humans that stands out as the largest
development in brain evolution. Hence, when calculations are corrected for body size,
it is the cortex that has grown disproportionately in the human brain: human cortex is
three times larger than one would expect for a typical mammal.
One of the functional correlations of this increased cortical volume is an increase in
behavioural flexibility, so it follows that the cortex might be the most interesting place
to look for a relationship between plasticity and behaviour. Cross-species comparisons
of cortical structure are enlightening in this regard. For example, if one compares the
thickness of cortex across mammalian species, one of the most obvious observations
is that cortical thickness correlates with perceived intelligence. Monkeys have thicker
cortex than carnivores, who in turn have thicker cortex than rodents.
One striking similarity, however, is that the number of neurons in a “column” of
cortex is the same across species. That is, mice and humans have the same number
of neurons across a slab of cortex. This means that the difference in cortical thick-
ness is due to neural processes (dendrites and axons), which basically means synapses.
Thus, we see that increasing the processing capacity across species is associated with
an increase in synapses. Similarly, within a species, there is a marked difference in
cortical thickness during development, even though the number of neurons declines
significantly during development. Again, it is the connectivity that accounts for the
increase in thickness. In sum, the cortex is a particularly interesting candidate for
studying plasticity-behaviour relationships. Of course, a disadvantage is that the cortex
is complex in structure and in function. Although this may be a compelling argument
to consider “simpler” neural systems, such as Aplysia, it is not a substantive argument
for not studying the cortex. Indeed, the complexity has an advantage in that the cortex
contains a wide variety of neuron types, transmitter types, and receptors for hormones
and other growth factors. This would seem like fertile ground for study, in spite of the
complexity.
10.2 Building a Better Brain
An interesting story is unfolding at a nunnery in Mankato, Minnesota. A group of
about 700 elderly sisters have become an experiment in brain building. There are two
unusual things about the sisters of Mankato. First, they are long-lived. Of the 150
retired nuns at Mankato, 25 are older than 90. Curiously, according to David Snowden
who has been studying the nuns, it is those nuns who earn college degrees, who teach,
and who are constantly challenging their minds who live longer than less-educated
nuns who clean rooms or work in the kitchen. Second, the nuns have agreed to donate
their brains to neuroscientists to study. The idea is that there should be a fundamental
difference between the brains of the long-lived well-educated nuns and the shorter-
lived, less well educated nuns. What might this difference be? Given the assumptions
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that we considered above, the likely difference is in the synapse.
At the same time that Hebb was proposing a synaptic explanation for learning,
he did an interesting experiment. He brought several laboratory rats home from his
laboratory at McGill and released them in his home. The idea was that these animals
would get a more stimulating environment in his home, especially as his wife chased
them around the kitchen with a broom, and this might increase their “IQ”. To test his
idea, he compared the later maze learning performance of his pet house rats to their
littermates who lived in a drab and unstimulating laboratory cage. The results were
unequivocal. The “enriched” experience improved maze performance.
Subsequent studies by many groups have shown that the reason was that the brains
changed. For example, my colleagues and I have found that living in a large rat condo-
minium with lots of toys can increase overall brain weight by up to 10% in two months
(e.g., Kolb & Gibb, 1991). What causes the increase? Again, based upon Hebb’s idea,
we have looked at the synapse. The simplest way to do this is to examine the den-
drite (see Figure 10.1). The dendrite is basically an extension of the cell body upon
which synapses can be made. Consider an arboreal metaphor. Suppose you want to
increase the number of leaves on a tree in order to increase the total amount of photo-
synthesis. There would be three basic ways. First, one can increase the density of the
leaves. Second, one can lengthen the branches and keep the density constant. Third,
one could increase the amount of photosynthesis by simply increasing the size of the
existing leaves. If one imagines the leaves as synapses, then there are three potential
synaptic changes: increased density on the dendrites, increased dendritic length and
increased synapse size. In fact, all three types of changes are found. Thus, the enriched
experience has built a brain with more synapses—in effect, a better brain. Thus, when
the brains of the Sisters of Mankato are studied, it is likely that there shall be a clear
increase in the dendrites.
10.3 Rebuilding a Broken Brain
About 60,000 Canadians will suffer a stroke this year and an equal number will suf-
fer a closed head injury. (That’s the population of Lethbridge for each!) Both stroke
and closed head injury victims have ‘broken brains’ and thus, broken behaviour. Until
recently it was believed that because we cannot grow new brain cells after birth, there
was no possible way to recover from brain damage. Any improvement that was seen
after brain injury was considered to be a result of a reduction in swelling or shock. It
is now becoming clear, however, that the brain has a built in mechanism that can af-
fect at least some repair. Thus, as the brain changes in response to experiences, it also
changes in response to injury. That the brain has such a capacity may not be surprising
when we consider that brain injury involves the loss of neurons. Since we lose neurons
constantly during our lifetime, the brain must have a mechanism in place to accommo-
date this loss. Imagine a region of the brain with 500 neurons. Assume each neuron
has 10,000 connections. Simple arithmetic tells us that the region has 500 x 10,000
= 5,000,000 connections. Now assume that 10% of the neurons die, leaving us with
450 neurons. If the number of connections was important to maintaining function, then
we ought to be able to increase the number of connections in the remaining neurons.
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Figure 10.1: Typical neurons of rats raised in “enriched” environments or in isolated
laboratory cages. Note the increased dendritic branching in the enriched cell. Short
sections of dendrite in the middle panel illustrate the the density of dendritic spines in
the terminal (T), oblique (O), and basilar (B) regions.
Thus, increasing the connections of each remaining neuron by about 10% leaves us
with the same number of connections. This is what happens during aging. Thus, up
until very old age, there is a continual increase in the number of connections on each of
the remaining cortical neurons. As a result, most people suffer very little behavioural
loss until well into old age. In the case of dementing diseases, such as Alzheimer, this
fails to occur and there is behavioural loss much sooner. The key here is that the loss
of neurons is gradual and not in a concentrated location. In a sense, we spend most of
our adult life rebuilding a breaking brain!
Let us now see what happens when the brain is broken suddenly and in a localized
area, such as in a stroke. In this case, millions of neurons and billions of connections
are lost. As long as at least some of the original functional regions are intact, it ought
to be possible to stimulate them to grow more connections, much as in aging, and
this will allow some recovery of function. The complete loss of a given area would
be impossible to recover from, however, because adding new connections to a region
involved in vision is not going to allow language to recover.
Studies in laboratory animals have shown that whenever there is significant recov-
ery of behaviour, there is a growth in the dendritic trees, and thus in the number of
connections, in the remaining regions involved in the damaged behaviours (e.g., Kolb,
Gibb, & van der Kooy, 1994). Furthermore, it appears that various factors may play
an important role in stimulating the growth of new connections. These are known as
“trophic factors” and they are chemicals that the brain normally produces during de-
velopment in order to assist in generating connections in the first place. In addition, it
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should be apparent that since experience can influence connectivity, it ought to be pos-
sible to develop therapies that would stimulate the brain to produce more connections
that might assist in recovery of function.
One of the implications of the plastic changes that underlay both recovery from
the processes of aging and brain injury is that the brain may be more successful in
recovering in younger animals than in older ones because there are more remaining
neurons to change. This pattern is unfortunately the case. Another implication is that
people who have brain damage early in life may not be as successful in staving off the
effects of age on the brain. This pattern, too, appears to be the case.
10.4 Conclusion
One of the fundamental, and most interesting, properties of the brain is its plasticity.
This feature of the brain allows us to learn and to benefit from experience. It also
allows us to live a relatively long life during which we are able to continue to learn new
things. Current research is elaborating the ways that the brain is plastic and discovering
ways to control the mechanisms that underlay plasticity. This offers considerable hope
that sometime in the not too distant future we will be able to build better brains and to
repair broken ones.
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Chapter 11
Questions About The Brain’s
Behaviour
Bryan Kolb
It is often stated that the basis of an education is to learn the questions. Mygoal in this essay is to introduce you to the key questions about the bestcomputer you will ever own—the one between your ears.
We begin by reviewing the life of our hero, Felix. Felix is a university student.
He awoke at his usual time of 7:30 AM on a Friday morning. As he sat up he was
puzzled as he tried to figure out if his memory of a peculiar episode, in which he tried
to subdivide his bedroom, was a dream or reality. It was a dream! He got up, showered
and dressed, and made his usual breakfast of coffee and toast while listening to the
morning show on the radio. Felix had stubbed his toe the day before and it was still
sore so he took some aspirin. He left his apartment and headed for school in his old
car. He met his classmates before his biology class and they discussed the upcoming
exam. He later went to the computer lab and worked on a paper. By 4:00 he was fed
up with university and headed for the Student Union pub to unwind over a beer with
some of his colleagues, including his girlfriend, Phyllis. He and Phyllis later went out
for dinner and discussed moving in together. They went to a movie and slept at Phyllis’
place.
There is little in the day in the life of Felix that is remarkable. Indeed, I can forgive
readers who found his life pretty boring. However, let us consider his life in a different
way by doing a postmortem on what his day entailed. When Felix awoke, it was at the
same time he always awakes on school days. Why? Felix does not use an alarm so what
is it that allowed Felix to wake up, or for that matter, what is it that caused him to go to
sleep in the first place? Felix had a dream about subdividing his bedroom. Why would
he have a dream at all, let alone one about his bedroom? (Think about his plans with
Phyllis!) Why did he have to consider whether his experience was a dream or reality.
What is different about his sleep when he was dreaming and his sleep when he was not
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dreaming? Felix got up, and went to shower and get dressed. To do this, he had to know
where the bathroom was, how to turn on the water, how to do up buttons and shoe laces
and so on. We take these abilities for granted but people with certain types of brain
injury can no longer perform simple operations such as showering and shaving, even
though they may be quite capable of carrying on an intelligent conversation. Further,
children do not find operating showers simple.
Felix had his breakfast and while doing so he consumed two drugs (aspirin and
caffeine). Later he consumed another drug (alcohol). Why did the caffeine and alcohol
affect his mood and energy level while the aspirin did not? Why did the aspirin make
his toe feel better? Felix drove his car to school and barely gave a thought to how to
work the gears, how to park, or what route to take. He also stopped at a red light and
drove through a yellow one, but the whole time he was singing along to the music on
the radio. How did he accomplish this? Why did he briefly stop singing when he turned
left across traffic? Does he have some kind of map in his head that he followed or did
he get from home to school by just following some sort of overlearned route? Why did
he stop at one colour light and not at another? Is Felix capable of doing any two things
at the same time or is there something special about singing and driving?
Once he met his friends he spoke to them and listened to what they said. How did
he do that? We take language for granted, yet if we are in a country with a language we
do not speak, we quickly appreciate the complexity of language. Felix wrote an exam
by pen and later wrote a paper on a computer. How did he do this? Were the same
processes at work in handwriting as in typing? Felix retrieved information about the
exam in order to answer the questions. How did he do this? How did he know where
in his mind the information was? Felix and Phyllis spent the weekend together. Pre-
sumably they enjoy each other’s company and they both get some type of physical and
emotional reinforcement from being together. Why do they find each other attractive
and not another person or a person of the same sex? Why do they enjoy physical con-
tact? When Felix and Phyllis discussed their future, both had mental images of what it
would be like. How did they generate these images?
11.1 The Brain Hypothesis
We have considered but a small sample of the questions that could be asked about
Felix’s behaviour. Having identified some of the questions, let’s now consider how
we could go about answering them. To do this, we need to consider another question.
What controls behaviour? Probably the most common answer to this question is the
“the mind”. But what is the mind? Historically, there are two views on this question.
One view, which was first clearly stated by Descartes in the 1600s, is that the mind is a
process that is separate from the body. For Descartes, it is some kind of spirit or energy
that is the basic essence of the self. It may utilize some aspects of bodily functions, but
it is essentially unconstrained by the body. This position can be called a dualistic one.
A second view, which is the one held by most neuroscientists, is that the mind and the
body are the same thing, the body in this case referring to the brain. In this case mental
events are simply a property of the brain’s activity. If the brain is altered or dies, the
mind is altered or gone. This position can be called a monistic one. It is sometimes
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also called the brain hypothesis.
The implications of these two views of the mind are very different. In the former
case behaviour can be produced independently of the brain but in the latter case it
is entirely dependent upon the brain. Felix is essentially his brain in this view. The
reader can see that explanations of abnormal behaviour, whether it be in the form of a
mental disorder such as schizophrenia or in the form of a pathological fear of virgins is
explained very differently. I note, parenthetically, that acceptance of the dualistic and
monistic views has implications for other things such as questions about the soul, the
uniqueness of humans, and so on but I leave these for the reader to ponder privately.
For the rest of this essay I shall accept the brain hypothesis. The question now becomes
“how does the brain work?”
11.2 Principles of Brain Organization
The brain is arguably the most complex thing that humans can try to understand. It is
thus with some temerity that I attempt to identify basic principles.
11.2.1 The brain is composed of neurons and glia
The human brain is a 1350 g organ found in the skull. It is composed of two types of
cells: neurons and glial cells. Neurons are the functional units of the brain whereas glial
cells are support cells. Estimates of the numbers of cells in the human brain usually run
around 1010 neurons and 1012 glial cells, although the number could be even higher. As
neurons are the basic functional unit of the brain, I shall consider only their structure
and function and leave glial cells as a mystery for now. The reader might be interested
to know, however, that the one distinguishing thing about Einstein’s brain appears to
be an unusually large number of glia.
There are numerous types of neurons but they share several features in common
(see Figure 11.1). They have a cell body, which like most cells contains substances
that determine the function of the cell. There are processes protruding from the cell
body, which are known as dendrites. Dendrites function to increase the surface area
upon which a cell can receive information from other cells. Finally, there is another
process, known as an axon, originating from the cell body. Different types of neurons
are morphologically distinct, just as different types of trees and bushes are morphologi-
cally distinct. The morphological differences in neurons reflect differences in function.
Neurons are connected to one another via their axons; any given neuron may have
as many as 15,000 connections with other neurons. The behaviour of a given neuron
is determined by the summed activity of all of the connections. The behaviour of a
neuron can be conceptualized as being like a light bulb hooked to a rheostat. If we
set the rheostat fairly low, the light will be on, but will appear quite dim. From this
point we can either increase or decrease the brightness by increasing or decreasing the
current going to the bulb. For a neuron, the amount of current going to the cell depends
upon the dendrites. If the connections to the dendrites increase the current, the neuron
becomes more active; if the connections decrease the current, the neuron becomes less
active. Most connections with other neurons are chemical. Thus neuron A releases
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Figure 11.1: A typical neuron showing some of its physical features.
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a chemical, known as a neurotransmitter, and the dendrites on neuron B are altered
briefly by the chemical. Different neurons release different transmitters, the two most
common ones in the brain being glutamate and GABA (gamma-amino butyric acid).
Glutamate functions to increase activity in other neurons whereas GABA functions to
decrease it. Thus, a drug that increases glutamate activity will serve to increase brain
activity whereas another that increases GABA will decrease brain activity. Another
interesting transmitter is dopamine. When dopamine activity is increased, we have
a pleasant feeling. Amphetamine and cocaine increase the activity of cells releasing
dopamine. We can begin to see the answer to one of our questions: the drugs Felix took
all affected different transmitters and therefore had different effects on brain activity.
11.2.2 Neurons and glia are organized into discrete functional re-
gions
Although neurons are the basic units of the brain, individual neurons are of little con-
sequence. In fact, we lose hundreds or perhaps thousands daily without much obvious
effect. Rather, it is the organization of the neurons into larger groupings that is impor-
tant. The brain has thousands of such groupings but we can conceptualize it somewhat
more simply. The most obvious feature of the human brain is that there are two large
hemispheres, which sit on a stem, known as the brainstem. The brainstem connects
with the rest of the body. Imagine a pumpkin. Now imagine your fist stuffed into
the pumpkin. The pumpkin represents the cerebral hemispheres, the fist represents the
brainstem, and the forearm represents the spinal cord. The brainstem is essentially all
that primitive animals such as fish or frogs have for a brain. The cerebral hemispheres
are a predominant characteristic of the brains of mammals and birds.
The cerebral hemispheres and brainstem are not single regions. Rather they are
both made up of hundreds of smaller regions, each of which has unique connections
and, in many cases, unique cell types. Consider the cerebral hemispheres. They have
an outer covering, much like the rind of the pumpkin, which is known as cortex. The
cortex is the dominant feature of the human brain. It can be further divided into dozens
of subregions, each of which is a functional entity.
11.2.3 Functions are localized in the brain
The many different anatomical regions in the brain are functionally distinct. This is
perhaps most graphically shown in the surgical theatre. Wilder Penfield at the Mon-
treal Neurological Institute developed a procedure for studying localization of function
in the awake human. Imagine the following. You are given a little Valium (which calms
you down) and taken to the operating room. Your hair has been shaved off and a local
anaesthetic is applied to the side of your head. The surgeon makes an incision on the
side of your head, much in the shape of the top of a question mark lying horizontally.
She then makes a flap of skin to expose much of the side of your skull. She then drills
four 1 cm holes in your skull with a hand drill, and, using a small saw, connects the
holes to remove a piece of bone about the size of a medium pancake. Your brain is vis-
ible. Because you are awake during this procedure, she can now ask you to do different
things. For example, she can ask you to talk or to move your arm and so on. As you do
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things for her she takes a tiny electrode and passes a small current in different regions
of the cortex. Stimulation in one region stops you from speaking. Stimulation in an-
other causes your little finger to move, and so on. She has demonstrated that functions
are localized to different places in your cortex. We can now ask a reasonable question.
What happens if we find a place that, when stimulated, affects our speech, and then we
surgically remove it. If functions are localized, we would predict that the function will
be lost. It is—provided we take all of the region. This observation is important for it
speaks directly to the brain hypothesis. If we can eliminate functions surgically, they
must be a property of the brain’s activity. Furthermore, we can predict that if a region
of brain is functioning abnormally, then behaviour will also be abnormal. I should note
at this point that surgical studies of the effects of brain stimulation are not done on
healthy people. They are done in preparation for surgical removal of abnormal tissue.
The surgeon must locate critical functions such as speech or vision in order to avoid
removing them accidentally!
11.2.4 The brain is organized into functional levels
In order to understand this we must first consider a taxonomy of behaviour. Behaviours
vary in complexity. Perhaps the simplest behaviours that humans have are spinal re-
flexes. We are all familiar with the effect of tapping the tendons just below the knee cap
when we are sitting on a counter with our legs hanging down. The lower leg “involun-
tarily” moves. Similarly, when something suddenly comes toward our eye, we blink.
Now consider repetitive behaviours such as walking. We walk without much thought.
This repetitive, rhythmical, movement is also largely controlled by the spinal cord. A
more interesting example is pelvic movements during sexual intercourse. These too
are controlled by the spinal cord.
The next level of behaviour includes units of movement such as the making of
different body postures to maintain balance and behaviours such as swallowing. These
behaviours are controlled by the first region above the spinal cord, which is known as
the hindbrain. It would correspond to your wrist in the pumpkin and fist metaphor.
The hindbrain not only controls the production of some kind of movements but it also
controls sleep and waking. Thus injury to this area may produce a coma because the
mechanism that wakens the brain is damaged. Thus, we can see one of the reasons that
Felix awoke. A region in his brainstem acted like a light switch and turned on the rest
of the brain.
The next level of behaviour includes behaviours that direct the body to sensory
events. Thus, when we hear a noise we turn our head in the direction of the noise,
which is known as an orienting reflex. This reflex is controlled by the midbrain, which
corresponds to your hand in our metaphor. As we progress to the next level of be-
haviour, we find that the behaviours begin to get more complex quickly. Thus, we
begin to add goal-directed behaviours. These are behaviours directed at things, such
as food, other animals, and so on. Indeed, we have now added the behaviours seen in
babies. This includes some affect, some preferences for different sensory events, and
preferences for particular foods. It also includes the ability to control body tempera-
ture. This control may seem like a simple thing, but think about the problems involved.
When we exercise we heat up. There must be a way of controlling this. When we sleep,
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we make few movements and heat must be generated. Males are all too familiar with
the way that the body controls the temperature of one of its internal organs— the testes.
The extension and retraction of the testes is done in response to changes in body tem-
perature in order to maintain the viability of sperm. These behaviours are controlled by
a region known as the diencephalon. It would correspond to your fingers clenched as
a fist in the pumpkin. Next, we add behaviours necessary for self-maintenance. These
include sexual behaviour, maternal behaviour, feeding and drinking, and so on. Fi-
nally, we add the ability to understand the sensory world and to be flexible in response
to a changing environment. These latter functions are functions of the cerebrum (the
pumpkin). The names of the various brain regions are not important at this stage. The
important point is that behaviour varies in complexity and different levels in the brain
control different types of behaviour. Although we have not specifically discussed it,
given point two (functions are localized) it must be the case that different functions are
localized at each level.
11.2.5 There are multiple pathways for each general function
Imagine looking at a can of diet coke. What do you see? Now imagine moving the
can to another place in front of you. What did you see when you moved the can?
Presumably the answers to these questions are something like the following. First,
you saw a cylindrical object that was red, white, and silver, and had writing on it.
When you moved it, you saw the same thing. Intuitively we conclude that the brain
must “see” the object much as we have seen it. Consider now what happens when
we damage different parts of the cortex. People with damage to one area, which is
known as visual area 4, can no longer perceive the colour. The red appears black, the
silver is sort of grey and the white is a light grey. This condition is quite different from
the usual “colour blindness” that is a result of a faulty retina in the eye. People who
have retinal colour blindness still have some visible colours. People with damage to
V4 have a very different sensation. Indeed, they typically lose weight because food
becomes so unappealing. Think about eating a black tomato or grey potatoes. Now
consider a different problem. People who have damage to another visual area, known
as visual area 5, cannot see movement. What does this mean to our coke can? The
can is seen normally when it is still but is invisible when it moves. When it comes
to rest again it is visible again! This example is really counter intuitive because we
believe that we perceive the same object when it is still and when it is moving. That is
not how the brain works, however. Consider the implications of this dysfunction. You
would be unable to cross the street because you would look down the road and see a
car. Then you would start to cross and it would become invisible—until it stopped as it
hit you. Or, consider talking to someone. You see their face but as their mouth moves
it vanishes. People with damage to visual area 5 learn to avoid looking at people who
are talking. This is the only way they can cope with the vanishing mouth. These two
examples of visual defects illustrate the fact that the brain takes the world apart and
analyses different features independently. A similar logic is used for the analysis of
other senses too.
Another interesting question arises from our example of the diet coke can. How
did you imagine the can? Did you use the same brain regions that you use to actually
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perceive one? What would happen if you were actually looking at a coke can and
then you imagined another one sitting beside it? How do you know which one is real?
After all, both are in your head? Finally, if the visual system takes the coke can apart
and different sensory channels analyse different bits, why do we see a coke can at all?
Is there some area of the brain that puts it back together? (The answer to the last
question is “no”.) Finally, we can ask more fundamental questions. How do neurons
do all these things anyway? These are the questions asked by cognitive scientists and
neuroscientists.
11.2.6 The cerebrum is functionally asymmetrical
One of the curious features of the human brain is that it produces language. We will
not consider how or why it does this in the current essay, but we will ask where it does
this. In our surgical example above we noted that a surgeon can find speech zones in
the cortex. Thus, we know that at least cortical areas are involved. What we did not
discuss, however, was that it is only in the left side of the cerebrum (the left hemisphere)
that the surgeon can find language. Thus, language processes are localized to the left
hemisphere. This leads to other questions. Is language the only function that is unique
to the left hemisphere? Why is language in the left hemisphere? If the left hemisphere
is talking, what does the right hemisphere do? These are questions of neuropsychology.
11.2.7 There are individual differences in brain organization
It is a common observation that even siblings behave very differently from one another.
If the brain is controlling behaviour, then it follows that there must be differences in
the brains of different people, and these brain differences account for the behavioural
differences. This account is not a big surprise as people do not look the same, they
have different fingerprints, and so on. A more interesting question is whether there are
any variables that are correlated with individual differences. There are at least two: sex
and handedness.
I doubt that many people would be surprised at an assertion that males and females
behave differently. The idea that this difference results from a difference in their brains
is probably less obvious, but it follows directly from the brain hypothesis. A more
interesting question, however, is why are the brains different? Studies with both lab-
oratory animals and humans have demonstrated that the major reason is the influence
of gonadal hormones. Thus, during brain development in the womb, males produce
testosterone, which alters their brain.
Similarly, during development, and especially during puberty, the production of
hormones by both sexes alters the brain. Take a simple example. Males have a penis
and the penis has behaviours. These behaviours are controlled at the lowest level by a
region in the spinal cord known as the nucleus of the bulbacavinosa. It should be no
surprise that females do not have this region! It may be a surprise, however, to learn
that they do have one early in brain development but that it degenerates. The reason it
degenerates is because they do not produce enough testosterone. This simple example
illustrates that hormones can alter the structure of the nervous system. Obviously,
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the more important question is whether they can also alter the brain itself. Studies in
various animal species have shown that they can.
Consider a simple example. Male song birds sing and most female song birds do
not. This behavioural difference is due to a fundamental difference in brain structure,
which is dependent upon gonadal hormones. Structural differences in the brain of hu-
mans are more difficult to study but there is now little doubt that there are fundamental
differences in the structure of male and female brains, and that circulating hormones
affect brain function throughout our lives. This idea leads to interesting questions.
Can we actually measure differences in behaviour of females during menstrual cycles?
Does the cognitive behaviour of females change with menopause? Does hormone re-
placement make a difference to these behaviours? What changes occur in males? Do
hormones have any effect upon the way that the brain is able to learn from experience?
The second major contributor to individual differences is handedness. About 10%
of the population is left-handed. If we examine the brain of left handed people, we
find that about 1/3 have language in the right hemisphere, while most of the rest have
language in the left hemisphere. A small proportion actually have language in both
hemispheres. Why do some people have language on one side versus the other? What
other functions are different in left-handers? Does handedness make any difference to
intelligence or to anything else? Why are some people left handed? Do other animals
show handedness? These too are questions of neuropsychology.
11.2.8 The brain is plastic
When we exercise muscles, they change. When we use the brain, it changes too. This
property is known as brain plasticity, and with some reflection, it should be obvious that
this is a necessary characteristic of the brain. When we learn things we are sometimes
able to remember them. In view of the brain hypothesis, this means that the brain must
have stored the information. If the brain stored the information, it must have changed
in some way. Indeed, this must be true for every experience that we can recall. If we
injure the brain there is often some recovery of lost functions. This means that the brain
must somehow have changed to allow this to happen. Brain plasticity is the topic of
another essay, so I will not consider it further here.
11.2.9 Brain activity can be influenced by knowledge
Cognitive psychologists often talk about “bottom-up” and “top-down” processes in the
brain. Bottom-up processes are those processes that are driven by data affecting the
brain. For example, when we analysed the colour of the coke can, we perceived red.
This perception was driven by the data. Top-down processes are rather different. Many
of our perceptions are affected by knowledge. Suppose there is a huge pile of pop cans
and our task is to find a diet coke can. How do we sift through the visual clutter and find
the diet coke can? Or, if we are looking for a face in a crowd, how do we ignore all the
faces but one? Obviously, our behaviour is driven by knowledge of what a coke can, or
a particular face, looks like. This knowledge must influence how the brain works. How
does it do this? Are there rules that govern how top-down processes and how do they
govern brain activity? These are examples of questions asked by cognitive scientists.
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11.3 Conclusion
I have tried to introduce the reader to some of the questions that psychologists ask when
they consider the brain’s behaviour. We began by considering the behaviour of Felix.
A simpler task now is for the reader to consider his or her own behaviour in the same
way. Of course, we have not asked the major question of psychology: how is it that we
are conscious and can even ask these questions? This is a more difficult question best
saved for another time.
Chapter 12
Behavioural Genetics: The
Study of Differences
Martin Lalumie`re
A large part of psychological science is concerned with identifying, cata-loguing, and explaining individual differences. One does not need a de-gree in psychology to observe that there are enormous differences in howpeople think, feel, and act. Everyone recognizes differences in the per-
sonalities of one’s family members, for example. These differences exist even though
family members live in the same culture, historical era, political climate, economic
circumstances, and house (at least while growing up). Think of five of your friends:
Even though they have many things in common (they are probably close in age, and
they all like you), I would bet that they differ in how smart they are, how outgoing they
are, how emotionally intense they are, how political they are, and so on. But organiz-
ing and explaining the origins of these differences, whether cognitive, emotional, or
behavioural, is more difficult.
Behavioural genetics is one of many ways to study the origins of individual differ-
ences. It is an important topic to study because, unlike many other areas of psycho-
logical research, it has produced a large body of knowledge that has survived the test
of time. The results of this field of psychology stand as close to facts as any result in
psychology. Many behavioural geneticists have moved on to other topics of research
because they have concluded that most of their original questions have been answered.
Behavioural genetics is about partitioning the sources of individual differences in
any trait that can be measured reliably. The fundamental question is how much of the
observed variability in a given trait can be explained by the fact that people have differ-
ent genes, and how much can be explained by the fact that people have been exposed
to different environments. One could turn the question around and ask how much of
the similarity among people can be accounted for by their genetic similarity, and how
much can be accounted for by their exposure to similar environments. Although the
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name of the discipline emphasizes genetics, the focus is on both genes and environ-
ment. In fact, as we will see, this discipline has much to say about the importance of
the environment in creating individual differences.
12.1 Research Methods
Behavioural geneticists are lucky. There are known genetic differences among people,
such that the size of the genetic difference can be compared to the observed difference
in the trait under study. Similarly, there are known environmental differences that can
be related to trait differences. When it comes to genetic differences, the level of pre-
cision of the magnitude of the difference is quite good. We know that, on average,
siblings share 50% of their polymorphic genes1, whereas cousins share 12.5%. There-
fore, if differences in a trait (say, intelligence) can be explained by genetic differences,
then siblings should be more similar in intelligence than cousins. Of course, siblings
could be more similar because they grew up in the same house, whereas cousins did
not (in many cultures cousins do grow up in the same house, but here we will assume
that they do not).
The degree of environmental differences is not as easy to quantify. We know that
siblings are exposed to more similar environments than cousins, but how much more
similar is unclear. Siblings grow up with the same parents, are exposed to the same
physical environment (the house, the number of books on the shelves, the family in-
come, the neighbourhood) whereas cousins grow up with different parents, perhaps in
different economic circumstances, perhaps in different neighbourhoods, etc. All that
we know for sure is that siblings are exposed, on average, to a more similar environment
than cousins. The exact degree of similarity requires precise measurement, something
that is not done very often.
The two main statistics of behavioural genetics are heritability (h2) and environ-
mentality (e2). The values for both statistics vary from 0 to 1, where 0 means that none
of the observed variance can be accounted for by genes (for heritability) or the environ-
ment (for environmentality), and where 1 means that all the variance can be accounted
for by genes (or the environment). In the classic research designs described below, h2
and e2 are mutually exclusive, such that the total amount of observed variance is equal
to the sum of h2 and e2.2 Heritability should not be confused with inheritance, the latter
meaning shared genes passed on by parents. A trait can have low heritability but be
completely inherited (e.g., binocular vision). Can you think of the reason for this?
There are two main research designs used to tease out the effects of genes and en-
vironment on phenotypic differences.3 The first is the twin and sibling design and the
second is the cross-fostering or adoption design. Of course, scientists do not experi-
mentally create twins or force adoption of siblings. These events happen naturally and
1Polymorphic genes are those that come in different versions (e.g., genes having to do with eye colour).
In contrast, monomorphic genes are those that all members of a species share.
2Technically, the formula also includes covariance and measurement error, but for pedagogical purposes
we can ignore these terms here.
3The phenotype refers to the manifest (or observed) characteristics of an organism, whereas the genotype
refers to the genetic complement.
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scientists take advantage of them to study the influence of genes and environment on
the development of individual differences.
There are two types of twins. Identical or monozygotic twins (MZ) share all of
their genes (100% relatedness) and non-identical or dizygotic twins (DZ) share only
50% on average. DZ twins are just like regular siblings, except that they were in the
same womb at the same time. Thus, if genetic differences account for most of the
difference in a given trait, MZ twins should be about twice as similar as DZ twins. Of
course, MZ twins might be more similar than DZ twins because people treat them the
same way (after all, they are very similar physically) or for other reasons. Therefore,
scientists have also studied a rare group of people: MZ and DZ twins who have been
reared apart. In this case, any greater similarity in MZ than in DZ in an observed trait
is likely due to genetic similarity and not environmental similarity.
In cross-fostering designs, unrelated siblings are reared together. Therefore, any
similarity is due to the fact that these individuals are reared in the same environment,
not to the fact that they share similar genes. One can also examine the degree of
similarity of foster or adoptive parents and their genetically unrelated children.
12.2 Estimating Heritability and Environmentality
Table 12.1 shows the degree of similarity in intelligence as a function of degree of
genetic similarity. As you can see, pairs tend to be more similar in intelligence as
they are more similar genetically. The results also show that being exposed to more
similar environments (being reared together rather than apart) is associated with greater
similarity in intelligence. These results are very typical of behavioural genetics findings
for many different traits: part of the observed individual differences can be explained
by genetic difference, and part can be explained by environmental differences. This
may seem like a trivial finding to you, but for a very long time psychologists and other
social scientists thought that people’s experiences were the sole determinants of their
behavioural characteristics.
There are many different ways to estimate h2 from twin and sibling studies. The
intra-class correlation for a given trait in MZ twins raised apart directly estimates
broad-sense heritability (h2). Broad-sense heritability reflects all genetic effects that
can only be shared by identical twins.4 In the example given above, broad-sense heri-
tability of IQ is 0.72.
Twice the difference in the correlation for MZ twins reared together and DZ twins
reared together estimates narrow-sense heritability, assuming absence of non-additive
effects.5 In the example above, narrow-sense heritability is 2 ∗ (0.86 − 0.60) = 0.52.
Twice the correlation for parent and offspring living apart from birth is an estimate
of narrow-sense heritability that does not require the assumption of absence of non-
additive effects (because these cannot be passed from parents to offspring). In the
4Broad-sense heritability = additive effects of genes at specific locations + dominance (non-additive
effects of genes at a single location) + epistasis (interaction of genes at different locations, including different
chromosomes). Dominance and epistasis can lead to MZ correlations that are more than twice as large as
DZ correlations.
5Narrow-sense heritability includes only additive effects of genes and is always equal to or less than
broad-sense heritability.
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Pair Relations Genetic Similarity Similarity in IQ (r)
Identical twins raised together 100% .86
Identical twins raised apart 100 .72
Non-identical twins raised together 50 .60
Biological siblings raised together 50 .47
Biological siblings raised apart 50 .24
Parent-offspring together 50 .42
Parent-offspring apart 50 .22
half-siblings 25 .34
cousins 12.5 .15
Table 12.1: Similarity in intelligence (based on intra-class correlation (r)) as a function
of degree of genetic similarity (data from Bouchard & McGue, 1981).
example above, narrow-sense heritability is 2 * 0.22 = 0.44. As you can see, different
calculations produce slightly different results. What matters is the range of values
obtained across many studies using different designs. In the case of IQ, that range
is centered on 0.50 for narrow-sense heritability and 0.75 for broad-sense heritability.
Heritability of IQ increases with the age of the subjects in the study. Can you think of
a reason for this counter-intuitive finding?
The correlation between unrelated siblings reared together directly estimates envi-
ronmentality (e2). Another way to assess e2 is to subtract h2 from 1.0 in studies of MZ
and DZ twins reared together, assuming perfect reliability of the measure. Another way
is to calculate the difference in the correlation obtained for MZ twins raised apart and
MZ twins raised together. For IQ, and using data provided by Bouchard and McGue
(1981), these methods produce e2 values of 0.34, 0.48, and 0.14. The value of 0.48 is
inflated because measures of IQ are in fact not perfectly reliable.
12.3 Some General Findings
It is now well accepted that most psychological characteristics show substantial heri-
tability. These include, as we have seen, intelligence, and also more specific cognitive
abilities, as well as different aspects of psychopathology (e.g., schizophrenia, depres-
sion, and anxiety), antisocial tendencies, and personality. Bouchard (1994) reported
that the five major dimensions of personality (extraversion, neuroticism, conscientious-
ness, agreeableness, and openness) show heritability values of 0.40 to 0.50. It is also
well accepted that environmentality accounts for a large portion of individual differ-
ences in these domains.
One of the most interesting findings of behavioural genetics has to do with the na-
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ture of environmental effects on the development of individual differences. Behavioural
geneticists distinguish between two types of environments: shared and non-shared.
The shared environment refers to the part of the physical and social environment that
is common to all siblings. For example, siblings live in the same house, have the same
number of books in the house, live in the same neighbourhood, and have the same num-
ber of parents. The non-shared environment refers to the part of the physical and social
environment that differs among siblings. Siblings have a different birth order, may
be treated differently by parents, and so on. Results of behavioural genetics studies
suggest that the type of environment that most influences the development of individ-
ual differences is non-shared. That is, aspects of the environment that are shared by
all siblings appear much less important in influencing the development of individual
differences than aspects that are not shared by siblings. In fact, siblings (other than
monozygotic twins) tend to be quite different from one another in their personalities,
despite sharing similar genes and living in a similar environment (Plomin & Daniels,
1987). Elsewhere we have suggested that there might be an evolved family process
that accentuates sibling differences (Lalumie`re, Quinsey, & Craig, 1996). For some
characteristics, the longer MZ twins live together, the more different they become.
Sociologists and psychologists have traditionally studied environmental causal fac-
tors that are part of the shared environment (e.g., socioeconomic status, overall parental
affection). They are now turning their attention to possible causal agents that are not
experienced similarly by siblings.
12.4 Some Limits and Cautions
All research methodologies have limits and require certain assumptions (statements of
fact that are taken as true but that cannot be directly examined). Behavioural genetic
designs have well-known limits and well-specified assumptions. Results of individ-
ual studies have to be interpreted in the context of these limits and assumptions. For
example, a study of twins reared apart assumes that twins are reared in a range of envi-
ronments that is similar to the natural range of environments found in human families.
This may not be true, because adoptive families are screened for suitable environments
for adoptee placements. This means that the range of adoptive environments is smaller
that what is found generally, resulting in an overestimate of h2 and an underestimate of
e2.
One important cautionary statement is that heritability and environmentality statis-
tics refer to population values at a given point in time. To say that height has a heri-
tability of 0.80, for example, says nothing about the importance of genes versus envi-
ronment in explaining your own height. Your height is completely determined by both
your genes and your environment—if one or the other didn’t exist, you would have no
height. Heritability has to do with explaining differences among a group of people. The
fact that some people in this class are shorter and others taller is mostly caused by the
fact that people have different genes (rather than caused by exposure to different envi-
ronments). Also, the heritability of height has increased from 0.50 to 0.80 in the last
50 years, clearly showing that it is a dynamic value. Can you think of why heritability
of height is higher today than it was 50 years ago?
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Another caution is that heritability says nothing about the mutability (the potential
to change) of a characteristic. Although IQ is highly heritable, cognitive abilities can be
greatly improved or suppressed through exposure to certain environments. IQ scores
have increased constantly over the last 100 years (so much so that standard IQ tests
have to be re-normalized on a regular basis), and few people believe that this change is
due to changes in the gene pool. Behavioural genetics speaks to what can be observed
at a given point in time, not to what can be done about improving the human condition.
Chapter 13
Where Does Schizophrenia
Come From?
Jennifer Mather
Y ou might see the question in the title of this chapter as part of a largerone—where does behaviour come from? Experts might answer the ques-tion differently, depending on their individual points of view. A compara-tive psychologist with evolution in mind might emphasise that humans are
primates, and look for the roots of our behaviour in survival-based reactions of mon-
keys. A neuropsychologist might see this question as an opening to discuss how the
brain programs behaviour, and go on to discuss the contribution of the frontal cortex
or the dopamine neurotransmitter system. A developmental psychologist would look
within your lifespan and say that all the behaviour you show now, as a young adult,
was built up through your childhood.
Schizophrenia is an example of adult behaviour (in this case a set of abnormal
behaviours) that must have had some foundation through childhood. But it isn’t always
easy to see this. It’s a mental illness, a set of wrong feelings, thoughts, and behaviours.
It usually hits in young adulthood, often quite suddenly. So how can something like
this have a background in childhood?
13.1 What Schizophrenia is
To figure out where schizophrenia comes from, and how it arises, we first need to know
what it is. It’s a mental illness, and a serious one, as it wrecks the lives of a lot of people.
One out of 100 people has at least one schizophrenic break—that’s 600 in Lethbridge
alone. Mental illnesses are catalogued by the American Psychiatric Association, in a
book called the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (the latest edi-
tion is called DSM-IV). Psychiatrists diagnose schizophrenia by a group of symptoms.
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One symptom is delusions, beliefs about things that are not true (these are often para-
noid delusions, believing that “they are out to get you”). Another is hallucinations,
perceiving things that aren’t really there. People with schizophrenia most often have
auditory hallucinations, particularly hearing voices. Maybe to rationalize that they hear
things that seem to come from inside their heads, people with this disease may believe
that God is speaking to them, or that someone has planted a transmitter inside their
brain. Often people with schizophrenia also have what’s called inappropriate affect.
Their emotions don’t seem to be properly expressed, or often don’t match what the
situation calls for, such as laughing at a sad movie.
Families of schizophrenic individuals often describe how the illness seemed to hit
suddenly. Promising young men or women suddenly begin to suspect everything their
family does. They get commands from Jesus or feel they’re being bugged by the local
police. When I worked with schizophrenics in the U.S., they often felt watched by the
Communists, but in Canada we weren’t quite so paranoid about the “Red Menace” and
Canadian schizophrenics settled for the local police force. They stay up late, don’t go
to school, or drop out of work. Their delusions and strange concentrations take over
their lives. My next-door neighbour in graduate school suddenly began to feel that his
professors were out to get him, that they were working to discourage and fail him (you
can see this delusion takes some time to be proven wrong). A promising life seems to
have become derailed, and it takes everyone about two years to understand that it’s a
mental illness, not a phase or adolescent rebellion, and not something that can be cured
by patience or “tough love”.
13.2 What Happens if you Develop
Schizophrenia?
What happens to people who have this illness? Often they have to leave school, quit
work, be hospitalized for help, and generally leave the normal world we know. The
good news is that schizophrenia can be treated. Right now the best treatment is antipsy-
chotic drugs that seem to damp down the disruption of brain function and get people
back on an even keel. Psychotherapy isn’t any help, mainly because it’s the brain and
not the environment or personality that’s going wrong. People with schizophrenia are
particularly sensitive to stress and have to learn or relearn how to deal with social situ-
ations and manage stressful situations like job pressure or exam time. Thus, behaviour
management and socialization therapy are also necessary.
If you follow a large group of people who have had a diagnosis of schizophrenia,
you will find that the result is not gloomy for everyone. About a quarter of them
recover. Maybe they have a few symptoms, maybe they have none at all, as if they have
recovered from the flu. About a third do okay, but have problems. They may recover
and then have relapses. They often give up their former high ambitions, and settle for a
life as a clerical worker, unskilled labourer, or housewife. They take drugs to help, and
they have to watch out for stress—they can’t handle high demand very well. A third
do badly. They are in and out of hospital and in and out of jobs. They never marry,
sometimes live in old hotel rooms, and sometimes live on the streets. In Lethbridge
13.3 Genetics and Risk 105
you can find the worst affected by schizophrenia hanging around places such as the
Public Library or the malls. One man was even living in a cave in the coulees. They
are “losers” in life in that they miss out on most things non-schizophrenics take for
granted, and our social support system doesn’t know how to handle them very well.
The most obvious losers are the 10% of schizophrenic individuals who commit
suicide. Many of them had shown a lot of promise before their illness hit. Most don’t
commit suicide when they are hospitalized, but rather after they’re getting somewhat
better. After all, if you know the life described above was all you had to look forward
to, mightn’t you despair?
Back to the question of where the illness called schizophrenia comes from. For
almost any behaviour, the answer is that it partly comes from inheritance and partly
from environment. It is very difficult to get good evidence for this perspective for any
behaviour, because behaviours aren’t clear. If you have blue eyes everyone agrees they
are blue, and everyone can count that we have five fingers. But what about paranoid
behaviour? When is too much? When is paranoid behaviour justified (i.e., maybe the
prof really is out to fail you), and when is it irrational? So we have to decide when
something hard to measure—mental illness—is the result of something so complex as
your many genes and your interactive environment. Nevertheless, we can trace it back
to a combination of inherited risk and childhood stress.
13.3 Genetics and Risk
One way in which we find evidence of a genetic background for a characteristic of
someone is to see if that characteristic occurs in his or her relatives. Each of us inherits
one-half of our genes from our mother and one-half from our father, and we would
have all our genes in common with an identical (monozygotic) twin. Of course, which
ones you inherit are not known; it’s all chance. Still, if inheritance matters, you would
be more likely to have a schizophrenic break if others in your family have, and this is
true. The risk for all of us is 1%. If you have a schizophrenic parent, your risk is much
higher, 10% (it doesn’t matter if it’s your mother or father). If you have a schizophrenic
identical twin, your risk of showing the disease is 50%. This rate is much higher, so
inheritance clearly has something to do with the disease.
But families are complicated things. After all, your parents not only give you the
genes that predict you, they also give you the environment that shapes you. Scarr
and McCartney (1983) have called this a Genotype-Environment Correlation. They
point out that your musical parents give you not only your musical ability, but a stereo
and music lessons. Your shy personality means that you read a lot, stay at home and
stay shy; maybe that’s why shy people choose to be accountants or librarians (though
accountants and librarians hotly deny this!). Your smart parents (on average) stressed
learning and provided you with books; that’s why you are at university and your friends
aren’t. So what your parents gave you is environment and heredity all mixed up to-
gether.
One way around the problem of genotype-environment correlation is to separate
them, to look at adopted children. Their biological parents gave them their genes, and
their adoptive parents gave them an environment (except for the important nine months
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before birth). Studies of children who have a biological parent with schizophrenia, and
adoptive ones without, show a risk of about 10%. Those with biological parents free of
schizophrenia, and an adoptive one with the disease, show a risk of about 2%. So it’s
clear—the risk follows the genes, and what you inherit does affect whether you are at
risk for schizophrenia.
Notice that just knowing the genes are there tells us nothing about how many there
are, or how they act. It could be several of them, and the more you inherit the higher
your risk. It could be one gene that gives you risk, and the environment could push you
to mental illness.
But if there is some problem gene, where would it act? It would probably be on
the brain, which is a huge and complicated structure that we are only beginning to
understand a little. When scientists look at the structure of the brain of people with
schizophrenia, there’s nothing obviously wrong. But when they look at the metabolism
they find that two areas of the cortex, the frontal and temporal, don’t seem to be acting
right. These areas are where I have worked with schizophrenia. I chose to study the
eye movement system because the control of this system is all through the brain. When
it goes wrong, the pattern of problems can be traced to dysfunction in one brain area.
The pattern in people with schizophrenia looks like the one in those with damage to
the frontal cortex, so the parallel suggests frontal dysfunction. I tested teenage children
with one schizophrenic parent. Half of them showed this same pattern, which suggests
that half of them have a vulnerable brain, likely to give them trouble if they end up in
the wrong environment.
This result is also a clue to the timing of schizophrenia’s onset. Our brain matures
over all our childhood, and the last parts to be finished, by late adolescence, are the
connections in the frontal cortex. That’s when schizophrenia hits. Of course, late
adolescence and early adulthood is also the time when youths leave home, get jobs and
marry—all stressful events. So we have that genotype-environment correlation again.
13.4 Childhood and Stress
What could your environment do? It could do quite a lot, and it has 18 years and nine
months to do it before you are considered an adult.
One part of childhood environment that people often don’t consider is what hap-
pens before you are born. We used to think of the womb as total protection, cushioning
the baby-to-be from everything outside. Now we know better. Everything from major
stress on the mother, to her excessive drinking, to diseases she catches, can affect the
unborn baby. These effects are particularly true at about the third month of the preg-
nancy, when the organs are forming in the foetus. Tracing backwards has shown that
some people with schizophrenia were in this third foetal month when their mother went
through one of the influenza epidemics that keep circling the world, usually in winter.
What might happen? Influenza (flu) is a virus. It might get across the placenta from
mother to baby. It could cause damage in the brain, minimal damage that doesn’t show
up until the brain matures fully—as much as eighteen years later.
Another part of very early childhood is the risky period near birth. Again, the
statisticians find that people with schizophrenia are more likely to have had a stressful
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birth than those without. It isn’t anything specific. It might be lack of oxygen just after
birth, prolonged and very stressful labour, some separation of the placenta before the
baby is born, or something leading to an emergency Caesarean. It’s hard to trace this,
too. No one remembers their own birth! Hospital records and mothers’ accounts of
a birth may be different, and each isn’t always correct, but something may have gone
wrong then.
The largest part of the childhood environment is also the most complicated; we
spend our whole lives in our families. We think of childhood as a time of innocence
and support, but it often isn’t. So much can go wrong, from sexual abuse to poverty to
divorce of parents, from bullying and shyness to brain damage from car accidents and
culture shock. Some of these factors, such as demanding and inconsistent parenting,
seem more likely to push children toward schizophrenia.
So genes and childhood set the stage. What causes onset? It could be the brain.
Maybe the brain defects that were caused before birth show up at maturity. Maybe
it’s the hormone surge at puberty, though that’s a bit early. It could be the social pres-
sures. Adulthood is stressful, and this may tip a vulnerable person over the edge to
schizophrenia. One study in Israel showed that it wasn’t short-term, extreme stress that
did it, but longer-term, repeated hassles. There were few instances of schizophrenic
breaks during the violent, but short Six-day War, but lots more during the demeaning
and hassling six-month period in Boot Camp. Once the vulnerability is there, many of
different stresses can do you in. The onset is later and less for women than men. Why?
It may be because men, although physically stronger, are physiologically and psycho-
logically weaker than women—more vulnerable. It may be that women’s emphasis on
friendship, support, and cooperation buffers them against stress and gives them more
coping skills. We don’t know for sure.
13.5 Adults and Schizophrenia
This chapter has discussed schizophrenia as if it were always the same symptoms, easy
to see as the same disease. It definitely isn’t. Part of that variability in persons with
schizophrenia is laid down during childhood, too. These 600 people in Lethbridge
coping with their disease are just that, variable people, normal except for the illness.
With a more outgoing personality, with a happier childhood, and with an intact family
to help them, they have a better chance to cope with schizophrenia when it hits. Of
course, with an intact and loving family to help, anyone with an illness will also do
better in the long run. Some will crumple under the impact of schizophrenia, some will
live with the weakness they have newly uncovered, and some will just go back to their
competent, former selves. But their past follows them—the better your childhood, the
better you will cope with your schizophrenia.
Wordsworth said “The child is father of the man”, and pop psychology now talks of
“the child within” the troubled adult. It’s not at all that clear; there is lots of potential
for recovery, and we develop and change as adults too, learning all our lives. Research
is helping; there are better drugs with fewer side effects, and we’re learning what works
in family therapy. Still, the schizophrenia that mysteriously appears in adulthood has
its roots in the genes and environment of our childhood. It is an example that all we
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are and will be comes from what we were.
Chapter 14
Illusory Visual Motion
Perception
Jennifer Mather
W hen we talk about dealing with incoming information, we use the twintitles of “sensation” and “perception”. There is a good reason for thisdivision, and it has a lot to do with what will be presented in thischapter. Sensation is the reception of information. Light falls on the
retina, sound moves hair cells in the ears and chemicals stimulate taste bud cells on
the tongue. Then information is passed to the brain that then sorts and combines it.
Perception is different. Perception is the evaluation and construction of the world out
there based on but not limited to what comes in. It involves expectation, generalization
and memory. If you think about movement for a bit, you’ll realize that movement must
be based on perception, not sensation. We don’t have any specific movement sense, we
have to construct movement from what we know and what we receive.
14.1 Why is Movement Important?
Movement is important to humans because there is a lot of information out there. In
addition to constructing our world from memory and action and expectation, we have
to select what matters from this dazzling array of information. Attend for a minute to
the things you filter out—the sound of the clock, the feel of the chair on your bottom,
the look of your jeans and t-shirt. You filter them out because their continued presence
doesn’t matter. Movement matters. It gives us cues for what’s around us and where it is
located. It helps us to see what is important. And it guides our own actions so we don’t
bump into chairs, coffee tables, and rocks. After all, we don’t need to keep processing
that the wall over there is the same wall it always was. But something moving may be
opportunity—or trouble.
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The third important thing about perception of motion is that we humans are visually
dominant. Vision is a finely-tuned sense, with all the early processing in the retinas of
our eyes. Visual information then goes to the brain, used in several brain regions, and
also takes up much of the cortex with its combining, sorting and assessment. When
there’s a conflict between visual and other information, we believe our eyes. Movie
makers use this dominance. Think of watching the characters on screen. We hear the
voices coming from where the actors move their lips, though of course the sound comes
from speakers on the wall. Watching a foreign film or a poorly dubbed one shows us
how much we depend on this coordination and how much we believe the sound that
matches the lip actions.
Because movement is so important, we often assume that we automatically and
accurately know when we are moving and when we are not. This assumption is not
necessarily true. I usually ask my Perception class to sit very still in their seats, then
I ask them if they are moving. Their answer is usually something to the effect that of
course they are breathing, but apart from that they are still. Then I point out that the
earth is rotating at quite a speed (1000 mph), with which they agree. In addition, the
earth is revolving around the sun (at 11,000 mph), and they agree with that too. So
when we think we are still, we really aren’t. The reasons we don’t perceive all this
as movement are two-fold. First, just as when you are on an aeroplane, we become
habituated to constant movement. Second, if we and our surroundings move at the
same speed and in the same direction, we don’t see and don’t compute movement. A
plane could go fast enough to counter the earth’s rotation and be “stationary”. If you
were in it, would you feel stopped? Probably not. So, given we don’t always get “the
truth”, how do we know we are or aren’t moving? Some of the ways we make mistakes
will help us understand how this motion perception works.
14.2 Five Ways to Make Things Appear to Move That
Don’t
14.2.1 Movement after-effect
Without moving your eyes, stare at a pattern or relatively large part of the field of view
that is moving in the same direction for a relatively long time. If, after about a minute,
you look away or the object stops moving, you’ll see a strange thing. Something that
moved leftward will seem to back off to the right. Something that was expanding will
now seem to shrink back. If you get a good dose of this biased exposure, you should
be able to look at something else and see it move or change.
Why does this happen? First we have to look at what happens in the retina when an
image moves across it. As the image hits a rod or cone receptor cell, it fires and passes
information toward the brain. All the receptor cells pass information to the next step in
the relay, the bipolar or amacrine cells. By the way they are interconnected, these cells
change the information that passes to the brain. Some of them are hooked-up in such
a way that they function as motion detectors, responding to motion in the left-to-right
direction, say, but not to its opposite.
We have a lot of different motion detectors feeding into the brain, ones that signal
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left-right, up-down, and toward-away, and report on optic flow. The toward detector
is very important; perception specialists call it the “looming detector”. The looming
detectors inform us whether something is coming at us, maybe on a collision course
with us, and suggest, duck! Even babies seem to have a primitive ability to detect
looming. Anyway, all these detectors are firing at a low rate. This firing stays in
balance and so we know there is no motion when nothing is moving.
When an object moves steadily in one direction across your retina, it stimulates
the motion receptors in only that direction. After a while, they fatigue. They begin to
fire at a lower level, still enough to tell you it’s moving, but at less than the original
rate. When the object stops moving, however, the balance is upset; the detectors in that
direction are still fatigued and fire less, and the ones in the opposite direction fire more.
What does you brain make of it? It perceives the imbalance in firing as movement in
the opposite direction.
14.2.2 Autokinetic movement
Look at an isolated spot of light in a darkened room, or at a star in an area of the sky
that has no surrounding stars. Soon it will appear to wander, not necessarily very far,
and not always in the same direction. If you were to turn the room lights on and watch
that same small light, you’d realize that it wasn’t moving at all.
What causes this wandering movement? Surely the retinal motion detectors told
the brain exactly what kind of movement across the retina was actually happening?
Yes, they did. But the brain itself actually needs more than one local signal to know
what’s moving and what’s not. The surrounding darkness means that there’s no frame
of reference in which to put that stationary light, and without it the brain is fooled. This
effect is probably complicated by the eyes moving around, so the dot is moving on the
retina too, and all in all it’s confusing to the motion detector cells.
Because this is a situation of too little information, you can fool around with peo-
ple’s perceptions about whether the light is moving or not. “Watch, it’s going to start
to move right!” This effect was the basis for an old social psychology experiment by
Sherif. He brought people into the lab first separately, and then in threes, told them
the light was going to move right, and observed their reports on distance. When view-
ing alone, they varied from less than an inch to nearly seven. After they all discussed
how far it went, they ended up agreeing on the distance as four inches. Even more
interesting was a study that told participants that they would be able to see the light
trace written words. Some of their subjects reported the names of these words, mostly
simple ones. However, one subject stomped out of the experiment because he said the
experimenters were reporting such personal information about him. Of course, it was
all in his head.
14.2.3 Induced movement
To produce this kind of illusory movement, simply find or project a small dot of light
onto a screen surrounded by a large frame. If the dot moves, or course you know it
moved. But if the frame is moved, the dot seems to move in the opposite direction. This
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only works if the dot and frame are all that you see. If they are in a larger background
or there are other objects around, the effect disappears.
What causes this inaccurate assessment of movement? It’s again perceptual, and
sort of a cousin to autokinetic motion. All we have as a reference is the dot and frame,
so even though the eyes correctly record what moved, it all goes to a Frame of Reference
system in the parietal cortex of the brain. This system operates according the rule of
thumb, little things move, large ones don’t. People move, walls don’t (if they do,
run! it’s probably an earthquake). Researchers have even recorded neurons in monkey
brains that make this “decision”.
It is easy to find real-world demonstrations of this rule. On a night with a moon and
broken clouds, you can go outside and stare at a demonstration of induced movement.
The moon seems to be racing through the clouds, and we can’t stop seeing it that
way, even though we know the clouds are actually moving much faster than the moon.
Closer to home, just put a sticky dot on your television screen. Run a basketball game
behind it. Get close to the screen if you can, as a bigger frame around the frame itself
makes the effect much smaller. The result is that the dot seems to do a lot of moving,
opposite the direction of play.
14.2.4 Afterimage movement
If you watch a sudden and intense light such as a flashbulb going off, you will probably
still “see” the image of the flashbulb after the flash has stopped. If you look around,
you will find that the image moves where you look. This effect can last quite a while,
at least a minute. If you get a good afterimage from a long distance and then you
focus closer, such as on your outstretched hand, you’ll discover that the image also
gets bigger.
What happens in this case is partly on the retina and partly in the brain. The flashed
image is so intense that the retinal receptors do the opposite of what happened in section
14.2.1: they keep firing. This persistent firing is called after-discharge. So why does it
appear to move? That part comes from the brain computation of eye movement. Our
eyes move around when we look at the world. Of course the brain receives information
of how we moved them, probably in the superior colliculus and the parietal cortex.
So the brain knows that the eyes moved, the retinal information says that the image
was stable on the retina, and the brain does simple subtraction and decides the image
moved. You can get the opposite result simply by carefully pushing on your eyeball.
“Image moved”, reports the input from the eyes. “I didn’t tell the eyes to move”, says
the brain. “OK”, the brain decides, “the world must have jumped.”
When I was a graduate student working on eye movement, I did an interesting
experiment with afterimage movement. I wanted people to eye-track their unseen hand
in the darkness. I attached a flashbulb so that it went off when the arm was in the same
position during each cycle of back-and-forth movement. That built up an image of the
hand on the retina, and people “attached” the unseen hand to the afterimage and tracked
it fairly well. They also reported that their arm felt as if it were where the eyes saw it
to be—visual dominance again.
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14.2.5 Stroboscopic movement
If you have a series of lights set in an array in front of you and they go on one after
the other, with just the right timing and spacing, you see instead one light, moving.
This is a pretty powerful effect; you can see it at the Fresh Express, and there’s a
television commercial that does almost the same thing with changing faces. What is
most interesting about this effect is that it is a transformation. Notice that the lights
don’t move, nothing moves. Instead we interpret the sequence of several stationary
lights being illuminated in turn as the movement of one light. What the eyes see as
steady the brain reports as a moving object.
This effect was one of the main phenomena that caused the Gestalt psychologists in
the early part of the century to push the perceptual aspect of the sensation-perception
combination. They argued that what is out there and what is reported by the brain
aren’t always the same; that we don’t just receive information, but also construct im-
ages. They argued further that the whole is different from the sum of its parts. To
this day, people studying perception still refer to the Gestalt approach. Of course we
process what we see and build on it, but we also expect and construct the figures that
fragmentary information suggests.
Notice that the whole of the television and movie industries is based on this quirk of
our processing. A screen is just a very large number of pixels, changing colour across
time. As we watch it, we construct in our brain the images of moving people and
objects that these dot patterns suggest. This effect is even more true for movies, which
are just a series of still shots. In the old days, technicians painstakingly hand-crafted
frame after frame of just-a-little-different pictures that, when run one after another,
were interpreted by watchers as flowing movement sequences.
14.3 Real Movement That Doesn’t Move
This last example is the opposite of all the ones I have given about “unreal” movement.
Simply stick your thumb out at arm’s length and slowly make a wide arc in front of
your face with your arm. Watch the thumbnail closely with both eyes, and you will be
tracking the thumb. Keep watching it. You know the thumb moved. Yet think of it,
the image of the thumb was stationary on your retina, and you didn’t stimulate retinal
motion detectors.
The explanation for this “constructed” movement is simple if you followed what
happened to the illusory movement of the afterimage of the flashbulb. The brain com-
puted both what happened to the image and what happened to the eyes. The image
was stationary, the eyes moved, ergo the object moved. We use this effect a lot, and
we probably don’t need much of a glance to compute where the object whose image
we pick up is going. Think of the ball being passed to you in a soccer game, the clay
pigeon moving before you try trap-shooting at it, the sailboat crossing in front of you.
We are pretty good at using even fragments of motion to track where things are and
where they are going to be in space.
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14.4 Why Aren’t We Confused About Motion All the
Time?
If I have given you a convincing argument that it’s easy to fool you about motion, you
may next ask why we aren’t lost and baﬄed most of the time. How come we know what
we are doing and where we are going? Part of the answer is that yes, our perception is
limited. We don’t know all that goes on in the world. Look at how much better visual
acuity the eagle over the coulees has than us. Look at how well your cat gets around
in the dark when you can’t see anything. Or remember Dr. Kolb telling you how well
your dog navigates and follows tracks by smell when you don’t even know any animal
was there.
Still, we do well in our niche. We use binoculars if we want to see anything far
away. We aren’t nocturnal, but we don’t try to stumble around in the dark. More
important, look back at the situations that produce illusory movement. We don’t usually
stare ahead as something moves across the retina to get the motion aftereffect. We
usually have an excess of visual information so we don’t have the chance to get either
autokinesis or induced movement. The flashbulbs that give you afterimage movement
are a relatively recent invention. When the image of an object appears near where a
similar one was a few seconds ago, as in stroboscopic movement, it usually is the same
object.
Illusions don’t happen often because they only occur under special conditions.
They are important to researchers in perception, though. There is a research rule that
fooling the person or the system shows you how they work—and that’s what we want to
know. Illusions tell us about how we construct and receive our world, and remind us of
the important lesson that’s part of the description of the area, sensation and perception.
Our sensory world, and thus all our world, is the result of top-down and bottom-up
processes, what we receive and what we surmise, and what we take in and what we
already know.
Chapter 15
Multiple Combinations of
Co-factors Produce Variants of
Age-related Cognitive Decline
Robert J. McDonald
D ementia is defined as cognitive impairments that are serious enough todisrupt normal daily living. The dementias include over 50 different dis-orders including vascular dementia, human prion diseases, Parkinson dis-ease, Pick disease, frontal disorders, dementia with Lewy bodies, Hunt-
ington disease, Alzheimer disease, and others (Haase, 1977). Alzheimer disease is the
most common cause of dementia accounting for over 65% of all forms of dementia if
combined with vascular pathology. The prevalence of the disease in the general popu-
lation is correlated with chronological age, with rare reports in the fourth decade and
then logarithmic increases over subsequent decades (Katzman & Kawas, 1994).
The onset of Alzheimer disease (AD) is often first detected by the patients them-
selves or by family members, and is usually manifested by changes in personality. Fol-
lowing these subtle changes, anterograde memory impairments without any obvious
sensory, motor, or motivational deficits are the defining feature of the early stages of
this disorder (Hyman, Van Hoesen, Damasio, & Barnes, 1984). These memory deficits
are usually seen on neuropsychological tests that are sensitive to medial temporal lobe
damage (Grady et al., 1988). The medial temporal lobe includes various structures
implicated in mammalian learning and memory processes including the hippocampus,
amygdala, and parahippocampal cortex.
The hippocampus is a learning and memory system that is critical for the acqui-
sition, encoding, and retrieval of representations of the various elements that define a
specific event and the context in which it occurred (Sutherland & Rudy, 1989). The
hippocampus in humans has been described as an episodic memory system essential
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for conscious awareness of personal experiences. The amygdala has been implicated
in tracking the biological significance of stimuli in the environment (Cador, Robbins,
& Everitt, 1989; Kapp, Wilson, Pascoe, Supple, & Whalen, 1990). A significant por-
tion of the parahippocampal cortex called the perirhinal cortex has been implicated in
object memory (Mumby & Pinel, 1994). There is evidence to suggest that the brain
damage and pathology associated with AD begins in the parahippocampal cortex and
then to the hippocampus and amygdala (Hyman et al., 1984) and these changes corre-
late strongly with the specific memory impairments found in the early and mid-stages
of AD. The transition between specific medial temporal lobe memory deficits to more
global deficits correlates with the location and extent of brain degeneration. In the late
stages of AD, brain damage and pathology spread beyond the medial temporal lobes
into extensive portions of the cerebrum. As is seen in these stages of AD, memory
impairments become more pronounced and more global deficits appear, including lan-
guage, movement, and executive functions.
The neuropathologies associated with AD are the features that differentiate nor-
mal neural tissue from tissue of patients diagnosed with the disorder. These defining
features are neurofibrillary tangles and senile plaques. These structures can be found
in both cortical and subcortical areas although structures in the medial temporal lobes
show the most dramatic accumulation of these abnormalities.
In Alzheimer’s (1907/1987) original description of the brain of a patient with what
would become recognized as Alzheimer disease, he noted that the internal structure
of neurons was abnormal and called them neurofibrillary tangles. These abnormalities
are called paired helical filaments and they consist of paired filaments that are wound
around each other in a helical arrangement. The neurofibrillary tangles’ primary con-
stituent is tau protein which has 6 isoforms in the human brain (Heutink et al., 1997).
The tau protein is an axon specific microtubule associated protein and seems to play a
critical role in the construction of microtubules (Goedert, 1996). Neurofibrillary tan-
gles found in the brains of AD patients have hyperphosphorylated tau protein, and it is
thought that this process leads to a dissociation of portions of microtubules that then
form into paired helical filaments in neurons (Clark, Trojanowski, & Lee, 1997). Sev-
eral types of senile plaques also have been found in the brains of Alzheimer disease
patients. The neuritic plaque consists of an amyloid core surrounded by a ribbon con-
taining neuronal processes and glial cells that co-exist with paired helical filaments
associated with neurofibrillary tangles.
15.1 The Model
This theory was formulated in response to the continued promotion of the idea that
Alzheimer disease is caused predominantly by a single dominant factor. In general,
there is no good evidence to suggest that this idea is true for the common non-familial
version of the disorder, suggesting that a new and comprehensive approach is needed
if we are truly committed to solving this complex, neuroscientific and social problem.
This theory proposes that Alzheimer disease and all forms of age-related cogni-
tive decline that are ultimately linked to hippocampal damage and related structures
are the consequence of interactions between various combinations of co-factors. These
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co-factors include genes, neurotransmitter changes, vascular abnormalities, stress hor-
mones, circadian rhythms, head trauma, seizures, and others not covered in this lecture.
The various co-factors can be roughly divided into two major categories. One set
of factors, if present, can create a neural environment that makes neurons more sus-
ceptible to damaging agents or forces. I will call this group the passive factors. This
group of factors includes senile plaques, neurofibrillary tangles, head trauma, cholin-
ergic depletion, and prolonged glucocorticoid exposure. The other set of factors are
damaging agents or forces that can produce neuronal death. I will call this group the
active factors. These factors include seizure activity, vascular abnormalities, circadian
dysfunction, and other unknown substances humans are exposed to in their particular
environment.
The basic prediction of the model is that a combination of at least one factor from
each category would be required to produce significant brain damage in the hippocam-
pus, and associated memory impairments. A patient with more than one factor from the
passive category would increase the speed and amount of cell death in the hippocampus
simply because the cells are more susceptible to the damaging effects of the agents in
the second category. A patient with multiple factors from both categories would have
increased amounts of cell death in the hippocampus, at a faster rate, and severe memory
impairments. Examples of different combinations of these factors and the outcome of
these interactions will be discussed in the reiteration of the model in the final section
of this lecture.
15.2 Co-factors
15.2.1 Genes
Alzheimer disease is the most common cause of dementia and is an etiologically com-
plex and heterogeneous disorder with gene mutations and gene isoforms that are con-
sidered to have roles in this disease (Pericak-Vance & Haines, 1995). Research over
the last decade suggests that 3 gene mutations on different chromosomes cause a rare
early onset form of Alzheimer disease that occurs when patients are 65 years of age
or younger. These gene mutations include the amyloid precursor protein (APP) gene
found on chromosome 21, the presenilin 1 (PS1) gene found on chromosome 14, and
the presenilin 2 (PS2) gene found on chromosome 1.
15.2.2 Vascular abnormalities
Abnormalities in the cerebrovascular system also appear to be a co-factor in the onset
and intensity of AD (Snowdon et al., 1997). The discovery of a relationship between
the APOE gene found on chromosome 19 and late-onset AD provides further support
for the link between this factor and the disorder because the APOE protein is found in
the major neuropathological hallmarks of AD (plaques and tangles) and in the vascula-
ture and cerebral vasculature of these patients (Premkumar, Cohen, Hedera, Friedland,
& Kalaria, 1996). The amyloid deposits found in cerebral blood vessels act to obstruct
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blood flow and can interfere with normal blood circulation to the brain (de la Torre,
1994).
15.2.3 Neurotransmitters
The discovery that patients with Alzheimer disease show abnormalities in the cholin-
ergic neurotransmitter system gave rise to a popular theory suggesting that this type
of dementia is caused by cholinergic dysfunction (Bartus, Dean, Beer, & Lippa, 1982;
Coyle, Price, & DeLong, 1983). Alzheimer patients show significant neuron loss in
the nucleus basalis of Meynert (NBM), neurons that project to widespread cortical ar-
eas (Perry, Perry, Blessed, & Tomlinson, 1977). The targets of these neurons are not
equally affected in AD with the temporal lobes showing the most loss of cholinergic
markers including various precursors and enzymes.
15.2.4 Stress hormones
It is generally agreed that there is significant variability in the incidence of age-related
cognitive decline within a group of chronologically identical individuals. Usually, a
group of aged individuals will separate into two sub-groups with one group showing
normal cognitive abilities and the other showing obvious impairments (Gallagher &
Pellymounter, 1988). This discrepancy in age-related memory dysfunction suggests
that some factor or co-factors are responsible for good versus poor cognitive aging.
One factor associated with poor cognitive aging is elevated glucocorticoid levels. For
example, experimentally induced elevations of glucocorticoid levels in rats have been
associated with neuropathology and cell death in the hippocampus (Landfield, Baskin,
& Pitler, 1981) and impairments in hippocampal-based memory processes (Landfield,
Waymire, & Lynch, 1978).
There also seems to be a relationship between elevated glucocorticoid levels and
AD found in humans. For example, patients diagnosed with AD show higher blood
cortisol levels (Davis et al., 1986), which has been correlated with hippocampal atro-
phy (Deleon et al., 1993), and also show alterations in the HPA axis in the early stages
of the disorder (Raskind, Peskind, Rivard, Veith, & Barnes, 1982). Further support for
the idea that there is a strong relationship between AD and HPA axis integrity comes
from a longitudinal study of healthy, aged subjects in which yearly assessment of corti-
sol levels were correlated with cognitive function (Lupien et al., 1997). Another study
showed a strong relationship between increases in cortisol during aging and hippocam-
pal shrinkage and related hippocampal-based memory deficits (Lupien et al., 1998).
15.2.5 Circadian rhythms
Temporal organization of physiology and behaviour in mammals is provided by circa-
dian rhythms that are generated in the suprachiasmatic nucleus (SCN) of the anterior
hypothalamus. A subsection of aging research has shown an interesting relationship be-
tween chronological age and circadian rhythm deterioration in human and non-human
animals. This age-related deterioration of circadian rhythms is expressed in fragmented
and reduced patterns of activity.
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The effect of aging on circadian function and sleep patterns is intriguing because the
disruption of paradoxical sleep or slow wave sleep (C. Smith, 1985) disrupts hippocampal-
based memory processes in human and non-human animals. Patients with various
forms of dementia, including AD, show increased incidences of circadian dysfunction
(Swaab, Fliers, & Partiman, 1985; Van Someren et al., 1996), sleep disorders, and
related hippocampal-based memory impairments.
15.2.6 Head trauma
Various studies have shown a significant relationship between the occurrence of head
trauma and incidence rates of AD(Mortimer, French, Hutton, & Schuman, 1985). A
review of 11 case studies suggests a significant contribution of head injury experience
with the likelihood of getting AD (Mortimer et al., 1991). Further support for a rela-
tionship between head trauma and AD comes from research investigating boxers, who,
following significant amounts of head trauma over their careers, also show neurofibril-
lary tangles and senile plaques (Corsellis, Bruton, & Freeman-Browne, 1983), which
is the neuropathology similar to that found in the brains of AD patients.
15.2.7 Seizure activity
The effects of seizure activity on the brain and memory are similar in human and non-
human animals. In humans, it is believed that mild epilepsy is not associated with mem-
ory impairments unless it is accompanied by another brain disorder, such as AD (Esiri,
Wilcock, & Morris, 1997). However, severe epilepsy can lead to cognitive deficits that
are related to hippocampal damage (Bruton, 1988). Extended inducement of seizure
activity leads to neuropathology and cell loss in the hippocampus of other mammals as
well.
15.3 The Model Revisted
In this section, I will revisit the model presented in the introduction of this lecture and
restate that there are various forms of AD and age-related cognitive decline caused
by different combinations of co-factors. The common thread linking all of these dif-
ferent disorders is that memory systems in the medial temporal lobe, particularly the
hippocampus, are damaged in all cases. One reason why the hippocampus and related
structures are more susceptible to these factors compared to other brain regions is that
some of the pathologies associated with AD seem to preferentially accumulate there
(plaques and/or tangles), the foci of seizure activity are located within medial temporal
lobe structures, and specific cell groups in the hippocampus are particularly sensitive
to changes in neuronal environmental conditions.
One of the general assumptions of the current model is that an individual with only
one factor would show low to moderate memory impairments. Individuals with two or
more of these co-factors would get a severe form of dementia, depending on the com-
binations. A combination of factors from both the passive and active categories should
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Figure 15.1: A hypothetical example of the etiology of a case of age-related cognitive
decline. This is the worst case scenario, according to the current model, for an aged
individual in which the cause of the disorder is hippocampal exposure to a neural envi-
ronment containing all of the co-factors that can cause damage to this memory system.
This patient would show relatively early and severe memory impairments.
produce the most severe cases of medial temporal lobe damage and associated mem-
ory impairments. For illustrative purposes, various hypothetical cases of age-related
cognitive decline will be described and discussed in lecture. This is not an exhaustive
description of all of the possible permutations but rather represents a selection of some
of the more interesting combinations and their outcomes. After introducing each case,
a brief indication of the onset (relative to all cases of late-onset AD) and severity of
memory impairments will be provided.
Figure 15.1 shows all of the co-factors reviewed in the present paper, and repre-
sents the worst case scenario for an aged individual. This subject would have all of the
co-factors that could act on the integrity of the hippocampus. The passive factors pro-
duce an environment that make neurons more susceptible to damaging agents or forces
(plaques, tangles, head trauma, cholinergic depletion, prolonged glucocorticoid expo-
sure) and the active factors could produce neuronal death, particularly when these cells
are more vulnerable (seizures, vascular abnormalities, circadian dysfunction). This pa-
tient would show early onset and severe memory impairments associated with medial
temporal lobe structures.
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15.4 Implications
The main implications of this model are threefold. First, patients with severe memory
impairments that are virtually identical to AD would be characterized as having the
disorder even when an autopsy reveals no plaques or tangles in their brain. According
to the present model, this would reduce a significant number of false negatives. Second,
researchers, clinicians, and doctors interested in the reduction and prevention of age-
related cognitive decline should be open to the development and use of prevention and
treatment regimes directed at various combinations of co-factors instead of hoping for a
magic bullet in the form of a pill that may never materialize. Finally, future research on
the etiology of age-related cognitive decline should continue to be directed at providing
a deep understanding of each co-factor implicated in these disorders, but should also
make a concerted effort towards understanding interactions between these factors.
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Chapter 16
Interactive Memory Systems
Robert J. McDonald
Material things are there by means of their images: knowledge is there of
itself; emotions are there in the form of ideas or impressions of some kind,
for the memory retains them even while the mind does not experience
them, although whatever is in the memory must also be in the mind. My
mind has the freedom of them all. I can glide from one to the other. I can
probe deep into them and never find the end of them. This is the power of
memory! This is the great force of life in living man, mortal though he is!
– St. Augustine
I n his book, Confessions, St. Augustine captures many critical aspects of ourmemory at a time in which little or nothing was known about this complex brainprocess. The opening epigraph suggests that our memory is:
1. multifaceted and not unitary
2. the repository for your own past and identity
3. the most important biological force in the human experience
St. Augustine goes even further and suggests that our memory allows us to change
our behaviour because memory contains a record of our past history and can be re-
played and analysed; it is the only force through which we can grow and change as
individuals.
The latter point is critical for this lecture because it is my assertion that the organi-
zation of memory in the mammalian brain and the neural systems that mediate multiple
kinds of memory must play a pivotal role in our thoughts, emotions, choices, actions
and even our personalities. Furthermore, these complex neural circuits in our brain not
only contain remnants of our past that are the basis of personal identity but also exert
an enormous influence on individual behaviour.
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The first section of this lecture will introduce a simple but powerful theory about
the organization of learning and memory processes called Interactive Memory Systems
Theory (IMST). The second section will briefly discuss a theory suggesting that normal
and abnormal manifestations of behaviour are determined, to a large extent, by some
complex set of interactions between an individuals genetic make-up, developmental
events during pre and post-natal development, and accumulated experience through
life. The relationship between the two theories will also be introduced and then, in the
final section, I will provide evidence that the etiology of many of the major psychiatric
disorders may be linked to alterations in the integrity of various memory systems using
drug addiction as an example.
16.1 Interactive Memory Systems Theory (IMST)
The foundation of modern views of the organization of memory in the mammal was
built on the influential work of Pavlov, Hull, and Tolman. Briefly, each of these sci-
entists formulated a general theory of learning and memory in which these functions
were mediated by a basic, underlying mechanism. The proposed mechanisms included
classical conditioning for Pavlov, reinforced stimulus-response (S-R) learning in Hull’s
theory, and the flexible cognitive mapping view for Tolman. Despite significant acri-
mony between supporters of these different positions, it now appears that all of these
theorists were correct in that the mammalian brain uses all of them, as well as other
types of learning mechanisms that appear to be mediated by different brain circuits.
The first direct evidence for the idea that there were multiple memory systems in
the mammalian brain came from Scoville and Milner’s (1957) discovery that patients
with damage to the medial temporal lobe showed impairments in some types of learn-
ing and memory function, but were normal in other aspects. Milner concluded from
this data set that structures in the medial temporal lobe, most likely the hippocampus,
were involved in complex memory processes, and that brain structures anatomically
and functionally independent of the medial temporal lobe mediated other learning and
memory function.
Most of the influential multiple memory theories of mammalian brain function
were formulated during the 1970’s and were inspired by Milner’s findings. Many of
these theories are dual memory formulations in which the hippocampus is the central
module, while some other brain area(s), independent of the hippocampus, mediates
non-cognitive S-R habit learning and memory function (Gaffan, 1974; Hirsh, 1974;
O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978; Tulving, 1972). Hirsh and Krajden (1982) were the first to
provide considerable detail on the different kinds of interactions that could theoreti-
cally occur between cognitive- and habit-based memory systems. A summary of this
view is captured in the following quotation: “When two different systems appearing to
address the same substantive matters are present, it is worthwhile to ponder how they
might interact. We think that on some occasions the two systems compete; on others
they cooperate. Once the fundamental differences between the two systems are under-
stood, their differing capacities become clear. Each has capabilities that the other does
not. There are certain features of knowledge that cannot be attained without using the
capacities of both.”
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Figure 16.1: Parallel learning and memory systems in the mammalian brain.
Thus, in the majority of situations both systems are processing information in par-
allel and it is the circumstances or details of a particular situation (e.g., the performance
requirements of a task) that determine whether systems interact competitively or coop-
eratively.
While this work was ongoing, a parallel line of research was accumulating a signif-
icant body of evidence suggesting that the dorsal striatum, cerebellum, and the amyg-
dala were also learning and memory systems. The combination of innovative dual
memory theories and evidence of anatomically distinct learning and memory systems
provided a fertile research context in which various pairs of double dissociations were
demonstrated.
This theory of multiple, parallel, memory systems suggests that the mammalian
brain has at least 3 major learning and memory systems. Each system consists of a
“central structure” and a set of interconnected neural structures. The “central struc-
tures” of these different circuits include the hippocampus, amygdala, and dorsal stria-
tum (see Figure 16.1).
These memory systems:
• acquire information simultaneously and in parallel and are always on-line.
• have access to similar information during events, but each system is specifically
designed to represent different relationships among the elements of a learning
situation. These elements include stimuli, internal and external responses, and
reinforcers.
• processing style is determined by the intrinsic organization of the system and the
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Figure 16.2: Normal and abnormal manifestations of behaviour are determined, to
a large extent, by some complex set of interactions between and individual’s: ge-
netic make-up, pre- and post-natal developmental events, and accumulated experience
through life.
input/output relations to the rest of the brain.
• process information independently, however, these systems can interact cooper-
atively or competitively to produce or influence ongoing or future behaviour.
Among the three central memory system structures for which the hippocampus is
thought to be critical, is the formation of episodic memories, in which a complex rep-
resentation consisting of the various elements of a situation or event is constructed
(Sutherland & Rudy, 1989; Tulving, 1972). The amygdala has been implicated in
the formation and storage of emotional memories (Bagshaw & Benzies, 1968). These
emotional memories uniquely encode the subjective valence of the experience (posi-
tive or negative). The dorsal striatum has been implicated in stimulus-response habit
learning and memory processes (Packard, Hirsh, & White, 1989). This kind of learning
occurs when the subject engages in repetitive behaviours. For example, the voluntary
behaviours by the driver elicited while driving a car on a repeatedly travelled route are
thought to come under the control of the habit system.
16.2 Who am I?
The second brain theory that will be explored in this lecture suggests that normal and
abnormal manifestations of behaviour are determined, to a large extent, by some com-
plex set of interactions between an individual’s genetic make-up, developmental events
during pre and post-natal time periods, and accumulated experience throughout the
lifespan (see Figure 16.2). All of these factors can have major effects on the organi-
zation of the brain. Alterations in the organization of the brain could affect overall
relationships between each learning and memory system, as well as the relationships
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Figure 16.3: A hypothetical outcome of complex interactions between genes, devel-
opment, and experience (GDE) factors on the organization of learning and memory
systems in the mammalian brain.
of these systems with the rest of the brain. For the purpose of the present discussion
the combination of factors will be referred to as the GDE (genes, development, experi-
ence).
Within the normal range of variability, alterations in the balance between these
memory/behavioural systems can lead to individual personality, affective style, choices,
actions and certain strengths and weaknesses associated with different tasks or situa-
tions (e.g., mathematics, athletics, music, social interactions, etc.). Figure 16.3 shows
a hypothetical outcome of complex interactions between GDE factors. One important
effect of these factors is on the intrinsic organization of various memory/behavioural
systems with each other and other neural systems. This example represents a normal
individual in which there is a balance between these systems that when activated result
in relatively normal patterns of behaviour in a wide range of situations.
A logical extension of this view is that there can also be changes in the balance
of these systems that lead to abnormal manifestations of behaviour including major
psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia, drug abuse, and mood disorders. Also, the
way memory systems interact can produce “abnormal” talents, as in the case of savants
and others who display unusual abilities (see Luria, 1968; Sacks, 1970) that may lead
to great accomplishments.
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16.3 Psychiatric Disorders: the Central Role of Inter-
acting Memory Systems
In the scientific literature, there is an emerging focus on the idea that the etiology of
almost all major psychiatric disorders are linked to abnormalities in brain areas impli-
cated in learning and memory processes. The evidence suggests that dramatic changes
in the relationship of these systems to one another, and with other brain systems, lead to
abnormal manifestations of behaviour. These cognitive and behavioural abnormalities
include schizophrenia, anxiety, depression, and drug abuse.
Historically, ideas about the etiology of these major psychiatric disorders have been
dominated by single factor theories. The idea was that these complex brain disorders
were caused by alterations in a neurotransmitter system, gene or some other single
factor. There are many single factor theories of brain disorders that continue to dom-
inate important areas of research. Examples of such theories include the idea that
schizophrenia is caused by an over-activation of the neurotransmitter dopamine, or
that Alzheimer disease, in which alterations in a small number of genes leads to over-
expression of beta-amyloid peptide or neurofibrillary tangles, is associated with neu-
ronal damage and cognitive deficits. Although single factor theories have generated a
significant amount of important research, they do not accurately account for the com-
plex etiologies of these disorders.
In the final portion of this lecture I will discuss the etiology of drug abuse and the
possible role of different learning and memory systems.
16.4 Drug Abuse
Various theories of the neural mechanisms of drug abuse have been put forward. One
popular view is that addicts administer drugs for their reward or pleasure-inducing ef-
fects. This is sometimes referred to as the hedonic theory of drug addiction. Another
theory focuses on various learning and memory systems in which the normal functions
of these complex neural circuits become subverted leading to compulsive drug seek-
ing behaviours (Everitt, Dickinson, & Robbins, 2001). In this model, drugs of abuse
initiate plasticity mechanisms in different learning and memory systems that come to
control behaviour of the individual over other, pre-existing memories. In this model,
the amygdala acquires information that promotes approach and interaction with drug
associated stimuli. The dorsal striatum promotes the acquisition of stimulus-response
(S-R) habits and the hippocampus acquires information about the context in which drug
stimuli are obtained.
16.5 Drug Abuse and Interacting Memory Systems The-
ory (IMST)
The IMST view of the organization of memory/behavioural systems in the mammalian
brain might be a powerful way of understanding the neural basis of drug addiction. The
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various theories mentioned earlier indicate the critical role different learning and mem-
ory systems play in drug addiction in which powerful plasticity processes and associ-
ated memories are formed during drug experiences that come to dominate behavioural
control.
Another window on the mechanisms of drug addiction that the IMST might open is
an explanation for individual differences in susceptibility to drug addiction (Glantz &
Pickens, 1992). We have previously argued that although these learning and memory
systems affect behaviour, there are GDE factors that alter the relationships between
these systems and the relationship of these systems to other brain areas. It is believed
that normal and abnormal manifestations of behaviour, like drug addiction, are deter-
mined, to a large extent, by some complex set of interactions between these factors that
can have a major effect on the organization of the brain. Thus, interactions between
GDE factors can affect neurobiological integrity and impart an organizational change
in the relationship of these memory/behavioural systems to one another, and with other
brain systems that could make an individual more susceptible to drug addiction.
One possible neural change that could mediate addictive behaviours is via enhanced
behavioural control exhibited by one memory/behavioural system. For example, vari-
ous GDE factors interact to enhance the dominance of the S-R habit system that would
lead to an increased tendency towards habitual control over behaviour. This could be
influenced by the ease of access to common output sites or via enhanced plasticity
processes associated with cognitive processes linked to addiction.
A second possibility is that, in particular individuals, alterations in brain organiza-
tion caused by GDE factors can lead to a bigger reward signal occurring when drugs
of abuse are administered. This increased signal could result in an acceleration of spe-
cific types of learning and memory processes associated with compulsive drug seeking,
which, in turn, could result in an acceleration of learning and memory processes de-
pendent on these signals and ultimately behavioural control by these systems.
A final example is based on the idea that various GDE factors could lead to an
organizational change in the brain resulting in a reduction of inhibitory control via
prefrontal cortical mechanisms (Kolb, 1990). This reduction in perfrontal inhibitory
control could result in increased behavioural control by memory/behavioural systems
that require the contribution of executive systems for appropriate choice behaviours
(Fuster, 1989; Moscovitch, 1994).
16.6 Summary
This current review and analysis puts forth the idea that the organization of memory
in the mammalian brain and the neural systems that mediate them must play a pivotal
role in our thoughts, emotions, choices, actions and even our personalities. According
to this view, complex interactions between neural circuits that contain remnants of an
individual’s past experience not only provide the basis of your identity but also exert
an enormous influence over ongoing behaviour. Interactions between these systems
and related brain areas are thought to determine who we are and how we behave in
particular situations. An extension of this idea is that abnormal manifestations of be-
haviour are caused, to a large extent, by alterations in the relationships among different
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memory/behavioural systems and other brain areas.
Symptoms associated with various psychiatric disorders are hypothesized to be
caused by complex interactions between patients’ genetic background, their pre- and
post-natal development, and their life experiences. All of these factors can have ma-
jor effects on the organization of the brain and even subtle alterations could affect the
overall relationship between memory/behavioural systems (balance) as well as the re-
lationships among memory/behavioural systems and the rest of the brain. In many
instances, it is this relationship between GDE factors and interactive memory systems
that ultimately determines manifestations of normal and abnormal behaviour.
Chapter 17
Repairing the Injured Spinal
Cord
Gerlinde A. Metz
W hen Christopher Reeve played his famous role as Superman in the1980’s, he would not have expected that years later his career wouldchange from an actor to an activist who would fight for the chanceto walk again. In May 1995, Christopher Reeve participated in an
equestrian competition in which his horse stopped suddenly. Reeve was thrown for-
ward, head-first, over the horse. As he hit the ground, the top two vertebrae of his neck
shattered and damaged his spinal cord. This accident left him seriously injured and un-
able to move or feel anything below his neck. When rushed to a hospital, assessments
revealed that the injury caused neurons to die and left a fluid-filled cyst in the center
of the spinal cord. “When Mr. Reeve was brought to the hospital, we predicted that he
would never be able to move his arms or legs again”, one of his doctors said. Reeve
was not only paralyzed from the neck down and confined to a wheelchair, but he was
unable to breathe without a respirator that steadily pumped air into his lungs.
Soon after his accident, Christopher Reeve began participating in various rehabili-
tation programs. He regularly performed exercise procedures that included training on
a Functional Electrical Stimulation bicycle, treadmill therapy, and spontaneous breath-
ing training. About four years later, Reeve found he could voluntarily move his index
finger and continued to recover some other movements, which came back in small
stages and strengthened over time.
In an attempt to improve Reeve’s weak voice and breathing, doctors implanted
small electrodes in his chest in an experimental procedure that they hoped would enable
the paralyzed movie star to breathe without a respirator. In 2002, the respirator was
turned off and “all you could hear was me breathing through my nose”, Reeve said.
After that, Reeve was able to wake up one morning and sense the smell of fresh coffee
for the first time in eight years. He became able to breathe independently for half an
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hour without the respirator while hoping to also be able to strengthen his voice.
Reeve founded the Christopher Reeve Paralysis Foundation, a non-profit organi-
zation that supports research to develop effective treatments and a cure for paralysis
caused by spinal cord injury and other central nervous system disorders. Reeve ded-
icated a portion of the funds toward stem cell research that might one day help in
replacing spinal neurons lost by an injury.
Reeve’s case illustrates the sudden and disturbing impact that a spinal cord injury
has on an individual’s life. But it also demonstrates that with continuous therapy and
training recovery might become possible even years after the injury. The belief had
been that most recovery occurs in the first six months after an injury, and that there
is no possibility of further change by two years after the damage. Christopher Reeve
showed that there is new hope for patients with spinal cord injury by using new state-
of-the-art therapies.
17.1 The Spinal Cord and Its Connections
The central nervous system includes the brain and spinal cord. The spinal cord is the
major bundle of neurons that carry information to and from the brain to the rest of the
body. It allows the brain to send information to the muscles of the body that result in
the ability to move, walk, or breath. In turn, the spinal cord gathers information from
the arms, legs, chest and back and sends it to the brain. The spinal cord is divided into
segments each accessing a specific section of the body.
With regard to the extensive connections between the spinal cord and the brain,
a local injury to the spinal cord can lead to extensive functional impairments. The
initial reason for seeking help after an accident is usually the inability to move the legs
(paralysis) and numbness in the limbs. The loss of function (due to the loss of the
brain’s descending access to the limbs) or loss of sensation (due to the interruption of
the ascending connections from parts of the body to the brain) are often permanent. The
loss of motor and sensory function is usually accompanied by many other symptoms
depending on the site of injury. A lesion interrupts the communication between parts of
the body below the level of injury and the brain. Lesions at a lower spinal level affect
leg movement and sensation and can also cause autonomic dysfunction of the inner
organs including a reduced ability to control the bladder and bowel, sexual dysfunction,
and exaggerated reflexes. Lesions at a higher level of the spinal cord can additionally
cause decline of voluntary breathing and speech, and disturbed arm movement.
17.2 Causes of Spinal Cord Injury
There are many causes of spinal cord injury, including demyelinating disorders, tu-
mors, infections, vitamin deficiencies, or displacement of soft cartilage plates that are
located between the vertebrae, the intervertebral discs. The most prominent cause of
spinal cord damage, however, is traumatic injuries induced by accidents. Although the
spinal cord is embedded in the cerebrospinal fluid and protected by the surrounding
solid bone structures formed by the vertebrae, a strong impact might crush the ver-
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tebrae and compress the delicate spinal cord tissue (contusion injury) or penetrate it
with pieces of broken bone (transection). It is noteworthy that more than half of the
individuals suffering from such traumatic spinal cord injury are under 30 years of age.
The highest incidence of accidents occurs during the summer months due to outdoor
activities. In the following, we will mainly focus on traumatic spinal cord injury, and
we will explore some of the latest findings in the treatment of spinal cord damage.
17.3 The History of Spinal Cord Repair
The characteristic and devastating symptoms of spinal cord injury were first recognized
by the ancient Egyptians. The discovery of a papyrus depicting the main features of
traumatic spinal cord injury dates to 4500 years ago. This surgical papyrus, named after
its discoverer, Edwin Smith, is considered the first medical document in the history of
humankind: it contains the description of 48 cases as written by an Egyptian surgeon.
One of those cases is that of a spinal cord injured patient. Notably, the description of
spinal cord injury concludes with the words “... a disease one cannot treat”.
The first suggestions on how to treat spinal cord injury were made by the Greek
physician Hippocrates. Hippocrates was a pioneer of modern medical methods and
believed that, with nutritional support, the body is able to cure itself. According to his
statement “let the food be your medicine and medicine be your food”, he recommended
a high fluid intake and a special diet to reduce bladder and digestive dysfunctions.
Nevertheless, although these therapies provided some symptomatic relief, they still
were not able to extend the life span of the patients. It was common that most patients
died within the first two weeks after injury, and a patient rarely was able to survive up
to two years.
It was 400 years ago that more invasive treatment approaches were investigated,
including the first surgical approaches. Significant progress, however, in treating spinal
cord injury was made not earlier than during World War II when thousands of spinal
cord injured patients were brought to the hospitals. This large influx of patients led
to systematic assessment of general medical care options and surgical approaches, and
physiotherapeutic and rehabilitation programs were developed. Over the following
years, combinations of different therapies have been explored in order to prolong the
life expectancy of patients and improve their quality of life.
17.4 Recovery from Spinal Cord Trauma
Critical factors in the recuperation period after spinal cord injury are the level and ex-
tent of injury. The level of injury determines which extremities and organs will be
affected. Furthermore, the quantity of the local spinal tissue damage is important. If
the lesion was incomplete, there is still some functioning below the primary level of
the injury and the remaining tissue creates a bridge for the exchange of information be-
tween the brain and lower spine. Even a small tissue bridge can provide an important
substrate for the nervous system to compensate for the functional loss to at least some
degree. A person with an incomplete injury may be able to move one limb more than
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another, may be able to feel parts of the body that cannot be moved, or may have more
functioning on one side of the body than the other. In this case, rehabilitative train-
ing might play a role to help the central nervous system compensate in a functionally
meaningful way.
In the worst-case scenario, the spinal cord lesion is complete and leaves no intact
tissue bridge to mediate functional recovery. The number of therapies available to im-
prove the quality of life in patients with this condition is very limited, however, standard
methods such as physiotherapy can be used to maintain the viability of muscle tissue
and strength. In general, only a few treatments have been internationally approved
for the treatment of spinal cord injury, but the latest research provides promising new
findings.
17.5 Treatment Strategies for Spinal Cord Injury
Despite the long history of knowledge about spinal cord injury, the inability to recover
from the consequences have been accepted as a law of nature. So far, the three major
goals of spinal cord injury treatment have been (i) to minimize further injury to the
spinal cord, (ii) to prescribe rehabilitative therapy so the patient can function to the best
possible ability, and (iii) to deal with possible long-term complications. Nevertheless,
the surprising recovery process of Christopher Reeve and other patients has set new
standards for this traditional view of spinal cord treatment, and the recent progress
in spinal cord research has provided some intriguing new technologies for therapeutic
strategies.
17.5.1 Protecting the spinal cord
A mechanical lesion of nervous tissue leads to destruction of neurons and immediately
triggers an immune response that leads to infiltration of the damaged tissue by immune
cells. Although the immune response supports the process of local wound healing, it
also has detrimental consequences by causing swelling of the tissue and exaggerating
the tissue loss. At this early stage after injury anti-inflammatory treatments come into
play. Anti-inflammatory substances suppress the immune response and therefore re-
duce the tissue damage caused by the inflammatory response. The number of neurons
dying early after an injury can thus be reduced (Tator, 1972).
The anti-inflammatory drug Methylprednisolone is currently the only standard drug
treatment in North America and Europe. The drawback of anti-inflammatory treatment
is that the therapy needs to be initiated as early as possible after injury. Mehtylpred-
nisolone, for instance, has been proven beneficial only if given within the first three to
eight hours after injury (Bracken, 2002). Such time intervals for treatment often are im-
practicable as spinal cord injuries might happen in locations that are difficult to access
by paramedics; for example, when climbing in the mountains. Therefore, alternative
treatments that are effective at a chronic stage after the injury need to be investigated.
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17.5.2 Teaching the spinal cord to move the body
Until about 20 years ago, it was believed that the adult central nervous system was in-
capable of plastic rearrangements. As a consequence, rehabilitation programs mainly
focused on the immediate post-injury phase to maximize existing function. More re-
cently, scientists started to believe that by encouraging patients to use their injured
body parts, functions would be able to improve even years after the injury occurred.
This has become the focus of rehabilitation and physiotherapy programs performed at
specialized centers (Dietz & Colombo, 2004).
The aim of physiotherapy is to assist and promote the recovery process by physical
means, such as massage and exercise. Repetitive exercises of arm or leg movements
are usually part of comprehensive programs that consider physiological, psychological,
and economic aspects of spinal cord injury rehabilitation and fitness. These programs
teach the patients to use alternative movement strategies to overcome the disability. For
instance, patients often need to re-learn daily activities, such as dressing themselves,
buttoning a shirt, or brushing their teeth. Other common training programs involve
walking on a treadmill. The treadmill allows adjustments to speed, so that patients can
be trained according to their individual capacity to perform stepping movements. In
patients who don’t have sufficient muscle strength to support their own body weight
when performing steps on a treadmill, the person can be suspended in a harness. Even
after complete spinal cord injuries that restrict the capabilities to acquire new motor
strategies, regular exercise helps to maintain and enhance mobility and muscle strength.
A revolutionary technology has been introduced with the Locomat, a robotic device
that supports walking movements on a treadmill (Wirz et al., 2005). The patient’s legs
are strapped to a machine that delivers power to the hip and knee joints. A ground-
breaking new computer system controls the speed and extension of the movements and
adapts them to a patient’s own ability to generate stepping movements. This novel
technology is expected to help patients redevelop functional walking patterns.
As we learned from Christopher Reeve, it is crucial for the success of any reha-
bilitation program that the program is continued over long periods of time. Although
the training process is often quite demanding for patients, recent studies performed in
Canada indicated that actively participating in training programs only twice a week can
significantly improve both long-term physical and psychological well-being of patients
(Hicks et al., 2003).
17.5.3 Rewiring the injured spinal cord
Although a spinal cord injury interrupts communication between the brain and the
muscles, the nerves and muscles below the site of injury remain alive and intact. A
new cutting-edge technology involves using a small electrical current to stimulate the
muscles that no longer receive signals from the brain, causing an otherwise paralyzed
muscle to contract. This technique, so-called Functional Electrical Stimulation (FES),
sends electrical currents by means of a computer system to the peripheral nerves that
control the individual muscles (Scott, Peckham, & Keith, 1995). The currents are
delivered by small electrodes that are implanted under the skin. The electrodes can
stimulate muscles to perform even complex movements such as grasping an object
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with the hand or executing a walking pattern. In turn, feedback about the performed
movement is provided by a variety of sensors so that any movement can be precisely
adjusted. Thereby, the FES system remodels the lost function of the spinal cord by
relaying motor commands and sensory feedback.
At the moment, FES is still a research project and not integrated in a larger clini-
cal program. FES has been successfully used in a small number of highly motivated
patients, including Christopher Reeve, who have volunteered to participate in the pro-
gram.
17.5.4 Regrowing the spinal cord
There is one central question that still remains to be discussed: Why does the spinal
cord fail to regrow and repair itself after an injury? Why do functional disturbances
after spinal lesions show only minor improvements and usually remain for the rest of
the patient’s life? The major problem is the fact that the capacity of the nervous tissue
to regrow after injury is very limited. There are a number of reasons that account for
the failure of regrowth of nervous tissue in adults. One of the key issues is the presence
of growth-inhibitory proteins in the environment of the neurons(Schwab & Bartholdi,
1996). The function of the nervous system depends on a highly specific pattern of
connectivity formed between neurons during development. To stabilize the neuronal
network in the mature central nervous system, the environment of the neurons pro-
duces inhibitory proteins that maintain the connections once established. This benefit
becomes a drawback once there is damage, and the trade-off is the loss of the ability
to regenerate. The presence of growth-inhibitory molecules then make it difficult to
restore the damaged connections. An exciting treatment approach that currently is still
in the experimental stage is to deliver neutralizing proteins directly into the damaged
area to block the inhibitory property of the neuronal environment. In animal experi-
ments, this treatment allowed remarkable neuronal regrowth in the injured spinal cord.
Detailed investigations also revealed that damaged neurons were able to regenerate
over long distances, and that the neuronal growth contributed to substantial functional
recovery.
Another approach that aims to rewire the injured spinal cord is stem cell therapy.
Stem cells are undifferentiated cells able to renew themselves and can divide into many
types of specialized cells, including neurons and support cells. The basic idea is that
implantation of stem cells into the damaged area of the spinal cord might help to re-
place the lost tissue (Brodhun, Bauer, & Patt, 2004). While stem cells can be cultured
under laboratory conditions, the use of human stem cells is one of the most contro-
versial methods of treatment. It was only in 1998 that the first human stem cells were
identified, and fundamental research is necessary before such cells can be used to treat
spinal cord injury. Scientists have not yet discovered the techniques needed to grow
large numbers of human stem cells and to manipulate them so they divide into the par-
ticularly desired cell types. Once convincing evidence for successful regeneration and
improved functional outcome is obtained in animal models, clinical studies in spinal
cord injured patients could be initiated using stem cell therapy in combination with
other treatment strategies.
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There are more than 1,000 new cases of spinal cord injury in Canada each year, and
most patients are young individuals. The increasing numbers of spinal cord and brain
injured patients strengthens the need for new therapies to repair the damaged spinal
cord and other parts of the central nervous system.
The recent achievements in basic and clinical research outlined above overcame
the dogma that patients with spinal cord injury are unable to recover to some degree.
Despite Christopher Reeve’s sudden death in 2004 at the age of 52 due to an infection,
his case still defies many scientific and medical expectations. His story shows that new
discoveries and future endeavors in research might help provide a cure for spinal cord
injury even for those with the most severe neuronal damage.
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Chapter 18
What’s the Matter with Stress?
Gerlinde A. Metz
T he opening of Robert Sapolsky’s book Why Zebras Don’t Get Ulcers(1994) describes the chasing of a zebra by a hungry lion in the Africansavanna. Sapolsky uses this example to illustrate a stressful condition af-fecting both the zebra and the lion under different circumstances. The case
of the zebra reflects the classic mammalian crisis of being chased by a predator, and the
stress experienced is short and intense. The mammalian body copes with such an acute
emergency situation by a stress response, consisting of a complex cascade of rapid
physiological changes. For a zebra sprinting away from a predator, this stress response
is ideal for dealing with that kind of situation. However, it is anything but helpful for
humans when they are feeling stressed over exams or worried about the future. While
the human body is still built to deal with short-term stress such as outrunning a lion,
the constant stressors of modern life might place the body in a critical condition.
18.1 The Concept of Stress
Although some ideas about stress and its implications in disease were developed mil-
lennia ago, the term stress has been used only recently. Hans Selye (1950) was the
first to introduce the term stress and to systematically investigate the effects of stress
on bodily functions. This line of research actually began by accident when Selye was
investigating physiological effects of hormones as a young scientist. His experiments
required that he inject rats on a daily basis with tissue extracts, a procedure that was
quite bothersome for the animals. He noticed that the animals treated with the tissue
extract showed enlarged adrenal glands and developed peptic ulcers and other patholog-
ical symptoms. His excitement about these findings ceased, however, as he discovered
that control rats that received only saline injections showed similar symptoms. Selye
assumed that not the tissue extract itself but the unpleasant procedure of daily injections
led to the adverse symptoms. To test whether pathological changes in fact derived from
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his manipulations, Selye subjected rats to other unpleasant stimuli, such as cold or hot
temperatures, and illness. Surprisingly, these animals again developed peptic ulcers
and enlarged adrenal glands. Selye hypothesized that different stressful manipulations
result in similar consequences and he termed this effect the nonspecific stress response.
Selye’s findings initiated a flood of scientific investigations that led to the concept of
stress. Stress can be defined as the sum of all nonspecific factors that can act upon the
body to increase energy consumption above the basal (resting) level. Stress threatens
the steady state of biological and physiological processes and thus adaptive responses
take place in order to counteract the stressor and reestablish a steady state. A stressor
is the stimulus eliciting such a stress response.
Selye’s definition of a stress response is characterized by the onset of a suite of
physiological and behavioural reactions in order to cope with an emergency situation.
The zebra trying to outrun the lion has to deal with the acute need of an unpredictable
amount of metabolic fuel. The adaptive stress response helps switch the body’s pro-
cesses into an emergency state to perform the “fight-or-flight” response. Selye pro-
posed three phases of a stress response. Phase 1 is the alarm reaction under acute stress
once the stressor becomes detected. In this phase, anabolic processes are interrupted
in favour of mobilizing glucose (sugar) to deal with the acute need for energy. In other
words, the zebra can digest its lunch after it has managed to escape the lion. Phase
2 of the stress response characterizes the body’s resistance to a continued exposure to
the stressor by adaptive coping mechanisms. The signs of the body that characterize an
acute alarm reaction have virtually disappeared. Depending on the type of the stressor,
the body is able to maintain the equilibrium of energy production and consumption for
a limited period of time. Phase 3 describes the exhaustion stage in which the body’s
adaptive response to the stressor wears out. The signs of the alarm reaction might
reappear and are irreversible, and the individual might eventually die. Work by Robert
Sapolsky and others showed that the pathological effects of such chronic stress are due
to prolonged activation of the stress response (Sapolsky, 1992) instead of a depletion
of chemicals mediating the stress response as originally proposed by Selye.
It is important to note that the physiological response to stress is an evolutionary
adaptation essential to survival of mammals, including zebras and humans. The stress
response is designed to cope with an emergency situation via different physiological
mechanisms that will be outlined in the following.
18.2 How to Survive an Acute Emergency
Let us assume the zebra was able to escape from the lion. How did it manage to imme-
diately mobilize the energy necessary to outrun the lion? Obviously, the zebra’s stress
response has been adaptive and saved its life under these circumstances. Acute stress
such as that experienced by the zebra results in an orchestrated cascade of physiolog-
ical responses. These processes lead to an immediate availability of energy to sustain
the sprint away from the lion, increased respiration and cardiovascular rates, a shift
in blood flow away from inactive areas of the body towards muscles and brain, and
inhibition of processes not critical for coping with the emergency situation (digestion,
growth, reproduction, and immune function). Moreover, stress modulates pain percep-
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tion so that responses to injuries become blunted. These responses are mainly mediated
by two endocrine systems that become activated under acute stress. One system leads
to a fast stress response within seconds, the other one leads to a slow stress response
within minutes after the appearance of a stressor.
The immediate increase in available levels of glucose and oxygen is mediated by
the fast stress response via release of epinephrine (also called adrenaline) from the
adrenal glands. This response is produced by the autonomic nervous system. The
autonomic nervous system mediates involuntary control of bodily functions and con-
sists of two components that take opposite roles. The parasympathetic nervous system
controls anabolic functions associated with growth, digestion, and reproduction. The
sympathetic nervous system, in contrast, is stimulated by arousal or stress. Both these
systems innervate essentially every organ in the body. Acute stress leads to inhibition
of the parasympathetic nervous system while activating the sympathetic system. An
increase in sympathetic tone results in the release of epinephrine and a close relative,
norepinephrine, within a few seconds. These two chemicals stimulate the mobiliza-
tion of glucose, increase cardiac activity, contract peripheral blood vessels, and affect
muscle activity.
The complex action of the sympathetic nervous system is accompanied by the slow
stress response mediated by steroid hormones. Like epinephrine and norepinephrine,
the steroid hormones of the slow stress response, also called glucocorticoids, are pro-
duced by the adrenal glands as well. Within minutes after the onset of a stressor, the
secretion of glucocorticoids is upregulated. This response is regarded as the essential
component for the adaptation to a physical stressor. Glucocorticoids, mainly cortisol in
humans, can exert a variety of effects, reflected in a inverted U-shape function (Sapol-
sky, 1997). The inverted U-shape function illustrates that, depending on the duration
and severity of stress, the response to glucocorticoids can have beneficial or detrimen-
tal consequences. The name glucocorticoids indicates that these chemicals have the
function to inhibit glucose and fat storage while at the same time stimulating glucose
mobilization to provide muscles with metabolic fuel. In addition, glucocorticoids in-
crease energy availability via the breakdown of fatty acids from adipose tissue. Gluco-
corticoids also have a variety of other effects, including anti-inflammatory actions. The
suppression of immune function by steroid hormones became of clinical importance
when they showed beneficial effects in the treatment of inflammatory and autoimmune
disorders such as allergies.
The release of glucocorticoids from the cortex of the adrenal glands is stimulated
through releasing factors produced by the brain (see Figure 18.1). It was quite te-
dious to determine the individual factors involved in this cascade while only minuscule
amounts of each chemical are present in specific areas of the brain. It took thousands
of brains derived from slaughterhouses and many years of research to determine the
key hormones of this cascade. The two competing scientists who pioneered this field,
Roger Guillemin and Andrew Schally, finally received the Nobel Prize for their dis-
coveries. Their main finding was that the actual master gland initiating the release of
glucocorticoids from the adrenal glands is the brain. Upon the experience of a stress-
ful stimulus, the hypothalamus receives the signal to produce corticotropin releasing
factor (CFR), which is transported to the anterior pituitary to initiate the release of cor-
ticotropin (ACTH). The anterior pituitary releases ACTH into the blood stream, which
142 What’s the Matter with Stress? – Metz
Figure 18.1: Overview of the control of glucocorticoid release through the
hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis (CRF is corticotropin releasing factor and ACTH
is corticotropin).
then reaches the adrenal gland where it stimulates the production of glucocorticoids.
They in turn act on various sites to divert energy to muscles, enhance cardiovascular
tone, suppress nonessentials such as digestion, growth, reproduction, suppress immune
function, and sharpen cognition. The rate of circulating glucocorticoid levels is reg-
ulated by a complex feedback mechanism through neurons possessing receptors for
these chemicals.
18.3 Staying in the Equilibrium
Another important model for understanding the consequences of the stress response
still needs to be introduced. We have outlined above the features of the adaptive stress
response, yet it is crucial for the body’s processes to maintain a steady state even during
an acute emergency. Walter Cannon, a professor of physiology at Harvard University,
introduced a unifying framework of mammalian physiology that is known as the con-
cept of homeostasis (Cannon, 1932). By 1929 he recognized the emergency function
of the adrenal glands in meeting vital threats to the body and in maintaining the equi-
librium of the many physiological processes of the organism. Cannon’s concept of
homeostasis refers to the coordinated physiological processes of the body that adjust to
current needs in order to achieve an optimum performance in a given situation. Under
regular circumstances, this results in homeostasis, a physiological steady state. Home-
ostasis can be challenged by various factors, including temperature extremes, food or
water deprivation, or an argument with the neighbour. To deal with such a stressful
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situation, the organism might require more energy while the steady state of bodily
functions has to adjust to these needs.
The concept of homeostasis is important for the understanding of the pathophysiol-
ogy of chronic stress. While the mammalian body is adapted to cope with acute stress,
prolonged exposure to a stressor might lead to permanent disruption of homeostasis.
How long does a zebra’s sprint in the Savanna take? It is not likely that it lasts for more
than a minute or two, while today’s life style requires the body to cope with stress for
much longer time periods.
18.4 Stress and Disease
In the latter part of this chapter we return to our original question. Why are zebras
less susceptible to develop ulcers than humans? One reason, as you might already
expect, are differences in the duration of the stressor. A zebra that outruns a lion has
overcome the stressful situation and might finally rest and continue digesting its lunch.
In contrast, the human life style might provide more frequent and prolonged threats
to homeostasis. Moreover, an aging human population is likely to contain individuals
who have been exposed to higher amount of glucocorticoids across their lifetime than
a zebra—which has a much shorter life expectancy.
Hans Selye was the first to explicitly note that chronic stress can cause disease
(Selye, 1950). His interpretation was that a stress response becomes terminated in the
long term because the body eventually runs out of supplies of the required hormones
and neurotransmitters. Thus, he concluded that the individual becomes unable to cope
with the chronic stress. This original view was revised by later research indicating that
disease begins when the stress response actually continues and sooner or later becomes
harmful (Sapolsky, 1987; McEwen, 2000). The excessive glucocorticoid exposure dur-
ing a stress response, well-suited to save the zebra’s life, might turn this adaptive reac-
tion into a devastating process under chronic conditions. For instance, chronic stress or
exogenous treatment with glucocortioids can cause or worsen various disorders, includ-
ing myopathy, diabetes, hypertension, impotency, and infertility; and can persistently
suppress immune function. The potential damage by elevated glucocorticoid levels
can accumulate during the course of a lifetime and might accelerate senescence. In
addition, recent research has indicated that the stress response in the elderly becomes
impaired thus further increasing the risk of stress-induced disorders. It takes more time
for an older individual to develop a full-blown stress response, and it takes longer to
return to resting levels and reestablish homeostasis afterward. Furthermore, it was hy-
pothesized that the exposure to glucocorticoids over a lifetime might determine the rate
of cognitive decline during aging. It has been found that there is a high density of re-
ceptors for glucocorticoids in particular areas of the brain. A glucocorticoid molecule
binds to one of these receptors inside a nerve cell and so interacts with physiological
processes inside the cell. Neurons possessing these receptors therefore are very sus-
ceptible to the effects of glucorticoids. Interestingly, there is a particularly high density
of glucocorticoid receptors in the hippocampus, a structure underlying learning and
memory. Because of its high density in glucocorticoid receptors, this structure serves
as a feedback station to control the amount of glucocorticoids in the system and to reg-
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ulate the secretion of these hormones. Its sensitivity to glucocorticoids, however, might
place the hippocampus in a vulnerable position under chronic stress conditions. Stud-
ies in laboratory rodents and field studies in primates have shown that hippocampal
neurons might degenerate under chronically elevated levels of glucocorticoids, leading
to loss of memory functions. It has been argued that cognitive decline during aging is
at least partially due to exposure to glucocorticoids and loss of hippocampal neurons.
Chronic stress not only affects brain functions, but also keeps bodily processes ac-
tivated for the fight-or-flight response for longer than necessary. Stress-related disease
occurs when the stress response is activated for too long or too frequently. The symp-
toms of ulcers, cardiovascular disease, diabetes, reproductive inhibition, psychosocial
dwarfism, and dysfunction of the immune system really are the tip of the iceberg of
stress-induced pathologies. Nevertheless, it usually is not the stress itself that makes
one sick, but stress makes one more likely to become sick. For instance, the suppres-
sion of immune system function seems appropriate for a zebra running for its life, but if
this effect persists into chronic conditions it might make the organism more vulnerable
to infectious disease or autoimmune dysfunctions.
18.5 Why is Stress Stressful?
The term stress is often used as a hypothetical concept in a mainly negative context.
It is noteworthy that the organism is able to habituate to many of the physical stres-
sors so they are no longer experienced as stressful. Nevertheless, many stressors in
today’s life style have a psychosocial component and thus the magnitude of a stress
response depends on the individual’s perception, personality, and perinatal experience.
It is well accepted that psychological variables, for instance an individual’s percep-
tion of a stressor, can modulate the physiological response. A number of studies have
generated ideas about psychological factors that can modulate the stress response. For
instance, the stress response can be diminished with gaining control over the stressful
situation such as the option to avoid or reduce the magnitude of a stressor. Rats placed
in a chamber that delivers mild electric shocks showed a significantly reduced stress
response when they were trained to press a lever to decrease the rate of shocks (Plaut
& Friedman, 1982).
Another variable that can modulate the stress response is the predictability of the
occurrence of a stressor. If rats are given a signal before the onset of a mild electric
shock, they show a lower stress response than rats that received an identical shock with-
out the warning. Finally, an important component of stress coping behaviour is to find
an outlet for frustration. Taking the example of a rat receiving mild electric shocks, a
major reduction in the physiological response can be found when the animal receives
a piece of wood to gnaw on or access to a running wheel. Such physical activities can
serve as protective outlets to reduce the stress response. Furthermore, social support
also plays a major role as a mechanism to cope with stress. The simple presence of
a conspecific might reduce the response to a stressful procedure. Similar mechanisms
can be found in primates. Imagine preparing for a difficult exam or undergoing a med-
ical procedure. The presence of a close friend or family member might take away
much of the stress associated these events. These examples illustrate that although the
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stress response is a relatively rigid hormonal cascade, there are numerous factors that
modulate the magnitude of the physiological response.
18.6 Conclusion
In today’s life style, we rarely encounter the physical stressors that our ancestors expe-
rienced. Nevertheless, the original mechanisms mediating the fight-or-flight response
are preserved. The complex influences of stress on the health of an aging individual
require more research, however, the lesson that we can learn from previous findings is
that the impact of external stressors can be considerably modulated by their perception
and by psychosocial factors.
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Chapter 19
Standing Up Straight, and
Staying There
Sergio M. Pellis
S tand up and gently lean your back against a wall. Just a light touch is neces-sary. Now raise both arms so that they are straight out in front of you. Feelanything? Try again, and this time pay close attention to your back. You willnotice that as you raise your arms, your back presses against the wall. This
result may seem obvious and trivial, but actually it is quite a profound illustration of a
general principle about movement and behaviour.
As you are reading this chapter, you reach over to pick up a can of Coke1, and we
see the same principle is at work. Quite simply, when you make a voluntary move-
ment, such as reaching out to grab a can of Coke, your body automatically adjusts your
posture so that you remain stable and balanced. If someone with an advanced case
of Parkinson’s disease2 is asked to do the above described experiment, as that person
1The main reason you need the Coke is that it helps keep you alert while studying. Actually, what
achieves this effect is a drug contained in the Coke, called caffeine. A major means by which nerve cells
(neurons) communicate with one another involves chemical substances called neurotransmitters. The caf-
feine influences certain kinds of neurotransmitters that act in part of the brain that regulates attentiveness.
Thus a little bit of caffeine stimulates this part of the brain and you can keep alert while reading this chapter
or driving a car for a long distance at night. Too much, however, results in stimulation of lots of other brain
areas, and you end up with the “coffee shakes”.
2Parkinson’s disease involves a particular constellation of symptoms, including a low amplitude tremor
of the extremities and difficulty in initiating movements. The tremor is actually what is called a resting
tremor. That is, the hands shake while they are resting, such as when folded in one’s lap, but as soon as the
person reaches to grab something, the tremor stops. The difficulty in initiating voluntary movements arises
primarily from the absence of the automatic responses that enable postural adjustment. The disease arises
from degeneration of a particular group of cells in the midbrain called the substantia nigra (black body).
This cell degeneration results in a reduced input of a neurotransmitter (dopamine) into another brain area in
the forebrain (the caudate nucleus), which is involved in working out how movements should be combined
together to achieve a task.
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raises their hands upward they will fall forward. By raising your arms you shift your
centre of mass forward, in front of your centre of gravity (somewhere between your
pubic area and navel); by leaning backwards, you shift your centre of mass backwards
to compensate for the added weight out front caused by your raised arms. This com-
pensation is an automatic, unconscious adjustment. We only become aware of it when
we are robbed of this ability by a disease, such as Parkinson’s (J. P. Martin, 1967).
19.1 Integrating Posture and Movement
There are a large number of such postural responses, usually automatic, which make
voluntary movement possible, of which we are ordinarily not aware. In fact, these
postural responses are so well blended into the execution of movements that we do not
notice them, until something comes along to disrupt their normal function. Let me give
you two concrete examples. Rats, like most other four legged mammals, walk with a
characteristic sequence of steps, so that if the rat steps with the left front foot (LF), the
next step will be with the right hind (RH), then the right front (RF) and finally the left
hind (LH), before the cycle starts again3. Following some forms of brain damage, rats
switch to a different gait sequence (LF–LH–RF–RH)4. Because four-legged animals
switch to different gaits at different speeds of locomotion (e.g. walk, trot, canter, run,
gallop), one possibility is that the brain damage has scrambled the organizing system
that selects appropriate gaits (Hruska & Silbergeld, 1979). This did not end up being
the correct explanation. Rather, we found that the gait shifts because of changes in
the rat’s ability to adjust its posture during walking. The brain-damaged rat will begin
by walking with the normal gait, but after a few steps it will switch to the abnormal
gait! At first, the rat’s posture is normal, so that when the hind foot moves forward,
it lands close to the forepaw onto the same side, and this unweights that paw (try it).
However, as the steps of the forelimbs tend to be longer than normal, and the steps of
the hind-limbs tend to be shorter than normal, after a few steps, the body is elongated.
Once elongated, a step by a hind foot only moves a short distance forward, landing far
from the forepaw on the same side. Now, instead of that forepaw being unweighted,
it bears more of the body’s weight, so that it is actually the forepaw on the other side
of the body that supports the least of the body’s weight, and hence the one that is
easiest to step with (again, try it). These are the postural changes that lead to a change
in gait (Pellis, Pellis, Chesire, Rowland, & Teitelbaum, 1987).5 Confirmation for our
explanation came recently from one of my colleagues in Israel. Studying the gaits of a
3To get this straight, try it. Get on all fours and try walking in this sequence. Given that your legs are so
much longer than your arms, try this by standing on your hands and knees.
4This abnormal gait sequence for a rat is actually the normal gait sequence for some four-legged animals,
such as baboons (Gambaryan, 1974), which suggests that varied types of gaits are represented in the brain
for different species. For as yet unknown reasons, some of these are used, but not others. Brain damage may
therefore reveal gaits not normally seen.
5This example also illustrates the difficulty in determining the processes that give rise to observed be-
haviour. In this case, a change in gait could be explained by either a direct change, such as in the brain
system which regulates gait sequence, or indirectly, via changes in posture. To be able to differentiate be-
tween these two possibilities, a detailed analysis of the movements of the animals was necessary. To achieve
a plausible diagnosis of such a pathology requires a lot of sleuthing, where all kinds of clues about behaviour
are used to detect a pattern of symptoms that support a particular hypothesis over another.
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variety of rodents, David Eilam (personal communication) found that a species of mole
rat, which has a long sausage-like body and small legs, walks with the same gait as our
brain-damaged rats!
In another example, brain-damaged rats were required to reach through a slot onto
a little platform to grasp and retrieve a small, highly tasty (to rats) food pellet. Nor-
mal rats learn this task very quickly and mould together a rat-typical sequence of body
and arm movements to achieve this task (I. Whishaw & Pellis, 1990). The surgically
treated rats, who had a form of brain damage that was a variation of that of the rats
in the walking experiment,6 had enormous difficulty in retrieving any food pellets suc-
cessfully (I. Whishaw et al., 1994). The rat would position itself at the slot, then dither
while making little forward and backward movements, and when it finally did reach
forward, it would fall over. The rat’s problem turned out to be similar to that of the
Parkinson’s patient described above. That is, the rat was unable to adjust its posture.
Typically, as a rat reaches forward, it shifts its body backwards simultaneously, thus
keeping its centre of gravity in about the same place. The brain damaged rat cannot
do this. After the initial difficulty in raising its paw (hence, all the dithering—how to
unweight the forepaw?),7 it does so, but then it topples over.
In these examples I have focused on what is called postural fixation, that is, the
ability to shift one’s posture so as to enable movement (e.g. walking, reaching) without
falling over. There are, in fact, a whole range of such ‘postural reflexes’, including
ones which are used to initiate walking, to stop yourself from falling over if pushed,
and to right yourself if you do fall. Most of these were identified and characterized in
the early part of this century by the neurologist, Rudolf Magnus, and his colleagues
(Magnus, 1924). However, to facilitate this analysis, Magnus used various kinds of
brain-damaged animals. As a consequence, many have been studied in clinical settings
as signs of pathology. It was a Japanese scholar, who having taught himself German so
as to be able to read Magnus, realized that these varied reflexes actually operate daily
during normal behaviour (Fukuda, 1984). For example, a reflex called the crossed-
extensor reflex occurs when turning one’s head to the side. This results in contraction
of the extensor muscles in the arm to which you turned your head8. Fukuda noticed
6The rats in the walking experiment were made Parkinsonian by destroying the cells carrying dopamine
to the striatum (the rodent equivalent to the human caudate—see the footnote on Parkinson’s disease, 147).
When this operation is done to an adult rat, it becomes completely akinetic (a = absence, kinetic = move-
ment). In order to make these rats walk, they were injected with a drug that blocked the action of another
neurotransmitter, acetylcholine, that occurs in the striatum. However, once the drug wears off, the animals
again cease to move. They will also not spontaneously feed themselves, and have to be fed, by pumping a
liquid diet directly into their stomachs, every 3-4 hours, day and night. The rats in the reaching experiment
were given the same surgery, but as newborn infants, not adults. These rats grow up seemingly normally, and
can feed themselves, but as explained in the text, they do have deficits.
7After sufficient practice, the brain-damaged rats do succeed in retrieving some pellets. In this sense, they
seem to recover. However, ‘recover’ usually means the reinstatement of that which is lost. In this sense, these
rats never really recovered; rather, they learned how to compensate for their problem: they raised the other
forepaw and then caught themselves with that paw on the front wall, to one side of the slot. They thus held
up their body with this paw, which freed the other paw so they were able to reach for the pellet! With such an
incredible capacity to compensate for deficits, differentiating between true recovery and compensation can
be quite difficult.
8This behaviour would be most clearly seen in a baby (not a toddler), as they have fewer complete neural
systems than adults to interfere with this reflex. A medical practitioner would be able to show you that if you
rotate the baby’s head to face the right, the right arm would extend, and if you rotate the baby’s head to the
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that this reflex is the one used to strengthen and lengthen one’s reach such as when
catching a ball. Similarly, stretching the ligaments on the front of your foot and ankle
causes the muscles at the back of your lower leg to contract, which makes you stand
straighter. This effect is why models usually wear high heels to “lengthen their line”,
and why cowboys who wear high-heeled boots “walk tall”. It is now well recognized
that posture and movement are integrally interconnected processes, which develop at
different rates. This difference in developmental rates is one of the main reasons why
babies are clumsy, and fall over. The neural systems controlling movement mature
before those that control posture. Similarly, our clumsiness when we learn some new
physical task arises from an initial lack of coordination between posture and movement.
19.2 Righting Reflexes
So postural adjustments ensure that we can move without falling, but what if we do
fall? Without being aware of your actions, you would first thrust out your arms towards
the ground and raise your head. This response would reduce the likelihood of injury,
especially to the head. Once on the ground, you have to regain your upright stance.
Again, by studying Parkinsonian patients, it can be demonstrated how protecting your-
self when falling and then getting to upright involves a number of reflexive responses9,
of which we are normally unaware. As the disease increases in severity, Parkinsonian
patients have greater and greater difficulty in turning over in bed (righting), and have
to adopt all kinds of bizarre strategies in order to do so (recall our reaching rats).
I first became interested in righting reflexes when studying Parkinsonian rats. The
puzzle was that while Parkinsonian patients have difficulty righting, Parkinsonian rats
do not10. Trying to solve this puzzle led into a 12 year journey to try to make sense of
the righting response.
left, the left arm would extend.
9There is a long history of debate about how to define a reflex. The simplest reflex is illustrated by the
quick withdrawal of your hand when you touch something very hot. Here the sensation of heat on your
fingers travels along sensory nerve cells (neurons) to the spinal cord, then back to the fingers along motor
neurons, which causes the muscles in your hand and arm to contract, so you thus withdraw your hand.
This pathway is the classic reflex arc—sensory nerve to spinal cord, spinal cord to motor neuron—defining
a reflex in terms of the structural connections in the nervous system. However, many reflexive responses
such as righting, involve more complex relationships of connections in the brain as well as in the spinal
cord. The main feature distinguishing these reflexes is that they appear to be automatic, that is, they are
performed without our awareness. In this case, a reflex is labelled by its functional qualities, not by its
specific structural arrangements. In this chapter, the term reflex is used to signify a response which we
normally perform without being aware of its execution.
10Animal models of human pathologies are essential to be able to characterize the damage producing the
pathology and to experimentally develop avenues of therapeutic intervention to ameliorate the symptoms,
if not cure the disease. However, while animal models are never 100% replicas of the disease, they are
usually close enough to be useful. For example, animal models of Parkinsonism simulate akinesia very well,
and have provided a valuable means of developing new drugs which provide relief to patients. One of the
reasons why there is a lack of 100% similarity in animal models of Parkinsonism is that in the animals,
the damage is confined to the substantia nigra, the key neural system affected by this disease. In the real
disease, while this structure is hit first, the pathology may spread to other neural systems, and so may result
in additional deficits. For example, problems with righting tend to occur after difficulties with initiating
movements arise. Treatment with dopamine ameliorates the difficulties with initiating movements, but not
with righting (Lakke, 1985).
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When a rat is placed on its back on the ground, it will quickly right itself by rotating
the body, head first, to a prone, standing position. In one of the forms of brain dam-
age that we were studying, the rats made all kinds of bizarre movements—when their
head turned to the left, their pelvis would turn to the right, and their legs would make
‘pumping-like’ movements. It seemed that the rat took forever to right itself (Pellis,
Pellis, Chen, Barzci, & Teitelbaum, 1989). At the same time, my wife was studying
the righting of infant rats: they also showed the same bizarre patterns of righting (Pel-
lis, Pellis, & Teitelbaum, 1991). What were they doing? Why did the infants resemble
the brain-damaged adults? And what, if anything, did this have to do with Parkinson’s
disease?
The clue came from Magnus’ classic work on righting (1924). He showed that
righting can be triggered independently by several sensory systems. The organs of bal-
ance, situated in a bony labyrinth in the inner ears11, can trigger the head and body to
right. Similarly, the sense of touch on the body can also do so. Magnus divided this
tactile (touch) based righting into two distinct types. Touch on the body can trigger the
head to right, but if the head is physically restrained, such tactile information triggers
righting by the body. More recently, a third type of tactile based righting was discov-
ered. Tactile input on the face can trigger a righting by the head (Troiani, Petrosini,
& Passani, 1981; Pellis et al., 1989, 1991; Pellis, Pellis, & Nelson, 1992). The final
type of triggering involves vision. A scheme of what triggers a righting movement and
then what it is that moves can be constructed. There is, therefore, vestibular-on-head,
vision-on-head, head (tactile)-on-head, and body-on-head. The fifth differs in that it is
body-on-body. The first four could be thought of as four different ways to trigger the
same response12. This aspect of Magnus’ model had us confused for a long time. These
sensory systems were not triggering the same response. Rather, each form of righting
was distinct. The clues were the tell-tale differences in the details of the movements
used during righting when each of these types of righting were engaged.
Following brain damage (Pellis et al., 1989) and in early development (Pellis et al.,
1991), some of these righting systems are missing, those that are present are incomplete
in their execution, and several of the systems present occur simultaneously. The net
effect is that movements counterproductive to righting are performed. For example,
body-on-body righting involves flexing the hind-leg closest to the ground, and tucking
it beneath the body and placing it on the ground, and then rotating the lower body
on top to an upright position. In the early stages of recovery from brain damage or
in early infancy, the hind-leg is placed, but no rotation of the body occurs. In order
to right, the leg extends pushing the body up and over to prone. Unfortunately, more
11Collectively, this collection is referred to as the vestibular apparatus, and contains two major compo-
nents. The sacculus and utriculus are two little chambers sitting askew from one another. Cells with little
sensory hairs (cilia) project up from the floor of each chamber. The cilia are coated with a layer of mucous,
on top of which sits little stones (otoliths). As you move your head, the stones pull on the cilia. This infor-
mation is then passed on to groups of cells in the brain. The second component involves three fluid filled
canals (one horizontal, and two vertical at 90◦ from one another). The inside of the canal has cells projecting
cilia into the tube, so that when you turn your head the fluid moves, moving the cilia. Again, this information
is passed on to cells in the brain. The first system lets you know the position of your head in space, and the
second informs you about the movement of your head.
12In an ingenious set of experiments, Magnus showed that each of these sensory systems could, indepen-
dently of each other, trigger the righting response.
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often than not, the foot is not far enough beneath the body, so that when it extends
it flexes out into the air. Repeated attempts to get a foothold leads to the ‘hind-leg
pumping’ mentioned earlier. In both recovery and development, each righting system
goes through the same stages of transformation. The interaction of these incomplete
systems leads to the bizarre patterns of movement that puzzled us at the beginning of
our work.
This new model of righting, where each type represents not only a distinct type of
sensory system, but also a distinct type of movement, finally made sense as to why brain
damaged adults resembled normal infants. But what has this to do with Parkinson’s
disease? Lakke (1985) showed that the difficulty that Parkinsonian patients have in
righting results from an inability to rotate their body axis13. He described various
idiosyncratic ways in which patients “learned” to overcome this problem. Some used
their legs and hands to push or pull themselves over. Others first sat up and then
turned to the side, which required minimal axial rotation. Our work suggests a different
interpretation for why different patients use different strategies to right.
As Parkinson’s disease progresses, the patient’s abilities diminish, whereas both our
brain damaged rats and our developing infants improved over time. We can view these
two trends as mirror images of one another. Many of the “idiosyncratic” strategies of
the patients actually looked similar to our rats when only certain portions of particular
righting systems were available to them. This suggests that as patients deteriorate, they
gradually regress, showing the opposite changes to the rats; that is, they are losing,
rather than gaining, components of righting systems. If so, then a diagnostic-schema
could be chartered to identify the stages of deterioration which particular patients have
reached14.
19.3 Conclusion
We have seen that maintaining yourself in an upright position involves a complex inter-
weaving of postural changes which adjusts your balance with your movements. Once
you do fall, there are a myriad of types of responses you can use in order to regain your
upright stance. In fact, we recently demonstrated that righting from a lying down posi-
tion involves a different class of righting than when you right while falling over (Pellis
& Pellis, 1994). This distinction is true across sensory modalities—therefore, there
is righting when stationary and righting when falling—one which utilizes information
from the vestibular apparatus, and the other which utilizes tactile input.
Which type of righting, or which types should be blended together in a particular
instance, is all decided without us being aware of the process. Indeed, most of our more
complex behaviours are performed without any thought. If you think about stepping as
13Actually, when lying down they cannot rotate the body axis, but if they fall they can. Therefore, they
are not paralysed (i.e. unable to move those muscles), but rather are apraxic (i.e., the ability [praxis] needed
to move these muscles is absent [a]). The muscles are able to move, but not when you wish them to. For this
reason, Lakke (1985) called this inability in righting axial apraxia.
14Another major problem is that these deficits in righting do not result from damage to the substantia
nigra/caudate system that is responsible for the typical Parkinsonian symptoms. Clearly, additional brain
systems must undergo pathological change. What are they?
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you are walking downstairs, chances are you will trip. One of the tasks of psychology
is to figure out how the brain is able to work out these complexities.
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Chapter 20
What is the Point of Play?
Sergio M. Pellis
T hat young animals play is well known. Most of us are familiar with theantics of kittens and puppies, or even monkeys at the zoo. But these arecaptive and pampered animals who do not have to hunt or forage for them-selves. What is more surprising is that in the wild, young animals spend
an extraordinarily large amount of time playing. For example, for my Ph.D. research,
I studied the development and play of Australian magpies, a crow-sized bird, native to
Australia. By four weeks, after fledging, they spend up to 20% of their daytime activity
engaged in play. This is at a time when about 50% of their food comes from their own
foraging, which has a low rate of success1. Clearly, young animals are spending time
and consuming energy that could otherwise be devoted to growth. In addition, studies
of free-living juvenile animals have shown that play also exposes them to the risk of
predation and injury.
So why do they play? Any television nature program will provide the answeryoung
animals learn all kinds of things from play—how to be good hunters, how to avoid
being prey, how to fight, how to have sex, etc. There is a problem, however; the actual
evidence for this is weak, or non-existent. However, for humans, the value of play
appears self-evident. Again, the evidence is weak or even contradictory.
A marvellous experiment by Corinne Hutt illustrates the problem nicely. She pre-
sented children with a novel and complex object, a box with a lever that operated a
bell, a buzzer, and four counters. Once the object was fully explored, it was incor-
porated into play. During play however, the children were less likely to discover un-
known properties of the object. Indeed, Hutt concluded that “. . . by being repetitive,
play is by definition a highly redundant activity, and can actually prevent learning”
(Hutt, 1966, p. 76). Another supposed benefit of play in humans is illustrated by the
use of play therapy to solve all kinds of psychological problems in children. A review
1Magpies live in open woodland and mainly feed on ground living (soil and grass) insects and other
invertebrates.
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by Phillips (1985) on its effectiveness revealed that most reports involved uncontrolled
case studies, or assumed folk wisdom. The few experimental studies do not support
the supposed power of play to ameliorate psychological difficulties. For example, in
one of the studies reviewed, retarded children were exposed to one of three conditions,
with each group being exposed to 29 sessions over 16 weeks. One group received play
treatment, another was given a movie to watch (placebo), and the third received no spe-
cial treatment. Personality and behaviour were found to improve in both the play and
the placebo groups2, with no statistical difference between them. The researchers con-
cluded that the beneficial effects were due to meeting in groups and to positive affect
(psychological jargon for feeling good).
The basic problem has recently been well put by Nigel Barber (1991), who points
out that “(p)lay research suffers from the inheritance of empirically unsupported as-
sumptions that are frequently accorded the status of fact—apparently because they are
reasonable, satisfy a need for explanation, and have been repeated by authorities” (p.
129). The bottom line is we do not know why animals, including humans, play. I will
illustrate the lack of empirical support for some of the common assumptions about play
and then suggest a different way of looking at the problem.
20.1 What Do Animals Do During Play Fighting?
As the name implies, play fighting is an activity which looks like fighting but does
not lead to injury, or other consequences typically associated with aggression3. Until
recently it was believed that “(t)he behavioural components of play fighting vary from
species to species but are generally predictable from a knowledge of those components
involved in the fighting of adults” (Meaney, Stewart, & Beatty, 1985, p. 5). But this is
not true. Rather, while some species use species-typical components of fighting in their
play, others do not. The key concept that was essential for distinguishing between these
two types of play fighting was that of the “target”. In a dog fight, dogs do not bite each
other just anywhere, but aim their bites at specific body parts—the back of the neck, the
throat and the muzzle. They will generally avoid biting other body areas. Therefore,
a dog fight involves the attack and defence of these particular body targets. Similarly,
play fighting by puppies involves the playful attack and defence of these same body
targets. From this we can conclude that play fighting for dogs is indeed predictable
from the components of serious fighting.4 This was also true for my magpies.
2This experiment shows us the importance of a placebo group. That is, some factor, other than the one
you think is important, may be producing the experimental effect. For example, at a party, most of us will
behave in a jolly manner after drinking beer, even if unbeknownst to us, there is no alcohol in the beer! This
does not mean that alcohol has no effect, rather, it means that when we assess these effects we have to make
sure to factor out other contributing influences. That is the role of the placebo group.
3Social play, or play involving two or more members of the same species, is one of the most commonly
observed forms of play. The most commonly observed form of social play is play fighting or rough-and-
tumble play. Other forms of play include object play, which is frequently seen in carnivores, such as cats,
and incorporates predatory behaviour patterns; solitary play which usually involves locomotor activity, such
as the gamboling of lambs; and humans also have fantasy play, which involves make-believe scenarios.
4You may have noticed that I have avoided defining play. The reason is simple—we all know play when
we see it, or think we do, but trying to pin it down by a set of criteria that unambiguously distinguishes play
from other behaviour is notoriously difficult. Therefore, for our purposes, think of kittens, puppies or young
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Like everyone else, I believed this was true for all species that exhibit play fighting—
that is, until I met the rat. When engaged in serious fighting, rats target their bites at
the lower back and rump of the opponent. However, when engaged in play fighting,
rats target the back of the neck. Adding insult to injury, when they contact the neck
playfully, they do not bite it, but instead rub their noses into the fur! After five years
of work, my colleagues and I confirmed that for 12 different species of muroid rodents
(mouse-like rodents including voles, deermice, gerbils and hamsters), the play fight-
ing targets are not the same as the body targets bitten during serious fighting, which
for all species are the lower back and rump (Pellis, 1993). For example, in the Syrian
golden hamster, the cheeks are the targets of attack and defence during play fighting.
If contacted, the cheeks are gently nibbled. In the Djungarian hamster5, play fighting
involves trying to get at the mouth, which is licked and nuzzled if contacted. Moreover,
the body areas contacted during play fighting are the same ones that are contacted dur-
ing sex (during foreplay, to be exact). Therefore, for some species, play fighting has
only a superficial resemblance to serious fighting, and its form can be predicted from
the species-typical components of sex, not fighting.
Nature is never so kind as to provide us with simple categories that neatly divide the
world into black and white—shades of grey always intrude. So too with play fighting.
Had our finding been as straightforward as it appeared at first, then there would be two
forms of play fighting—true play fighting, which involves components of serious fight-
ing, and pseudo-play fighting, which involves components of sex, and hence should
really be called sexual play or play sex. The Djungarian hamster shatters this picture.
In fact, during play fighting, it attacks and defends both the mouth (a sex target) and
the rump (a fighting target). This may also be the case for other species. For example,
one of my students at Lethbridge found that for kittens, playful attacks can be directed
at the neck and throat (a fighting target) and the anogenital area (a sex target). These
are not just randomly directed bites, rather, the cats orient themselves so as to gain
access to these body areas, even if it means moving the mouth past some other part of
the body. Therefore, play fighting may be seen as involving a spectrum: at one end,
all the behavioural components are predictable from fighting, and at the other, all are
predictable from sex. In between it is a mixture. A necessary precursor for any gen-
eral theory that accounts for why animals play fight is to know what it is that animals
do during play fighting. Clearly, the what is not as simple as was previously believed
(Pellis, 1993).
20.2 Big Brains Mean Lots of Play
Think about the animals you have seen playing. Dogs, cats and monkeys come to mind.
Not sparrows or starlings. What about a playful lizard? Not likely. More species of
mammals (warm blooded, hairy or furry, milk producing animals like us) have been
reported to play, than have species of birds. As for other types of animals, no convinc-
children engaged in what you believe play to be. That is the phenomenon I am dealing with here.
5So named because it comes from Djungaria, which is near the Russian part of Mongolia.
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ing reports have yet come to light. Birds are warm blooded and feathery (not furry)6,
so why don’t as many bird species play as do mammalian species? Think about what
it means to be called a ‘bird brain’? In general, birds have smaller brains than mam-
mals, even when differences in body size are taken into account7. Even within birds,
those that are most playful are the larger brained species, such as crows. After all, you
don’t get much play out of chickens! Amongst mammals, predators are larger brained
than prey species, and hence dogs and cats are more playful than sheep and cattle. The
most playful mammals are primates—the playful antics of monkeys and chimpanzees
are legendary. Not surprisingly, primates are the largest brained mammals. The most
playful primate is our own species, and we have the largest brain amongst primates.
Get the picture? The brainier the species, the more it plays. No less an astute observer
of the universe than James T. Kirk, Captain of the USS Enterprise, has made this very
clear: “(t)he greater the complexity of the mind, the greater the need for the simplicity
of play” (Star Trek; Episode – Shore Leave).
Is it really true that we need a large brain so as to play? First of all, it is necessary
to consider the brain in a little more detail. When comparing two mammals, if one has
a relatively larger brain than the other, it means that the forebrain area (the cortex) is
larger. More specifically, it is the part of the cortex called the neocortex, which is a
new (i.e., neo) development in the mammalian brain. So the above conclusion can be
restated: mammals with a larger neocortex play more. But is a neocortex needed in
order to play? My colleagues and I recently did an experiment to test this conclusion.
Under anaesthetic, the cortex of infant rats was removed by suction. Their play fighting
as juveniles was then compared to that of the play of siblings whose cortices (plural
of cortex) were left intact. The decorticate rats played just as frequently as intact rats,
and used all the same behaviour patterns. The decorticates differed a little in how
frequently they used some of the behaviour patterns, but in sum, it could be concluded
that frequent, complex play did not require an intact cortex for its occurrence. That
is, more primitive parts of the brain are sufficient to generate play (Pellis, Pellis, &
Whishaw, 1992). So it is not true that you need a big brain in order to play, but it may
still be true that you need the neocortex in order to learn whatever lessons are to be
learned from play.
To understand what may be learned, a digression is in order. Adult male rats that
have been decorticated as infants are incompetent when it comes to sex. They will
approach a receptive female, and mount her head or her flank, with a consequent lack
of success regarding copulation. That is, adult male rats that were deprived of their
cortex as infants are inept at foreplay (I. Q. Whishaw & Kolb, 1985). Intact adult
male rats that are deprived of the opportunity to play show the same incompetence at
foreplay as do decorticate rats that have had the opportunity to play as juveniles. From
this we can draw two conclusions. First, play is necessary for the development of male
sexual competence, at least in rats and some other species, such as rhesus monkeys (C.
Moore, 1985). Second, the cortex is necessary for learning this skill. So play does seem
6Fur and feathers both serve the same function, that of preventing heat loss. Both birds and mammals
produce energy so as to generate heat and hence are called “warm-blooded”. The energy loss would be
greater without insulation, and hence more energy would need to be generated so as to keep warm.
7The brain of a blue whale is much larger than the brain of a human. However, the whale weighs several
tons, a human weighs around 100-200 lbs. Therefore, relative to our size we have larger brains than whales.
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to be important for learning something, and having a big brain does mean something
when it comes to play. Maybe.
20.3 Immediate Costs/Delayed Benefits
“Most theories about the functions of play assert that play has immediate costs and de-
layed benefits. The young animal, it is argued, plays at the immediate expense of time
and energy expenditure but subsequently benefits from, say, improvements in predatory
or social skills later in ontogeny” (P. Martin & Caro, 1985, p. 85). That is, play now,
profit later. Several studies have attempted to demonstrate that improved predatory
skills in carnivores (e.g. cats and coyotes) result from playful experiences as juveniles.
The results have been inconclusive. As noted above, however, for rats and monkeys,
juvenile play experience has been demonstrably linked with adult sexual competence.
Therefore, juvenile play may function to practice foreplay. You play, then, in order to
get good at sex. However, there are some problems with this conclusion.
The first difficulty with this conclusion is that not all species that exhibit juvenile
play show this relationship to adult sexual competence (e.g., guinea pigs). The second
problem is with the timing of the critical age at which sexual competence is acquired.
Play typically follows an inverted U-shaped curve during development, so that it is rel-
atively infrequent in infancy, peaks in the juvenile period, and then is reduced to a low
level again after sexual maturity. Thus in rats, for example, the peak in play occurs
30-40 days after birth. Yet rats fail to acquire sexual competence if deprived of sibling
contact at 14-18 days (Gruendal & Arnold, 1974), which is before the peak in play! In
a study of play and sexual competence in sheep, Orgeur and Signoret (1984) showed
that the peak in play occurs at four weeks after birth, yet the critical time for the acqui-
sition of sexual competence is between three to six months. In other words, the critical
experience for sheep is gained after the peak period. The period of maximum play
in the juvenile period cannot be explained by the function of acquiring sexual compe-
tence. The third problem is that for both rats and sheep, one successful copulation by
these play deprived individuals leads to a complete elimination of the incompetence
in foreplay. So why all that play if one correct result is all that is needed? Practice
implies the more you do it, the better you get. On the other hand, once monkeys miss
out on the juvenile experience, they will never gain competence again, no matter how
much sexual experience they have later. So while there may be some truth to play being
present so as to practice foreplay for some species, this is not a valid conclusion for all.
What about the possibility that the benefits are gained at the time the play is per-
formed? That is, juveniles play in order to make them better juveniles, not better adults.
There is not much evidence for this either. One study suggests that juvenile rats play so
as to regulate their energy and nutrient intake (Barber, 1991). The idea is quite simple.
Imagine that a juvenile needs 10 g of protein a day8, and has access to an unlimited
supply of food that has a concentration of 0.01 g of protein per 1 g of food. That means
they would have to eat 1000 g of the food per day. Given that a 30 day old rat only
8Proteins form the basic building blocks of our cells, and are critically needed during development when
our bodies grow in size, which means increasing the number of cells present. Other major nutrients in food
(carbohydrates and fats) are used as a source of energy to maintain and repair cells, and for cells to reproduce.
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weighs about 35 g, this means that that rat will need to eat nearly 29 times its own body
weight! In order to get the needed proteins, the rat would gain far more calories than
needed, and unless eliminated, this would lead to a very fat juvenile rat. This would be
a great liability. Think of what chance an obese rat would have in escaping from a cat!
Therefore, Barber’s solution is that by playing, the juvenile rat eliminates the excess
calories, while accumulating the needed proteins. Ingenious, and it may well be true
for rats. Unfortunately, this cannot explain play in all species. For example, Galapagos
fur seal pups gorge themselves suckling so as to gain an enormous amount of weight
and then once the mothers have left them for good, uses these energy stores in order to
sustain themselves and to complete their growth. Yet when the mothers leave them, the
young seals persist in playing with one another, wasting energy that would otherwise
go toward growth and that cannot be replaced (Arnold & Trillmich, 1985). Therefore,
energy regulation cannot be the universal explanation for the occurrence of juvenile
play.
Recently, my colleagues and I have found a possible immediate benefit for the play
of rats. Rats live in colonies, with the males forming dominance relationships, where
one male is dominant and the others are his subordinates. Male rats, furthermore,
keep playing together well into adulthood, but only at a rate of about 5% compared
to the juvenile peak. It turns out that the subordinates preferentially initiate playful
contact with the dominant, not with each other. Also, when the dominant responds to
their playful overtures, the subordinates respond as they did as juveniles, which is by
rolling over onto their backs. Basically, the subordinates are using play as a means
of ‘sucking up’ to the dominant (Pellis, Pellis, & McKenna, 1993). Syrian golden
hamsters are solitary as adults, and if forced to live together after the juvenile period,
the subordinates will try to avoid playful contact with the dominant (Pellis & Pellis,
1993). This shows that in this species, sucking up has not evolved as a strategy for
peaceful coexistence. The example of rats shows that play can have immediate benefits,
but this does not explain the juvenile peak in play. Also, the example of the hamsters
shows that a function for play in one species does not predict a similar function in other
species.
20.4 Conclusion
Statements beginning with ‘play is’ or ‘play does’ should be viewed with great scep-
ticism. As I have indicated, there is very little evidence of play having any beneficial
consequences, either at the time it occurs, or later in life. Some of the evidence pre-
sented that does show beneficial consequences may only be true for one, or a few
species. There are no benefits of play that are true for all species that play. It seems
common sense that if juveniles, of whatever species, engage in play it must be good
for them. Science, however, is usually the opposite to common sense.9 If something
9This is well illustrated by our understanding of motion. “Imagine being in the centre of a large flat field.
If one bullet is dropped from your hand and another is fired horizontally from a gun at exactly the same time,
which will hit the ground first?” The answer is neither (or both). “That the bullet which is fired is travelling
horizontally has no effect on how fast it falls under the action of gravity” (Wolpert, 1992, p. 3). Another
example: imagine an aircraft dropping a bomb. Where will the bomb hit the ground, in front, beneath or
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makes common sense, then in science that rarely will be the correct answer.
With respect to play, perhaps the question we started with is all wrong. Although
playful behaviour occurs, especially in the juvenile period, it may not be the phe-
nomenon that needs explaining. Let’s turn this problem on its head. Perhaps what
needs explaining is the occurrence of a juvenile phase. Broadly, this period can be de-
fined as that phase in life where the animal no longer depends on its parent(s) for food,
but is not yet sexually mature10. There are two general theoretical perspectives on this
issue. First, a juvenile phase exists so as to provide the young organism the opportu-
nity to learn many things, with one of the means of learning being play. Second, the
juvenile phase may be a by-product of growth rules. That is, it takes a certain amount
of time for the organism to achieve its adult size. From this perspective, play may be
just something juveniles do to fill up all the spare time they have.
The first view cannot be correct, because as I have indicated there is virtually no
evidence that animals learn much at all during play. But then, the second view cannot
be completely correct either, because I also showed some evidence that some animals
do gain some benefits from play. This leads to a third perspective. That is, the length
of the juvenile period is set by growth laws, but once present, the juvenile can make
good use of its time. Put simply, the juvenile period did not evolve so that youngsters
can play, but since they have to pass through a juvenile period, those juveniles that
do play may be better off than those who just pass their time doing nothing (Pagel
& Harvey, 1992). An advantage of this perspective is that it discourages universal
pronouncements about what play does. Rather, it recognizes that in some cases, play
may have no benefits, in others, it may have benefit A, while in others again, it may
have benefits B, C, or D. Thus, we are forced to look more closely at each individual
instance of play, rather than assuming we know why it is there.
behind the plane? Unlike common sense, “science often explains the familiar in terms of the unfamiliar” (p.
3). In this case, the relationship between gravity and horizontal motion is not as we would intuitively think.
10The juvenile period is a phase of delayed maturation that occurs in invertebrates (e.g. insects) as well
as vertebrates (e.g. fish, mammals). However, it is most pronounced in mammals, especially primates. This
takes us back to brain size. Mammals with the largest brains also have the longest juvenile period. Therefore,
the correlation between brain size and play may result from a common cause—length of the juvenile period.
Correlation does not equal causation!
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Chapter 21
Uncommon Sense
Glen Prusky
“Look at me!
Look at me!
Look at me now!
It is fun to have fun
But you have to know how.
I can hold up the cup
And the milk and the cake!
I can hold up these books!
And the fish on a rake!
I can hold the toy ship
And a little toy man!
And look! With my tail
I can hold a red fan!
As I hop on the ball!
But that is not all
Oh, no.
That is not all. . . ”
That is what the cat said . . .
Then he fell on his head!
He came down with a bump
From there on the ball.
And Sally and I,
We saw all the things fall!
—The Cat In The Hat, Dr.
Seuss
T his passage, from one of the best known children’s stories in the Englishlanguage, is a feast for our senses. It is not difficult to imagine the Cat InThe Hat perched precariously on a ball, juggling a menagerie of colouredarticles along with the reluctant fish, not to mention the noise accompany-
ing his fall from grace. Presumably, the reason the words on the page alone can provide
us with such a vivid percept is that we have had many related sensory experiences in
our life. We know that balancing and juggling simultaneously would be difficult, that
red is different from blue, what milk tastes like, the smell of a cake and the noise a rake
and a fishbowl would make as they met the floor, let alone the bemused look the cat
would wear after the disaster! However, it is unlikely that you have ever given seri-
ous consideration to how it is that you distinguish the sounds, smells and sights of the
world, because it happens instantaneously and it takes no effort at all. It may come as
a surprise, though, that sensory processing is not a simple task. Your senses do not just
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reflect the external world but they first filter most of it out and then “create” a percept
for you that has every appearance of clarity, precision and completeness. The problem
is that everything you have ever experienced or will ever experience, must have or will
pass through your sensory systems! There is no other way to acquire information. Like
it or not, this is your Reality with a capital R.
One can view our sensory systems as being exquisitely sensitive to their respective
environmental stimuli. For example, it is often stated that your olfactory system can
detect a single drop of perfume in a very large room, or that you can hear a pin drop in
a quiet room, or that you can see a few photons of light in a dark room. While in some
ways these are impressive statistics, it is my contention that it is a wonder that we see
or hear at all, given how bad our external receptors are.
In the first place, our receptor systems are anything but sensitive. In the auditory
system, for example, adults can only hear things in a frequency range between 50 Hz
and 20,000 Hz, if they are lucky. Rodents and other small animals can produce and
detect frequencies up to 100,000 Hz! The next time that you are in a forest at dawn or
dusk and notice that the animal chatter is loud, imagine how loud it would be if you
could hear all of it!
Your visual system is even worse. It is true that you can probably detect visible
electromagnetic energy from about 350 nm (violet) to 700 nm (red). This detection
seems impressive until you realize that it represents only a tiny fraction of all the elec-
tromagnetic information that is out there in the world. If you turned on an AM radio
and tuned it to a local station it is detecting electromagnetic energy 10 orders of mag-
nitude higher in frequency than you can! In addition to the AM signals out there, AC,
TV, FM, radar, infrared, ultraviolet, X-rays, Gamma-rays and other debris from the Big
Bang are all around you all the time and you are completely unaware of it because you
do not have the sensory equipment to detect it.
Why do we lack sensitivity? The reason is that our senses have not evolved to
give us all information, but just give us the information that has been useful to our
lineage through evolution. The ability to hear ultra-high frequency vibrations, or broad-
band electromagnetic energy has not been advantageous. Hominids are generalists
and, with the exception of colour vision, none of our sensory systems are really good
or really bad. You can find many animals that have more sensitivity than humans in
one or more of their sensory modalities. That sensitivity has been advantageous to
their evolution, but they have paid a price for it; the sensitivity they have gained in
one modality has usually been offset by a reduced sensitivity in another. Rats, for
example, have excellent auditory, somatosensory and olfactory capabilities, but their
visual systems have lower acuity and no capacity to process colour. Eagles, on the other
hand, have far better visual acuity than humans, but their somatosensory capabilities are
less impressive. Rodents don’t need high visual acuity and colour vision because they
occupy dim niches in a nocturnal environment. However, birds of prey need excellent
vision in order to localize their dinner while flying. We do not predominantly occupy
either the night or the sky and the sensitivity of our sensory systems reflect this.
Second, in many ways your sensory receptors are simple, crude and convoluted in
their function. Your auditory system seems to have been cobbled together from the
junk heap of evolution. Sound waves enter your ear and cause sympathetic vibrations
in your ear drum. Your ear drum is connected to a series of small bones, which believe
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it or not, your reptilian ancestors used to articulate their jaws. The last bone in the
series moves like a piston within a small hole in the cochlea, creating waves in a fluid
that move the hair cells of the basilar membrane. In other words information is initially
air conducted, then it is translated into bone movement, then it is translated into fluid
conducted vibrations, where it finally mechanically-stimulates hair cells that translate
the movement into neural activity. Hardly a pillar of engineering efficiency!
Again, in many ways the visual system is designed even worse! Imagine if I told
you that you had to look at this page upside down and backwards, through a thick,
yellow liquid and a layer of tissue that had a big, black spot in the middle! It doesn’t
sound easy, but that is the problem that your visual system faces. Light enters the eye
through the cornea where it travels through some fluid and is then inverted by a lens
and projected on the retina at the back of the eye. However, between the lens and the
retina there is a large chamber filled with a jelly-like substance. Once the light gets to
the retina, the real problem starts. The retina is backwards! The photoreceptors are not
at the front surface of the retina, but are hidden behind a number of layers of opaque
cells. Finally, there is a hole in your retina at the point where the optic nerve leaves the
eye.
At this point it is reasonable to ask the question, if sensory detector systems are so
bad, then how do I see and hear as well as I do? The simple answer to this question is
that your brain does it.
Your external sensory receptors account for only a small part of your sensory sys-
tems. Each sensory system has specific brain regions that process their information. In
fact, more than half of your cerebral cortex is involved in sensory processing, and the
visual system occupies the lion’s share of that. Why is this the case? If sounds, sights,
surfaces, and smells exist, why does it take so much brain to detect them? The problem
is that they don’t exist; your brain makes them up for you. Let me use an example to
illustrate this point. A notorious pastime of vision researchers is to ask someone how
far they can see. Often, when people realize that they can see the sun and the stars, their
answer is on the order of light years. The fact is that you don’t see any great distance at
all: light travels to you, so you “see” no further than your retina! Nothing seems more
obvious to us than the observation of “things” out there in the world. But when you
think about it, nothing could be further from the truth. All that your retina “sees” is
light falling on its two dimensional surface, all your skin “feels” is mechanical stimu-
lation, all your nose “smells” or your tongue “tastes” is the concentration of chemicals,
all your ears “hear” is vibrations in air. No colour, no touch, no flavour, no sound, no
pleasure, no pain. It is all manufactured for you by your brain.
If that doesn’t convince you that the brain is creating your world, try this. Remem-
ber that I told you that the retina has a hole in it. This hole is actually called the optic
disk and it is an area near the centre of the retina where there are no photoreceptors, so
there is a “hole” in your visual field. It is unlikely, however, that you see a black spot as
you read these words. Why not? The short answer is that your brain hides the hole so
that you don’t notice it. You can demonstrate this point to yourself by visualizing your
blind spot. First, close your left eye and stare at a point in front of you on a surface
at arms length from your eye. Then move a pen from left to right with your left hand
across the middle of your visual field. At first you will be able to see the entire pen,
but as you move the tip of the pen into your blind spot, the tip will disappear and then
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reappear again as it exits the other side of the “hole”. You will notice that the “hole”
is not black, but rather blends into the surroundings of your visual field. It is as if your
brain airbrushes this hole out so that it looks like the surrounding picture: a cunning
forgery!
The fact of the matter is that sensation is not a simple task. It requires a huge
amount of your brain to produce meaningful sensations out of nothing more than en-
ergy. The brain does such a good job of this that we are convinced that sounds, sights,
smells, tastes and objects actually exist.
Maybe Dr. Seuss knew what the brain was up to when he created the character
of The Cat in the Hat. At the end of the story the children are faced with the messy
consequences of playing with the cat:
Then our fish said, “Look!
Look!”
And our fish shook with fear.
“Your mother is on her way
home!
Do you hear?
Oh, what will she do to us?
What will she say?
Oh, she will not like it to find
us this way!”
(. . . )
And THEN!
Who was back in the house?
Why, the cat!
“Have no fear of this mess.”
Said the Cat in the Hat.
“I always pick up all my play-
things
And so. . .
I will show you another
Good trick that I know!”
Then we saw him pick up
All the things that were down.
He picked up the cake,
and the rake, and the gown,
And the milk, and the strings,
And the books and the dish,
And the fan, and the cup,
And the ship and the fish.
And he put them away.
Then he said, “That is that.”
And he was gone
With a tip of his hat.
In many ways, the cat does the same job for the children in the story as your brain
does for you. It cleans things up and leaves you (and your mother!) with the impression
that everything is nice and organized no matter how messy things were before.
Chapter 22
Nurture’s Little Secret: Use it or
Lose It
Glen Prusky
At birth our death is sealed, and our end consequent upon our beginning.
— Marcus Manilius, 1st Century A.D.
It is unlikely that Marcus Manilius was commenting on brain developmentwhen he made this statement nearly 2000 years ago. However, nervoussystems basically follow the rule that “their end is consequent on theirbeginning”. As a student, you rely on your brain every day to get you
to the university and back home again. Yet as mundane as this seems, not even that
simple task would be possible if your brain did not have appropriate experience during
the first few years of your life. This chapter explores the issue of why this experience
is so important to normal function and how this process works.
Before these questions can be answered, it is important to understand some of the
functional properties of the nervous system. The human brain is composed of many
individual cells called neurons. Neurons contain the same structures as other animal
cells, including a nucleus and a membrane, but they differ in their form and function.
For example, the shape of neurons is very distinctive, due to the many small branch-
like fibres that can extend for great distances from a central cell body. These fibres are
divided into two functionally-distinct types.
One type of fibre, called a dendrite, is specialized for receiving chemical informa-
tion from other neurons and converting it into electrical signals, and another type called
an axon, is capable of generating electrical signals and sending chemical information
from one neuron to another. Although the size and shape of neurons vary widely, most
neurons have many dendrites and only one axon. However, because both dendrites
and axons can branch widely, one axon can send the same message to many different
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neurons, and a single dendrite can receive information from many different neurons.
Neurons communicate with each other at points of close proximity between axons and
dendrites, called synapses.
At a synapse, electrical activity in the axon of one neuron releases a chemical called
a neurotransmitter that interacts with receptive sites on the adjacent dendrite of another
neuron, and either stimulates the cell or inhibits it. Individual neurons or groups of neu-
rons with specialized functions form precise networks of specific synaptic interconnec-
tions, and the combined activity of these networks forms the basis of our behavioural
interactions with the world through our sensations, thoughts and actions. This elab-
orate organization in the nervous system comes about by a series of highly ordered
steps, with a precise temporal sequence that is characteristic of each individual neural
network. Moreover, each neuron in each network forms synapses only with a limited
subset of potential partners and these connections are formed only at specific regions
of the partner’s dendritic surface.
At first glance, it would appear that the organization of the brain is so intricate and
predictable in its development that it must be predetermined in a genetic plan. The
problem is that it is not possible for the genome to prescribe this complexity because,
as voluminous as it is, it does not contain enough information. It is estimated that there
are approximately one million genes in the human genome, but, there may be as many
as one billion times that many synapses in the mature brain! If the genome alone can’t
produce this complexity, then what does? The answer is that the brain works very hard
to organize itself through a combination of active destruction and construction.
First, it is obvious that your body started off in life small and got larger as you
developed. You are taller today than you were when you were born because you have
added many new cells to your bones, skin and other tissue. Brains also start off small
and get bigger as they age, but they actually lose neurons during development. In
addition, many of the connections between the neurons that you are born with are also
lost during development. Why would a brain that needs to develop complexity in its
function dismantle itself? The fact of the matter is that it does not dismantle itself;
it just removes the neurons and the connections that it does not need. It is not that
different from creating a statue. There are at least two ways to create a statue. In one
instance, a statue can be built out of clay by adding one piece at a time in all the right
places to assemble the form and features of your subject. However, it could also be
built by starting with a block of marble, much as Michelangelo did with the statue
of David, and removing all of the stone that is not part of the form you desire. The
brain does the latter; it begins with many inappropriate neurons and connections and
unmasks its mature form by removing them.
Second, brains build stronger connections between neurons during development to
enhance function. The mature nervous system has fewer neurons and connections than
it did in infancy, but it often has more efficient synapses between the remaining ones.
For example, the neuronal networks that are responsible for activating your muscles in
infancy must become much more effective as the organism matures in order to control
the increased size and complexity of the musculature. If not, as an adult you would
have no more ability to move than you did as a child. It is not different from managing
your money more efficiently as the size of your family increases.
The main question, though, is what rule does the brain use to determine which
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neurons live or die and which connections are lost or strengthened in this process? For
the most part, the rule is that neurons and connections between neurons, whose activity
is associated with uncommon stimuli are lost, and neuronal connections associated with
common stimuli are retained and enhanced. In other words, the functional properties
of neurons are, to a large degree, molded by environmental experience. You start off
life with more neurons and connections than you need, and then you maintain and
strengthen the ones that are useful based upon your experience, and discard the rest.
Examples of this process have been well documented in sensory systems, the inter-
face between you and your environment that provides the brain with most of its activ-
ity. If these systems are sufficiently active during development, your brain acquires the
ability to use them effectively at maturity. If, on the other hand, your sensory systems
are deprived of their normal environmental stimulation, the activity of the brain will be
diminished and your sensory abilities will be permanently curtailed. The brain simply
reflects the environment that it matures in.
An interesting feature of this process is that it is not equally active throughout de-
velopment, but primarily occurs during a restricted period of time early in development
called a “sensitive” or “critical period”. As a result, at these critical stages of devel-
opment, the precise organization of the brain is dependent upon specific interactions
between an organism and its environment, and this influence of the environment on the
brain, and therefore on behaviour, changes with age. This process means that abnor-
mal environmental experiences usually have more profound effects on the maturation
of the brain and on behaviour during early stages of postnatal development than in
adulthood. One notable exception to the principle of restricted critical periods, are the
neural networks responsible for many forms of learning. These networks seem to have
the ability to change throughout life to facilitate the acquisition of new information. It
is this exception that you are probably counting on to get you through university!
There are probably many of reasons why critical periods of neural flexibility exist.
First, it allows the nervous system and its behaviour to reflect the environment that it
will live in. There is no point in having a constantly changing nervous system through-
out the course of life. Basic features of nervous system function probably need to be
laid-down first, so that more complicated functions can be built on them. For example,
complex language function, which requires accurate sensory information, could prob-
ably only come about if reliable sensory function is established first. Second, neural
flexibility is probably biologically adaptive. Species that can adapt to changing envi-
ronments have probably been more successful during evolution. Humans occupy more
niches than any other species on the planet and it is probably the incredible flexibility
of our nervous system that has played a large part in our ability to live in many differ-
ent environments. Third, neural flexibility is a way to increase the complexity of the
nervous system without using more genes to do it. The competition for resources has
increased through, making it a more complex undertaking to survive as a species. Un-
doubtedly, increased complexity in brain function and behaviour is an advantage under
these circumstances.
Finally, imagine for a moment that a terrible accident occurred and your brain was
damaged beyond repair. However, a new brain could be cloned from your cells, and
this brain could be placed back in your skull and you could “survive”. (This is a
common occurrence according to the pages of the National Inquirer!) Would you be
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the same person? Of course not! The neural connections in your new brain would not
be the same as your old brain because they would have to be modified in order for your
nervous system to work efficiently. But because the environment that you are in now
is different from the environment that your old brain developed in, you would sense
things differently, perceive things differently, think differently, and act differently and
your memories would be all gone. Genetically, you would have the same brain, in the
same body, but you would be a different person, and there would be no way to turn you
into the old you.
Take care of your brain.
Chapter 23
Language, Evolution and
Human Uniqueness: On How to
Explain Really Complex Things
Drew Rendall
D epending on your orientation, psychology is either the science of humanbehaviour or the science of the human mind (or better yet, both, since thetwo are inter-related). Either way, language is central, because languagemediates much of human behaviour and because language recruits a va-
riety of cognitive processes. Now there are at least two broadly distinct components
to a science of anything: [1] sorting out exactly what the thing is, and [2] sorting out
how the thing came to be. Both components of any science involve the use of general
principles and processes that are applicable to a wide array of things (phenomena). In
the life sciences, the sciences of all things biological (of which psychology is a part),
component [1] reduces to sorting out how the thing is structured, how it develops, and
how it functions, while component [2] reduces to sorting out how the thing evolved, in
both cases using general principles and processes of evolutionary theory, the reigning
theoretical paradigm for the explanation of biological phenomena.
Right away contemporary psychological science risks running aground because in
some quarters there persists the notion that humans are unique, somehow qualitatively
distinct from the rest of life on Earth . . . and therefore not subject to general principles
and processes that govern biological phenomena. The obvious proof of our uniqueness
lies in language, the pinnacle of human complexity, unrivalled by anything observed
among animals. The implications for psychological science are clear: language is cen-
tral to human psychology; a comprehensive account of human psychology requires an
understanding of its evolution; but humans and language are unique. Thus, a com-
prehensive science of psychology is unattainable because one fundamental component
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of that science—understanding how human behaviours and minds have evolved—is
precluded. How can we avoid this pitfall?
The first step is to review evolution and our place in nature.
23.1 Evolution and Primate Phylogeny
Evolution is about descent with modification. Descent simply refers to the line of
historical relatedness between ancestors and descendants that arises as a simple by-
product of sexual reproduction that occurs in all biological organisms. Parents beget
offspring, and one generation gives rise to the next, which gives rise to the next, which
gives rise to the next . . . in an endless and connected sequence of reproduction. Mod-
ification simply refers to the fact that small changes in form and behaviour can occur
over time such that descendants begin to diverge slightly in form and behaviour from
their ancestors.
Evolutionary science allows us to use the patterns of similarity and accumulated
change between organisms to chart their phylogenetic (i.e., evolutionary) relatedness.
As we all know, humans are primates, members of a taxonomic grouping (the order
Primates) that includes more than 200 living species of prosimians, monkeys and apes
that share a common biological ancestry (Figure 23.1). Primates first appeared at the
end of the Cretaceous (ca. 65 million years ago) when the extinction of the dinosaurs
left many ecological niches vacant. The subsequent radiation of the mammals included
the first primate species who successfully penetrated the arboreal (tree-living) niche.
As primates, we all share a variety of traits. That is, we can trace continuity be-
tween ourselves and all the species that share our taxonomic order. All primates, by
virtue of our legacy of common ancestry, share a basic suite of traits such as forward
facing (rather than laterally facing) eyes, pentadactyly (five fingers on hands and feet),
opposable thumbs, and nails (rather than claws) on all digits. This suite of traits reflects
our heritage of a life in the trees—it is an adaptive complex that allowed primates to
exploit the arboreal niche. The five-fingered condition, combined with an opposable
thumb and digits supported by nails rather than claws, provided improved grasping
ability allowing primates to exploit arboreal food resources using a wide range of sub-
strates (trunks, branches, twigs and vines). Forward facing eyes provided overlapping
fields of vision (i.e., stereoscopic vision), adding depth perception crucial for moving
and leaping in a complicated 3-dimensional environment.
These are traits that humans possess and that we share with all other primates.
Of course, we share a great deal more with the species that are most closely related
to us for the obvious reason that the amount of time that separates us from our last
common ancestor with these species is shorter and thus the amount of change that has
accumulated in our respective lineages is less. For example, we share a variety of
additional morphological and behavioural traits with our closest living relatives, the
great apes (orangutans, gorillas, and chimpanzees). Immunological analyses of gene
products (e.g., blood proteins and other macromolecules) as well as direct studies of
DNA itself indicate that chimpanzees are the species most closely related to us and
that we shared a common ancestor as recently as 4.5 million years ago (R. Martin,
1990). Not surprisingly, then, the list of traits we share with chimpanzees is long and
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loris
bushbaby
mouse lemur
ringtail lemur
ruffed lemur
sifaka
tarsier
squirrel monkey
capuchin
owl monkey
titi monkey
tamarin
marmoset
spider monkey
howler monkey
red colobus monkey
black & white colobus
langur
snubnosed monkey
vervet monkey
patas monkey
mangabey
baboon
gibbon
orangutan
gorilla
human
chimpanzee
macaque
Figure 23.1: Phylogeny of the primates.
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includes: a long life span, a long gestation period, a long period of infant dependency,
large body size, large brains, a flexible rotary shoulder, an omnivorous diet including
significant meat content, large social groups, a patrilineal social structure, similar facial
expressions, tool manufacture, hunting, warfare/genocide, and promiscuous mating.
23.2 Explaining Complexity
Thus, the history of humans can be traced clearly to primates and the path is well-
marked with evolutionary breadcrumbs—signs of anatomical and behavioural conti-
nuity. Despite the overwhelming evidence of our evolutionary history, proponents of
human uniqueness resist evolutionary accounts of language. They frequently concede
evolutionary continuity in other aspects of our anatomy and behaviour - continuity of
the sort just reviewed—but maintain that language is unique, that it has not evolved.
In their view, language is simply too complex to have evolved. It is, in fact, not a
biological phenomenon at all, but a uniquely human cultural phenomenon.
It is ironic that proponents of human uniqueness choose complexity as the basis for
arguing the non-biological basis of language, because complexity has in fact long been
considered a hallmark of evolved biological phenomena. In a recent book on language,
Steven Pinker (1994) compares language to things like “eyes” that are “organs of ex-
treme complexity and perfection”, an expression coined by the grandfather of modern
evolutionary theory, Charles Darwin (1859). Pinker’s analogy is designed to confront
the reader with the overpowering logic that language has in fact evolved using the very
quality (complexity) sceptics invoke as proof that it has not. How does the analogy ac-
complish this? In short, there are only two explanations for extremely complex things:
[1] chance; and [2] design. Eyes are very complex things—finely tuned optical devices
composed of myriad different but integrated components all operating in synchrony.
Eyes are composed of a protective outer layer (the cornea), an iris for varying the pupil
aperture and thus light intake, a lens for focusing light on the light-sensitive retina that
lines the back of the eye-ball, photoreceptive cells (rods and cones) for receiving the
light, an array of nerve cells (ganglion cells) and supporting cell complexes (bipolar
cells, horizontal cells, and amacrine cells) for conducting this information to the fibres
of the optic nerve, and tiny muscles for varying the iris aperture and the lens shape (not
to mention the network of capillaries for delivering blood and providing lubrication
for the cornea). Taken together, the various components that make up eyes are highly
improbable arrangements of matter. That is, they are extremely unlikely to have come
together by chance. The possibility that something as complex as an eye could have
arisen by chance is, as Pinker and others before him have remarked, as imponderable
as supposing that a strong wind might blow through a junk-yard and from bits and
scraps of metal miraculously assemble a fully functioning aircraft. The alternative is
that eyes—and other complex and improbable arrangements of matter—arose by de-
sign, which in the case of biological phenomena means by evolution, through a long,
slow, gradual process of tinkering that accumulates minor modifications of form and
function.
But exactly how does evolution generate organs of extreme perfection? Recall that
evolution is about descent with modification. It is a logical truism that the organisms
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that we see today in the forms that we see them in, are here today in those specific forms
because their ancestors successfully reproduced and passed along the traits that aided
them in doing so (this is the inescapable logic of Darwin’s mechanism of evolution,
aptly termed “Natural” Selection). Not all individuals are identical to one another in
form or behaviour (another inevitable by-product of sexual reproduction, the shuﬄing
of genetic material every generation). And not all individuals that are born reproduce
successfully: some die at birth, some die early from disease, others are preyed upon.
Those that survive and reproduce are those that were better able to procure food re-
sources, to avoid predators, and to withstand disease, perhaps because they could run
just a little bit faster, or, in the case of eyes, because they could see just a little bit farther
or with slightly greater acuity. Whatever slight advantages these individuals possessed
would be passed on to their offspring and the process continued with each subsequent
generation potentially adding to the slight improvements of the previous ones. Over
vast periods of time—literally millions of generations—evolution can produce highly
complicated structures, so-called organs of extreme perfection (such as eyes), simply
out of the slow, gradual accumulation of minor modifications of structure that provide
slight improvements in function.
So, the complexity of a phenomenon, rather than being viewed as an obstacle to
evolutionary explanation, is in fact a sure sign that something has evolved—complexity
is one mark of an evolved biological phenomena. The only alternative is to argue
something like “a strong wind blew through a junkyard and assembled an aeroplane”.
23.3 How to Recognise Biological Phenomena
But what about the claim that language is qualitatively different from anything seen
in animals and therefore that it must be a cultural rather than biological phenomenon?
Certainly the lack of obvious signs of continuity between human language and animal
communication systems makes the problem of reconstructing language evolution more
difficult. But this should not preclude the possibility that it has evolved. Consider
another distinctive feature of human behaviour, namely bipedalism, the characteristic
way that we humans stand, walk and run on two legs. Our two-legged posture, like lan-
guage, is qualitatively different from anything seen among primates, or indeed among
all other mammals. Yet this fact does not motivate people to attribute walking to cul-
ture. They do not view walking as some wonderful cultural invention. Rather, they
have no trouble believing that the capacity to walk bipedally is a part of our biology
and like other aspects of our biology that it has evolved. In fact, language appears to fit
the bill of an evolved biological phenomenon equally as well.
In his book on language, Pinker highlights a number of diagnostic features of
evolved biological phenomena: they are marked by complex design properties; they
are supported by specialised structures; they are universally present in the population;
and they follow a canalised (i.e., regular) developmental sequence. Clearly, bipedalism
fits the bill. Standing and walking upright is a complex way to balance oneself and
get around. In fact, bipedal walking is often regarded as ‘controlled falling’ (doubtless
many of you have had occasion to challenge the complexity of bipedalism and averted
falling with varying degrees of success). Bipedalism is supported by specialised de-
176 Language, Evolution, and Human Uniqueness – Rendall
Figure 23.2: Anatomy of the human vocal tract.
sign of the bones of the pelvis, femur and tibia. Our pelvis is short, broad and rounded
(relative to those of quadrupedal, or four-legged, animals) in ways that optimise the
biomechanical efficiency of attached muscles responsible for maintaining an upright
posture and moving our legs. Our femurs (thigh-bones) are angled inward slightly,
which shifts our centre of gravity while walking to a more stable central location be-
neath us (versus to one side or the other). And the articulation of our femurs and tibias
(the knee joint) can “lock” allowing us to remain upright with minimal muscular exer-
tion. Walking is universally present—all humans walk upright. And walking follows a
canalised developmental sequence: no child can walk at birth, but all acquire the skill
with no formal instruction.
Language also fits the bill of an evolved biological phenomenon. Language is in-
deed complex (on this, we all agree). It uses arbitrary combinations of sounds (words)
to stand for (or symbolise) objects and events in the environment. Typically, many
such symbolic sound combinations are concatenated into lengthy utterances whose se-
quential ordering is governed by rules of syntax and grammar that determine their
meaning. For example, the statements “Joe ate crow” and “Crow ate Joe” use the same
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words to describe very different events whose meaning is interpretable only from the
ordering of the elements. Language is supported by specialised structures (see Fig-
ure 23.2). We produce speech through the regulated control of airflow across the vocal
folds of our larynx (or “voice-box”) that sits atop the trachea (the airway leading from
the lungs). The resulting air pressure waveform caused by the vibration of the vo-
cal folds is filtered by the cavities of the supra-laryngeal (“above the larynx”) vocal
tract (neck, mouth and nasal cavities). Movements of the jaw, tongue and lips (the
speech articulators) shape the filtered laryngeal waveform into the various vowel and
consonant sounds of speech. The wide range of speech sounds we produce is, in part,
attributable to the location of our larynx deep in the vocal tract, a position to which
it descended only in the last 100,000 years from higher in the vocal tract of primate
ancestors. The low laryngeal position in humans greatly increases our risk of choking
as water and food particles now slip more easily down the trachea (to the lungs) versus
down the oesophagus (to the stomach) where they are supposed to go. However, this
cost was more than compensated by linguistic benefits (Lieberman, 1991). The low
position of the larynx creates a large resonating cavity (the pharynx) at the back of the
mouth and top of the neck that allows us to generate a large variety of speech sounds
via movements of the jaw and tongue (which alter the resonating properties of this
cavity). Because we can rapidly and dynamically reposition the jaw, tongue, and lips
during speech production, we can produce upwards of 40 different speech sounds per
second. This rapidly changing speech stream is decoded in listeners first by peripheral
sense organs and then by central neuro-cognitive mechanisms. The peripheral auditory
sense organs (our ears) capture and transduce the rapidly changing air pressure wave-
form that constitutes speech into mechanical vibrations in the middle ear and ultimately
into electrical impulses in the cochlear nerve of the inner ear (via several intermediate
transductions). Cochlear nerve impulses are transmitted to the brain’s temporal lobe
for additional central processing. Central speech processing operations—such as the
phonetic, phonological, syntactic and semantic analysis of speech utterances—appear
to have specific localised seats in the brain lateralised to the left hemisphere. For ex-
ample, specific areas in the left frontal cortex (inferior frontal gyrus, roughly Broca’s
area) and the left tempero-pareito-occipital junction (posterior superior temporal gyrus,
angular gyrus, and supra-marginal gyrus, roughly Wernicke’s area) participate in syn-
tactic/phonetic and semantic processing, respectively (see Figure 23.3). Thus, a great
number of physical structures of the body participate in language and show evidence
of specialisation for this purpose.
Language is also universal. Cultural practises vary markedly around the world.
However, all human populations regardless of their culture possess a language that is
as rich and fully complex as any other. Finally, language follows a canalised (i.e.,
regular) developmental sequence. No child anywhere speaks at birth, but the ability
emerges reliably in all children around the world in all languages at about the same
time . . . and all without formal instruction.
Clearly then, language, like bipedalism, belongs in the realm of the biological, in
the realm of things that have evolved. Why then are some people inclined to give two
different explanations to two equally distinctive characteristics of human biology—
walking and talking? Why do they link walking to biology, but talking to culture?
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Figure 23.3: Left cerebral hemisphere of human brain with language centres indicated.
23.4 Cartesian Dualism
The view that language is uniquely human can be traced to age old moral pre-occupations
having to do with distancing ourselves from the other “beasts” that inhabit this earth,
at the same time celebrating our exalted special human status, both practises serving
to justify our dominion over and exploitation of everything on this planet. If we aren’t
special, how can we morally justify our consumption of everything?
Cartesian dualism provides probably the best known rationalisation for this posi-
tion. Descartes argued that animals were mere automata, organic robots that acted re-
flexively in response to sensory stimulation, whereas humans were distinctly different,
possessed of a rational soul capable of acting on free will (i.e., possessed of a “mind”).
Descartes arrived at this view via a circuitous route, however. Ironically, Descartes
was initially inclined to the view that human and animal behaviour might be governed
similarly by a large set of mechanical reflexes. This possibility occurred to him after
viewing an exhibit at a local fair in France that contained a variety of hydraulic hu-
man statues connected by pipes to hidden platforms throughout a visitor viewing area.
When visitors stepped on one of these platforms, water flowed through the pipes and
activated the statues that then moved, made sounds, and behaved in ways that were
to all appearances complex, internally motivated, in short just like humans! If a sim-
ple system of pipes could produce such complex actions, then perhaps a great deal of
animal and human behaviour (however complex it appeared on the surface) could be
accounted for by a similarly simple system of mechanical reflexes.
However, the social climate at the time (mid-17th century, the time of the Inquisi-
tion) was ill suited for a view that posited identity in behavioural mechanism between
animals, machines, and humans (particularly one that appeared to dispose of free will).
Descartes pursued a different tack instead. In an exhaustive series of thought experi-
ments designed to doubt everything in experience that was not basic, primal and self-
evident so as to arrive at a core of experiential axioms, he explored the fallibility of
bodily experience but the veridicality (truthfulness) of thought experience. In brief, he
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argued that our bodily experiences can all be doubted because they are brought to us
through our senses, which we know to be imperfect. After all, we frequently mistake
people on the street. We sometimes even hear unspoken voices (incidentally, Descartes
is rumoured to have suffered from schizophrenia). Because all bodily experience de-
rives from sensory experience and because our senses are infinitely fallible, Descartes
argued that our very bodily existence can even be doubted. However, at bottom what
cannot be doubted is doubt itself, the fact that we have doubts. That is, we cannot
doubt that we are a physical being simply by virtue of the fact that we have doubts, or
more generally thoughts. This is the cause for Descartes’ famous refrain, “Cogito, ergo
sum.” [I think. Therefore, I am.] The logical conclusion to Descartes was that mind
and body must be of different substances. Descartes held that the body consists of a
physical substance that obeys basic physical laws (reflexes), but the mind consists of
some incorporeal substance, or spirit, that acts independently according to completely
different laws. This is the basis for Cartesian mind/body dualism (Descartes, 1637,
1641).
Descartes’ dualism was dualistic in its implications. Not only were mind and body
distinct, but so were humans and animals. Animals were mere automata governed by
basic physical processes like those that moved the hydraulic statues at the french fair.
Humans were unique by virtue of possessing a mind that operated independently of the
body. In sum, our bodily existence was saved by our doubts, our uniqueness was saved
by our minds. . . and Descartes was saved from certain excommunication and censure
unlike his contemporary Galileo (who doubted that the Earth was the centre of the
universe)1.
23.5 Language and Mind
And what has language to do with Cartesian views of uniquely human minds? The
connection lies in the relation between language and mind. Language is the medium
through which we express our thoughts (of this, there is no doubt). According to some,
the relation is reversed— that language affects rather than reflects our thoughts. The
former position, known as linguistic determinism, proposes that language determines
thought. That is, our impressions of the world are determined by the language we use
(Whorf, 1956). For some, the connection between language and thought is so intimate
that the two are taken to be synonymous—that we literally think in language. The latter
views are not widely endorsed (that many of our most basic thoughts and feelings are
difficult to articulate stands in obvious contradiction). However, they have served as
impetus for serious considerations of the dissociability between language and thought,
and for research programs designed to characterise the language of thought (or mind)
as distinct from spoken language (Fodor, 1975).
Irrespective of which way the causal arrow points—whether language affects or
reflects thought—language and mind are thoroughly interwoven. As noted above, we
place great importance on the mind in defining who we are. In fact, as Cartesian du-
1Note that speculation over the connection between mind and body pre-dated Descartes, continued in his
wake and is still a lively topic of debate today, though few take seriously the notion of a mystical mind spirit
or the view that animals are reflexive automata.
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alists maintain, the fact that we think lies at the core of what we “think” it means
to be human. Given the need to distinguish ourselves from animals—the need to be
unique—it is critical to argue that the mind and therefore language must be unique to
humans.
And this is why two distinctive human traits—walking and talking— are often
given two different explanations: because we are morally obliged to distinguish our-
selves from the beasts, because the mind as the seat of our humanity is the best candi-
date for making this distinction, and because language is intimately connected to mind.
Voila`! Human minds and language are unique. Walking simply doesn’t have the same
cachet, so it can be comfortably relegated to biology.
23.6 Morality versus Science
This is not the place to indulge the moralities of ‘human uniqueness’ viewpoints. For
starters, morality can be a sensitive subject. But far more importantly, morality has
little bearing on us here. Morals and ethics are the subject matter of Philosophy and
other Humanities—how things should or ought to be. Science is about how things are,
and how they came to be this way.2 Furthermore, science seeks explanations through
recourse to general principles and processes that apply to a wide range of phenomena.
It is immediately clear that uniqueness views are unscientific because they offer
no explanation in terms of general principles that apply to a wide range of phenom-
ena (Cartmill, 1990). In fact, the ‘uniqueness’ argument is logically equivalent to the
‘chance’ argument that Pinker uses as a foil for evolutionary explanations of com-
plex, highly improbable arrangements of matter. Explanations based on ‘uniqueness’
or ‘chance’ attribute the cause of a phenomenon to completely unpredictable events.
If the causes of a phenomenon are unique and unpredictable, then by definition we
can never understand them. And so explanations in terms of uniqueness are really
non-explanations, because they add nothing to our understanding. They tell us nothing
about how the things we are interested in (in this case, human minds and language)
came to be.
Instead, we seek a scientific explanation of how things are and how they came to
be the way they are. In the life sciences—where the subject matter is organic life,
the study of all things biological— the explanatory framework is evolutionary theory,
which can account for the history of organic change and for highly improbable arrange-
ments of matter in terms of general principles and processes that govern descent with
modification.
Of course, it is conceivable that not all phenomena will submit to evolutionary ex-
planation. In such cases, we can always resort to uniqueness or chance explanations of
their origins. The latter are explanations of last resort, however, because they leave us
with nothing to do in the meantime—they are explanatory dead-ends. Neither form of
2The fact that morals are not the province of science does not relieve scientists of moral responsibilities.
On the contrary, the activities of science are governed by a serious ethical code regulating the conduct and
reporting of research. Further, scientists play a pivotal role in shaping societal ethics. Their professional
contribution lies in establishing the nature of focal phenomena and how they came to be the way they are as
the critical first step in sorting out how they should or ought to be changed, if they can be.
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explanation is morally better or worse than the other. But one is scientifically sound
and productive in its assumptions, while the other is not. Starting from an assumption
of chance or uniqueness suggests no means to proceed, no way to further understand
the phenomenon in question because it is assumed to be the result of unique and un-
predictable causes that are logically beyond study. The search for understanding ends
before it can begin. In contrast, starting from an assumption of biological constitution
suggests a very clear path: use general principles and processes of evolutionary theory
that have proven applicable to a wide range of biological phenomena to try to learn how
the thing came to be the way it is. This approach is productive—it gives us something
to do!
23.7 Avoiding the Pitfall
Returning to the issue that framed this essay, “How can we hope to achieve a com-
prehensive science of human psychology—one that includes an understanding of how
we came to be the way we are—if humans, their minds, and language are assumed to
be unique?” By now, I hope the answer is clear. We can foster a truly comprehensive
science of psychology if we abandon notions of human uniqueness and set about the
task of understanding human biology in its entirety including the nature, function and
development of human behaviour, human minds, and human language and how they
have evolved.
Of course, one might still object, “why is it so important to understand how some-
thing has evolved? After all, isn’t it enough just to know how it works now? And
wouldn’t this remove us from the problem that framed this essay?” It might, but at sig-
nificant cost. Understanding how something has evolved is often an important source
of insight into its current design, its current functions and its inherent limitations. Con-
sider again, eyes. Eyes, as we’ve noted, are extremely complex organs, but they have
certain limitations that reflect their evolutionary history (those reading this through
eye-glasses will be instantly sympathetic). Our forward-facing eyes evolved for depth
perception but at the considerable expense of peripheral vision (ubiquitous crumpled
car-fenders testify to this expense). Eyes also come with a blind spot, a quirky result
of evolution working with limited raw materials. Eyes work by focusing light on pho-
toreceptive cells (rods and cones) of the retina, the light-sensitive lining that constitutes
the back surface of the eye. Ganglion cells collect the unprocessed light information
from these photoreceptors and conduct it to fibres of the optic nerve that then transmit
the information to the optic lobe of the brain for further processing. Our blind spot
derives from the fact that the optic nerve fibres must exit the eye somewhere in order to
conduct light information to the optic lobe. They do so at the back of the eye, through
a small hole in the retinal lining, where as a result there are no photoreceptive cells at
all. Hence, visual information focused on exactly this spot on the retina simply cannot
be seen—there are no light detecting cells to see it! Of course, it didn’t have to be this
way. Eyes could have been constructed without a blind spot, had we been designing
them on paper with draftsman’s tools, the way we build mechanical lenses. But evolu-
tion is blind, limited to working with the materials immediately at hand. The result, a
complex seeing organ with specific limitations, a camera with a hole in the film!
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Other examples abound. Primate hands are great for grasping (branches, bottles,
baseballs), but are not so good for playing piano (why can’t our thumb and pinky stretch
further!), typing at computer keyboards for extended periods (witness carpal tunnel
syndrome), or securing the last peanut from the bottom of the narrow-necked Planter’s
jar. Brains are good for solving social problems (If Sarah told Bob not to tell Sally
about Suzy and Biff sleeping together, but Sally found out about Suzy and Biff, who’s
in trouble with Sarah?) but are much less proficient at math (If twice a number can be
quartered and doubled and then squared and divided by itself but not change, what is
that number?). And language is good for many things but it is comparatively clumsy in
love. Why? Why are these complex organs good for some things but not others? The
answer is that evolution designed them to solve particular adaptive problems using the
materials presently at hand. Therefore, to fully appreciate how something works now,
we need to know something about how it was designed and why—that is, we need to
know something about its evolution.
So, if instead of assuming uniqueness (and thus immediately facing an explana-
tory dead-end), we assume that human minds and language are biological phenomena
subject to evolutionary pressures that govern descent with modification, what should
we expect to see in the communicative and cognitive systems of other species, espe-
cially other primates? We should see evidence of general processes similar in some
respects to those that underlie human minds and language, but different to the extent
that the species have diverged over evolutionary time and thus elaborated the processes
to meet the different demands of their respective environments. Although the study of
nonhuman primate communication is a comparatively new field, the evidence already
amassed confirms just that.
23.8 Nonhuman Primate Vocal Communication:
Evaluating Continuity with Language
Early views of other primate (and other animal) communication systems, prior to sys-
tematic field studies in the wild, assumed that vocalisations were simply hard-wired,
reflexive manifestations of internal states of arousal (e.g., fear, hunger, or aggression)
that were unaffected by experiential influence and recruited only low level limbic mech-
anisms that regulate the emotions . . . in short, markedly different than human language
(we can now well imagine what might have motivated such a view). More recently,
serious research efforts have been undertaken on a variety of different species, and
the results have radically changed this view. This research indicates that the func-
tions, mechanisms and development of vocal communication in primates are similar
in many respects to those of language. For example, there is now evidence that pri-
mates produce vocalisations that function symbolically to refer to objects and events in
their environments in a fashion at least crudely similar to the words of language. The
best known example comes from vervet monkeys (for a more thorough description of
vervet monkeys, their system of vocal communication and comparisons with language,
see Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990).
Vervet monkeys are small-bodied (4-5 kg) group-living monkeys that inhabit savannah-
23.8 Nonhuman Primate Vocal Communication: Evaluating Continuity with Language 183
woodland environments in east and southern Africa. Their size and habits expose them
to high risks of predation. When the monkeys encounter a predator, they produce
loud ‘alarm’ calls that alert other group members to the danger. The monkeys actu-
ally produce three acoustically distinct alarm calls in response to three different classes
of predators that prey upon them: leopards, eagles (and other raptors) and large snakes
(e.g., pythons). Contrary to early views, these alarm calls are not simply manifestations
of a monkey’s internal state of arousal, in this case, fear. Although predator encoun-
ters can obviously be frightening experiences, the monkeys produce exactly the same
alarm call when they spot a leopard in the distance as they do when they encounter a
leopard at close range, even though the two circumstances portend very different risks
of predation (and thus likely fear). They produce an acoustically distinct alarm call
when they spot an eagle, and paralleling the case of leopard alarm calls, they give the
same eagle alarm call whether the eagle they have spotted is soaring overhead (i.e.,
hunting, and therefore a risk) or perched in a tree (i.e., not hunting, and therefore not
a risk). Furthermore, when a monkey who is alone encounters a predator, it often does
not produce alarm calls even though the risk of predation (and hence arguably fear) is
much higher than when in the comparative safety of the rest of the group.
Instead, the alarm calls appear to function symbolically to denote the different
classes of predators. Each of the different alarm calls precipitates a behaviourally
distinct escape response appropriate to the type of predator. In response to hearing
a leopard alarm call, monkeys on the ground dash to the trees and scramble to the
safety of the small, terminal branches where leopards cannot go. In contrast, in re-
sponse to hearing an eagle alarm call, monkeys in the trees rapidly descend from the
terminal branches where they are most vulnerable to swooping eagles, while monkeys
on the ground run for the cover of a dense bush. (Note that appropriate escape re-
sponses to leopards and eagles are diametrically opposed. The small branches of trees
are a good place to avoid a leopard but a bad place to be for an eagle. Beneath a bush
is a good place to hide from an eagle, but a good place to find a leopard!) Finally,
in response to hearing a snake alarm call, the monkeys all stand erect on their hind
legs and scan the grass around them looking for a snake. Importantly, it is the calls
themselves that precipitate these distinct responses and not anything about the caller’s
subsequent behaviour or the context in which the calls are produced. Experiments in
which researchers have hidden speakers and then played back pre-recorded versions of
the three different alarm calls to groups of vervet monkeys in the absence of a predator
indicate that the calls alone are sufficient to elicit the distinctive responses. Thus, like
different human words, different vervet monkey alarm calls symbolise different types
of African predator. Subsequent research has revealed similar capacities in other pri-
mate species and some non-primate species besides (e.g., Primates: ring-tailed lemurs-
Macedonia, 1990; rhesus macaques- Hauser & Marler, 1993; and baboons- Rendall,
Seyfarth, Cheney, & Owren, 1999; Non-primates: honeybees- Frisch, 1976; chickens-
Gyger, Marler, & Pickert, 1978).
Vervet monkeys use of, and response to, their different alarm calls is not given from
birth, however. Although young vervet monkeys appear capable of producing the dif-
ferent alarm calls (at least in broad outline), they do not use them entirely appropriately,
nor do they respond to the alarm calls of others in adult fashion (Cheney & Seyfarth,
1990). At first, infants produce eagle alarm calls to a broad class of aerial stimuli, in-
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cluding many small raptors that would not prey on vervet monkeys, many non-raptorial
birds (e.g., storks, doves), and even such harmless objects as leaves falling from trees
overhead! They produce snake alarm calls to long, thin objects on the ground such as
sticks. At the same time, infants do not respond to alarm calls the way adults do—that
is, with distinct escape responses for each predator type. Instead, they typically look
around anxiously for their mother and run to her. Occasionally they behave quite inap-
propriately, like running under a bush in response to a leopard alarm call. Only grad-
ually do infants begin to limit the range of stimuli that elicit alarm calls to just those
that pose a predatory threat, and only gradually do they develop distinctive, adult-like
escape responses. The developmental process by which vervet monkeys acquire these
abilities is not definitively known. However, these findings clearly indicate that experi-
ential influences do impact vervet monkey vocal communication (similar effects have
been identified in other species) and thus that, as in humans, important aspects of vocal
usage and comprehension emerge slowly over the course of development.
Additional research suggests that, like humans, monkeys’ use of symbolic vocal-
isations is also based on underlying conceptual representations. In humans, different
words, such as “house” and “mouse”, are judged to mean very different things even
though they sound similar, while the words “smart” and “bright” are judged to have
similar meanings even though they sound very different. Our evaluation of what these
different words mean is based on the underlying conceptual representations that they
instantiate rather than on their acoustic similarity. (If judgements were based on acous-
tic similarity, then ‘house’ and ‘mouse’ would be judged more similar to each other
than ‘smart’ and ‘bright’ are to each other.) Playback experiments similar to those
described above have confirmed a similar phenomenon in vervet monkeys.
In addition to their alarm calls, vervet monkeys produce a host of other vocalisa-
tions in a range of other contexts. One specific context involves interactions between
neighbouring groups who are invariably intolerant of one another. In this context, the
monkeys produce two very different sounding vocalisations: when they first spot an-
other group of vervet monkeys at a distance, they produce a call termed a “wrrr”; when
another group approaches to close range, they produce a different call termed a “chut-
ter”. Hence, the monkeys have two very different sounding vocalisations that mediate
the same context—interactions with other groups. Using a habituation-dishabituation
design of playback experiments, researchers have shown that the monkeys respond to
these two different calls not simply on the basis of their acoustic structure but on the ba-
sis of the underlying concepts that the calls represent (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990). The
habituation-dishabituation experimental design is a technique commonly used in psy-
chology laboratories to test basic perceptual abilities. It is based on the principle that
repeated exposure to a single stimulus produces a gradual decrease in responsiveness
to that stimulus (i.e., habituation), while subsequent exposure to a different stimulus—
one with different physical properties—typically precipitates a dramatic recovery in
responsiveness (i.e., dishabituation).
Using this approach, field researchers reasoned that if vervet monkeys compare
their calls simply on the basis of their physical (acoustic) properties, then an animal
exposed to repeated presentations of one intergroup call, the “wrrr”, should gradually
cease responding (i.e., habituate), but should show a dramatic recovery of response
upon subsequent presentation of the other intergroup call, the “chutter”, because the
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two calls are physically very different. If, however, vervet monkeys compare their calls
on the basis of their underlying conceptual representations, then animals who stop re-
sponding after repeated exposure to “wrrrs” should show a transfer of habituation when
subsequently presented with a “chutter” (i.e., they should show no dramatic recovery
of response) because although acoustically very different these two calls mediate the
same event— i.e., have the same underlying conceptual representation (having to do
with other groups), like ‘smart’ and ‘bright’ above. Vervet monkeys tested in this man-
ner in the wild did indeed transfer habituation between the two different intergroup
vocalisations suggesting that their use of these calls is mediated by underlying concep-
tual structures perhaps similar to those of humans.
Finally, laboratory studies of vocal perception in monkeys have revealed a left-
hemisphere bias for processing species-specific vocalisations. This is analogous to
the left-hemisphere bias for processing speech in humans described earlier. As in hu-
mans, areas of the left temporal cortex of monkeys appear to be especially important in
decoding salient features of vocalisations. Neuroanatomical studies have identified ad-
ditional areas in the left hemisphere of monkey brains that are structurally homologous
to speech areas in the left hemisphere of the human brain, although the functional role
of these areas remains obscure (in monkeys as it does to some extent also in humans!).
23.9 Conclusions
Evidently, there are important points of continuity between human and nonhuman pri-
mate systems of vocal communication. Clearly the evidence reviewed does not estab-
lish equality between human language and nonhuman primate vocal communication.
Nor should it. Evolution is about descent with modification—so we should expect to
see some differences. . . in addition to similarities. And, in fact, many differences be-
tween human language and nonhuman primate vocalisations exist. For example, while
some nonhuman primate calls possess a symbolic function similar in some ways to
human words, the bulk of their calls apparently do not. Furthermore, whereas human
language is intentional, in that we speak as a deliberate attempt to inform others, the
same does not appear true of nonhuman primates. Calling animals do not seem to ap-
preciate the effect of their calls on others and do not seem to call with the intent “to
inform”.
These differences do not negate the value of evolutionary explanation, however.
The purpose of seeking a scientific evolutionary explanation is not to establish equality
between human language and animal communication, or to somehow elevate animal
minds and engender a deep appreciation for their abilities (though this might sometimes
be a healthy side-effect), or to somehow debase or humble human minds, reducing them
to the level of animals. It is not a competition (at least not to anyone but humans). The
point of science is to contribute to a comprehensive understanding of who we are and
how we came to be this way, however simple or complex, lowly or exalted that may
seem to be.
Appeals to uniqueness do not provide that understanding. At different points in
the past, the list of human ‘uniquenesses’ has been long. It has included such things
as: humans are the only beings that manufacture tools, humans are the only beings
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that hunt cooperatively, humans are the only beings that have language. The list has
been seriously shortened. We now know that other primates (and many other animal
species besides) manufacture tools, hunt cooperatively, and have complicated systems
of communication. Of course, die-hard human uniqueness proponents are quick to
move the goal-posts.They are quick to re-define each of these abilities in such a way
that only humans can fit the bill. This can always be done. After all, evolution is about
descent with modification, and so every species is going to differ at least a little bit even
from the species most closely related to it. So, in some sense, it will always be possible
to argue that X or Y species is somehow unique. But this is not productive. It doesn’t
tell us anything about how they came to be this way. The value in finding that some
other species manufactures tools, or hunts, or communicates in complex ways, is not
simply to match the ante of human abilities. The value in finding similar phenomena
in other species lies in the contribution this can make to a general understanding of
how such things come to be: how they are designed, what functions they serve, what
problems they are designed to solve, and what their inherent design and functional
limitations are.
In the case of human minds and language (and other complex things) we are still
a long way from understanding how they came to be, what all their functions and
limitations are, and what problems they are designed to solve (though we know some of
the problems they are not designed to solve. . . recall math and love, above). However,
the evidence of continuity between human and nonhuman primates in at least some
aspects of communication and cognition is exciting, for it promises to contribute to
an understanding of how human language and mind came to be the way they are. It
promises to contribute to a comprehensive science of psychology.
Chapter 24
Competition, Cooperation,
Social Cognition and the
Evolution of Human
Psychology: Why Do We Think
and Do What We Think and
Do?
Drew Rendall
A salesman comes to your door and offers you a set of Wilkinson ever-sharpkitchen knives and a certificate redeemable for a weekend for two at a con-dominium resort in Fairmont Hot Springs, all for only $100. You pause.Sounds good. Too good, in fact. You think to yourself, what’s the catch?
You have serious doubts. Why?
In 1977, Craig Packer reported a study of male baboons living in east Africa
(Packer, 1977). In 1,100 hours of observation, he noted 20 instances in which a high
ranking male, consorting with a sexually receptive female, was confronted aggressively
by a coalition of two subordinate males in the group. On six of these occasions, the
coalition was successful in displacing the consorting male, one of the two males of
the coalition threatening, chasing and otherwise distracting the consort male, while the
second male attempted to copulate with the female. This was a landmark finding in the
behavioural sciences published in one of science’s most prestigious journals, Nature.
Packer’s results were remarkable not because we knew so little about the behaviour of
wild baboons. On the contrary, baboons are one of the best studied species of non-
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human primate, and at that time a great deal was already known about their natural
behaviour. Packer’s results were remarkable because they appeared to represent a bona
fide instance of “true” cooperation. Why should this be so remarkable?
24.1 Competition: The Default Behavioural
Program
Darwin stands out as one of the most important scientific thinkers in recent history, his
single most important contribution, of course, being his theory of evolution by means
of natural selection that was published in 1859 under the short title, The Origin of
Species. Prior to Darwin, many scholars had debated the diversity of life on earth and
had speculated about its origins. Why were there so many different types of organisms?
Why were they distributed around the globe the way they were? Why were there so
many in some places and so few in others? And why were some found only in one
place and others only in another? A variety of scenarios had been proposed, but none
offered a systematic account that could make sense of the similarities and differences
among organisms, nor the reasons for them. After decades of careful research, and
only then at the considerable coaxing of his colleagues, Darwin published his hypoth-
esis (subsequently labelled a theory), which was thorough, profound and best of all,
wonderfully simple.
The gist of it is as follows: organisms need a variety of resources to survive and
reproduce (e.g., food, water, and refuge); such resources are in short supply and or-
ganisms are capable of reproducing at rates that quickly outstrip them; hence, life is a
struggle in which (obviously, or “naturally”) the more skilled competitors secure more
resources for survival and reproduction; more skilled competitors will thus be favoured,
or “selected” evolutionarily, in that their progeny will be more numerous in succeeding
generations; whatever traits that make certain individuals more successful in compe-
tition for limited resources will be preserved among their descendants (i.e., offspring
resemble their parents). Simple.
These are the core elements of Darwin’s proposal and they help to account for the
diversity of life on earth and its causes because, as you might expect, the particular
traits that are favoured in a given environment will depend on the conditions that pre-
vail in that environment and they will be different from the traits that are favoured in
a different environment where different conditions prevail. Any given environment of-
fers a variety of ways to make a living (a variety of ‘niches’), and selection will favour
organisms that compete most successfully in some one particular niche, leaving other
organisms to compete in a different niche. Over time, organisms differentiate along
lines compatible with their different niches as selection favours changes that improve
each organisms’ ability to compete in its particular niche. Some (rich) environments
offer more possible niches and so sustain greater numbers of different organisms, other
(poorer) environments offer fewer niches and thus support fewer different organisms.
Still other environments offer completely different sorts of niches and so support com-
pletely different types of organisms. In this way, “from so simple a beginning endless
forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been and are being evolved” (Darwin,
24.1 Competition: The Default Behavioural Program 189
1859: closing sentence of the The Origin of Species).
In the century and a half since Darwin’s proposal, these basic points have been
confirmed over and over again in all manner of organisms, animals and plants alike.
Darwin’s theory of evolution by means of natural selection has had an increasingly
broad impact such that it is now embraced by virtually all fields of natural science,
including psychology.
The central upshot of Darwin’s work that concerns us here is that competition is
a ubiquitous feature of daily life for all organisms because natural selection favours
individuals who procure even slight advantages that translate into greater reproductive
success. Among nonhuman primates, including baboons, competition is seen in many
arenas. For example, individuals compete for limited food resources. Fruit, a staple
food for many species, occurs in small clumps that are patchily distributed throughout
a forest. Individuals in a group compete to gain and maintain access to fruit patches,
displacing those already in the patch and repelling others who try to join. A consistent
result of such competition in many species is the development of fairly rigid dominance
hierarchies within the group. Animals of high rank typically have priority of access to
the best resources. Of course, adequate food supplies are critical to reproduction, par-
ticularly in females who must gestate, lactate and then care for offspring. Without
sufficient energy reserves, females will not even ovulate. Compared to low-ranking fe-
males, high-ranking females often have higher reproductive success: they reach sexual
maturity at a younger age, they have shorter intervals between successive births, they
produce more babies during their lifetime as a result, and more of their babies survive
to adulthood in order to reproduce themselves. Much of this reproductive advantage
stems from superior resource access for high-ranking females. It can also result from
direct reproductive competition among females. In some species, high-ranking females
target aggression at low-ranking females and sometimes also their young infants. The
resulting social stress (as well as direct physical injury) compromises the reproduc-
tive function of subordinate females to varying degrees (as noted above). In a few
species, the reproduction of subordinate females is completely suppressed: there may
be several adult females in a group, but only one—the highest ranking (or ‘alpha’)
female—actually breeds.
Males also compete, most conspicuously for access to sexually receptive females,
because male reproductive success is more limited by breeding opportunities than it is
by access to food resources. Success in such competition favours large males who can
physically overpower smaller males and thereby gain access to more females. Females
also often prefer to mate with large, physically dominant males with a demonstrated
ability to secure resources. Not surprisingly, priority of access to adult females trans-
lates into increased reproductive success for males, and over evolutionary time selec-
tion has so favoured large males in reproductive competition that they are considerably
larger than females in many species and possess other morphological traits that equip
them for reproductive competition, such as large canine teeth.
Other examples of competition abound and can be observed in virtually every facet
of life. For example, low-ranking female monkeys even compete among themselves
for opportunities to groom high-ranking females due to the possible benefits that such
friendly behaviour might some day return to them in the eyes of these high-ranking
females. In fact, so pervasive is competition that you might say it is the default be-
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havioural program. Darwinian natural selection favours organisms that compete in
their own self-interests. And that is why Packer’s baboons seemed so remarkable.
They were cooperating! . . . (if ultimately only to compete for an opportunity to mate)
24.2 Cooperation: The Evolutionary Challenge
Cooperation, in everyday parlance, typically implies individuals joining forces to achieve
some mutual goal that is then shared. In this sense, cooperation is not remarkable and
poses no problem for classic Darwinian natural selection favouring individuals who act
in their own self-interests. It is common to see multiple individuals acting in concert
toward some mutual goal whose benefits they all reap. Predator defence strategies of
herd-living ungulates, such as muskox, are a familiar example. Faced with a predator,
muskox aggregate in a tight circle. While an individual on its own stands little chance
of defending itself, a tight circle of horned animals provides a more formidable de-
fence. The normally vulnerable hindquarters are turned toward the centre of the circle,
while the horned heads and front hooves face out and can be tossed to and fro and
kicked outwards. In this way, the protective self-interests of each individual are served
by the collective behaviour of many. In the field of animal behaviour, such cooperative
behaviour is termed “mutualism” because all participants benefit simultaneously.
What Packer’s baboons did was different. One subordinate male heeded the solic-
itations of a second subordinate male, and the two confronted a higher ranking male
whom neither could have defeated on its own. At this point, the recruited male an-
tagonised the higher ranking male, threatening and chasing him, while the recruiting
male attempted to mate with the female. In this case, then, one male helped another at
some cost to itself (in terms of time and energy but especially risk of injury attacking
a high-ranking male). The other got an opportunity to mate. In short, one male paid a
cost, the other received a benefit.
This sort of cooperation is often termed ‘altruism’ because it involves self-sacrifice,
foregoing some opportunity oneself so that another may benefit, or (as in this case)
actively helping another at some cost to oneself. You might think of it as pure or “true”
cooperation in the sense that the helping behaviour is not motivated by any immediate
self-interest. It is the mirror image of competition or selfishness. It is selflessness.
Perhaps obviously, such true cooperation—altruism—is not favoured by Darwinian
natural selection. Individuals that help others at a cost to themselves will be “selected
out” because they increase the ability of others to survive and reproduce at the same
time that they reduce their own ability to do both. The simplest way to see the logic of
this would be to imagine an individual who chose to forego eating when food was in
short supply so that others might eat. Obviously, any individual who behaved so altru-
istically would suffer seriously and die, while those who did not forego eating would
continue to survive and reproduce. However minimal was the reproduction of the lat-
ter individuals (given the acknowledged food shortage), it would still exceed that of
the altruist who forewent eating entirely. The result: there would be fewer and fewer
altruists in each succeeding generation until eventually they would be selected out en-
tirely. This is an extreme example, of course, but the logic applies no less surely in all
other cases. A small amount of feeding restraint would produce a small decrement in
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reproductive success, but over sufficient time, this too would lose out to self-interested
individuals who did not restrain themselves at all. Quite simply, altruistic behaviour
(true cooperation) is not evolutionarily stable.
However, just as surely there do appear to be examples of organisms cooperat-
ing. How can this be? For a long time after Darwin, examples of cooperation were
a puzzle for evolutionary theory. It was not until 1964 that a neo-Darwinian named
William D. Hamilton resolved the problem (Hamilton, 1964). Like Darwin’s origi-
nal thesis, Hamilton’s insight had broad impact but was elegantly simple. Hamilton
pointed out that the entity on which natural selection operates is not, in fact, the indi-
vidual but rather the gene. That is, when considering the evolution of any particular
form of behaviour, what is important ultimately is not simply the reproductive success
of the individual performing the behaviour but rather whether or not, as a result of the
behaviour, the underlying gene guiding the behaviour increases its representation in
future generations. And there are two routes by which genes can secure representation
in future generations: directly, by the straightforward route of their bearer’s reproduc-
tion; and indirectly, through the reproduction of relatives who share identical copies of
the gene by virtue of descent from a common ancestor. Thus, genetic representation
is more inclusive than that that results from an individual’s own reproduction. It also
includes a portion of the reproduction of an individual’s relatives. This more inclusive
measure of evolutionary success is termed, ‘inclusive fitness’.
Here was a gene’s eye view of evolution that made perfect sense (once realised)
given the discovery early in the 20th century that genes are the building blocks of
organisms as well as the units of inheritance. Offspring are genetic copies of their
parents. In sexually reproducing organisms, 50% of an offspring’s genetic makeup is a
copy of its mother’s genes, the other 50% a copy of its father’s genes (owing to the fact
that in the meiotic cell division preceding gamete formation the full complement of
genetic material in each parent is halved in anticipation of being fused with a gamete
from the other parent, in order to preserve in the fertilised offspring the original full
complement of genetic material). In this way, members of a family are genetically
related to one another. The degree to which family members are related varies and can
be expressed in terms of the proportion of genetic material they share. For example,
parents are related to each of their offspring by a factor of 0.5—that is, they have in
common 50% of their genetic material. Full siblings (who share both the same mother
and the same father) on average also have in common 50% of their genetic material.
Half-siblings (who have only one parent in common) share only 25% of their genetic
material. Cousins share only 12.5% of their genetic material. And so on . . . more
distantly related individuals having in common a smaller and smaller proportion of
their genome.
Another way to understand genetic relatedness is in terms of the probability that
any two individuals will share a gene for a particular trait. In the case of full siblings
(or parents and offspring), this probability is 0.5, matching the proportion of the to-
tal genome they share. In more distantly related individuals this probability declines.
Among unrelated individuals, the probability is zero.
The solution to the cooperation puzzle in all of this lies in the observation that a
trait that imposes some cost on its bearer can still evolve if it provides a more than
compensatory benefit for a close relative (the more than compensatory benefit being
192 The Evolution of Human Psychology – Rendall
measured in terms of gene copies governing the behaviour in question). Imagine a case
in which you could help your brother in such an important way that it allows him to
successfully have and rear three children (say, for example, you could save him from
drowning). Doing so cost you the ability to have one child of your own (because of
some physical injury sustained in the process of saving your brother). The cost to you
(in the sterile accounting of evolutionary genetics) is one copy of the gene governing
this behaviour.1 However, the benefit to your brother is three children, each of which
has a 50% probability of carrying a copy of the gene for this behaviour. On average,
then, the behaviour results in 1.5 copies of the gene governing it transmitted to the
next generation through the reproduction of your brother. So, although the behaviour
serves to decrease its representation in the next generation via its bearer’s reproduction,
it more than compensates for this loss by a greater increase in its representation in the
next generation through the reproduction of relatives. Hence, the behaviour will be
“selected for” . . . it will persist.
In other words, helping your kin is a lot like helping yourself. There will be certain
circumstances in which helping them to reproduce—even at some cost to yourself—
will actually serve to increase the number of copies of your own genes that are con-
tributed to future generations. This insight translates into a generalisable rule—Hamilton’s
Rule—for predicting the circumstances under which cooperative behaviour of any par-
ticular sort should evolve. Basically, cooperative behaviour will be favoured by evo-
lution when the benefit to the recipient of an altruistic act, discounted by the degree
of genetic relatedness between altruist and recipient, exceeds the cost of the act to the
altruist (formalised in mathematical notation: rB > C, where r = degree of genetic
relatedness, B = benefit to the recipient, and C = cost to the altruist).2 The above
scenario is obviously an extreme example to illustrate Hamilton’s Rule, but the logic
applies perforce in cases where the genetic stakes are not so high, the only difference
lies in the size of the numbers that will be involved in the accounting!
In sum, then, selection will favour cooperative, or altruistic, behaviour among ge-
netic relatives, when it actually increases the number of copies of the altruist’s genes
1Note that explanations that imply “genes for behaviour” are short-hand expressions used for expository
convenience only. In no way does Hamilton’s insight imply that there are literally genes for behaviour, or
even more restrictively that there is a single gene for any particular behaviour. Hamilton’s insight implies
only that there is a genetic basis for behaviour generally, which we know to be true for a wide array of
species including humans. The link between genes and behaviour is obviously complicated, involving many
intermediate factors related both to the organism’s biology and physiology and to the environment (and inter-
actions between them). However, the link is no less sure and no less important because of these complexities.
Therefore, the core of Hamilton’s insight applies perforce, and explanations of it often make use of short-
hand expressions that may imply “genes for behaviours” so as to avoid the convoluted wording otherwise
needed to properly explain the complicated relation between them each time the issue is raised.
2Although discussion may seem to imply sophisticated decision-making processes even including mathe-
matical analyses of cost-benefit ratios, no conscious evaluation or mathematical calculations are ever implied.
Things like ‘costs’ and ‘benefits’ and formulas that relate them—like Hamilton’s Rule—are concepts that
we use in order to formalise our scientific analysis of behaviour and make clear the various assumptions
we are using to do so. They do not imply that the organisms concerned possess anything like the same
concepts, or go through anything like the same evaluative steps we do in analysing their behaviour. Thus,
the implied “decisions” about when and with whom to cooperate are not meant to imply conscious, rational
decision-making of the sort we find familiar. Rather, we assume only that organisms that behave in ways
that maximise the benefits they receive in respect of the costs they pay will be favoured by natural selection,
irrespective of the actual mechanisms that guide them in their tendency to behave in such ways.
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contributed to the next generation via the reproduction of kin. Appropriately, Hamilton
termed this evolutionary mechanism “kin selection”. Somewhat ironically, this kind
of cooperative behaviour is not really altruistic at all. That is, at bottom, it is not self-
sacrificing, but rather genetically selfish, and in this sense, it is completely in keeping
with classic Darwinian natural selection.
Hamilton’s theory of kin selection was a critical addendum to Darwinian natural
selection that has helped to refine modern evolutionary theory. In the 35 years since
Hamilton’s thesis was published (kin selection was actually Hamilton’s doctoral the-
sis), innumerable examples have been documented of “cooperative” behaviour among
kin (i.e., nepotism). In fact, among nonhuman primates, including baboons, kinship is
one of the most important organising principles of social life. In many species, females
remain in their natal group throughout life, while males disperse at sexual maturity to
join other groups. Thus, females form the core of related individuals in a group. Ac-
cordingly, it is the females that show the highest levels of friendly affiliation and the
highest levels of (kin selected) “cooperative” (genetically selfish) behaviour. In fact,
in many groups, there are typically two or three distinct female lineages, or matrilines;
hence, some females within a group are closely related to one another, while others
are not. Females in such groups show a complex mix of cooperative and competitive
behaviour, being affiliative toward related females in their own matriline and antago-
nistic toward unrelated females from rival matrilines. Related females feed together,
rest together, and socialise and groom one another at high rates. They also support one
another in aggressive encounters with females from rival matrilines. Unrelated females
spend far less time together and are typically antagonistic when they do.
Males, on the other hand—being unrelated—are almost always competitive, often
fiercely so. Fighting is common among males, often over access to females, and can
cause serious injuries and even death. This is not invariably the case, however. Males
are sometimes affiliative and cooperative. For example, in chimpanzees, it is the males
who show high levels of affiliation and cooperative behaviour, while females are rela-
tively intolerant of one another. However, in the case of chimpanzees, contra the many
other primate species just noted, it is the males who remain in their natal groups and
form the core of related individuals, while females disperse at sexual maturity. And
this really is the clincher that relatedness guides affiliative and cooperative behaviour,
for when the patterns of dispersal (and thus relatedness) among the sexes are reversed,
so too are the patterns of affiliation and cooperation.
Kin selection makes an even more specific prediction, in fact, namely that the level
of cooperative behaviour between individuals should vary as a function of the degree
of relatedness between them: cooperation should be highest among close kin and de-
crease with diminishing degrees of genetic relatedness. After all, the proportion of the
genome shared among distant kin is small; therefore, the benefit accruing to a relative
far removed would have to be very high indeed to justify the cost of cooperation. Ei-
ther that, or the cost of cooperation would have to be trivial. In contrast, between very
close kin, comparatively small benefits (when only minimally discounted by the high
degree of relatedness between participants) will exceed the cost of most cooperative
acts. Exactly this pattern is observed. Cooperation is highest among close relatives,
such as between parents and offspring, siblings, grandparents and grandchildren, and
it decreases steadily with increasing genetic distance, as among cousins, and among
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nieces/nephews and aunts/uncles.
Thus, cooperative behaviour in nonhuman primates (and many other organisms)
conforms well to the predictions of kin selection: cooperative behaviour is seen pri-
marily among close kin.
24.3 Reciprocal Altruism
But Packer’s male baboons were not close kin, or related at all (at least they were
unlikely to be). Baboons are one of the many primate species in which females form the
core of the group and males disperse. So the adult males that ultimately end up residing
in a group are normally unrelated. Hence, cooperation among male baboons does not
jibe with the principles of either classic Darwinian natural selection, or Hamiltonian
kin selection. If males are unrelated to one another, then the act of helping another at
your own expense (in this case, the risk of serious injury) cannot provide any genetic
returns. As we’ve noted, cooperation of this sort—true cooperation, or altruism—
should not persist.
It was not long after Hamilton resolved one facet of the apparent cooperation
problem, by observing that it obtained primarily only among kin, that another neo-
Darwinian, Harvard biologist, Robert Trivers resolved the remaining paradox of appar-
ent cooperation among non-kin (Trivers, 1971). He demonstrated that such cooperation
could nevertheless accord with Darwinian principles so long as certain conditions were
met. Briefly, cooperation among unrelated individuals can be sustained so long as the
cost of helping another individual on one occasion is more than repaid by the benefit
received from reciprocated help from that same individual on some future occasion.
This was a sort of “I scratch your back, you scratch mine” type of explanation, and it
was referred to as Reciprocal Altruism because it involved an iterated sequence of re-
ciprocated altruistic acts. So long as the balance sheet remains in the black—that is, the
benefits received by an individual outweigh the costs paid—it will pay individuals to
cooperate. Here again, cooperation of this sort can be viewed as ultimately selfish be-
cause in the end each cooperating individual receives more than it gives. Nevertheless,
it could be evolutionarily stable. . . in principle.
However, as Trivers acknowledged (and you might imagine, perhaps from personal
experience), this sort of cooperative system is highly unstable because there is an ever-
present temptation to defect—to avoid paying the cost of helping after having already
reaped the benefit of being helped. In fact, extensive mathematical modelling and com-
puter simulations were undertaken to test the conditions under which such a system of
cooperation actually could evolve. Only a single scenario proved stable, a straight-
forward Tit-for-Tat strategy in which altruistic acts were reciprocated in the strictest
fashion, individuals alternating back-and-forth between the roles of helper and helped.
Under these circumstances, individuals will continue to support one another so long
as each cooperates. However, at the first sign of defection in one, the other will also
defect. . . and the whole system gets derailed.
Furthermore, notwithstanding its inherent instability, a system of cooperation based
on reciprocal altruism challenges the odds because it also depends on several fairly
stringent conditions, including: [1] the need for repeated encounters, so that altruistic
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acts performed now even have a chance of being reciprocated in the future. Individ-
uals will be reluctant to cooperate with strangers, for example, because the chance of
meeting again and having one’s help reciprocated is low; [2] the ability to remember
past encounters and their details (whether or not others cooperated); [3] the ability to
recognise specific individuals so as to distinguish those with whom one has interacted
(and cooperated) from those with whom one has not; [4] the ability to detect and pun-
ish cheaters (if only by withholding future support). Collectively, this set of conditions
describes a fairly complicated social problem.
And these are the reasons why Packer’s study was so remarkable. Partners in the
baboon coalitions alternated roles in apparently tit-for-tat fashion. Males solicited help
preferentially from other males who had previously solicited their help. Here, then,
was a bona fide instance of true cooperation, demonstrating that a stable system of
reciprocal altruism was possible not only in principle but also in practise. By extension,
it also implied that baboons must have the requisite social problem-solving abilities to
support such a complicated system of reciprocity.
24.4 Primate Social Cognition
In fact, we now know that the basic conditions for reciprocity obtain in baboons and
many other primates (as well as non-primates). Thus, primates are long-lived and often
form cohesive social groups whose membership is stable, both conditions providing
effectively infinite opportunity for repeated encounters with the same individuals. In
fact, many species are very gregarious with high rates of social interaction. Individ-
uals interact repeatedly every day and as a result form strong and enduring social re-
lationships. The members of social groups also clearly recognise one another on an
individual basis. Individual recognition is implied most basically in their linear dom-
inance hierarchies: each individual occupies a specific social rank, higher than some
and lower than others. Not only do individuals know their own rank relative to others,
but they know the ranks of others relative to each other. For example, if in a group of
monkeys animals ranked 4 and 7 are sitting together and animal 3 approaches the pair
to be groomed, animal 7 invariably moves off while animal 4 never budges. Animal 7
evidently knows that it is the lowest ranked animal of the three and thus ought to be
wary, while animal 4 knows that although it is subordinate to the approaching animal
3, animal 7 is more subordinate still, so it can stay put. Clearly, this behaviour requires
the animals to be able to individuate one another in addition to knowing each other’s
rank.
In fact, monkeys are extremely sensitive to rank and its effects. Subordinate female
monkeys sometimes compete subtly for opportunities to groom higher ranking females
seemingly in an effort to curry favour with them. In return for such grooming, higher
ranking females appear more tolerant of subordinate groomers in other contexts (e.g.,
feeding), and are even motivated to support them in subsequent agonistic encounters.
The latter effect was demonstrated in an experimental study of wild vervet monkeys in
which a concealed loudspeaker was used to play back the recruitment screams of cer-
tain females to other females in the group in the presence or absence of recent grooming
between them. Recruitment screams are given during a fight to solicit aid from others.
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Female subjects in these experiments were more responsive to the recruitment screams
of other females if those females had just recently groomed them, suggesting that the
strategy of subordinate females ingratiating themselves to dominants through groom-
ing can be effective. (Incidentally, this too is an instance of reciprocal altruism—the
exchange of grooming for help in a fight.)
More direct evidence for individual recognition derives from the fact that social
relationships among group members are highly individualised. That is, relationships
show special qualities depending on the identity of the participants. As already noted,
affiliative and cooperative behaviour are highest among kin and vary according to de-
gree of genetic relatedness, while aggression is most severe among nonkin. Individuals
often also have preferred grooming partners and partners with whom they travel and
socialise. In addition, individual males and females in some species sometimes form
especially close bonds, termed friendships. Male and female “friends” remain close to
one another throughout the day, sit and rest together, groom each other at high rates,
support one another in fights with others, and may huddle and sleep together at night.
Such friendships can endure for many years.
Recognition of group members extends to the vocal domain. Analyses have shown
that many primate vocalisations show consistent individual differences in their acous-
tic structure, and several studies have shown that the animals can use these differences
to recognise one another at a distance. Rhesus monkeys, for example, produce a har-
monic vocalisation that researchers term a “coo” (because of how it sounds). The
monkeys produce coos at high rates when foraging in dispersed fashion in dense veg-
etation where visibility is limited. The calls function to maintain vocal contact when
individuals are out of sight, which is important for highly nepotistic species such as
rhesus monkeys who often need to recruit aid from kin in competition with other group
members. Using field experimental techniques, researchers have played back to iso-
lated females the pre-recorded coos of either a close female relative or a familiar but
unrelated female in the group (Rendall, Rodman, & Emond, 1996). They find that fe-
males respond dramatically to the calls of their female kin but tend to ignore the calls of
nonkin. Moreover, they appear to be able to distinguish between the calls of individual
female relatives.
Not only can monkeys recognise one another, but they also appear to understand
something about each others’ social relationships. In a set of field experiments similar
to those just described, Robert Seyfarth and Dorothy Cheney played back to female
vervet monkeys the scream vocalisations of either their own infant or an unrelated
infant in the group (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990). Mothers responded preferentially to
their own infant’s calls. More interestingly, other females in the vicinity responded
by looking toward the mother even before the mother herself had responded. These
females were able thus to recognise the calls of various infants in the group and match
them to their appropriate mothers. In similar fashion, Verena Dasser tested the ability
of monkeys housed in a large captive colony to match slides of infants in the colony
to their appropriate mothers (Dasser, 1988). They could, and could do so even when
the slides of mothers and infants were several years old—i.e., the monkeys retained a
memory for the appearance of others at younger ages.
This latter result implies that monkeys also have the requisite memory skills re-
quired for reciprocity. Recall that reciprocal altruism requires an ability to remember
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past encounters, the identity of the participants, and the outcomes so as to adjust fu-
ture behaviour accordingly. Additional evidence for these skills comes from natural
patterns of reconciliation and redirected aggression observed in several species. In the
course of daily activities, fights routinely break-out over access to limited resources of
one sort or another (e.g., food, water, preferred resting sites, access to preferred so-
cial partners). Opponents in such fights often remain hostile to one another for several
hours, such that if they encounter one another later they are apt to avoid each other or
resume aggression. Many times after such a fight, the antagonists, or their kin, will
subsequently redirect aggression at the relatives of their former opponents, even hours
after the original fight. However, at times, rivals immediately reconcile by directing
affiliative gestures toward one another, which function to restore baseline levels of tol-
erance such that when these individuals encounter one another again later they are
likely to behave amicably.
In sum, primate social life appears to be a complex balance of competition and
cooperation, some individuals competing (nonkin), others cooperating (kin), and still
others competing to cooperate (e.g., low-ranking females competing to groom high-
ranking females), or cooperating to compete (e.g., subordinate males cooperating to
displace a dominant male for an opportunity to mate). Taken together, the various
findings indicate clearly that primates possess the requisite memory and recognition
abilities to support a system of reciprocal social exchange as well as many other cog-
nitive abilities sustaining other complex patterns of social behaviour.
In fact, findings like these have led many to speculate that primate cognition is
especially well developed in the social domain. Primate evolutionary history has been
characterised by a disproportionate increase in brain size, meaning that, as an order,
primates have larger brains for their body size than do most other animals. Researchers
have hypothesised that the selective pressures that account for this increased brain size
are social in nature—in essence, that primate brains have evolved in large part to solve
problems in the social domain. Alternative hypotheses tend to stress environmental
factors such as the ecological challenges posed by foraging for patchily distributed and
ephemeral fruit resources, or the technological challenges involved in manufacturing
and using tools, or constructing elaborate nests of vegetation in which to sleep.
Formal tests of these hypotheses are few, though evidence of the sort just reviewed
certainly suggests that primates are highly gregarious animals with a well developed
social acumen. Overall, primates seem no different than many other animals in their
ecological and technological skills: many other animals are fruit specialists like pri-
mates and meet the challenges that fruit harvesting poses without dramatic increases
in brain size; and with few exceptions, primates do not make extensive use of tools, or
build nests of more complicated design than any other animals. However, primates do
seem to distinguish themselves from other animals in their range and degree of socially
complex behaviour. Furthermore, social problems also seem to be inherently more
complicated than most ecological and technological problems because conspecifics
(unlike features of the physical environment) are reactive to one’s behaviour. Thus,
social problem-solving involves predicting and interpreting the behaviour of others so
as to adjust your own at the same time that your adjustments are eliciting behavioural
changes in those whose behaviour you’re trying to predict. Hence, the social world is
constantly changing in an integrated but endless spiral of causality.
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One recent effort to test the social hypothesis more formally was undertaken by
Dorothy Cheney, Robert Seyfarth and Joan Silk (Cheney, Seyfarth, & Silk, 1995).
They focused on one very important cognitive ability—the ability to understand the
relation between cause and effect. This relation is fundamental to many aspects of
life: it is a core property of the physical world (e.g., moving objects that contact others
cause the latter to move; gravity causes suspended objects to fall; wind causes trees to
move). It is also fundamental to social behaviour (e.g., socially dominant individuals
cause subordinates to behave submissively).
Previous research had shown that monkeys do not perform well on tests of the
cause-effect relation in the physical domain (reviewed in Tomasello & Call, 1997). One
standard test involves presenting a monkey with a clear plastic tube with a food item
in the middle, and providing several suitable poking sticks. The tube is too narrow to
accommodate the monkey’s hand, but large enough for a stick to be inserted. Subjects
try in vain to jam their hand in the tube, to bite the tube open, or to break it by pounding
or jumping on it. After much trial-and-error, subjects begin to explore the tube with
one of the sticks (after first using it to try to break open the tube) and eventually learn
to poke the food out of the tube. The tube is then modified to include a small “trap”
well at some point along its length such that if the food is pushed in one direction it
will fall into the well and be lost, but if pushed in the opposite direction it will emerge
out the end of the tube as before. Subjects proficient on the original task, now exposed
to this simple modification, have great difficulty, pushing the food into the trap as often
as not (i.e., behaving at random). Gradually, they begin to pay very close attention to
the direction the food is travelling down the tube as they push, and if it appears headed
for the trap, they stop and push from the opposite direction. Next, the tube is modified
one more time, this time simply rotating the tube so that the trap is on the top and thus
at no risk of capturing the food no matter which direction it is pushed from. In this
condition, subjects continue to proceed very cautiously as in the last condition, paying
very close attention to the direction the food is travelling. If the food is approaching
the trap—even though the trap is now on the top of the tube—subjects immediately
stop and push from the opposite direction. Analogous sorts of tests of cause-effect
reasoning in the physical domain have returned the same general result. The monkeys
simply don’t get it!
For comparison, Cheney, Seyfarth and Silk designed an analogous test in the so-
cial domain (Cheney et al., 1995). In baboons (as in many other species) dominant
animals attacking subordinates produce harsh threat vocalisations that elicit shrill fear
calls from the subordinate victims. The relation between these calls is obligatory:
dominant threat calls elicit or cause fear calls in subordinates. The reverse never oc-
curs. That is, subordinate threat calls never elicit fear calls from a dominant. The
investigators capitalised on this relation to test the baboons’ understanding of it. Us-
ing previously recorded vocalisations from animals in one group, they constructed se-
quences of causally consistent (a dominant threat call paired with a subordinate fear
call) and causally inconsistent calls (a subordinate threat call paired with a dominant
fear call). When played back to other individuals in the group, the causally consistent
sequences elicited very little response. However, the causally inconsistent sequences
elicited much stronger responses suggesting that the baboons were struck with the so-
cial anomaly that this situation implied, a contradiction of the normal causal relations
24.5 Human Evolutionary Psychology 199
that underlie their social behaviour.
Clearly this is only one test that favours the social hypothesis. More research is
needed. However, in combination with their many other complex patterns of social
behaviour, it lends credence to the hypothesis that the trend toward increased brain size
in primates might reflect cognitive specialisations for solving problems in the social
domain.
24.5 Human Evolutionary Psychology
The primate trend toward increased brain size reaches an extreme in the human pri-
mate. Humans have extraordinarily large brains, about seven times what would be
expected for a mammal of our body size. (Our brains are more than three times the
size of that of a chimpanzee, our closest living relative.) What accounts for this dra-
matic increase in brain size? What are large human brains for? What problems did
they evolve to solve? Questions like these are the focus of a relatively newly recog-
nised subfield of psychology called Evolutionary Psychology. Actually, evolutionary
psychology has deep roots dating to Darwin and before, but only fairly recently has
it begun to crystallise into a distinct subfield that pursues issues of human cognition
within an explicitly evolutionary framework.
The most fundamental tenet of evolutionary psychology is that the brain is an
evolved organ (just like every other organ of the body), and that its design (like the
design of every other organ of the body) is functionally specialised. Like the functional
specialisation of other bodily organs (e.g., the heart for pumping blood, and the liver
for filtering it; the lungs for breathing oxygen and the blood for delivering it to the
body), the brain is functionally specialised to solve a variety of specific problems. The
brain is not a single, general-purpose problem-solving device. Rather it is a set of mul-
tiple distinct but inter-related problem-solving devices each specialised to operate on
informational content specific to particular domains of experience. Furthermore, only
problems that represent recurrent evolutionary challenges (as opposed to problems of
a transient or fleeting nature) are likely to be reflected in the brain’s design. After all,
evolutionary change of any kind occurs very gradually over long periods of time in re-
sponse to enduring selective pressures. Circus bears can walk bipedally, like humans;
however, such dancing bears show none of the functional modifications of the pelvis
and lower-limb required for habitual bipedal locomotion that humans show, because
bears have been dancing in circuses for only a short time, while humans have been
walking upright for more than 4.5 million years.
Thus, evolutionary psychologists operationalise the human brain as a collection of
more-or-less specialised cognitive modules dedicated to particular problems that have
represented recurrent challenges over (at least) the last several million years of human
evolutionary history. There is some evidence indicating that many of these recurrent
challenges have, as in other primate species, been social in nature.
Consider the problems described in 24.1. They illustrate the Wason card selection
task, a standard experimental technique for studying human reasoning, which has often
been assumed to exemplify a classic general-purpose cognitive process. In problem 1,
the task is to detect violations of an office filing rule that involves cross-coding client
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files in two different ways. In Problem 2, the task is to detect violations of an alcohol
consumption rule. In Problem 3, the task is to detect violations of a general cost-benefit
rule.
In fact, all three problems test exactly the same reasoning skill - the ability to detect
violations of a logical relation of the form: “If P, then Q”. In other words, if some
particular condition “P” holds, then some other condition “Q” must also hold. In all
three problems, the correct answer involves turning over exactly two cards: the card
that corresponds to “P” and the card that corresponds to “not Q”. That is, in order to
detect whether or not the obligatory relation linking “Q” to “P” has been broken, one
must turn over the card corresponding to “P” to ensure that there is indeed the required
“Q” on the reverse. The card corresponding to “not Q” must also be flipped to ensure
that there is NOT a “P” on the other side. Because all three problems test the same
logical relation, performance should be equally good on all three. . . but this proves not
to be true!
In the first problem, the solution translates into turning over cards 2 (P) and 3 (not
Q) to ensure that the file coded ‘D’ is, in fact, also coded with a ‘3’ on the reverse
and (evidently, counter-intuitively) to ensure also that the card coded ‘7’ is NOT coded
with a ‘D’ on its reverse. Turning over either of the other two cards is irrelevant with
respect to the prescribed rule. This is probably obvious for the card coded ‘F’ because
the rule said nothing about files coded with this letter. It may seem less obvious (in
fact, surprising to many people) for the card coded ‘3’. However, turning over this card
is not informative with respect to the rule either, for although the rule prescribed that
all ‘D’ files had to bear a ‘3’ code, it did not prescribe the converse, namely that all ‘3’
files had to bear a ‘D’ code. So, it does not actually matter what is on the reverse of the
card coded ‘3’.
In the second problem, cards 1 and 3 must be turned over (which probably seems
patently obvious): it is necessary to check that the beer-drinker is of legal age and also
that the 16-year old is not consuming alcohol. How old the coke-drinker is and what
the 25-year old is drinking are irrelevant.
In the third problem, the solution requires flipping cards 3 and 4 to ensure that those
who have not paid the cost have not accepted the benefit, and to ensure that those who
have accepted the benefit have also paid the cost. Whether or not those who have paid
the cost have also accepted the benefit is irrelevant to the rule. It is likewise irrelevant
what those who forego the benefit ultimately do vis a vis paying the costs.
Tests like this (using many different forms of question) have been administered to
scores of subjects and the results are always the same. People have great difficulty with
problems like that exemplified by Problem 1 but no trouble with problems like those
exemplified by Problems 2 and 3. As already noted, all three problems embody exactly
the same relation—a rule prescribing an obligatory connection between two things or
events. The only difference among them is that Problems 2 and 3 frame this relation in a
social context. That is, in the form of a social ‘contract’ or exchange. That, and the fact
that, by comparison to Problem 1, Problems 2 and 3 are embarrassingly simple! They
seem completely intuitive. This result suggests that human reasoning skills are not,
in fact, ‘domain-general’, but rather are ‘domain-specific’, meaning that they operate
best on informational content in specific domains rather than being general-purpose
processes for reasoning about problems across domains with different informational
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Problem 1
Part of your new job at an accounting firm is to make sure that client documents
are organised correctly. The firm has numerous clients that it organises according
to different rating and coding rules. Your job is to make sure that the documents
conform to the following rule:
“If a client has a ‘D’ rating, then its documents must be marked code ‘3’.”
You suspect that the person you replaced did not categorise the documents cor-
rectly. The cards below have information about the documents of four clients.
Each card represents one client. One side of a card tells a client’s letter rating and
the other side of the card tells that client’s number code.
Indicate only those card(s) you definitely need to turn over to see if the documents
have been categorised correctly.
F D 7 3
Problem 2
In its crackdown against drunk drivers, provincial law enforcement officials are
revoking liquor licences left and right. You are the owner of a restaurant, and
you’ll lose your operating license unless you enforce the following law:
“If a person in your restaurant is drinking alcohol, then she/he must be over 18
years old.”
The cards below have information about four people seated in your restaurant.
Each card represents one person. One side of a card tells what a person is drinking
and the other side of the card tells that person’s age.
Indicate only those card(s) you definitely need to turn over to see if any of these
people are breaking the law.
Beer Coke 16 25
Problem 3
It is your job to enforce the following law:
“If you take the benefit, then you must pay the cost.”
The cards below have information about four people. Each card represents one
person. One side of a card tells whether a person accepted a benefit and the other
side tells whether that person paid the cost.
Indicate only those card(s) you definitely need to turn over to see if any of these
people are breaking this law.
Paid
Cost
Didn’t
Accept
Benefit
Didn’t
Pay
Cost
Accepted
Benefit
Table 24.1: Reasoning problems adapted from the work of John Tooby and Leda Cos-
mides.
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contents.
It is important to note that the ability to detect violations in these tests does not vary
with the detail provided, nor with content familiarity. Problem 1, for example, arguably
provides the most detail but yields poor performance, while Problem 3 is worded in the
most abstract fashion (i.e., devoid of details), yet performance is good. Furthermore,
experimenters who conduct these tests are careful to draft many different forms of the
questions to control for differential familiarity with their content. Nevertheless, the
results are the same. In fact, even very unfamiliar social problems, describing social
contracts that are completely foreign (even exotic!) to subjects (e.g., “If a man eats
cassava root, then he must have a tattoo on his face.”) are solved easily, whereas highly
familiar but non-social problems (e.g., “If one goes to Boston, then one takes the train.”)
prove difficult. Thus, familiarity with social problems cannot by itself account for our
skill at detecting violations of social contracts, a fact further evidenced by the behaviour
of small children. Even very young children with comparatively little social experience
are expert at detecting social violations, as anyone who has tried to “short-change” a
small child on the last slice of pizza, or the larger of two ice-cream cones, can attest!
Instead, we just seem to be inherently good at reasoning about social contracts—we
are inherently good at detecting “cheaters”.
Formal tests like these using the Wason card selection task are not conducted in
isolation. Rather they have been inspired and buttressed by many other sorts of re-
sults that together support the view that human psychology has been shaped in large
part by evolutionary challenges faced in the social domain. Humans, like other pri-
mates, are intensely social and engage in many complex social practises; hence, the
social problems so generated have been a recurrent feature of our evolutionary history.
Other aspects of our environment—such as its ecological and technological bases—
have changed markedly over the last several million years and continue to change
rapidly today! However, our capacity for group living and intense sociality have not
changed. The functional demands of social problem solving, therefore, have been a
continuing selective pressure that has favoured cognitive adaptations for negotiating
social exchange. Problems 2 and 3 above are comparatively easy, then, because they
tap special cognitive mechanisms for reasoning about social contracts and ferreting out
cheaters to them.
Interestingly, although we are adept at detecting cheaters, we are far less adept at
detecting altruists. In identical versions of the Wason card selection task, subjects do
poorly if asked to detect altruists rather than cheaters—that is, to identify individuals
who pay the cost but do not take the benefit to which the cost entitles them. At first,
this result may seem surprising given the fact that we have specialised social reasoning
skills. However, when you think about, detecting altruists does not represent a serious
selective pressure. Failing to detect an altruist is not costly to you for it is the altruist
who pays the cost (not you) without taking the benefit. Failing to detect a cheater, on
the other hand, is costly to you because the cheater takes the benefit (from you) with-
out paying the cost. This imbalance in the ability to detect cheaters versus altruists
suggests that the cognitive mechanisms underlying social exchange are highly specific.
Not only is the cognitive architecture of our minds not designed as a general-purpose
device for solving problems across different informational domains, but even within
more specific domains, such as that of social exchange, evolved cognitive mechanisms
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are quite finely tuned to specific dimensions of those domains, in this case, to detect-
ing cheaters. Cheating is the aspect of social exchange that represents the evolutionary
challenge, and it is to this aspect of the problem that we have specific cognitive mech-
anisms.
In fact, cheating is not the only part of the social exchange problem that is critical
and a specialised cheater detection module is but one possible evolved social cognitive
module. Examples of other hypothesised social cognitive modules include: a module
for recognising faces, important for discriminating among individuals for various social
purposes but especially social exchange and reciprocity (as outlined earlier); a module
for language, critical for mediating social interaction including social contracts; and a
module for mate selection, decisions about mating obviously being a recurrent part of
our evolutionary history. There is a variety of evidence in support of these (and other)
social cognitive modules. Faces, for example, are highly salient stimuli. Faces are
obviously the focus of our social attention, but this facile observation does not simply
reflect social experience. Faces are extremely salient even to new-born infants. Small
babies—only hours old—preferentially orient to schematics that display landmark fa-
cial features (i.e., eyes, a nose and a mouth) over schematics displaying other things.
They are also sensitive to the proper orientation of these landmark facial features, such
that disrupting the normal configuration of eyes, nose and mouth eliminates the pref-
erence for looking at them, which suggests that human infants are innately equipped
with cognitive mechanisms for recognising faces. (Perhaps a cognitive specialisation
for recognising faces accounts also for the peculiar human tendency to “see” faces in
very obscure places, such as clouds, impressionistic art, and even mountain-scapes!)
Language too is central to human social behaviour (see Chapter on Language, Evo-
lution and Human Uniqueness). Language is present in every population around the
world, and despite their superficial diversity all languages embody the same core ele-
ments (e.g., symbolism, grammar, and syntax) and share a common underlying organi-
sational structure. Furthermore, although children are not born talking, every child the
world over acquires language at about the same age, following a similar developmental
trajectory, and all without formal instruction, even if their abilities are compromised
in other domains. Thus, mentally challenged children acquire language just as surely
as other children, suggesting that language has important biological underpinnings and
recruits specialised cognitive processes.
Finally, large-scale studies of mate selection in many populations around the world
have revealed remarkably consistent sex differences in the cues that males and females
find attractive in potential mates, the differences correlating with the different resources
that limit reproductive success in each sex. Thus, across cultures, females prefer males
of high status with demonstrated access to material resources (which often translates
into a preference for older, established males), while males prefer females with high
fertility (which almost invariably translates into a preference for younger females ir-
respective of socio-economic position). Despite marked differences in the details of
cultural and mating practises around the world, then, males and females consistently
show the same psychological mechanisms governing mate attraction.3
3This does not mean that there are not a host of other variables involved ultimately in decisions about
mating (or marriage). Obviously, these issues are incredibly complicated and are influenced by numerous
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Although the emphasis here has been on social cognitive modules, potential cog-
nitive specialisations need not be limited to the social domain. Indeed, modules spe-
cialised for other problem domains have been proposed (e.g., food choice, and habitat
selection). Evolutionary psychology is a young subfield and its full depth and breadth
have yet to be realised. However, it is already beginning to yield important insights into
the evolution of human psychology—into why we think and do what we think and do.
Like any new field of enquiry, one test of its utility is its compatibility with accumu-
lated knowledge in related fields. In this respect also, evolutionary psychology looks
promising, as many of its findings are compatible not only with basic evolutionary the-
ory that guides research in most of the behavioural sciences but also with empirical
findings in closely allied subfields of psychology, namely neuroscience.
Increasingly, research in neuroscience is revealing functionally specialised areas of
the brain, some of which correspond to hypothesised social cognitive modules. Re-
cent work has revealed individuals with very specific cognitive deficits resulting from
highly localised brain damage. For example, some individuals suffer from a deficit that
compromises their ability to recognise faces, a deficit termed prosopagnosia. Although
these individuals can recognise other objects without difficulty, they cannot recognise
the faces of very familiar people such as their own husbands. (An analogous deficit
in recognising voices has also been hypothesised.) Research has also identified nu-
merous brain areas involved in language processing, damage to any one of which can
cause specific language deficits (generally termed ‘aphasias’). For example, diffuse
damage in the left frontal lobe often impairs speech production (traditionally called
Broca’s aphasia), while damage in the left temporal or parietal lobe can impair speech
comprehension (Wernicke’s aphasia). More localised damage within these areas can
cause even more specific language impairments such as the inability to name familiar
objects (anomia), or the inability to comprehend the grammatical structure of speech
(agrammatica).
Research like this supports the tenets of evolutionary psychology that the brain is
structured as a collection of distinct cognitive modules specialised for processing cer-
tain kinds of information. In many ways, evolutionary psychology and neuroscience
are complementary, evolutionary psychology suggesting specific problem domains that
represent plausible evolved cognitive modules and neuroscience evaluating the struc-
tural realisation of such modules. As yet, localised brain areas for detecting cheaters
have not been identified, and it is possible that they never will be. Some cognitive pro-
cesses may be highly distributed in such diffuse neural networks that they are robust to
damage to localised circuits or simply resist efforts to localise them. It is interesting
to note, however, that schizophrenics who typically manifest compromised reasoning
skills have no trouble with social contract problems like those illustrated in Box 1,
confirming that cognitive mechanisms for the latter (however diffusely distributed they
may prove to be) are nevertheless insulated from other reasoning domains. Thus, in
combination, evolutionary psychology and neuroscience are mutually informative and
should ultimately contribute to an ever-clearer picture of the functional organisation of
the human brain and the problems it has evolved to solve.
cultural practises in addition to basic aspects of biology. Nevertheless, it is illuminating to find such con-
sistent differences despite tremendous cultural diversity, differences that align well with sex differences in
evolutionarily recurrent selective pressures affecting reproductive success.
24.6 Conclusion 205
24.6 Conclusion
Competition and cooperation are ubiquitous features of primate social life. The com-
plex interplay between these conflicting influences on behaviour has, over the course of
primate evolutionary history, shaped the structure and function of human psychology.
The challenges of negotiating social exchange have been a recurrent selective pressure
favouring cognitive adaptations for reasoning about social problems. These social cog-
nitive adaptations represent a collection of distinct but integrated processing modules,
each dedicated to specific informational content within the social domain. Much of the
human psyche, then, constitutes an evolved cognitive architecture designed to solve
various problems associated with being a highly social organism whose survival and
reproduction hinges on negotiating encounters with social companions.
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Chapter 25
Memory Systems in the Brain
Rob Sutherland
O ne of the more important insights gained by modern psychology is thatour ability to remember reflects the functioning of several, separate mem-ory processes and systems in the brain. Our ability to remember whatwe ate during our last meal, the face of our paternal grandmother, how to
maintain our balance during turns while ice-skating, how we felt when we scored our
first “A” on a university test, or where we have just placed our pen are all instances of
memory, unified by the fact that it is the same mind who “has” each of these memo-
ries. That they are unified in any important way may be illusory. Each represents a
complex set of processes occurring in connections between neurons contained within
anatomically distinct, functionally separate brain regions.
Consider the case of patient HM who contributed more to the modern understand-
ing of human memory systems than any other person. For years HM suffered epilep-
tic seizures many times each day. Available treatments were ineffective. While still a
young man, HM was referred to a Boston neurosurgeon, W. Scoville, who was pioneer-
ing a surgical procedure in which brain tissue was removed to reduce seizures. Scoville
performed a radical version of the procedure, termed “medial temporal lobectomy”,
during which nearly all of HM’s medial temporal lobe was removed, importantly, in
both left and right hemispheres of his brain. In part prompted by complaints from HM
and his family about memory problems after the surgery, Scoville carried out many
standard tests of psychological functions, including general intellectual competencies,
attention, digit span, and the like. HM passed all of these with flying colours, yet com-
plaints of memory problems persisted. It was not until a young neuropsychologist from
McGill University, Brenda Milner, conducted a more thorough and appropriate battery
of psychological tests that the nature of HM’s plight was discovered.
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25.1 HM’s Memory Deficits
Milner showed that HM was able to remember normally any new information only for
as long as he continued to think about it—very soon after he turned his attention to
something else, he was unable to recall the new information. For example, if Milner
introduced herself and carried on a normal conversation about any topic HM would
have no difficulty in holding up his end. However, if, in mid-conversation she drew his
attention to something occurring out of HM’s window, when she would subsequently
ask if he remembered her name or what they had been talking about he would have
completely forgotten, often denying that they had ever spoken before. Thus, when
HM engaged in effortful attention to new information his recall was normal. This
unaffected memory process is termed working memory. HM appeared to have a specific
impairment in forming new long-term memories. This deficit is termed anterograde
amnesia. Milner further demonstrated that HM could recall accurately events from
most of his life before his surgery and he remembered his own telephone number and
home address and the like. However, memories from the 5 year period before surgery
were almost entirely gone. This loss of memories of events from before brain injury
is termed retrograde amnesia. Milner concluded that Scoville had removed a brain
region essential for acquiring and—at least initially—storing long-term memories. For
several reasons Milner believed that a structure called the hippocampus was the critical
area within the medial temporal lobe. Subsequent work has revealed that Milner was
essentially correct that the hippocampus is critical for certain forms of memories, but
so are other medial temporal lobe structures, albeit in somewhat different ways. Thus,
HM may be viewed now as a patient who has lost functioning of several important
memory systems (described below).
25.2 Certain Forms of Memory are Preserved
A student of Milner’s, Suzanne Corkin, made another important discovery about HM’s
memory. She showed that there were two kinds of new memories that HM had no trou-
ble forming and retaining. The first involves learning new skills. The classic example
is learning to trace a complex figure when only a mirror-image of the subject’s hand
movements are available—the subject cannot see his or her hand directly, but must
learn to make movements based upon the inverted visual information from the mirror.
With extended practice people learn this skill and retain it for a long time—so does
HM. In fact, HM and other patients with his form of amnesia have learned and remem-
bered a surprisingly wide range of new skills—without being able to report a single
memory from any of the previous practice episodes! When questioned about how they
are able to perform these skills almost flawlessly they answer something along the lines
of, “I guess I am naturally good at this kind of thing.”
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The second kind of preserved learning is termed priming. When subjects are shown
specific pictures, words, or other items, very quickly or within a long list of similar
material they are often unable to explicitly recall whether they had seen a specific item
on the list, say a picture of an aeroplane or the word “clarinet”. Despite a complete
absence of explicit memory for these items, it is possible to show that people retain
long-term information about the items. This retention can be tested in a few indirect
ways. One way is to show a very degraded, fragmentary version of the original item,
say a fragmented picture of the identical aeroplane. It has been shown that the prior,
“forgotten”, exposure significantly enhances the ability to identify the degraded picture
(this enhancement is very specific to the original picture, it does not generalize to all
pictures or even pictures of other planes or the same plane in a different orientation). A
second indirect way to test for retained information can be illustrated with the example
of the word item “clarinet”. This test is a simple spelling test that takes advantage of
the fact that there are many homophones in the English language. A person is asked to
spell a word like “reed”. Because the words “read” and “reed” are spoken identically,
the request is ambiguous and one might expect the person to respond with the higher
frequency spelling, “read”. However, even if a person does not remember that the word
“clarinet” had previously been presented, the person’s spelling is often biased toward
“reed”, the lower frequency spelling that was primed by the earlier presentation of a
reed instrument.
Indirect tests of memory are often thought to tap long-term memory that is uncon-
scious or not reportable. The contemporary term for this form of memory is implicit
memory and it is largely, if not completely, preserved in amnesia. In contrast, di-
rect tests of memory, involving items such as, “tell me what you ate for breakfast”,
or, “what was the topic of our most recent conversation?”, or, “where do you live?”,
measure explicit memory, information that can be consciously recalled and reported to
others. The preservation of memory for skills and of priming in the face of devastated
explicit memory after medial temporal lobe damage represents a good illustration of
two facts. Our brains contain multiple, independent memory systems. And, much of
what we do as a consequence of prior experience occurs without conscious awareness.
25.4 Functional Brain Imaging
The branch of science that deals with complex psychological processes, such as mem-
ory, attention, perception, and so on, with a focus on brain mechanisms is called cog-
nitive neuroscience. Most of our information in cognitive neuroscience has depended
upon careful behavioural studies of patients and nonhuman animals with brain injury—
accidental or experimental—going back to clinical studies in the 1800s by Alzheimer,
Korsakoff, and others. Contemporary work on memory draws on a very wide array of
methods, including those from cognitive psychology, neurocomputational modelling,
neurophysiology, neuropharmacology, and physics. Functional brain imaging provides
cognitive neuroscientists with a set of new, rapidly evolving, extraordinarily powerful
methods. Given that the mind is the brain in action, functional brain imaging allows
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Figure 25.1: Dense-array ERP sensors.
us to actually observe the mind/brain as it is thinking, feeling, planning, fantasizing,
and remembering. We will discuss two of these methods in some detail: event-related
potentials (ERPs) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).
25.5 ERP
Neurons are specialized for processing information, in large part because of their abil-
ity to undergo carefully regulated, rapid shifts in the electrical properties of their mem-
branes. These changes (the action potentials and synaptic potentials described in other
chapters) generate electrical currents that produce measurable changes in the electrical
field on the surface of the head. The size of these changes depends upon many factors,
including how many neurons are generating a similar signal, how far these neurons are
from the recording contacts on the head, how synchronized are the signals from differ-
ent neurons, what other signals are being generated in other neurons, and the amount
and type of tissue through which the electric field changes are distorted between the
signal and the recording contacts. Making accurate inferences about the location of a
neuronal signal at any point in time is a dauntingly complex task and there is much
current work directed toward improving this accuracy. Some of the improvements are
based upon better mathematical approaches to “source localization” and some, such
as the dense-array system pictured in Figure 25.1, are based upon improvements in
contacts/detectors (such as dramatically increasing the number of surface contacts). A
major advance was the development of signal averaging techniques.
25.6 ERP: Signal Averaging
Consider a memory task in which familiar and novel pictures of faces are shown to a
person and the person’s task is to push one button if the face is familiar and a different
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button if the face is novel. Rather than measuring brain activity during presentation
of each face, ERP workers average the responses at each contact over all of the face
presentations of a certain type. The assumption is made that there is lots and lots of pro-
cessing going on during the face task, most of which is irrelevant to recognizing faces.
Subject may be thinking about what they did last night, what they are going to eat for
lunch, why this experiment is taking so long, and so on. A further assumption is made
that this irrelevant processing will not have a consistent temporal relationship to the
presentation of each face. In contrast, relevant activity in visual areas and mnemonic
systems involved in face recognition is quite likely to have a relatively constant tempo-
ral relationship to when each face is presented or perhaps to when a response is made
by the subject indicating that this is a familiar or novel face. What one is able to see
after such averaging at each scalp contact is a flat line before face presentation followed
by reliable fluctuations in the local electric field beginning soon after face presentation
that continue to change for several hundred milliseconds until just before the response
is made. The signals can be averaged by time-locking to any event, be it stimulation
(face presentation), movement (button push), or meaningful action (correct familiarity
response).
Because the scalp contacts are in slightly different locations relative to the neuronal
signals within the brain, it is often possible to accurately determine the location of the
individual waves or potentials. This is especially true for signals that arise from neurons
of the cerebral cortex that are close to the skull. Using this strategy and superimposing
inferred locations onto a subject’s 3-D MRI scan we can see a variety of processing
stages for faces. First, we can identify regions of posterior visual cortex that respond to
faces very early on, but these regions show the same response to non-face stimuli that
have very similar visual features. Next, areas of temporal cortex (fusiform and lingual
gyri to be exact) show the first face-specific signals, but these areas respond equally to
all faces, be they familiar or novel. Finally, beginning around 400 ms after the face is
presented there are medial temporal regions that respond differently to familiar versus
novel faces—these would correspond to the circuits where memories first interact with
the specifics of face perception.
The ERP technique has three important advantages compared with most other
methods. One is temporal resolution. Neuronal activity occurs very quickly and ERP
techniques allow for accuracy below a millisecond. A second is validity. ERPs measure
the electrical activity from neural information processing directly. A third is safety and
ease of use. There is no need for potentially harmful and expensive radioactive iso-
topes, injections, or non-physiological applied electromagnetic fields. An important
short-coming of the technique is the blurring of electrical field flux by various tissues
(fluids, bone, skin) between the generator of the signal and the scalp contacts and math-
ematical uncertainties associated with source localization.
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Figure 25.2: Average signals shown at 7 of the ERP scalp contacts for familiar and
unfamiliar faces (from Eimer, 2000).
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Figure 25.3: A MRI of the brain viewed from the three standard orientations
25.7 fMRI (Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging)
fMRI is a newer technique for measuring brain activity 1. An example image is shown
in Figure 25.3 and the machine that generates the images is shown in Figure 25.4.
fMRI is not beset by the source localization problems of ERP, but it has inferior tem-
poral resolution (at best a few seconds is its quickest response). fMRI takes advantage
of the fact that the brain has a regulatory system that delivers extra oxygenated blood
to areas where neurons have been especially active (because neural activity places de-
mands on pathways related to oxidative metabolism). Most of the oxygen in blood
is carried by hæmoglobin molecules and if we were to look carefully at a capillary
that irrigated a region of fusiform gyrus just as we looked up from a book to stare at
our grandmother’s face we would notice a decrease for a few seconds in the number
of oxygenated hæmoglobin molecules followed by a longer lasting increase in local
oxygenated hæmoglobin.
It is this later upswing in oxyhemoglobin that creates the BOLD response (Blood Oxy-
gen Level Dependent effect) that is the measured signal in most fMRI. Essentially,
MRI depends upon recording radio-frequency signals generated by aligned hydrogen
atoms “spinning” coherently in a strong magnetic field. Oxy- and deoxyhæmoglobin
get into the picture because these two molecules differ in how much they disturb the
local magnetic field, which changes the coherence of the signalling hydrogen atoms.
1see http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fmr intro/ for a description of the basics
214 Memory Systems – Sutherland
Figure 25.4: MRI scanner
Deoxyhæmoglobin perturbs the local field more than oxyhemoglobin, thus there is an
increase in the MRI signal as the relative amount of oxyhemoglobin goes up. More
neuronal activity = more oxyhemoglobin = greater MRI signal intensity. We can be
much more sure of where neuronal activation is occurring with fMRI (to within about
0.5 mm) than we are about when the activation occurred, since the BOLD response
unfolds over many seconds. Just like with ERPs, we can locate the sources of inferred
activity within a 3-D MRI scan as shown in Figure 25.5.
25.8 What About Memory Systems?
Functional brain imaging studies, especially fMRI, have confirmed many of Milner’s
conclusions about memory. In particular, neuroimaging studies have shown a sharp
dissociation between those areas that are involved in working memory and those that
subserve long-term memory processes. Milner would predict that medial temporal lobe
regions, especially hippocampus, would be strongly activated in the latter but not the
former tasks. Based upon a great deal of other work with frontal lobe lesion patients
it would be predicted that a specific region of frontal cortex would be activated by
working memory tasks and not by long-term memory tasks. What do we see with fMRI
studies? When we show short lists of words or other items and soon after ask subjects to
identify whether or not particular items were on the list, there is a prominent activation
of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (and little activation of hippocampus). In contrast,
when people are engaged in committing new information to memory, especially new
spatial information (see Figure 25.6 for an example), or when they are retrieving this
information from long-term memory there is a prominent activation of hippocampus
and a less robust activation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.
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Figure 25.5: BOLD signal generated by presentation of a complex visual cue superim-
posed on a 3-D structural MRI.
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Figure 25.7 provides one comprehensive overview of the different memory systems
we have mentioned. This taxonomy of Squire and Knowlton (1994) refers to explicit
and implicit memory as declarative and non-declarative respectively. Within the medial
temporal lobe structures under the Declarative label you will see the amygdala. This
structure, located just in front of the hippocampus, is especially activated by emotion-
laden events. We know from experimental lesion work with nonhumans that damage
to the amygdala impairs learning various associations between cues and emotions, like
fear or pleasure, without affecting other forms of associative learning. Consistent data
have been collected in fMRI studies with humans, in which various kinds of learned
emotional responses activate amygdala neurons (and not hippocampus or dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex). If we turn our attention to the other side of the memory taxonomy
figure, under skills and habits the cerebellum is listed. Experimental or accidental dam-
age to the cerebellum has little or no effect on emotional learning, or working memory,
or formation of new explicit memories. Instead there is a very selective deficit in classi-
cal conditioning. Conditioning involving discrete conditioned responses like eye blinks
or leg flexion is abolished by cerebellar damage. Likewise, classical eye-blink condi-
tioning has been shown in human fMRI studies to selectively activate portions of the
cerebellum.
25.9 Conclusion
Not too long ago, a significant number of well-educated, intelligent scholars wrote
definitive treatises concluding that we would never, using the tools of science, be able
to learn the composition of stars. Their argument was based upon the impossible dis-
tances from earth to stars and upon the scarcity of useful information that could be
gathered. Despite their arguments, we now have amazingly accurate information about
stellar composition, not to mention stellar life-cycles and origins. In a similar vein,
we often hear that the human mind and self are impossibly complex and that there
are insurmountable difficulties in obtaining good useful information. The burgeoning
field of cognitive neuroscience, with its newly acquired and maturing methods of lesion
analysis, functional brain imaging, and neurocomputational modelling, are leading us
to solve problems in psychology where the imaginations of a prior generation saw only
impenetrable dark.
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Figure 25.6: Panel A shows a computerized street scene that must be committed to
memory during a spatial mapping task. Panel B shows activity in right hippocampus
during performance.
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Chapter 26
Ethical Considerations in
Psychology and Neuroscience
Research
Rob Sutherland
T he most important event in how we attempt to answer psychological ques-tions was the change from a reliance upon the methods of insight, intro-spection, and learning the doctrines of long-dead authorities to the applica-tion of direct observation and analysis of the phenomena of behaviour and
brain. An important implication of this aspect of the scientific method is that we use
humans and other animals as the subjects for our observations and experiments. This
use has brought psychologists and neuroscientists into regular contact with the realm
of societal norms about what is ethically justified and what is lawful.
Cultures in different places and our own cultures in different times have evolved
numerous rules about how people and other animals should be treated. In some it is
unethical for strangers to look upon a woman’s face; in others, it is ethically justified
to abandon a baby before the age of one, or to own another person as property; in still
others, it was a moral imperative to torture and even kill people who did not submit to
a particular version of Christianity.
Over the second half of the 20th century scientists witnessed major changes in
the understanding of the ethical status of human and nonhuman animal participants in
research. This chapter tries to identify some of the major events and ideas in this recent
evolution that set the ethical context for our research.
In 1984 I visited Dachau, the first of the German concentration camps active during
World War II in a town very near Munich. The camp is maintained as a musem exhibit-
ing artifacts and photographs of the horrifying treatment of prisoners and as a memorial
to the unknown thousands and thousands of victims, nearly all of them German left-
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wing labour activists, communists, gypsies, homosexuals, or Jews, whose cremated
remains are buried in mass graves around the camp. I was not prepared for the graphic
and extensive documentation of the scientific research conducted on the prisoners. One
series of experiments I vividly remember. The participants were placed into air-tight
chambers and exposed to suddenly lowered air pressure as a laboratory simulation of
very high altitude. The experimenter wanted to learn at what altitude people would
die and how the low pressure affected various organs including the brain. At specific
pressures the tops of the participants’ skulls were quickly cut off to immediately ex-
amine the condition of the brain, regardless of whether the person was already dead.
I knew that experiments like this one had been conducted, but seeing the artifacts and
photographs generated a strong sense of what these experiments must have been like
to witness.
The victors at the end of WWII conducted show trials in Nuremberg, Germany in-
volving various members of the Nazi government, military officers, and officers who
participated in concentration camp activities. The testimony concerning mass execu-
tions, genocide, treatment of concentration camp prisoners, and medical experiments
provoked a sense of outrage and urgency to create an international legislative solution
to problems of this sort. One outcome was a codification in 1944 of ethical principles
that has become the foundational ethical guide to researchers. This set of principles
came to be called the Nuremberg Code.
The principles are:
1. from the participant. Informed consent includes freedom from coercion, fraud,
deceit, and enough understanding of the nature, methods, purpose, and duration
of the research to make an enlightened decision. It includes information about
inconveniences, duress, and health effects from the research. It is the responsi-
bility of the experimenter to determine that the conditions of informed consent
are satisfied.
2. The study should yield results for the good of society, not obtainable by other
means.
3. Based upon design and prior knowledge of the disease and animal experimenta-
tion, the anticipated results should justify the experiment.
4. Avoid unnecessary physical and mental suffering.
5. No experiment should be conducted if there is a good chance of death or dis-
abling injury.
6. The degree of risk should not outweigh the humanitarian benefit.
7. Preparations should be taken to prevent even remote possibilities of subject in-
jury or death.
8. Only qualified scientific personnel should conduct the experiment.
9. Subjects have the right to quit the experiment if they perceive physical or mental
effects making it impossible to continue.
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10. If at any stage in the course of an experiment the scientist believes that injury,
disability, or death may result, he or she must terminate the study.
The World Medical Association at its General Assembly in Helsinki, Finland in
1964 expanded upon and added to the 10 principles of the Nuremberg Code. The
Helsinki Declaration was subsequently amended several times, most recently in 2000.
The most important additions include:
1. The design and performance of each experimental procedure involving human
subjects should be clearly formulated in an experimental protocol. This protocol
should be submitted for consideration, comment, guidance, and where appropri-
ate, approval to a specially appointed ethical review committee, which must be
independent of the investigator, the sponsor, or any other kind of undue influ-
ence. This independent committee should be in conformity with the laws and
regulations of the country in which the research experiment is performed. The
committee has the right to monitor ongoing trials. The researcher has the obliga-
tion to provide monitoring information to the committee, especially any serious
adverse events. The researcher should also submit to the committee, for review,
information regarding funding, sponsors, institutional affiliations, other potential
conflicts of interest, and incentives for subjects.
2. Medical research is only justified if there is a reasonable likelihood that the pop-
ulations in which the research is carried out stand to benefit from the results of
the research.
3. The right of research subjects to safeguard their integrity must always be re-
spected. Every precaution should be taken to respect the privacy of the subject,
the confidentiality of the patient’s information and to minimize the impact of the
study on the subject’s physical and mental integrity and on the personality of the
subject.
4. For a research subject who is legally incompetent, physically or mentally inca-
pable of giving consent, or is a legally incompetent minor, the investigator must
obtain informed consent from the legally authorized representative in accordance
with applicable law. These groups should not be included in research unless the
research is necessary to promote the health of the population represented and this
research cannot instead be performed on legally competent persons.
5. Research on individuals from whom it is not possible to obtain consent, including
proxy or advance consent, should be done only if the physical/mental condition
that prevents obtaining informed consent is a necessary characteristic of the re-
search population. The specific reasons for involving research subjects with a
condition that renders them unable to give informed consent should be stated in
the experimental protocol for consideration and approval of the review commit-
tee. The protocol should state that consent to remain in the research should be
obtained as soon as possible from the individual or a legally authorized surrogate.
The major changes introduced by the Helsinki Declaration include a much more
complete elaboration of the meaning of informed consent and consent by legal guardians,
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establishing the principle of the right to privacy or confidentiality, the establishment of
a central role of the ethical review committee in overseeing research on humans, and
clarifying the idea that the research should have promise in benefiting specifically the
population studied. Further evolution of the guidelines awaited a few landmark human
studies.
From 1932 to 1972, 399 poor black sharecroppers in Macon County, Alabama were
denied treatment for syphilis and deceived by physicians of the United States Public
Health Service. As part of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, designed to document the nat-
ural history of the disease, these men were told that they were being treated for “bad
blood.” In fact, government officials went to extreme lengths to insure that they re-
ceived no therapy from any source. Needless to say these men suffered horribly and
unnecessarily in order to provide information to researchers funded by the National
Institutes of Health in the U.S. This study and several others led to a major commis-
sion to re-establish basic ethical principles. In 1978, the U.S. National Commission
for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research submit-
ted its report entitled The Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the
Protection of Human Subjects of Research. The Report, named after the Belmont Con-
ference Center at the Smithsonian Institution where the discussions which resulted in
its formulation were begun, sets forth the basic ethical principles underlying the ac-
ceptable conduct of research involving human subjects. Those principles, respect for
persons, beneficence, and justice, are now accepted as the three quintessential require-
ments for the ethical conduct of research involving human subjects. The principles can
be thought of as underlying the specific guidelines developed in the Nuremberg Code
and the Helsinki Declaration and are in no way in conflict.
Respect for persons involves a recognition of the personal dignity and autonomy of
individuals, and special protection of those persons with diminished autonomy.
Beneficence entails an obligation to protect persons from harm by maximizing antici-
pated benefits and minimizing possible risks of harm.
Justice requires that the benefits and burdens of research be distributed fairly.
The Report also describes how these principles apply to the conduct of research.
Specifically, the principle of respect for persons underlies the need to obtain informed
consent and privacy; the principle of beneficence underlies the need to engage in a
risk/benefit analysis and to minimize risks; and the principle of justice requires that
subjects be fairly selected.
The principles first enunciated in the Nuremberg code and elaborated upon in the
Helsinki Declaration and the Belmont Report continue to provide the benchmarks
against which contemporary experiments’ ethical considerations are measured. How-
ever, it is important to note that unethical researchers will continue to find ways to
perform unacceptable experiments off the ethical radar screen. For example, the U.S.
government in the 1950s and 60s conducted a series of experiments to study the brain-
washing effects of high doses of LSD on psychiatric hospital inmates and ordinary
citizens in the U.S. and Canada. Furthermore during the same era, small quantities
of dangerous radioactive isotopes were inserted chronically into unsuspecting children
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who were undergoing routine surgical procedures such as tonsillectomy. The purpose
was to study effects of long-term radiation exposure. Both of these kinds of experi-
ments were funded by U.S. granting agencies, but were performed under the protection
of government secrecy laws. It was not until decades later that the information finally
became public.
26.1 Research with Non-human Animals
The ethical principles guiding research with nonhuman animals seem to be less clear.
For example, there is a sizeable contemporary contingent who see no harm in and great
benefit to banning all research with nonhuman animals. At the same time, some believe
there should be no constraint at all on nonhuman animal research. In the context of little
consensus it is worthwhile to clarify the historical and contemporary arguments for and
against such research in a point/counter-point fashion.
26.1.1 Arguments for nonhuman animal research
Naturalism
This position holds that animals kill one another, eat one another, and inflict pain and
suffering in their natural life histories. Humans, just like all other animals have always
exploited other organisms in similar ways. Experiments with nonhumans represent
extensions of the natural use of animals to promote human lives. [Even if this position
were correct, one would need at least one additional valid argument to have a good
ethical justification, namely, establishing that something that is natural is automatically
good. No one has come up with a satisfactory argument equating the two and there
are at least several examples of things that are natural that we do not believe are good.
For example, rape and murdering children are considered by many psychologists to be
natural, but they are certainly not ethically good.]
Souls
A position most closely associated with the French luminary Rene´ Descartes is that
only humans are given souls by God. Nonhuman animals have no souls. The imma-
terial human soul enables us to experience modalities such as suffering, love, moral
certitude, etc; in the absence of a soul an animal has no such inner experience. Ani-
mals exhibiting pain responses are showing us only “sham” pain, not “felt” pain. Non-
human animals are like zombies (i.e., without the inner experiences—only the overt
responses). Thus, in the absence of the ability to really suffer, any kind of experimen-
tation is justified. Contemporaries of Descartes described his ability to inflict extreme
pain upon a nonhuman animal while laughing at its tormented responses. [Today the
concept of an immaterial soul has no scientific currency at all. As the knowledge of
the relationship between neural circuitry and pain experience has expanded, we can see
that at least all vertebrates have the kind of neural machinery that is, in humans, the
basis for pain and suffering.]
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Utilitarianism
This argument is based upon the idea that we should behave in such a way as to
maximize the general happiness and minimize the general suffering. One must do a
cost/benefit analysis for each research project. This position is very much in keeping
with the spirit of the Nuremberg Code and Helsinki Declaration. The public consensus
is that human happiness and reduction in suffering is more important than the unhap-
piness of nonhuman animals created by experiments. [What principles does one use to
weigh the suffering of a nonhuman animals against the benefit to human happiness or
reduction in human suffering?]
26.1.2 Arguments against nonhuman animal research
No benefit
One of the most often repeated arguments against nonhuman animal research is that
it produces no benefits—that the results do not improve human (or nonhuman animal)
health or happiness. For example: “Animal experiments mislead doctors and the gen-
eral public. Diseases such as cancer, that are artificially induced in laboratory animals,
have no relationship to the diseases which aﬄict humans. These are largely caused by
lifestyle and pollution1.” Therefore the suffering of the nonhuman animal subjects is
unjustified. The real motive is profit for experimenters and/or sadism. [Virtually all of
the current therapeutic drugs, surgical techniques, transplant procedures, vaccinations,
diagnostic procedures, and new safety features in homes and vehicles were developed
using research with nonhuman animals. If you encounter people espousing this view
ask them if they would sign a card to carry in their wallet or purse, stating that if they
are found unconscious or unable to speak on their own behalf that they want no proce-
dure, treatment, or product used for their recovery that was developed using research
with nonhuman animals.]
Lack of necessity
Many argue that research with nonhuman animals is unnecessary because the same in-
formation could be obtained by studying people, human tissue, human DNA, or com-
puter models. [Think about where our information about DNA and its function came
from. Where would we get the basic physiological information to put into our com-
puter models? If you really understand very little about, say, pain pathways in the brain,
how could you model them? Our ability to create experimental systems that replace
nonhuman animals as subjects is based upon a copious amount of valid experimental
data from experiments with nonhuman animals.]
Animal rights
This argument is based upon an analogy to certain aspects of the history of human
rights. There was a time in this century in North America when certain groups of cit-
izens were denied fundamental rights, such as the right to vote, etc. Two large groups
1Animal Liberation NSW website
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were women and African Americans. The rationale was that these two groups essen-
tially lacked some qualities that are prerequisite to exercising these rights in a responsi-
ble fashion. As it became clear that there were no such essential differences that would
exclude them from having these rights, the fundamental rights were extended to them.
So too, the rights that humans have in respect to being subjects in experiments are de-
nied to nonhuman animals supposedly because nonhumans lack some essential quality.
However, there is no relevant essential difference between humans and nonhuman ani-
mals. Therefore, nonhuman animals must be granted the same rights as humans. [This
is an erroneous reconstruction of how women and African Americans won their rights.
Rights are not all or none—perhaps there is some category of rights different from that
of an intact adult human that nonhuman animals might properly fit.]
Animal liberation
A more extreme position is that by freeing nonhuman animals from all of our ex-
ploitation of them as pets (read slaves or prisoners), food, clothing, and subjects in
experiments, we will also improve our treatment of other humans, and that this ethi-
cal elevation will continue to have positive vibrational effects such that there will be a
continuing animal ethical evolution to the point that the lions will lay down peacefully
with lambs, each of them enjoying a strict vegan diet. To give a flavour of this position:
One of the spiritual experiences I had was when my dog Mitra was dy-
ing. I took him to his beloved Sangre de Cristo Mountains and there, as
his true home, I laid him down in the soft grass among the aspen trees. I
saw the magic of death unfolded as his body became lighter and lighter
as if he allowed his corporeal existence to enter the magic of transforma-
tion. He was ready to abandon the density of his animal form for the final
reunion with the great mystery. As Homo sapiens, we are beginning to
examine our own moral and spiritual consistency. Animal liberation is hu-
man liberation. Every tree, every rock, every animal should be an object of
reverence, this was how our ancestors lived. To guard the rights of nature
and animals can serve as our own passage to spiritual maturity2.
Also along these lines. we find people suggesting that nonhuman animals can have
the capacity to show human, moral reasoning, and to enter into social contracts with
humans:
St. Francis once converted a wolf to reason. The wolf of Gubbio promised
to stop terrorizing an Italian town; he made pledges and assurances and
pacts, and he kept his part of the bargains. But St. Francis only performed
this miracle once, and as miracles go, it didn’t seem to capture the pub-
lic’s fancy. Humans don’t want to enter into a pact with animals. They
don’t want animals to reason. It would be an unnerving experience. It
would bring about all manner of awkwardness and guilt. It would make
our treatment of them seem, well, unreasonable. The fact that animals are
2The Animal Liberation Movement and Global Spirituality, Dr. Mira Foung
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voiceless is a relief to us, it frees us from feeling much empathy or sor-
row. If animals did have voices, if they could speak with the tongues of
angels—at the very least with the tongues of angels—it is unlikely that
they could save themselves from mankind.3
Animal welfare
A final position that accepts that some research with nonhuman animals is justified but
only if consistent with strict guidelines is termed the Animal Welfare position. This
position has many similarities to our current state of guidelines with humans who can-
not give informed consent. It is based upon the Russell-Burch three Rs: reduction,
refinement, and replacement. Reduction refers to taking whatever steps possible to en-
sure that the fewest animals are used consistent with obtaining valid scientific results.
Refinement refers to adopting increasingly precise, less harmful or stressful, and less
invasive procedures. Replacement refers to using invertebrates, tissue cultures, and
computer models, whenever these are feasible, instead of a vertebrate animal. Prior to
conducting an experiment, the procedures, rationale, and design must be evaluated, just
as human work is, by an ethics review committee that is independent of the researchers
proposing the experiment. Something akin to informed consent is provided by this
committee whose job it is to ensure that the accepted guidelines and ethical principles
are not violated. There are several extensive documents outlining contemporary prin-
ciples and practices of nonhuman animal research. Two of the best representatives are
the National Institutes of Health guidelines and the guidelines of the Canadian Council
on Animal Care. Both of these guidelines are followed by researchers at the University
of Lethbridge.
The following principles are excerpted from the NIH guidelines for nonhuman an-
imal research (http://oacu.od.nih.gov/regs/guide/guide2.htm):
1. Animals selected for a procedure should be of an appropriate species and quality,
and of the minimum number required to obtain valid results.
2. Proper use of animals, including the avoidance or minimization of discomfort,
distress and pain, is imperative.
3. Procedures with animals that may cause more than momentary or slight pain or
distress should be performed with appropriate sedation, analgesia or anesthesia.
Surgical or other painful procedures should not be performed on unanesthetized
animals paralyzed by chemical agents.
4. Postoperative care of animals should minimize discomfort and pain and, in any
case, should be equivalent to accepted practices in schools of veterinary medicine.
5. Animals that would otherwise suffer severe or chronic pain or distress that cannot
be relieved should be painlessly killed at the end of the procedure or, if appro-
priate, during the procedure. If the study requires the death of the animal, the
animal must be killed in a humane manner.
3
’Do creatures have the same rights that we do?’ By Joy Williams (C) 1997 Harpers Magazine.
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6. Living conditions should be appropriate for the species and contribute to the ani-
mals’ well-being. Normally, the housing, feeding and care of all animals used for
biomedical purposes must be directed by a veterinarian or other scientist trained
and experienced in the proper care, handling and use of the species being main-
tained or studied. In any case, appropriate veterinary care should be provided.
7. Exceptions to these principles require careful consideration and should only be
made by an appropriate review group such as an institutional animal care and use
committee.
Canada too has adopted national guidelines developed and promoted by the Cana-
dian Council on Animal Care (http://www.ccac.ca/). Both public and private sec-
tor research are bound by these rules. The rules are summarized below from a CCAC
statement approved in 1989:
The use of animals in research, teaching, and testing is acceptable only if it
promises to contribute to understanding of fundamental biological princi-
ples, or to the development of knowledge that can reasonably be expected
to benefit humans or animals.
Animals should be used only if the researcher’s best efforts to find an al-
ternative have failed. A continuing sharing of knowledge, review of the
literature, and adherence to the Russell-Burch 3R tenet of Replacement,
Reduction and Refinement are also requisites. Those using animals should
employ the most humane methods on the smallest number of appropriate
animals required to obtain valid information.
The following principles incorporate suggestions from members of both
the scientific and animal welfare communities, as well as the organiza-
tions represented on Council. They should be applied in conjunction with
the Canadian Council on Animal Care’s Guide to the Care and Use of
Experimental Animals.
1. If animals must be used, they should be maintained in a manner that
provides for their physical comfort and psychological well-being, ac-
cording to CCAC’s Policy Statement on Social and Behavioural Re-
quirements of Experimental Animals.
2. Animals must not be subjected to unnecessary pain or distress. The
experimental design must offer them every practicable safeguard,
whether in research, in teaching or in testing procedures; cost and
convenience must not take precedence over the animal’s physical and
mental well-being.
3. Expert opinion must attest to the potential value of studies with an-
imals. The following procedures, which are restricted, require inde-
pendent, external evaluation to justify their use:
(a) burns, freezing injuries, fractures, and other types of trauma in-
vestigation in anesthetized animals, concomitant to which must
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be acceptable veterinary practices for the relief of pain, includ-
ing adequate analgesia during the recovery period;
(b) staged encounters between predator and prey or between con-
specifics where prolonged fighting and injury are probable.
4. If pain or distress is a necessary concomitant to the study, it must
be minimized both in intensity and duration. Investigators, Animal
Care Committees (ACC), grant review committees and referees must
be especially cautious in evaluating the proposed use of the following
procedures:
(a) experiments involving withholding pre- and post-operative pain-
relieving medication;
(b) paralyzing and immobilizing experiments where there is no re-
duction in the sensation of pain;
(c) electric shock as negative reinforcement;
(d) extreme environmental conditions such as low or high temper-
atures, high humidity, modified atmospheres, etc., or sudden
changes therein;
(e) experiments studying stress and pain;
(f) experiments requiring withholding of food and water for periods
incompatible with the species specific physiological needs; such
experiments should have no detrimental effect on the health of
the animal;
(g) injection of Freund’s Complete Adjuvant (FCA). This must be
carried out in accordance with CCAC Guidelines on Acceptable
Immunological Procedures.
5. An animal observed to be experiencing severe, unrelievable pain or
discomfort, should immediately be humanely killed, using a method
providing initial rapid unconsciousness.
6. While non-recovery procedures involving anesthetized animals, and
studies involving no pain or distress are considered acceptable, the
following experimental procedures inflict excessive pain and are thus
unacceptable:
(a) utilization of muscle relaxants or paralytics (curare and curare-
like) alone, without anesthetics, during surgical procedures;
(b) traumatizing procedures involving crushing, burning, striking or
beating in unanesthetized animals.
7. Studies such as toxicological and biological testing, cancer research
and infectious disease investigation may, in the past, have required
continuation until the death of the animal. However, in the face of
distinct signs that such processes are causing irreversible pain or dis-
tress, alternative endpoints should be sought to satisfy both the re-
quirements of the study and the needs of the animal.
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8. Physical restraint should only be used after alternative procedures
have been fully considered and found inadequate. Animals so re-
strained, must receive exceptional care and attention, in compliance
with species specific and general requirements as set forth in the
Guide.
9. Painful experiments or multiple invasive procedures on an individ-
ual animal, conducted solely for the instruction of students in the
classroom, or for the demonstration of established scientific knowl-
edge, cannot be justified. Audiovisual or other alternative techniques
should be employed to convey such information.
230 Ethical Considerations – Sutherland
Chapter 27
Reproduction and Evolution
Paul L. Vasey
C harles Darwin, the founding father of modern evolutionary thought, onceremarked that “The sight of a feather in a peacock’s tail whenever I gazeat it, makes me sick!” What was it about those feathers and that tail thattroubled Darwin so?
Although the peacock’s elaborate train of iridescent feathers is spectacular, to be
sure, Darwin realized that there was a price to be paid for such flamboyant beauty. Sig-
nificant amounts of energy must be diverted during development to produce such an
exaggerated characteristic and once developed, the enormous tail (which can weigh up
to four pounds) has to be carried around, necessitating even more energy expenditure.
Walking on the ground and having to schlep such a tail around would seem cumber-
some enough, but imagine how difficult it must be to take off in flight, let alone stay
airborne! In addition, it seems likely that the showy tail feathers would attract a lot of
attention; just think about the reaction they elicit from zoo-goers. For all intents and
purposes, the peacock’s tail would act like a lighthouse beacon calling forth unwanted
predators who would be all too willing to partake in a tasty meal. Once located, the
long, flowing tail would appear to be a perfect handle for some predator to grab hold of
while dispatching its peacock prey. In other words, the peacock’s tail seems to hinder
its ability to survive rather than enhance it. Given all these costs, why on earth would
the peacock tail have evolved at all?
The second problem Darwin faced with the peacock’s tail was that only half of the
members of the species—the males—possess the showy train of feathers. Darwin also
noticed that when it came to their tails, peacocks behaved differently from peahens.
Peacocks displayed their tails by fanning them out and then vibrating the feathers so
that they shimmered, while turning around in a circle. The existence of sexually di-
morphic morphological and behavioural traits (i.e., traits that differ between males and
females) puzzled Darwin greatly. If both males and females lived in the same envi-
ronment, then they presumably faced the same types of problems in terms of survival.
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Yet peacocks look and behave like nature’s Las Vegas showgirls, while females of the
species, peahens, look more like nature’s chimney sweeps. Indeed, it would not be sur-
prising at all if the causal observer mistook the peacock and the peahen to be entirely
different species. Why would the sexes have evolved sexually dimorphic character-
istics? Why did peacocks have that bedazzling train of tail feathers, while the drab
peahens had none?
To make matters worse, Darwin realized that the peacock’s tail was not an idiosyn-
cratic and isolated case of evolution gone wrong. Rather, it was only the tip of the
iceberg. Examples of exaggerated, sexually dimorphic morphological and behavioural
traits abound in the animal kingdom: the horns of male mountain sheep, the chest
beating of the adult male gorilla, the croaking of male bullfrogs, and the facial hair of
human males. The challenge for Darwin was to make sense of these intriguing charac-
teristics.
27.1 Darwin’s Theory of Sexual Selection
In 1871, Darwin published his book, The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation
to Sex, in which he outlined his now famous “Theory of Sexual Selection”. Darwin
formulated sexual selection theory to explain the enigma of the peacock’s tail, and
other exaggerated, sexually dimorphic traits like it. Such characteristics could evolve,
Darwin suggested, even if they contribute absolutely nothing to survival. In fact, they
might even be detrimental to the individual’s survival. But how could individuals with
such obvious “handicaps” exist? Simply put, Darwin reasoned that exaggerated, sex-
ually dimorphic traits like the peacock’s tail, existed because they enhanced males’
ability to acquire female mates (i.e., reproductive partners), not because they helped
males survive.
Sexual selection, Darwin argued, is a process of differential reproduction among
males of the same species that results because some males are better able to acquire
reproductive partners than others. What this means is that males of a particular species
vary greatly in terms their lifetime reproductive success (i.e., the number of surviving
offspring produced during a male’s lifetime). In humans, for example, many men fail
to reproduce at all. At the other end of the spectrum, the most reproductively success-
ful man ever known to exist, Moulay Ishmail “The Bloodthirsty”, former emperor of
Morocco, sired 888 children. In between these two extremes, any number of possible
reproductive outcomes exists for human males. Clearly then, the potential exists for
males in most species to vary enormously in terms of their reproductive output. The
reason for such variation is simple: not all males are equally adept at acquiring female
reproductive partners; some are better than others.
How exactly do males acquire mates? Darwin argued that males compete among
themselves (i.e., intra-sexually) in order to obtain access to female mates. He defined
mate competition in rather broad terms, as any behaviour that a male performs which
increases the likelihood he will fertilize a female, at the expense of a rival male doing
the same. As such, Darwin recognized that mate competition could be quite large
in terms of its scope. Males could, for example, compete intra-sexually for direct
access to fertile females. However, fertile females need not be the immediate objects
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of rivalry for mate competition to take place. Males can compete for female mates in
more indirect ways as well. For example, they can vie for control of resources (e.g.,
food, nesting sites, shelter from predators) that females require. This control, in turn,
would allow males to obtain exclusive access to any female that utilizes the resources
under the males’ control. Males could also compete for high dominance rank within
their social group that would, in turn, allow them to obtain access to female mates prior
to their subordinate rivals.
Darwin recognized that mate competition could take on a number of different
forms. Most obviously, males can engage in contest competition by threatening or
fighting with each other in order to: (1) gain exclusive access to a female mate, (2)
obtain the resources needed to attract females mates, or (3) increase their position in
the male dominance hierarchy. Contest competition involves males interacting directly
with each other, but it does not necessarily require that they come into physical contact.
For example, male fiddler crabs posses a sexually dimorphic pincer than constitutes one
third of their body weight. By simply waving their enlarged pincer in the air, males can
threaten same-sex rivals and cause them to flee the area. Contest competition can, how-
ever, escalate to the point of all-out physical aggression between males. Head-butting
contests, during which male mountain sheep slam into each other’s horns head-on, are
a classic example. Physical aggression can be severe, resulting in deep flesh wounds
and, in some cases, even death. Male macaques (a type of Old World monkey) have
sexually dimorphic canine teeth that they use to slash the skin of other males during
competitive interactions. In the macaque species I study, Japanese macaques, I have
seen males lose fingers as a result of intense competition. As such, an entire gradient
of contest competition exists starting from low-level, non-contact threats right up to
high-level contact aggression.
Intra-sexual mate competition among males also can be manifested when males at-
tempt to attract discriminating females so that the females will choose them as mates.
This type of competition, termed courtship competition, often involves males perform-
ing highly stylized courtship displays that involve particular vocalizations, gestures,
movements and facial expressions. For example, mountain sheep perform gentle “fore-
leg kicks” during which a male raises one front leg up and touches the underbelly of
a female. In many bird species, such as the peacock, males can pique fertile females’
sexual interests by performing ritualized courtship “dances” during which they display
their elaborate plumage.
It is important to note that although successful competition among males can en-
sure the victor access to fertile females, taken alone, it does not guarantee that a male
will actually copulate with those females it is able to access. For a successful copula-
tion to occur, Darwin believed females had to discriminate carefully among males and
choose the one with which they would copulate based on a pool of potential suitors.
Thus, males are affected by sexual selection not only because they engage in inter-
sexual competition for female mates, but also because females exercised mate choice,
favouring some males as mates, while ignoring others.
Armed with sexual selection theory, Darwin argued that morphological and be-
havioural sex differences were readily explainable, and indeed, expected. Certain mor-
phological and behavioural characteristics such as the horns of the male big-horn sheep
and their head-butting contests, could evolve simply because they enhanced the males’
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ability to compete with other males for: (1) direct access to female mates, (2) the re-
sources needed to attract female mates, and/or (3) the dominance rank needed to access
females prior to male rivals. Other morphological and behavioural characteristics, such
as the peacock’s tail and its courtship “dance”, could have evolved, because they en-
hanced the males’ ability to attract discriminating females into choosing them as their
mates. Darwin reasoned that males who possessed such characteristics would access
more female mates and, in turn, reproduce more than those that did not. The advan-
tageous traits, if heritable, would be passed onto offspring and spread throughout the
population.
27.2 Females and Sexual Selection
Darwin argued that sexual selection affected males, but it did not affect females. He
based this argument on his belief that females did not compete for mates. Mate com-
petition, Darwin believed, lead to inter-individual differences in life-time reproductive
success because some individuals were better competitors than others. In the absence
of inter-individual variation in reproductive success, sexual selection could not favour
certain traits in certain females at the expense of others because all females reproduced
at similar rates. Based on this of this logic, sexual selection could not be an important
mechanism driving the evolution of females of the species. But maybe Darwin missed
something.
Subsequent research demonstrated that sexual selection could operate on females
because not all males were equally valuable as mates. In a series of experiments, May-
nard Smith (1955) demonstrated that female fruit flies could discriminate among vari-
ous male mates, preferring males who performed a particular courtship dance. Males
that were not inbred were the best dancers, and it was these males that females pre-
ferred as mates. Interestingly, these same males had higher sperm counts than did
inbred males. Thus, female fruit flies apparently choose males based on their courtship
behaviour, which in turn was an honest indicator of their fertilizing ability. As such,
females that preferred fancy dancers ended up having more of their eggs fertilized and,
by extension, a higher lifetime reproductive success.
Maynard Smith’s fruit-fly research demonstrates that for females, mate quality was
more important than mate quantity. Choosing to mate a disadvantaged male imposed
negative consequences on a female’s reproductive success, whereas, choosing to mate
with a more valuable male conferred reproductive advantages. So what should females
choose? In theory, females should discriminate among potential male mates in favour
of those that contribute the most to offspring quality and survival (Trivers, 1972). Thus,
females should choose a male based on (1) ability to fertilize eggs (i.e., a mature,
sexually competent male of her species), and (2) quality of genes (i.e., ability of genes
to survive, reproductive ability of genes, compatibility of genes). In addition, in those
species in which males help care for their young, females should prefer males based
on the quantity and quality of their parental care (i.e., willingness and ability to invest,
compatibility of parental attributes).
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Although Darwin stated that males typically engage in mate competition, while fe-
males exercise mate choice, he never explained why these sex differences in patterns of
mate acquisition existed in the first place. One hundred years after Darwin published
his theory of sexual selection, Robert Trivers (1992) formulated his ground-breaking
“Theory of Parental Investment” to explain why males and females differ in terms of
how they acquire mates. Trivers (1972) argued that sex differences in parental invest-
ment could explain sex differences in patterns of choice and competition. He defined
parental investment as any investment by a parent in an offspring that increases the off-
spring’s changes of survival (and hence, future reproduction) at the cost of the parent
producing another offspring.
Trivers (1972) noted that in the “typical” species, females provide considerably
more parental investment than males. Gestation, parturition (i.e., giving birth), lacta-
tion, protection, feeding and carrying are all reproductive “costs” that females incur in
relation to having offspring. Females that become pregnant can potentially incur these
costs for years. In contrast, males can simply walk away from a casual copulation hav-
ing lost only a few minutes of their time. One consequence of this sex difference in
parental investment is that females are occupied for much of their lives producing and
caring for offspring, while males are not. As such, females have only the potential to
produce a small number of offspring relative to males who can produce many (remem-
ber Moulay Ishmail “The Bloodthristy” and his 888 children!). Another consequence
of this sex difference in parental investment is that at any one time, there will be fewer
fertile females in a population relative to reproductively active males. In other words,
a lot of males will be looking to copulate with fertile females, but only a few fertile
females will be available to do so. It is not surprising then that females are sometimes
characterized as valuable “resources” that limit male reproductive success.
Given these sex differences in parental investment and the consequences they en-
tail, males and females typically employ different mate acquisition strategies. Gener-
ally, males have a relatively low threshold for sexual arousal, they copulate relatively
indiscriminately, and they compete intra-sexually for reproductive access to females.
Females, on the other hand, exhibit sexual restraint relative to males, and they rarely,
if ever, compete for reproductive access to males. Instead, they discriminate among
potential reproductive partners in favour of those males which contribute the most to
the quality and survival of their offspring (Trivers, 1972).
An examination of “atypical” species in which males provide the bulk of parental
care, lends support to Trivers’ (1972) theory of parental investment. Such “sex role
reversed” species are few and far between. However, examples include pipefish, mor-
mon crickets, moorhens and certain species of frogs. In such species, it is the males
that are choosy about the females with which they copulate, while the females com-
pete among themselves for access to a male—just as parental investment theory would
predict (Gwynne, 1991).
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27.4 Sexual Coercion
How the sexual selection process occurs has been overwhelmingly conceptualized in
terms of two interactive mechanism: intra-sexual competition among males for female
mates, and choice of male mates by females (Darwin, 1871). Although other mecha-
nisms such as male choice of female mates have long been recognized (Darwin, 1871,
p. 263), they have attracted relatively limited research attention. More recently, how-
ever, there has been a growing recognition that these alternative mechanism for sexual
selection need to be formally acknowledged and investigated.
In particular, researchers have begun to ask what happens when a male is unable to
access a female mate: is it because he is unsuccessful at contest competition, courtship
competition, or both? Studies show that in a wide variety of species the solution to this
problem is a violent one: sexual coercion (Smuts & Smuts, 1993). Sexual coercion
occurs when a male uses force, or the threat of force, against a female to increase the
likelihood that he will mate with her and some other male will not.
Perhaps the most dramatic example of sexual coercion in animals comes from
orangutans (Mitani, 1985). In this species, most copulations by sub-adult males and
nearly half of all copulations by adult males occur after the female’s fierce resistance
(e.g., slapping, screaming, hitting, and bitting) has been overcome through violent
restraint. At the other end of the spectrum, males can coerce females into mating
with them simply be following the female continuously for days on end. I watched a
Japanese macaque male do just this. He shadowed an uninterested female for days,
always remaining within a few meters of her. Because this male was dominant, no
other males dared to approach the female, and she was simply unable to mate, or have
normal social interactions with other group members. The harassing male would even
disrupt the female from foraging for food. Finally, after five days of constant stalking,
the beleaguered female gave up and allowed the male to copulate with her. Having
obtained what he wanted, the male abandoned the female’s side immediately after he
ejaculated.
In all instances, males use sexual coercion to override female choice. In theory,
males that behave in this manner are more likely to reproduce, relative to males that do
not and, as such, sexual selection will favour the evolution of sexual coercion in males.
Indeed, a survey of the animal kingdom indicates that sexual coercion is a widespread
behavioural pattern. Researchers have suggested that the success of sexual coercion is
why males tend to have lower thresholds for sexual arousal than females. If we look
at humans, for example, men are much more willing than women to have sex with a
member of the opposite sex one hour after meeting him or her for the first time (Buss
& Schmitt, 1993).
So, males are thought to benefit reproductively from sexual coercion. Females,
on the other hand, incur costs when they are the victims of sexual coercion; they are
unable to select carefully the male with whom they will produce offspring. In theory
then, sexual selection should favour the evolution of female counter-strategies against
coercive males. In many species, this result is exactly what we see. For example, in
Japanese macaques, females sometimes respond to the screams of a victim of sexual
aggression by “mobbing” her aggressor. Faced with tens of females pouncing on him,
the male typically beats a hasty retreat.
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Evolutionary studies of sexual behaviour tend to focus on reproductive sex. This em-
phasis is understandable to some extent, because differential reproduction is the engine
that drives evolution. Without reproduction there can be no evolution. Consequently,
the study of reproductive sex makes good sense from an evolutionary perspective, but
it is important to remember that reproduction does not occur in isolation. Animals
engage in a myriad of non-reproductive sexual behaviours as well (Bagemihl, 1999).
These behaviours can influence patterns of potentially reproductive sex, and by exten-
sion, evolution. As such, any comprehensive understanding of reproduction and evo-
lution necessitates understanding the relationship of reproductive sex to various forms
of non-reproductive sexuality.
The species I study, Japanese macaques, represents an excellent model for exam-
ining the relationship between reproductive and non-reproductive behaviour, because
females of this species engage in heterosexual and homosexual behaviour through their
lives. More specifically, they engage in mounting with both males and females within
the context of consortships—temporary, but exclusive sexual relationships which can
last for several days. Females can mount, and be mounted, hundreds of times during
these relationships (see Figure 27.1). This behaviour presents somewhat of a dilemma
for male Japanese macaques. Unlike most species in which males only have to compete
with other males for reproductive opportunities, in Japanese macaques, males have to
compete with both males andfemales (Vasey, 1998). In other words, male Japanese
macaques have to engage in inter-sexual (i.e., male-female) competition for mates, in
addition to engaging in intra-sexual competition.
What does inter-sexual competition for mates look like in Japanese macaques?
Typically, a male competitor will intrude on a female homosexual consortship and
attempt to disrupt the females’ sexual activity. During these intrusions, the male will
target one of the female consort partners as his competitor, and the other as his desired
mate. The intruder then attacks the female competitor and solicits the desired mate
for sex. Following about one third of these intrusions, the female competitor retaliates
against the male by attempting to drive him away from her female consort partner.
As with intra-sexual competition for mates, it appears that inter-sexual mate com-
petition involves behaviours that influence the acquisition and retention of reproductive
partners through interactions with conspecifics (i.e., members of the same species). It
is not immediately apparent, however, why male Japanese macaques would engage in
inter-sexual mate competition. After all, female consort partners can’t reproduce to-
gether, so they pose no direct reproductive threat to the males. Moreover, by engaging
in these competitive interactions, males risk injury. In light of such considerations,
shouldn’t males avoid inter-sexual mate competition altogether and instead simply ap-
proach potential mates immediately after their homosexual consortships have termi-
nated? This possibility might be the case were it not for the fact female homosexual
consortships in Japanese macaques occur in the context of intra-sexual mate competi-
tion. In such a context, the potential always exists for males to lose copulations to their
same-sex rivals. Consequently, males able to access mates engaged in homosexual
consortships, prior to same-sex rivals, would gain a reproductive advantage.
My research shows that inter-sexual competition for mates occurs in about sixteen
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Figure 27.1: Female homosexual mounting in Japanese macaques. The mountee fa-
cilitates the mount by reaching back to grasp the mounter. The mountee’s immature
offspring huddles below his mother (Photo by author).
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other species of birds and mammals, including humans. Among the Indians of the
north-west Amazon, for example, both males and females try to seduce young unmar-
ried men that visit from other villages (Sorenson, 1984). Women attempt to ambush
the visiting men if they happen to see them going to bathe alone. Men, in turn, try to
seduce the visitors when they go to bathe to keep them away from the local women.
This strategy effectively lessens the chances that the visiting men will be seduced by
village women.
27.6 Conclusion
Sexual selection has favoured sex differences in patterns of mate acquisition. In “typ-
ical” species, males compete intra-sexually for female mates. Females, on the other
hand, carefully discriminate among potential male suitors. When males cannot access
female mates through contest or courtship competition, they may attempt to coerce
them sexually. Females may, in turn, demonstrate counter-strategies to circumvent
sexually coercive males. These sex differences in mate acquisition tactics ultimately
stem from sex differences in patterns of parental investment. In some species, such as
Japanese macaques and humans, the ability to compete for mates is a more generalized
capacity that extends into the inter-sexual arena.
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Chapter 28
Sex and Gender Diversity
Paul L. Vasey
I magine you walk into a government office to renew your driver’s license and arerequired to fill out a personal information data sheet. One of the questions readsas follows:
Please check one of the following:
Gender: Male
Female
You hesitate and then write “Neither” beside the question.
What’s the problem? The problem is that the question asks for information about
your gender, but then provides you with only two possible answers, both of which
pertain to sex.
Many of us confuse sex with gender, and vice versa, in our everyday lives. We
often make no distinction between the two terms, and use them interchangeably, as if
one were synonymous with the other. In reality, however, sex and gender do not refer
to the same phenomenon and one should not be equated with the other. This distinction
isn’t simply an arcane linguistic point of interest for grammar mavens. As I hope to
demonstrate, the definitional sloppiness associated with sex and gender is particularly
problematic for psychologists and other scientists who are interested in understanding
the combined influences of biology and culture on human behaviour.
28.1 Defining Sex and Gender
The terms sex and gender have quite different etymologies. Sex derives from a group
of Indo-European words that collectively refer to “dichotomous relationships in which
two categories are divided, one from the other.” It comes from the Latin “sexus,”
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meaning “either of two divisions of organic nature distinguished as male or female
respectively.” The word gender, on the other hand, is derived from a group of Indo-
European words that collectively refer to “systems of classification in which there may
be many categories.” It comes from the Latin “genus,” meaning “kind or race” (Walker
& Cook, 1998).
In contemporary terms, the correct use of the term sex is in reference to an in-
dividual’s biological status as defined by one, or some combination of, the following
parameters: (1) sex chromosomes, (2) sex hormones, (3) gonads, (4) internal reproduc-
tive organs, (5) gametes, (6) external genitalia, and (7) secondary sexual characteristics.
All cultures recognize the two sex categories male and female. There is no culture that
recognizes only one sex.
Inclusion into the category of male or female depends on the constellation of bio-
logical parameters that an individual possesses. Males are typically characterized by all
of the following: XY sex chromosomes, a preponderance of circulating androgen, two
testes, two vas deferens, two seminal vesicles, two epididymis, two Cowper’s glands,
one prostate gland, sperm production, a penis, a scrotum, and various secondary sexual
characteristics including the development of facial hair and increased shoulder width at
puberty. Females, in contrast, are typically characterized by all of the following: XX
sex chromosomes, a preponderance of circulating estrogen, two ovaries, two fallopian
tubes, one uterus, one cervix, ova production, a clitoris, a vagina, two labia majora, two
labia minora and various secondary sexual characteristics including the development
of breasts and a widening of the hips at puberty.
Although we currently have the technology to assess each of these biological pa-
rameters, we typically do not examine all of them when making sex determinations.
Rather, the precise combination of biological criteria used to define whether one is
a male, or a female, varies cross-culturally and historically (Dreger, 1998a; Fausto-
Sterling, 2000). In our culture, for example, sex is assigned at birth following in-
spection of the external genitals. After puberty, secondary sexual characteristics (e.g.,
breasts, facial hair, shoulder width, hip width, bone and muscle structure) provide im-
portant clues about the sex that we perceive an individual to be (Devore, 1989).
In contemporary terms, the correct use of the term gender is in reference to cul-
turally constructed categories of people that are determined, in part, by perceived sex
distinctions. In other words, gender is a system of separating people into groups based,
in part, on the sex that others perceive them to be. All cultures recognize the two gen-
der categories, boys/men and girls/women, which are subdivided on the basis of age.
There is no culture that recognizes only one gender.
As with sex, inclusion into a particular gender category is initially assigned at birth
on the basis of external genitals. For example, following inspection of the external
genitals, babies with penises and scrotums become baby boys and are traditionally
dressed in blue clothing that is deemed masculine and thus, appropriate attire for boys.
Babies with clitorises, vaginas and labial folds become baby girls and are traditionally
dressed in pink clothing which is deemed feminine and thus, appropriate attire for girls.
Once this initial assignment occurs different “rules” of conduct (i.e., gender role
expectations) exist for the members of these two gender categories. Gender role expec-
tations vary cross-culturally and historically. In our culture, for example, the expec-
tation exists that boys and men will not wear dresses, nor will they carry their books
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on their hips when walking; girls and women will. Similarly, it is expected that girls
and women will not aspire to become Catholic Popes or swim topless at the public
pool; boys and men will. Behaviours that are considered to be appropriate for boys and
men are labeled masculine, whereas, those that are considered appropriate for girls and
women are labeled feminine. Following infancy, gender is primarily attributed to an
individual on the basis of the constellation of masculine and feminine behaviours they
actually manifest in public (i.e., their gender role enactment,Devore (1989)). More of-
ten than not, individuals’ gender role enactment conforms to their culture’s gender role
expectations. As such, individuals that are perceived to be boys/men typically engage
in masculine behaviours, whereas individuals that are perceived to be girls/women typ-
ically engage in feminine behaviours.
28.2 Changing Sex
Whether individuals can change their sex or not depends on how sex is defined. If, for
example, we define sex solely on the basis of sex chromosomes then we would have to
conclude that an individual cannot switch from one sex to another. Presently, we sim-
ply do not have the technology to alter an individual’s complement of chromosomes.
Similar arguments against the possibility of ever changing one’s sex can be made if sex
is defined in terms of gonads, internal reproductive organs and/or gametes.
These internal markers of sex may be ascertainable in the laboratory, but in our
day to day lives, they simply don’t count (Devore, 1989). In Canada, for example, sex
is legally defined on the basis of external genitals: males have penises and scrotums,
while females have vaginas, clitorises and labial folds. Secondary sexual characteristics
such as facial hair, breasts, bone and muscle structure are also important criteria that
we use in social situations to determine what sex we think an individual is likely to be.
If we define sex solely in terms of these external criteria (which is exactly what we do
on a day-to-day basis), we would have to conclude that individuals can change from
one sex to another. Indeed, legally speaking, this is very much the case in Canada.
For example, transsexuals are individuals that feel uncomfortable with their natal
sex (i.e., the sex they were born as) and prefer to live as members of the other sex
(Bolin, 1996; Devore, 1998). They undertake a variety of hormonal and surgical pro-
cedures aimed at making their external genitals and secondary sexual characteristics
(e.g., body hair, breasts, facial structure, trachea or “Adam’s apple”, etc.) conform
in appearance to those of the opposite-sex into which they were born. Many post-
operative transsexuals go on to live as full-fledged members of their chosen sex and
“pass” entirely unnoticed by other members of their society (Bolin, 1996; Devore,
1998).
The existence of transsexuals underscores the important point that an individual’s
sex identity (i.e., the sex that they feel themselves to be) may not be concordant with
the biological reality of their natal sex.
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28.3 Changing Gender
Gender is often incorrectly assumed to be a natural and inevitable social manifestation
of an individual’s biological sex. It is important to note, however, that masculine and
feminine behaviours can be “performed” by either sex. Consequently, it is entirely
possible for a male to engage in predominantly or exclusively feminine behaviours
and to pass unnoticed in public as a girl/woman. Likewise, it is entirely possible for
a female to engage in predominantly or exclusively masculine behaviours and to pass
unnoticed in public as a boy/man (Devore, 1989). Indeed, some transgendered indi-
viduals (or transgenderists) are uncomfortable with the gender they were assigned at
birth and, consequently, they switch to living, part-time or full-time, as members of the
opposite-gender (i.e., gender crossing, (Bolin, 1996)). Transgendered individuals that
cross from one gender to the other may pass entirely unnoticed by other members of
their society and, in doing so, live in accordance with the gender role expectations asso-
ciated with their chosen gender (Bolin, 1996). Others may endeavor to live unnoticed
in their preferred gender, but be much less successful at passing, often with violent
results. A recent, real life example of the latter is Brandon Teena, a gender-crossing
female who was murdered in Falls City, Nebraska, because she was transgendered. A
fictionalized account of Brandon Teena’s life and death is depicted in the Hollywood
film “Boys Don’t Cry.”
Individuals need not engage in gender-crossing to be considered transgendered.
For example, some individuals may be uncomfortable with their assigned gender and
may, as a result, engage in various combinations of masculine and feminine behaviours
that results in others perceiving them as ambiguously gendered (i.e., gender mixing,
(Devore, 1989; Bolin, 1996)). For example, androgynous individuals are simultane-
ously, highly feminine and highly masculine (Bem, 1974). The model/singer/actress
Grace Jones is a good example of an androgynous individual with her crew-cut hair
and full, red lips. Gender undifferentiated individuals are simultaneously not particu-
larly masculine and not particularly feminine (Bem, 1974). The character, “Pat,” from
the television program “Saturday Night Live” is a good example of a gender undif-
ferentiated individual. The show’s running joke was that everyone tried increasingly
inventive ways to determine whether Pat was a man or a woman, but Pat’s ambiguous
behaviour squelched these efforts and left everyone scratching their heads and won-
dering. By enacting gender in this manner, androgynous and gender undifferentiated
individuals draw attention to themselves and live publicly in ways that flout gender role
expectations for how they should behave.
It is important to note that transgendered individuals are not transsexuals and thus,
they do not desire to alter their external genitals. As such, they demonstrate that gender
identity (i.e., the gender an individual perceives himself or herself to be) is not neces-
sarily concordant with sex identity. In other words, individuals may be uncomfortable
with their assigned gender, but perfectly comfortable with their assigned sex. A great
example of this occurs in the film, “The Crying Game.” One of the characters, Dil,
is a gender-crossing male who passes very well as a woman. When confronted about
the reality of “her” biological sex, Dil seems quite unconcerned about “her” penis and
simply comments “Details, details, baby!”
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In Western society sex is conceptualized in a dichotomous manner. There are two sexes
and they are diametrically opposed to one another. You are either a male, or you are
the “opposite-sex,” a female. There are simply no other options. Indeed, this seems so
self-evident that most people would think it is not even worth mentioning. You can’t
be both sexes; you can’t be neither sex; and you certainly can’t be some third option.
Or can you?
Consider, for example, the following case of an intersexed individual, Chris, who
has Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome (AIS). Chris has XY sex chromosomes and testes,
both of which are male-typical. Chris’s body produces male-typical sex hormones,
called androgens, but is “blind” to their presence because the receptors that “read” an-
drogens are not functioning. The internal reproductive organs that Chris possesses are
male-typical to some extent, but they never developed in the “absence” of androgens.
Chris has female-typical external genitals and, as such, she possesses a vagina, a cli-
toris and labial folds. At puberty, Chris’s body responded to small amounts of naturally
occurring estrogen by developing female-typical secondary sexual characteristics such
as breasts and broad hips. Chris is infertile and has never menstruated. So what sex
is Chris? Is she a female? Or, is he a male? Or is Chris something else altogether?
How you answer this question depends entirely on the primacy you give to the various
criteria used to measure biological sex.
Intersexed individuals, like Chris, have a mixture of male and female sex character-
istics. Their very existence suggests that some individuals are neither male, nor female.
Interestingly, when questioned about their sex identity, many intersexed individuals ex-
press the belief that they are neither male, nor female, but something else that they call
“intersexed” (Kessler, 1998). If we accept the argument that intersexed individuals are
neither male, nor female, then we would have to conclude that sex is not dichotomous
as is commonly assumed, but rather, that it exists on a continuum. According to this
perspective, males and females are the most common expressions of sex and they exist
on opposite ends of a sex continuum. However, a myriad possible, albeit less common,
intersexed bodies exist in between these two extremes (Kessler, 1998; Fausto-Sterling,
2000).
Our dichotomous view of sex can have negative repercussions for individuals that
cannot be easily categorized as males or females. In Western cultures, including here
in Canada, a “state of emergency” is declared when an intersexed baby with ambiguous
genitalia is born (Fausto-Sterling, 2000, : p. 275, note 1). A team of medical experts
is rapidly assembled and the child’s genitals are surgically “normalized” as soon as
possible so that they resemble male- or female-typical genitals. Follow-up studies of
intersexed individuals that have undergone “corrective” surgery indicate that they suffer
significant physical and psychological effects as a result of these operations (Dreger,
1998b). An intersexed child’s ambiguous genitals do not threaten that child’s life, so
we might ask why are such invasive surgeries tolerated given that they seem medically
unnecessary and cause so much physical and psychological damage? Some researchers
argue that we permit the surgical “normalization” of intersexed infants because their
ambiguous genitals threaten our culture’s expectations concerning the dichotomous
nature of sex. Faced with this threat to the “logic” of our two-sex system, we attempt
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to make intersexed infants either male or female.
The dichotomous view of sex that characterizes Western culture is not universal. In
some areas of the Dominican Republic, for example, three sexes are recognized: males,
females and guevedoche (gway-va-doe’-chay – meaning “eggs at twelve”). Gueve-
doche are individuals with XY sex chromosomes that have a rare condition known as
5-alpha reductase deficiency. Individuals with this condition do not produce 5-alpha
reductase, an enzyme that converts testosterone into 5-alpha-dihydotestosterone. In
the absence of 5-alpha-dihydotestosterone, the external genitals of XY individuals do
not develop in a male-typical fashion and appear ambiguous at birth. At puberty, high
blood level concentrations of androgens result in some penile growth, the descent of the
testes (aka the “eggs”), and the development of male-typical secondary sexual charac-
teristics. In the Dominican Republic these individuals are commonly identified at birth
as guevedoche, not as males or as females (Herdt, 1996). Typically, they are raised as
girls and then at puberty, they adopt masculine gender identities and behave as men.
Thus, the Dominican Republic provides us with an example of a culture that has three
sexes (male, female, guevedoche) and two genders (boy/man, girl/woman). Males and
guevedoche both become men. This underscores an important point: the criteria we
use to determine sex, gonads and genitals and the like, are biological realities to be
sure, but the manner in which sex is actually defined is culturally determined (Herdt,
1996; Fausto-Sterling, 2000).
28.5 Are Two Genders Enough?
As with sex, Western society has traditionally conceptualized gender in a dichotomous
manner. This perspective holds that there are two genders and they are diametrically
opposed to one another. You are either a boy/man or, you are the “opposite-gender,”
a girl/woman. There isn’t any middle-ground. We might identify the singer k.d. lang
as a “butch” (i.e., masculine-acting) woman, but she is a woman nonetheless. As such,
most people in your Psychology 1000 class would say that you can’t be both of these
genders; most would say you can’t be neither of these gender; and most would certainly
deny the existence of some third option.
In Western cultures, individuals that behave in a gender atypical manner are pathol-
ogized by the psychiatric profession. In Canada, for example, children that behave in
a manner that is more consistent with the expectations of the opposite gender to which
they were assigned at birth are diagnosed as having a mental disorder called “Gender
Identity Disorder” (GID) (for a full list of the diagnostic criteria for GID see the 4th
Edition of the American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders). Children diagnosed with GID are “treated” within a clinical setting
with various therapies aimed at making them behave in ways that conform to Western
culture’s gender role expectations. One such therapy, for example, encouraged boys
with GID to walk like the 1970’s television character, Steve Austin–”The Six Million
Dollar Man” (Hay, Barlow, & Hay, 1981). It seems reasonable to expect that the en-
forced repudiation of one’s gender identity and accompanying behaviours would cause
such children a great deal of distress. Reflecting on similar treatments, Daphne Scholin-
ski (1998, p. x), a woman who was institutionalized throughout much of the 1980’s
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after being diagnosed with GID as an adolescent, writes of feeling “. . . so false your
own skin is your enemy.” Interestingly, research done by my colleagues and myself
indicates that there is no scientific support for the conclusion that gender-atypical chil-
dren diagnosed with GID have a mental disorder (Bartlett, Vasey, & Bukowski, 2000).
Why then do we tolerate imposing such behavioural therapies on children given the po-
tentially negative message it sends to them about their self-worth? My colleagues and
I have argued that, quite simply, we pathologize such children because they threaten to
destabilize the particular gender role boundaries Western culture legitimizes.
The dichotomous view of gender that characterizes Western culture is by no means
universal. Some cultures recognize three or four genders, as opposed to two (Nanda,
2000). These “alternative” gender categories are defined according to various param-
eters in association with sex distinctions. These parameters can include: (1) the type
of work performed, (2) the religious activities in which one engages, (3) the position
employed during sexual intercourse, (4) whether one is sexually abstinent or not, (5)
one’s sexual orientation, (6) the clothing and appearance one adopts, and (7) the man-
nerisms (e.g., timbre of voice, gait, posture, gestures) that characterize an individual.
In a number of non-Western cultures, alternative genders are referred to with specific
linguistic terms (e.g., alyha, hwame, hijra, sadhin, bakla, kathoey, mahu, fa’fafafine,
etc.) which denote that they are neither men nor women, but rather a separate gender
category (Nanda, 2000).
In Oman, for example, three genders are recognized: boy/man, girl/woman, and
xanith (za’-nith; Wikan, 1977). Xanith are biological males that members of their
culture recognize as being neither boys/men, nor girls/women. In Omani culture, the
ultimate criterion for defining a male’s status as a man is his ability to engage in penile
penetration of sexual partners, be they female or male. Consequently, males that do
not penetrate their sexual partners, but instead take the receptive role during anal in-
tercourse, are not men, they are xanith. Thus, it is sexual position (in association with
biological sex), not sexual orientation, that defines one’s gender in Omani culture.
In terms of their gender role enactment, xanith engage in a mix of masculine and
feminine behaviours (Wikan, 1977). For example, Omani culture is characterized by a
great deal of sex segregation; men and women do not interact except if they are close
kin. Instead, men interact primarily with other men, and women interact primarily with
other women. If a man who is not a close kin member comes to a woman’s home and
her husband is not there, the woman refuses to let the man in. Likewise, an Omani
women would never speak to a man on the street unless the man was a brother, father,
husband or son. But xanith are not men, nor are they women, and as such, they are free
to interact with both men and women in private and in public spaces.
In other ways, the gender role enactment of xanith cannot be described as gender
mixing because the behaviours they manifest are regarded as being neither masculine,
nor feminine, in Omani culture. For example, Omani men wear “masculine” white
robes and women wear “feminine” patterned robes with bright colours. Xanith do not
“mix” these masculine and feminine styles of dress. Instead, they dress in a manner
that is neither masculine nor feminine; they wear unpatterned robes with pastel colours.
Similarly, Omani men brush their hair back from their face, whereas, women part their
hair in the middle. Xanith, on the other hand, part their hair on the side.
The Omani case is instructive because it provides us with an example of a culture
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that has two sexes (male, female) and three genders (boy/man, girl/woman and xanith).
Males can become either men or xanith. This underscores the important point that
gender is culturally constructed and as such, males do not necessarily have to be men
(and females do not necessarily have to be women). Moreover, the xanith demonstrate
that alternative ways of thinking about gender do not necessarily require that we make
reference to masculine or feminine qualities, or even some combination of the two. In-
stead, gender can be enacted in culturally specific ways that are considered to be neither
masculine nor feminine. As Westerners it can be extremely difficult to conceptualize
that such possibilities even exist.
28.6 Concluding remarks
Sex and gender do not refer to the same phenomenon and they should not be used as
synonyms. Sex refers to an individual’s biological status as defined by various parame-
ters including: sex chromosomes, sex hormones, gonads, internal reproductive organs,
gametes, external genitals and secondary sexual characteristics. Gender refers to cul-
turally constructed categories of people that are determined, in part, by perceived sex
distinctions. By differentiating between these two phenomena, we can better disentan-
gle the combined influences of biology and culture on human behaviour.
In Western society, we tend to think about sex and gender as dichotomous. Every-
one is either a male or female and, likewise, everyone is either a boy/man or girl/woman.
All males are boys/men, and all females are girls/women. By examining the exceptions
to these sex and gender “rules”—transsexuals, transgenderists, intersexuals and alter-
native genders like xaniths—we can better understand the rules themselves.
28.7 Website Resources
For information on male-to-female transsexuals you can visit the transsexual women’s
resource website at: <www.annelawrence.com>.
For information on female-to-male transsexuals you can visit the FTM international
website at: <www.ftm-intl.org>.
For information about transgender individuals you can visit the website: <www.gendertalk.com>.
For information about intersexuality you can visit the Intersexed Society of North
America’s website at: <www.isna.org>.
Chapter 29
Subliminal Messages
John R. Vokey
Is it possible that the meaning or content of an event can affect people’s be-haviour without their being aware of the event? Can briefly-flashed mes-sages in film and video commercials, embedded sexual imagery in printand video advertising, sub-audible messages in self-help audiotapes, or
backward or barely audible messages in rock music lead people to make purchases they
hadn’t intended to, stop smoking, or commit suicide? Is it likely that such techniques
are actually more effective than promotional messages of which people are aware?
Subliminal persuasion refers to the use of hidden or otherwise imperceptible or masked
stimuli to manipulate viewers or listeners to behave in ways they otherwise would not.
Of the many folk psychology beliefs, the notion that such methods are an effective
means of controlling people’s behaviour is one of the most pervasive, and an inevitable
topic of discussion in any course in introductory psychology.
Part of the wide-spread fascination with subliminal persuasion is undoubtedly its
insidious nature and its ready confirmation of what many already believe to be the
unscrupulous methods of advertisers, public relations experts and large corporations.
A large part probably is also attributable to the phenomenal popularity of the books
and college-circuit lectures of Wilson Bryan Key (1973, 1976, 1980, 1990), a former
professor at the University of Western Ontario, and the leading proponent of the belief
of a major conspiracy among advertisers and product manufacturers to manipulate the
unsuspecting public through subliminal methods.
Another part is no doubt due to the rapidly expanding, $50-million per year mar-
ket in subliminal self-help tapes, which have produced numerous testimonials to their
effectiveness in promoting, among many other things, weight loss, breast enlargement,
improvement in sexual function, self-esteem, and improved bowling scores (Pratkanis,
1992; T. E. Moore, 1992). And part, too, is most likely attributable to the influence
in books and well-publicized public sermons and lectures of fundamentalists and other
conservative religious and political zealots who have promulgated the belief of oc-
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cult, satanic messages in rock music,1 and who, in addition to promoting mass record-
burning rallies to destroy the offending material, have lobbied, sometimes successfully,
for the requirement that all such rock music be affixed with prominent warning stick-
ers attesting to its subliminal content, as a “consumer protection act” (McIver, 1988;
Vokey & Read, 1985).
We will touch briefly on each of these subliminal techniques, but first we will dis-
cuss the one study most often cited by proponents of these beliefs as “proof” of the
effectiveness of subliminal persuasion.
29.1 The Vicary “Eat Popcorn/Drink Coke”
Study
Popular discussion of subliminal persuasion inevitably appeals to James Vicary’s no-
torious “Eat Popcorn/Drink Coke” study of the mid-1950s. Indeed, only months after
results of the study were made public in newspapers and magazines, a survey of the
American public revealed that already 41% of respondents had heard of subliminal ad-
vertising; by the 1980s over 80% reported being aware of the term, with roughly 70%
of those believing it to be effective in increasing sales (Pratkanis, 1992).
Unfortunately, except for a credulous summary prepared for an article in a maga-
zine for high-school students, there has never been a primary publication of the Vicary
study, despite repeated demands at the time from sceptical, professional advertisers
and research psychologists that Vicary do so. Consequently, the study has never been
subjected to any proper scientific review. However, what can be gleaned about the
study from the published reports in newspapers and popular magazines of the day is
as follows. In 1956, in a movie theatre in Fort Lee, New Jersey, James Vicary—a
social psychologist and advertising expert—and his Subliminal Projection Company,
conducted six weeks of studies, involving thousands of unsuspecting movie-goers, to
test a device that secretly flashed the messages “Eat Popcorn” and “Drink Coke” for a
third of a millisecond2 every five seconds during the film. Vicary claimed an almost
58% increase in sales of popcorn, and an 18% increase in Coke sales (Pratkanis, 1992),
although why the technique was so much more effective for sales of popcorn than for
sales of coke was never explained.
Reports of the study provoked immediate outrage. In an influential article that re-
flected the deep concerns of many Americans, Norman Cousins (1957) warned of the
serious consequences of such a device, and argued that it should not be allowed. The
U. S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) undertook an immediate investiga-
tion, and ruled that the use of Vicary’s techniques could result in the revocation of a
license to broadcast3. Members of the U. S. National Association of Broadcasters were
1The primary meaning of the term “occult” is simply “hidden”; thus, to say that there are “occult” mes-
sages in rock music recordings is to say nothing more than that the recordings contain “hidden” messages,
as is common to other such creative productions as poetry, visual, and performance art. Unfortunately, many
automatically read the secondary meaning into the term, that of “preter-” or “supernatural”, and from there
it is but a simple, uncritical slide to “satanic messages”.
2That’s 0.00033 of a second!
3Despite an announced “deep concern” about the use of subliminals, the FCC subsequently did not pass
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prohibited from using subliminal advertising, and it was banned outright in Britain and
Australia.
Probably the most important fact about the 1956 Vicary study, however—and one
never mentioned by proponents of subliminal persuasion—is that it apparently never
happened: in a 1962 interview, Vicary admitted that he had made the whole thing up!
His company did have the claimed device, but as Vicary stated in the interview “... we
hadn’t done any research, except what was needed for filing a patent. I had only a minor
interest in the company and a small amount of data—too small to be meaningful.” So
much for the thousands of subjects, and the large increases in sales (Pratkanis, 1992).
More than the fact that the study had never happened, is the fact that in subsequent
attempted demonstrations of his machine as a way of responding to critics, Vicary fre-
quently failed to get the machine to work at all, and when he did, no one in the audience
felt the least bit compelled to comply with the flashed messages. Furthermore, when
the machine was finally subjected to a controlled test by an independent research com-
pany, no increase in the sales of either popcorn or coke was observed (Pratkanis, 1992).
In 1958, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) tested Vicary’s claims by sub-
liminally flashing the message “Call Now” 352 times during the popular Sunday-night
program Close-Up. No increase in telephone calls was observed, and no one called
the station, although when asked to guess the message, almost one-half of the roughly
500 viewers who sent letters claimed to have been made hungry or thirsty during the
show. Not one letter writer, however, guessed the correct message (Pratkanis, 1992).
Another company, Precon Process and Equipment, began in 1957 to use subliminal
messages on billboards and in movies, and received a patent for the technique in 1962
(McIver, 1988). The patent was awarded because the device could do what was claimed
for it—in this case, insert subliminal messages—not because the subliminal messages
themselves were shown to be effective.
29.2 Mad Max, ALF and Garfield
Because of the credulous reports of the now-apocryphal Vicary study, many advertis-
ing, television, radio, and film companies began using subliminal messages, often in
the belief that it would enhance the effect of some scene or message, and many still do.
In a recent investigation of alleged subliminals in video and film, for example, Pound-
stone (1993) freeze-framed his way through such films and television shows as Mad
Max and the cartoon version of ALF, both of which clearly do evince the subliminals
claimed for them. In Mad Max, the subliminal (a close-up of a face showing an im-
possible widening of the eyes of a biker so that even the conjunctiva were showing just
before he crashes into an oncoming truck) was clearly intended to enhance the impact4
of the scene, but most of the subliminals Poundstone found, such as the many in the
ALF cartoons, were clearly inserted as gags by the producers. In one fleeting image in
any such regulation, preferring instead to “pass the buck”, arguing that the use of subliminals properly was
under the jurisdiction of the U. S. Federal Trade Commission. Indeed, years later, the FCC allowed the use
of a subliminal in an announcement about a murder. Apparently, the briefly-flashed phrase “Give yourself
up” was unsuccessful in convincing the murderer to turn himself in (McIver, 1988).
4I know; it’s a bad pun, but I couldn’t resist it.
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ALF, for example, there is a picture of Garfield the cat with one of his normally bulging
eyes missing to reveal a pink cavity, passed out in front of an open refrigerator full of
wine bottles, one of which is spilling its contents. Taped to the refrigerator is a note
reading “I ♥ ALF”.
Of course, the existence of such subliminals proves only that people use them and
believe them to have the intended effects (for the non-gag subliminals, anyway; the
others are probably intended more as inside jokes), not that they actually are effective.
George Miller, for example, who produced the Mad Max subliminal, undoubtedly be-
lieved that it would enhance the effectiveness of the scene, but that doesn’t in any way
prove that it does; the scene may have had exactly the same effect without the sublimi-
nal. As we will see, this fallacious confusion between the simple demonstration of the
use of subliminals in some medium and the conclusion that they are therefore effective
is common to the claims of many in this area. But first, we will attempt to define the
term “subliminal”.
29.3 The Meaning of “Subliminal”
The term “subliminal” is derived from the construct of a “limen of consciousness”, a
threshold or line separating conscious from unconscious. The concept dates back to
the literal beginning of psychology as an empirical science separate from philosophy
in the seminal writings of Johan Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841).5 Herbart argued that
ideas (i.e., both perceptions and thoughts) differed from one another in strength, and
inhibit or suppress one another in a dynamical fashion, competing with one another to
achieve enough strength to rise above the “limen of consciousness” and, hence, be con-
sciously experienced. Ideas below the line still exist, in this view, and through collateral
inhibition can influence what other ideas, including themselves, are subsequently con-
sciously experienced.6 In this way, perceptions obtained only subliminally (i.e., below
the “limen of consciousness”) can still affect what we experience consciously (i.e.,
think about) and how we behave.
It is this idea or something very similar to it that informs most popular discussion
of subliminal persuasion or perception. Yet, except for Freudian psychology (which is
not a credible scientific theory of perception or cognition), few models of perception
and cognition take such notions seriously. First, contrary to the common caricature of
psychology in the popular media, no modern theory posits “an unconscious”, that is, a
mind-entity separate from consciousness such that perceptions, ideas, beliefs and de-
sires can slip or exert influence from one to the other. Rather, perceptual and cognitive
processes can and often do occur without our awareness, and without our having to or,
in many cases, even being able to consciously control them.
5Herbart argued strongly that psychology should be an empirical science—that is, based on experience,
divorced from philosophy. Hence, he is fairly considered to be the father of the science of psychology. How-
ever, Herbart also argued that psychology could not be an experimental science; that aspect of psychology
did not occur until Wilhelm Wundt in Europe and William James in the U. S. set up the first psychological
laboratories in 1875.
6Herbart’s notions of a dynamic unconscious clearly foreshadow the Freudian concepts of the dynamic
subconscious, and related ideas such as repression, although Freud explicitly denied the connection.
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Think of riding a bicycle, catching a ball, or even reading this text. Not only do
they happen “automatically” (after you have become competent at them) and without
our awareness of how we are doing them, but any attempt to gain conscious control of
them usually results in the process coming to a grinding halt (i.e., and you falling off the
bicycle). The important point is that these processes may occur unconsciously—that
is, without all the internal chatter that normally accompanies what we refer to as “con-
scious” processes, but there is no reason to suggest that they therefore occur in some
special mind-place called “the unconscious”, any more than you would want to say that
the internal workings of your toaster, car, or computer occurred in an “unconscious”;
although, they certainly occur unconsciously, that is, without awareness—unless you
are willing to believe that your computer, say, is sentient.
Second, few current perceptual or cognitive theories hold to the idea of an absolute
sensory or information threshold dividing those events we are aware of from those we
are not. Rather, it is viewed as a continuum along which the amount of information
or sensation we require for a given event on a given trial before we are willing to say
we are aware of it varies as a function of the context, the event itself, task demands,
payoffs, and the like. This style of decision making about sensory and other kinds of
events occurs because the event itself always occurs in the context of both internal and
external “noise”—a background of half-formed, fleeting thoughts, impressions, sensa-
tions, desires, and beliefs of varying and unpredictable intensity against which we must
detect the event in question. Sometimes, for example, this background “noise” is low
enough that even relatively weak signals can be confidently detected; other times, it
completely overwhelms even the most intense of signals so that a confident decision is
impossible; unfortunately, we are rarely completely sure which state we are in, some-
times mistaking noise for signal and other times mistaking signal for noise, so we are
constantly having to balance the costs of deciding that the event happened when in fact
it didn’t against the costs of failing to detect the event when it did. Thus, to say that
you are “aware” of a given event is to say that in your opinion for the demands of the
particular task in question you have gathered sufficient sensory or other evidence to
conclude that the event did happen.
From this perspective, experimental psychologists can define two different “thresh-
olds” of awareness. The subjective threshold refers to that level of information or
stimulus intensity at which the individual claims to be “just guessing” or responding
at a chance level—at which it just “feels” as if you have no information to decide one
way or another about some event. Note that this threshold corresponds to a testimonial;
events subliminal in this sense of being below the subjective threshold are events whose
presence observers do not report (T. E. Moore, 1992).
In contrast, the objective threshold, refers to that lower level of information or
stimulus intensity at which the observer is no longer able even by guessing to discrim-
inate between events, say, the presence or absence of a signal, at a level above chance.
Events subliminal in this sense are events whose presence the observers can’t detect
(T. E. Moore, 1992). The results of research using events below the objective threshold
are clear: there is no compelling evidence for unconscious or subliminal perception
of them, no evidence that the meaning or content of such events can affect people’s
behaviour (Holender, 1986; Greenwald, 1992). Put simply, if an event is below an
individual’s objective threshold, it has no effect on him or her at all.
254 Subliminal Messages – Vokey
The subjective threshold is different; here we can demonstrate an effect on the
observer. Consider the results of what was one of the first psychological experiments
performed in America. In this experiment, Pierce and Jastrow (1884) investigated their
own abilities to discriminate tiny differences in pressure with their fingertips, and found
that the accuracy of their decisions was still well above chance—that is, above what we
would now call the “objective threshold”—even when they were convinced they were
just guessing. In a similar experiment reported a few years later, Sidis (1898) found that
subjects shown cards containing a single character at a distance between the cards and
the subject at which the subjects saw nothing more than a blur or a spot, and therefore
were convinced they were just guessing, were still able to name the characters at a
level above chance. Numerous experiments of this type continue up to the present day,
virtually all with the same result: by adjusting the intensity or duration of the target
stimulus, people brought to the point of being convinced that they can no longer detect
differences between events, say a video clip or an auditory tape with and without an
embedded message, still obtain enough information—in their view “unconsciously”—
to perform better than chance when forced to guess.
This, then, is subliminal perception in the sense of an apparent dissociation be-
tween awareness and the acquisition of information, but two points need to be noted
about it. First, it is a long-established, unsurprising phenomenon in psychology, and
no special devices or sophisticated processes are needed to produce it. Indeed, many
of the techniques at issue here, such as Vicary’s messages flashed for one-third of a
millisecond or the messages on self-help auditory tapes, are well-below people’s ob-
jective thresholds, and hence are not capable of producing this or any effect. Second,
there is no convincing evidence that the effect when it occurs at all extends much be-
yond improving the accuracy of people’s guesses in forced-choice tasks. That is, there
is no good evidence that the meaning or content of such events can affect people’s
behaviour. And, given the extreme difficulty of ensuring that the stimuli used are si-
multaneously above the objective threshold but below the subjective threshold, many
cognitive scientists seriously doubt whether there has been a convincing demonstration
of the effect even on forced-choice guessing: just because individuals claim to be “just
guessing” doesn’t mean that they had no awareness of the event; maybe they were just
being overly careful in attributing awareness, saying that they were guessing unless
they were absolutely sure. In fact, doing so on only a few trials would be enough to
establish the effect (Holender, 1986; Greenwald, 1992; T. E. Moore, 1992).
Thus, if it can be shown for some event that it is above observers’ objective thresh-
olds, and if it can be shown that it is simultaneously below their subjective thresholds
(and we are willing to accept that being below the subjective threshold completely ex-
hausts all possibilities for awareness), and if we can show some effect on the observers’
behaviour consistent with the meaning of the event that doesn’t also occur in the ab-
sence of the event, then we would have a demonstration of subliminal perception and
subliminal influence.7 None of the popular claims for subliminal influence come even
7Note that failing to be able to meet this criterion does not mean that unconscious perception doesn’t
happen, only that it doesn’t happen without concomitant awareness. That is to say, it may be that there
are unconscious effects, but that they are always associated with awareness; adjust conditions sufficient to
eliminate the awareness, and you automatically eliminate unaware effects as well. If the unaware effects are
never different from what would be expected from exercising the aware knowledge, it would be impossible
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close to meeting this criterion. As noted, many fail because the events or messages
are below the objective threshold, many to point of not existing at all! Others con-
tain messages that are not obviously subliminal: observers are generally quite aware of
them. And none of them present any scientific proof that the messages have the effects
claimed for them. It is to those specific claims that we now turn.
29.4 Wilson Bryan Key and Subliminal
Advertising
In four books and innumerable college and university lectures8 over the last two decades,
Wilson Bryan Key9 has made a career out of the claim that advertisers have resorted to
subliminal advertising to influence the buying public. He provides an extensive litany
of such messages he claims to have found in print, film, and television as proof not
only that advertisers use such techniques, but also that they must be effective, else why
would so many different companies be using them? Key’s primary claim is that ad-
vertisers use a variety of subliminal techniques to embed sexually-explicit words and
symbols into the pictorial content of their advertisements and, indeed, the products
themselves (such as Ritz crackers)10 to manipulate the public by subliminally capital-
izing on the public’s obsession with sex. In Key’s view, subliminal sexual imagery is
much more persuasive than the more explicit use of sexual symbols, such as scantily-
clad women that until recently seemed to populate beer and automobile commercials.
A paradox of Key’s books and lectures is that they consist almost entirely of ex-
pose´s of the subliminal content. The reader is regaled with photograph after photograph
of advertisements highlighting the “subliminal” imagery that Key sees in them: male
and female genitalia, phallic symbols, and numerous occurrences of the word “sex”.
But of course if Key and his audience can see these images, then they are hardly sub-
liminal, subjectively or otherwise. In fact, what Key appears to mean by “subliminal
perception” is more akin to the processes of selective attention, not perception without
awareness (Creed, 1987).
But that’s not the worst of Key’s odd beliefs. He claims that the brain comprehends
the totality of a complex stimulus such as print advertisements “at the speed of light”,
which is certainly more than a little faster than the neurons of my brain operate (and,
I’d wager, Key’s as well). According to Creed (1987), Key claimed in one of his
lectures—in direct contradiction to basic neurophysiology and brain function—that the
“unconscious brain” could perceive, analyse, and fully comprehend an advertisement
in “less than a millisecond”. No evidence is offered for any of these claims.
ever to demonstrate them. But if this were the case, it is not clear what it would mean to say that there were
such effects.
8Creed (1987) reports that his U. S. university paid Key $2000 plus expenses for his public lecture.
Ignoring expenses and assuming that this rate of pay is typical of the 40 or so lectures per year Key claims
to give, then Key’s income from lectures alone is over $80,000 per year.
9A not uncommon mistake is to reverse Key’s first and second names; in fact, despite the careful eye of a
professional editor, this error crept into one of our own publications discussing Key’s work (Vokey & Read,
1985, p. 1232). We suspect a subliminal influence of the Beach Boys. . .
10When asked recently in court if he really believed that the word “sex” was baked, as he had claimed,
many times into the surface of Ritz crackers, Key replied, “Yes, and on both sides too”!
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Furthermore, no independent scientific evidence is offered either about the actual
existence of the “subliminal” images that Key sees in the advertisements, nor their
effectiveness. In fact, his examples appear to be little more than constructions and
projections of his own fantasies. For example, one of Key’s (1973) principal examples
of subliminal manipulation is the phrase “u buy” printed backward in an advertisement
depicting four types of rum. None of the dozens of my colleagues and students have
been able to find this message when shown the ad, yet Key claims that 80% of the
students in his studies must have unconsciously perceived the message, because that’s
the percentage that preferred the rum so labelled when asked to choose one of the
four. In his view, the facts that the preferred rum comes in a larger bottle, is only one
presented in a fancy brandy-snifter rather than a hi-ball glass, is of a darker colour than
the other three, and is the only one that has the words “extra special” clearly written on
the label—among other things—could not possibly account for the marked preference
of his students. No, to Key, it is only the backward subliminal phrase “u-buy” that only
he can see that can explain the preference.
In another example, Key (1973) asserts that the explanation for why 95% of college-
age males in another of his studies were able one month later to remember a Playboy
advertisement depicting a naked woman was that the ad also contained subliminal sex-
ual imagery. That most young men would probably remember a picture of a beautiful,
naked, young woman after a month even without subliminal sexual imagery seems to
have escaped Key’s notice, as has the use of control conditions, generally. In our own
research on the issue (Vokey & Read, 1985), we could find no effect on memory of
embedding the word “sex” in photographs compared, as controls, to the embedding of
nonsense trigrams or no embedding in copies of the same photographs, despite the em-
bedded words being perceptible (i.e., above the objective threshold) when pointed out
to the subjects, none of whom was aware of the embedding (i.e., below the subjective
threshold) until it was pointed out to them. There is in fact no scientific evidence to
support Key’s claims, and virtually the whole of cognitive science and neuroscience to
contradict them.
John O’Toole, president of the American Association of Advertisers, asked in his
review of Key’s most recent book, “Why is there a market for yet another re-run of
this troubled man’s paranoid fantasies?” (T. E. Moore, 1992). There may not be. In
a pretrial hearing of the Judas Priest case (discussed subsequently), after listening at
length to Key failing to give a straight answer to questions put to him, and hearing
him claim that “science is pretty much what you can get away [with] at any particular
point in history and you can get away with a great deal” (T. E. Moore, 1992), the judge
decided he had had enough and refused to allow Key into his court room during the
actual trial to serve as a witness for the plaintiffs. Perhaps in a broader sense it’s time
the rest of the world did the same.
29.5 Subliminal Auditory Self-Help Tapes
The story with subliminal auditory self-help tapes is much the same as that with sub-
liminal advertising, except that the techniques have shifted from the visual to the au-
ditory domain, and instead of the crass motives of advertisers, we have the apparently
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more noble objective of psychotherapy (Moore, 1992). One further difference is that
instead of one person (Key) making money on books and the lecture circuit, we now
have many companies making quite substantial profits11 on the selling of audiotapes
that to the naive listener (me, at any rate) appear to contain from 15 minutes to over an
hour of rather monotonous, new age “music” performed typically on pan pipes, harps,
and flutes, although some use orchestrated classical pieces. You also get sometimes
extensive fold-out notes with the tapes, containing more psychobabble than a week of
Oprah Winfrey, Ann Landers, and Dr. Joyce Brothers rolled together. Sometimes the
documentation also includes a long list of references to “scientific” proof that sublim-
inal audiotapes work, most of which are either irrelevant (such as studies on priming
in lexical decision), nonsense (such as Key’s books), or simply wrong. Some of the
tapes even go so far as to warn you about the many fraudulent tapes out there that use
subliminal techniques that don’t work, unlike, it is claimed, the “scientifically proven”
process used on the current tape.
What you don’t get, however, is anything that will result in dramatic improvements
in mental and physical well-being, or even improved bowling-scores, beyond placebo
effects. In fact, you may not even be getting the promised subliminal auditory mes-
sages. Merikle (1988), for example, subjected a collection of supposedly subliminal
audiotapes to a sensitive spectrographic analysis, and found nothing on the tapes be-
yond the music. Now that’s subliminal! Obviously, any auditory stimulus that is too
subliminal to register on auditory equipment more sensitive than the human ear is too
subliminal to have any effect at all.
The business of subliminal auditory tapes got its start with Hal Becker, an engineer
who began experimenting with visual subliminal techniques in the 1950s. He produced
a device in 1978 to insert subliminal messages in music audiotapes. According to Time
magazine in 1979, 50 department stores had begun using the device to insert messages
such as “I am honest; I will not steal” many times at a low (“subliminal”) level in the
background music of the stores in an attempt to discourage shoplifting. Time claims
that the stores reported a significant reduction in theft, although no evidence is offered
to substantiate the claim (McIver, 1988).
As T. E. Moore (1992) notes, there are two rather fundamental problems with the
rationale for the effectiveness of subliminal audiotapes. The first has to do with the
nature of physical signal or message itself. With visual subliminals, the subsequent
masking with other visual material does not change the target message, it simply lim-
its the length of exposure to the target—a procedure experimental psychologists call
backward masking. In contrast, with auditory subliminals, the target stimulus is first
reduced substantially in volume, and then is overlaid with a masking stimulus (i.e., the
music) of much greater physical energy. Given that it is physical energy that affects
the basilar membrane of the ear, how is the listener supposed to separate the physically
drowned-out subliminal signal from the masking stimulus? It is analogous to trying to
detect by weight alone which of two kilogram bags of sugar at the supermarket used
more glue in the packaging.
The second problem T. E. Moore (1992) notes is the complete lack of a theoretical
rationale for why such messages should have the therapeutic effects attributed to them.
11Some of these tapes sell for as much as $400 per set (T. E. Moore, 1992).
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Why should the repeated sub-audible presentation of the messages “I am a nice person”
or “I will not eat” be effective in promoting either self-esteem or weight-loss, when
the superliminal presentation of them would produce nothing but boredom? To the
extent that an explanation is offered, it is usually to attribute to “the unconscious” with
no evidence whatsoever precisely the processes necessary for the imputed effects to
occur. As Greenwald (1992) argued recently, there is neither theoretical necessity nor
empirical support for the psychoanalytic unconscious.
There is also no empirical support for the alleged therapeutic effects of these tapes.
None of the nine reported studies on the efficacy of these tapes has shown an effect con-
sistent with the manufacturers’ claims (T. E. Moore, 1992; Pratkanis, 1992). One of the
more interesting of these studies is that of Pratkanis, Eskenazi, and Greenwald (1990),
because in addition to demonstrating no effect of the subliminal tapes, it suggests why
so many users of them are willing to provide testimonials to their effectiveness.
In the experiment, volunteers interested in the potential of subliminal tapes (and
therefore most like those who would actually buy them) were recruited to participate
in a study of the effectiveness of the tapes to promote either self-esteem or improved
memory. According to the manufacturer, the self-esteem tape contained messages such
as “I have high self-worth and high self-esteem”, and the memory tape messages such
as “My ability to remember and recall is increasing daily”. Volunteers first filled out
measures of self-esteem and memory, and then proceeded to use either the esteem or
the memory tape according to the manufacturer’s instructions every day for 5 weeks.
Although one-half of the subjects received their tapes with the correct instructions, the
other half received the tapes with the instructions for the other tape: memory instruc-
tions for the self-esteem tape, and vice versa. After the 5 weeks, subjects again filled
out the esteem and memory measures, and also indicated whether they believed the
tape they had received to have been effective.
The results were that the tapes produced no effect whatsoever on either self-esteem
or memory, regardless whether the correct or incorrect instructions had been received.
However, the subjects believed the tapes to have been effective, indicating that they
thought their self-esteem had improved if they thought they had received a self-esteem
tape (regardless of whether or not they had), and that their memory had improved, if
that was the tape they thought they had received (again, regardless of whether or not
they had). Pratkanis et al. (1990) called this effect on belief the “illusory placebo
effect”, and it demonstrates one reason why testimonial or anecdotal evidence for the
efficacy of some product or treatment (e.g., “it worked for me!”) is almost always
worthless.
29.6 Subliminal Messages in Rock Music and
Suicide Trials
In the Fall of 1982, a fundamentalist preacher from California, Gary Greenwald, ar-
rived in Lethbridge to hold two days of public lectures on the evils of what he referred
to as “backward masking” in rock music. These capacity-crowd lectures were followed
by a mass rally and record-smashing spree. Similar performances by both Greenwald
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and many others have occurred throughout Canada and the United States, numerous
books of the same theme have been published, various state governments have con-
sidered legislation to control “backward masking” in rock music, or at least require
warning stickers on the recordings, and at least one Canadian member of parliament
and the Consumers Association of Quebec have supported government investigation of
the issue (McIver, 1988; Vokey & Read, 1985).
Greenwald’s use of the term “backward masking” is not what experimental psy-
chologists mean by the term, mentioned earlier. Rather, it refers to the masking of the
meaning of an auditory message by playing it backward. Unlike other claims of sub-
liminal persuasion, the stimulus in auditory backward masking is usually quite audible,
often as the forward or normal lyrics of the song. Greenwald’s claim is that when these
songs are played backward, intelligible messages can be heard that are not apparent
when heard in the forward or normal direction. However, they are, he claims, per-
ceived unconsciously by listeners as they hear the recordings in the forward direction.
Greenwald and his colleagues further claim that these backward messages inevitably
are evil in content and, because they are perceived unconsciously, cannot be resisted
as they lead the unsuspecting youthful listener down a path of licentious sex and drugs
and who knows what all.
As with Key and his many “examples” of subliminal advertising, to make their
case, Greenwald and the others provide an ever-growing list of evil, “satanic”, back-
ward messages that they have found in rock music. You can order audiotapes from
Greenwald in which he demonstrates many of the messages he has found in the record-
ings of such rock groups as Queen, Jefferson Starship, Led Zeppelin, The Beatles, and
Pink Floyd, to name just a few. The initial question, of course, is whether these mes-
sages are really there; there is no question that Greenwald and his audiences believe
they hear the messages that Greenwald plays for them, but are they actually there or
are they, as with Key’s examples, constructions and projected fantasies of the listener?
Reversed speech retains many of its speech-like qualities; in fact, in our own work
on the issue (Vokey & Read, 1985), we opined that to us it sounds a lot like the Swedish
Chef from the old Muppets television show.12 Consequently, any speech played back-
ward will occasionally produce something akin to a word or a phrase, particularly if
the listener is told how to interpret the gibberish, as Greenwald does with his listeners.
For example, playing the phrase “Jesus loves you” backward will sound something like
“we smell sausage”, particularly now that you’ve been told what to listen for, but it is
strictly coincidence. As generations of cloud-watchers will attest, you can “detect”
meaningful patterns in just about anything, particularly if you are told what to look for.
Poundstone (1983, 1986, 1993) has analysed many of these alleged backward mes-
sages and has found that most of them are merely coincidental reversals. Some, how-
ever, particularly in recordings made since the claims for such backward messages
became a major media event in the early 1980s, clearly are engineered reversals—that
is, reversals intentionally inserted in the recording—and clearly intended as jokes. Un-
like the coincidental reversals, these engineered reversals are clear and unambiguous
when played backward. One of my personal favourites is in the song “Goodbye Blue
12A claim, incidentally, that was misconstrued by one Globe and Mail reporter to be that we had found
that all rock music was actually Swedish when played backward!
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Sky” on Pink Floyd’s, The Wall. Just as the song ends and before the next song begins
(which, not so incidentally, is identified as “Empty Spaces” on the record label, but
as “What shall we do now?” on the album cover), is a somewhat muted passage that
sounds something like speech, but you could play the album through many times with-
out noticing it. However, played backward a voice very clearly says: “Congratulations,
you have just discovered the secret message. Please send your answer to old Pink, care
of the funny farm...” (Poundstone, 1983).
The more important question is whether the meaning of backward messages could
affect listeners. The only evidence that Greenwald and other fundamentalists offer is
first an equation of backward messages with studies of subliminal advertising such as
Key’s that, in their view, have demonstrated powerful effects. Second, they assert that
it is the young people who preferentially listen to rock music who have the greater
incidence of sexual promiscuity, drug abuse, and other criminal behaviour. Aside from
the fact that both sets of behaviours are a function of youth, citing them as evidence
of the effectiveness of backward messages in rock music is circular reasoning, because
backward masking was advanced as the explanation for these behaviours in the first
place. If that isn’t clear, consider the following: “A and B are found together because A
causes B.” How do you know A causes B? “Easy, because A and B are found together.”
In fact, there is no evidence that the meaning of messages heard backward has any affect
on people. In the only published research on this question, in a series of experiments,
we could find no effect of the meaning of engineered, backward messages on listeners’
behaviour, either consciously or unconsciously (Vokey & Read, 1985).
The seriousness with which people take these claims is apparent by the fact that
they have been the basis of at least two wrongful death lawsuits filed against recording
companies and artists by the parents of teens who committed suicide, allegedly as a
consequence of listening to the rock music recordings.13 In the first of these, a father
filed suit against heavy-metal rocker Ozzy Osbourne and his record company after the
man’s 19-year-old son committed suicide in 1984 after a night of heavy drinking and
listening to Osbourne’s Blizzard of Ozz album. The father contended that the content
of the album song “Suicide Solution”, particularly a 27-second, forward subliminal
message, had driven his son to suicide. However, as the subsequent legal proceedings
made clear, the song is actually intended to be anti-suicide. Furthermore, the alleged
subliminal message is in fact quite perceptible (or at least as perceptible as any of
the lyrics are in heavy metal music), not subliminal at all (Poundstone, 1993). The
California District Court of Appeals dismissed the suit in 1988, citing the “free speech”
amendment of the American constitution.
The second case involved two teenage boys who, two days before Christmas in
1985, spent the afternoon drinking beer, smoking marijuana and listening to Judas
Priest’s Stained Class album. They then took a shotgun into a playground of a nearby
church and shot themselves, one of them dying instantly, and the other surviving with
half his face blown off. The boys’ families filed a multi-million dollar lawsuit not, as
Poundstone (1993) notes, against the beer company, drug dealers, or the gun shop from
which the weapon had come, but against Judas Priest and CBS records. The survivor
13In addition to the two cases discussed here, similar suits have been filed in at least five other states in the
U. S. (Poundstone, 1993).
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initially offered to the police the explanation for the suicide attempt that “life sucks”.
Later, he cited the Judas Priest song “Beyond the Realms of Death”, claiming to have
been “mesmerized” by the suicidal themes of the lyrics. Possibly because of the earlier
court ruling in the Osbourne case, by the time the suit came to trial in Reno, Nevada in
1990, the plaintiffs argued instead that the cause of the boys’ behaviour was a series of
backward subliminal messages on the album, and a forward subliminal “Do it” in the
cut “Better by You, Better than Me”.
It was because of the alleged backward messages that Don Read and I were asked
to serve as expert witnesses and to assist the defence in this case. Our evidence was
presented to the court much as outlined here. However, it soon became clear that in the
opinion of the plaintiffs and the judge, the crux of the case concerned the existence and
likelihood of effect of the forward subliminal, “Do It”. Unlike the earlier Osbourne rul-
ing (which concerned consciously perceptible messages), the judge in this case ruled
that subliminal messages are not protected by the First Amendment of the U. S. consti-
tution, principally because, being subliminal, it is not possible for persons to be aware
and therefore prevent themselves from unconsciously “hearing” and thereby rejecting
them, as they can with aware speech. Despite that, however, the judge found in favour
of the defendants—not because in his view the whole idea of subliminal messages in-
ducing people to suicide is nonsense, but because there was not sufficient evidence to
prove that the subliminal message “Do It” had been intentionally placed there by Judas
Priest (Vance and Belknap v. Judas Priest and CBS Records, 1990).
29.7 Conclusion
Despite apparent use of subliminal techniques in different media, there is as we have
seen simply no evidence for effective subliminal persuasion in film or video, advertis-
ing, self-help audiotapes, or rock music, and there is certainly no theoretical basis to
expect it. Perhaps the next time somebody tells you in whispered tones about the infa-
mous “Popcorn and Coke” study as support for how some subliminal audiotape taught
“this man” calculus while he was sleeping, you can set them straight.
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Chapter 30
Implicit Learning
John R. Vokey
Is it possible to learn something without being aware that you’ve learnedit? Can you gain knowledge about structural relationships, concepts, cat-egories, and contingencies without knowing you’ve learned it, even whenyou are able to use it successfully in some task? Some scientists have
suggested not only that it is possible, but that such “learning without awareness” or
“implicit learning” is the usual way we acquire, retain, and use much of our knowledge
about the world around us. They argue that it is the system of learning that underlies
“intuition”, and that it functions independently of the conscious or explicit learning
system.
30.1 A Demonstration
Try the following simple demonstration on one of your friends. While your friend
is telling you a long story, respond as you usually do in such social situations, for
example, nodding your head and saying “uh-huh” or “umhmm” to express interest,
except do so for all and only the plural nouns in your friend’s story. If you keep track
of the number of plural nouns your friend uses, you should find that the rate with
which your friend uses them increases, sometimes quite substantially. It can be even
more effective if a group of people, such as students in a classroom, reinforce some
behaviour of the story-teller, say, an instructor.1 Yet, if you then ask your friend (or
instructor) why he or she was using so many plural nouns, he or she will often have no
idea, dismissing your claim with such perfunctory statements as “That’s just the way I
talk” or “The story (or lecture) just required that many of them”.
1Don’t try this demonstration on psychology professors; they are a dour, humourless bunch, who, being
omniscient, will go out of their way to thwart you. Do feel free, however, to try it on professors in your other
courses.
263
264 Implicit Learning – Vokey
30.2 Implicit Operant Conditioning
This simple demonstration was the core of a series of experiments in the 1950s on
learning without awareness (e.g., Adams, 1957; Eriksen, 1960), although research on
the issue began much earlier (e.g., Thorndike & Rock, 1934). The intuition informing
much of this work is the simple observation that non-human animals are capable of the
same form of what is called “instrumental learning” or “operant conditioning”. Oper-
ant conditioning is what you use to train your dog, for example. It refers to the fact that
behaviours (such as the production of plural nouns) followed by rewards or reinforcers
(your “uh-huhs” in the demonstration) increase in frequency, while unreinforced be-
haviours drop off. Although capable of instrumental learning, the belief is that animals
obviously aren’t doing it consciously; thus, it is not implausible that humans could also
evince similar learning without awareness. If you have trouble buying the argument,
you are probably thinking of some anthropomorphic, high-level mammal such as dog,
cat, or dolphin. Adjust the level of animal downward until you reach one that you are
sure is not capable of consciousness. For me, worms and insects do the trick. Rest
assured that these animals are also capable of learning.
30.2.1 Two problems
Despite its plausibility and apparent empirical support, the idea has always had its crit-
ics. They point to two major problems: (1) the sensitivity of the measure of awareness,
and (2) the difficulty of establishing just what has been learned. For example, in the
demonstration case the conclusion is that the person has learned a specific contingency
(that plural nouns lead to reward), and that he or she has done so without awareness
of that contingency. But most studies of this type assess awareness only well after
the learning has been established. What if the person had been aware of the contin-
gency while learning, but has simply forgotten it by the time he or she is asked about
it? Think of the myriad skills you have learned, such as driving a car, operating your
computer, etc., all involving many specific contingencies. Many or all of these con-
tingencies were learned explicitly (and sometimes painfully), but have since become
quite automatic, often to the point that we are no longer able to describe explicitly
what we have learned. But, although they are now good examples of implicit memory
or implicit retrieval, they aren’t examples of learning without awareness because we
were aware of them as we learned them. Along the same line, perhaps more probing
or more precisely focused questions would reveal that the person was still aware of the
contingency in some form or another.
Even more troublesome is the possibility that the person was explicitly learning
about some contingency, just not the one nominally being taught.2 If this contingency
were correlated with the “correct” one, then it would appear that the person had learned
the “correct” contingency without awareness when in fact what he or she had learned
was something else of which they were fully aware. In an elegant experiment, Dulaney
2There is also the possibility that the person was not learning any contingency at all, at least not in
the usual sense of some strengthening of an abstract association, but rather some other form of knowledge
that produces similar behavioural effects. This possibility is considered in the subsequent discussion on the
implicit learning of complex structure.
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(1961) demonstrated that this was precisely what was going on in the instrumental
learning studies of implicit learning. He showed that his subjects were consciously
learning such heuristics or rules as “produce an item from the same semantic category
as the item just reinforced”. Although this rule is incorrect, it is correlated with the
correct one of producing plural nouns.
For example, if the person had just been rewarded for saying “diamonds” then stay-
ing with the same semantic category would make it likely that he or she would produce
another plural noun (“rubies”), which would be rewarded, than if the person changed
categories, even though the rule is not correct (Shanks & St. John, 1994). Imagine the
person’s surprise when he or she is then informed about the correct contingency. From
the learner’s perspective, it would appear that he or she talked about jewels for a while,
then jewellery, then fashion accessories, then clothes, etc., but nothing that would ap-
pear to require the use of plural nouns. And at any rate, the person certainly was not
thinking about plural nouns while doing it. As the rule the person was using appears
on the surface to bear no relationship to the correct one, the only conclusion the person
can come to in order to account for the apparent learning of the correct rule is that it
must have occurred unconsciously. Numerous studies of this type have been done since
and none has shown unequivocal evidence for implicit learning, leading Brewer (1974)
in a review of the literature to conclude that operant learning in adult humans does not
occur without awareness.
30.3 Implicit Classical Conditioning
To circumvent the problem of correlated rules, the experimenter has to gain complete
control of the contingency relationship so that none other but the “correct” contin-
gency exists, something that is not possible with instrumental learning tasks. One way
to achieve this goal is to use a form of training known as classical or Pavlovian con-
ditioning (after Ivan Pavlov, who identified it). This form of training has the further
advantage that it is considered by some to be even more primitive than instrumental
learning, so it is clear that it doesn’t require awareness to be learned, in that even the
most primitive of animals seem capable of it. The question, then, is can it occur with-
out awareness in adult humans. In such implicit classical conditioning experiments,
one stimulus, say a red light, is paired with electric shock, and another stimulus, say
a blue light, is paired with no shock, and the experimenter records the galvanic skin
response (GSR), a measurable change in the electrical potential of the skin that occurs
in anticipation of pain or other noxious events.3 Initially, of course, both lights produce
exactly the same GSR, but after a few pairings, the GSR to the red light is markedly
different from that to the blue, which remains essentially unchanged, indicating that
the subject has learned the association of the red light with shock.
One obvious problem is that very few people would fail immediately to pick up
explicitly on the contingency, even if their being aware of it wasn’t the source of the
conditioned GSR. Consequently, experimenters have come up with all sorts of creative
ways of hiding the correct contingency in a flurry of other events that ultimately are
3Other unconditioned stimuli and responses have been used, but shock and the GSR have been the most
common; the pattern of results is the same, regardless.
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not correlated with the correct contingency. However, as long as the experimenters
are careful to use appropriately sensitive measures of awareness, then no matter how
creative the experimenter has been, the results are always the same: if subjects show
conditioning of the GSR, then they also show awareness of the correct contingency; and
subjects who show no awareness of the contingency, also fail to show conditioning of
the GSR. Hence, as with instrumental learning, Brewer (1974) concluded that classical
conditioning in adult humans also does not occur without awareness. No experiment
has occurred since to change this conclusion (Shanks & St. John, 1994).
30.4 Implicit Learning of Complex Structure
It’s possible that these simple learning tasks are just that: too simple; possibly basing
our intuitions for what should be a likely place to find implicit learning in humans on
what non-human animals can do unconsciously is misleading. Perhaps a more complex
learning problem, something uniquely human, would be a more promising candidate
situation. Arthur Reber has been a major proponent of this view; in fact, he is credited
with naming it “implicit learning” in an article in 1967. He describes implicit learning
as a process by which knowledge of the structure of a complex stimulus environment
is acquired largely independently of conscious awareness of specific components of
that environment (Reber, 1989). He argues that the implicit learning system is used
not for tasks and situations that are easy to handle explicitly, such as the learning of
simple contingencies, but for those highly complex structures that are difficult or im-
possible to learn explicitly in a reasonable amount of time, particularly given the often
impoverished and ambiguous contexts in which we encounter them.
The quintessential human trait is language, by which is meant (by linguists, any-
way) a formal, syntactical structure, or generative grammar. We don’t encounter the
grammar of our language in a simple form, such as a list of rules or explicit diagrams
(“grammar school” training, notwithstanding) that would facilitate the explicit learning
of it.4 Rather, we encounter the grammar of our language only by way of exemplars of
its use in the speech around us. These are hardly optimum or even adequate conditions
for the explicit learning of the rules; imagine attempting to learn the far simpler rules of
baseball or even cribbage from simply watching them being played: I doubt you’d ever
pick up on the “infield-fly rule” or the point gain for “his nobs”, for example, or be able
to discriminate the formal rules of the game from the heuristics and strategies used by
the players. In fact, even professional linguists have elucidated probably only a small
part of the broader structure underlying, say, spoken English from studying examples
of its use—and that’s taken many lifetimes of some of our most brilliant intellectuals to
do. Yet, most children master this incredibly complex structure in just a few short years
with little or no explicit training, and most of us can speak grammatically and correctly
recognize grammatical speech, effortlessly and with little or no explicit thought. Here
then would appear to be a clear example of implicit learning: not only are most of us
currently unaware of the grammatical rules we use to communicate, we also apparently
weren’t aware as we learned them as young children.
4Furthermore, if you recall your grammar school days or have ever taken a course in linguistics, you will
remember how difficult it was to learn and use the few rules you were taught explicitly.
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Figure 30.1: An example of an artificial grammar (from Vokey & Brooks, 1992).
Using the example of language learning as a guide, Reber constructed much sim-
pler artificial grammars to study implicit learning. An example of one is shown in
Figure 30.1. Grammatical items are formed by following the arrows between the num-
bered nodes, picking up the letters in passing. For example, the item “MVRXM” is
grammatical according to this grammar, whereas the item “MVXRT” is not because it
cannot be formed in this way. A sample of grammatical items from this grammar is
shown in Table 30.1.
These artificial grammars are inordinately many times simpler than the grammars
of natural languages, or even that of the orthography or “spelling rules” of English,
which they superficially resemble. These “finite state grammars”, as they are known,
are not just simpler than natural language grammars, they are fundamentally different;
no linguist currently seriously considers them to be even representative of the grammars
underlying natural language, although they were considered promising candidates for
study in the early 1950s. Despite their simplicity, these grammars retain many of the
learning characteristics of their natural analogues. For example, even a grammar as
simple as the one in Figure 30.1 requires at least an afternoon of study to learn when
studied in its formal, diagrammatic form (Reber, 1989), and asking subjects to attempt
explicitly to deduce the rules from a sample of exemplars (which is all one ever gets
with natural grammars), such as the eight items shown in Table 30.1, is virtually im-
possible (Brooks, 1978; Reber & Allen, 1978).
However, we aren’t able to say much explicitly about our natural grammar, either;
but we are able to use our implicit knowledge of it to guide our behaviour. One gram-
mar task that most adults and linguistically-competent children find simple to do is to
discriminate grammatical productions from ungrammatical ones, even when the exam-
ples make no sense. In fact, making sense appears to be completely irrelevant in making
these judgments, exactly as a linguist would predict from an independent knowledge-
base of pure syntax. For example, Noam Chomsky’s famous phrase “Colourless green
ideas sleep furiously” clearly makes no sense, but is just as clearly grammatically cor-
rect, whereas the phrase, “I have a jacket with green two sleeves”, is understandable,
despite being ungrammatical. Yet, if you ask people how they know that the first phrase
is grammatical and the second not, they have extreme difficulty explicitly citing the ap-
propriate rules, despite having little difficulty apparently in using them. In fact, what
268 Implicit Learning – Vokey
VXM MVRXR
VXTVX MTTTTVT
MTTVRXM VXRRRRR
VXTTTVT MVRXTVX
Table 30.1: Items generated from the artificial grammar shown in Figure 30.1.
most people say is that the judgment is intuitive, the grammatical items just look or
“feel” right.
Can we get a similar dissociation between performance and explicit knowledge of
the rules with artificial grammars? Remarkably, the answer is “yes”, and with surpris-
ingly little training. As a simple demonstration, ignore the diagram of the grammar,
and study the items in Table 30.1 for a short while until you are satisfied that you could
remember them if you were to be given a later memory test.
Study Them Now!
Now, look at the list of items shown in Table 30.2. Some of these items, as with
the eight study items, were generated by the grammar; the remainder were constructed
to violate the grammar in one way or another. Without looking at the study items or
the grammar, go through the list, placing a check-mark next to the items you “feel”
are probably grammatical—that is, probably follow the rules of the grammar in Figure
30.1, leaving the other, ungrammatical items blank.
Try it now!
In formal experiments similar to what you’ve been asked to do, participants are first
asked to study in some fashion or another a sample of grammatical items, and then are
told for the first time about the existence of the grammar, but not the rules themselves,
and then are asked to sort a list of new items for grammaticality. If you are like the
many subjects who have been given this task in numerous experiments by Reber and
others, you should have found it relatively effortless, even if you weren’t completely
sure, as they often are not, about any of your choices.
Don’t Read Any Further until You’ve Tried the Grammar Task!
Subjects given this task, although usually with many more test items, typically
have accuracy scores anywhere between 60 and 80 percent correct, depending on the
MVRXTVT VXVRXRX VXTTTVX VXTVRXT
VXRRRRM MTVRXVR MTTVRXR MTVRXRX
MTTTTVX MVRXRRT VXTVT VXRRT
MVRXM MTTVM MVR MVRXTVR
Table 30.2: Some of the sample items shown here were generated by the grammar
shown in Figure 30.1; the remainder were constructed to violate the grammar.
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precise instructions and training tasks given them. To determine your percent accuracy
score in discriminating grammatical from ungrammatical items, add the number of
odd-numbered items (i.e., items in columns 1 and 3 of Table 30.2) that you checked to
the number of even-numbered items (i.e., items in columns 2 and 4 of Table 30.2) you
left blank, divide by 16, and multiply by 100. How did you do?5 If you are like most
subjects, you will have no idea how you did as well as you did; that is, your explicit
knowledge of the artificial grammar will lag well-behind your ability to sort the items
with respect to grammaticality, just as it does for the natural grammar of your native
language. Yet, unlike your many years of experience with your native grammar, you
probably spent no more than a few minutes learning this artificial one.
Reber (1989) has taken evidence such as this as strong support for his contention
that not only do people learn (at least some of) the rules of the artificial grammar, but
that they learn it implicitly, by engaging a learning system separate from the explicit
learning system. Reinforcing this conclusion is the finding that asking the subjects to
search explicitly for the rules rather than simply study the initial list of items results in
few if any useful, explicit rules and performance little better than chance when they are
asked to sort the items for grammaticality (Brooks, 1978; Reber & Allen, 1978).
As with the claims for the implicit learning of simple associations discussed earlier,
Reber’s claims have not been without their critics; in fact, the last few years has seen
a plethora of such challenges, although there have been criticisms of his conclusions
all along (e.g., Brooks, 1978). These criticisms are similar to those levelled at the
other work discussed previously, particularly the possibility that what the subjects are
actually learning in the grammar tasks is correlated with but otherwise not the same as
the abstract rules of the artificial grammar.
Brooks (1978), for example, argued that what subjects are using in the learning of
artificial grammars is the similarity between test items and specific, remembered study
items. Because items that obey the rules will tend to look more alike one another than
will ungrammatical items, this simple strategy will tend to sort the items correctly. If
you compare each of the items you selected in Table 30.2 to the study items in Table
30.1, you will probably find that you preferred those items that were highly similar to
one or more of the study items, and rejected those items that had no close matches. My
own work on these tasks has served to extend and refine this simple idea (Brooks &
Vokey, 1991; Vokey & Brooks, 1992; Vokey & Brooks, 1994).
A related idea is that what the subjects are doing is accumulating not whole in-
stances as in Brooks’ and my theorizing, but simply small parts of the items, such as
bigrams and trigrams. Test items containing recognizable parts of the study items are
then judged to be grammatical by subjects, whereas items containing unfamiliar parts
are rejected. Again, this strategy will tend to sort the items correctly even though the
subjects have learned nothing directly about the underlying grammar (e.g., Dulaney,
Carlson, & Dewey, 1984).
5Don’t be concerned if your score was at or even below chance (50%). With so few test items, it would
be easy to get most or all of them wrong simply by chance alone.
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30.5 Conclusion
The possibility that subjects in implicit learning experiments are learning and respond-
ing to something other than the nominal basis of the task as set by the experimenter has
plagued the interpretation of the results of these experiments. There is no question that
our performance in many tasks is influenced by knowledge of which we are unaware
(Higham & Vokey, 2000; Higham, Vokey, & Pritchard, 2000; Vokey & Higham, 1999).
In a recent review of the literature on implicit learning, however, Shanks and St. John
(1994) concluded that despite 60 years of attempted demonstrations, there is still no
unequivocal evidence that the acquisition of such knowledge occurs implicitly.
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